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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. THE PUZZLE 
In January 2011, severe protests shook the Arab world. Protesters on the streets of Cairo 
shouted: “Illegitimate, illegitimate”1 and called for the downfall of the Egyptian regime. 
Similar scenes could be witnessed in many other countries. In stark contrast, in 2009 a 
pioneer study ranking 72 states across the world according to their level of legitimacy 
stated that “claims about legitimacy crisis or even failure in countries like Egypt and 
Algeria – to take two widely cited examples – turn out to be exaggerations” (Gilley 
2009: 26). Despite this scholarly assessment, many Arab citizens obviously did not per-
ceive of their ruling regimes as legitimate. In the course of 2011 the rulers of Tunisia, 
Egypt, Libya, and Yemen were ousted, protests occurred in almost all Arab countries, 
and in many countries struggles for power are still ongoing. Michael Hudson even states 
that “[a] reading of the first year of the Arab uprisings suggests that they are all about 
the perceived illegitimacy of rulers and regimes. So, perhaps it should be back to the 
drawing board for students of legitimacy in the Arab world” (Hudson 2014: 253).  
In those cases where rulers were toppled it can be assumed that their legitimacy was not 
sufficient to stay in power. But this leads to a host of other questions. If protests are an 
indicator for a lack of legitimacy, what does it mean when demonstrations do not lead to 
a regime breakdown? Why have the uprisings in Algeria and elsewhere not led to major 
changes, but were contained instead? Is the reason a more legitimate government or 
something else? In order to shed light on such questions, it is helpful to take a closer 
look at the concept of legitimacy and relate it to the question of regime stability, for 
which it is an essential factor. 
Legitimacy is a central category in political science as it describes the acceptance of 
political rule on the part of the citizens. From the incumbents’ point of view, it entails 
the “right to rule” (cf. the title of Gilley 2009). Legitimacy constitutes a crucial element 
of political stability in any setting. It is a reciprocal category that refers to the relation-
ship between the ruler and the ruled. From an empirical-analytical perspective, democ-
racy is not a prerequisite of legitimacy. A lack of legitimacy anywhere may lead to se-
vere political crises, the downfall of rulers, and even the collapse of regimes, as mani-
                                                 
1
 Al-Jazeera English, 29 January 2011, online: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/201112974149942894.html rev. 22.03.13. 
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fold examples through history until the recent popular uprisings in the Arab world 
demonstrate. So while legitimacy is an important object of study in its own right, the 
consequences of its presence or absence have decisive implications for stability and thus 
the maintenance of political rule in the first place. In this sense, the issue of legitimacy 
touches upon the grand questions and core of political science: why regimes persist, 
transform or collapse.  
Given the multitude of challenges that the Arab countries faced in recent decades, polit-
ical regimes in this world region used to display a surprising level of stability: no self-
induced collapse occurred between 1970 and 2011. This durability over a considerable 
time span is remarkable. Instead of assuming legitimacy as the reason for stability, some 
scholars accounted for the longevity through referring to the use of repression (see i.a. 
Brownlee 2005; Bellin 2004). However, the literature widely acknowledges that even 
authoritarian rule that rests on force alone cannot last long (cf. e.g. Alagappa 1995a: 42; 
Geddes 1999: 125; Gandhi 2008: 76; Linz 2003: LXIV; Heins 1988: 21; and many 
more). This reasoning implies that at least a certain degree of legitimacy must have been 
present in the respective regimes. Also more recently in the Arab uprisings, only some 
of the regimes that witnessed large-scale protests have broken down, while others have 
remained in place. The uprisings certainly demonstrated a crisis of legitimacy in all cas-
es, but have not led to a regime breakdown everywhere. It can therefore be assumed that 
strategies have been set in place to regain legitimacy or at least to prevent an escalation 
of protests. Beyond short-term crisis management, it has been proposed that in the long 
run “the search for some form of legitimacy must be at the core of every regime-
survival strategy in nondemocratic polities” (Albrecht & Schlumberger 2004: 373). 
The point of departure of this thesis for assessing legitimacy is therefore a crisis of legit-
imacy. The analysis focuses on the strategies of political rule geared towards solving 
this crisis. If the strategies of legitimation are observed to be successful, the conclusion 
is that legitimacy has been restored. Nevertheless, these strategies might also fail. But 
although a crisis of legitimacy is the point of departure of analysis, not all strategies of 
political rule that are used during a crisis are necessarily strategies of legitimation. As 
stability can be attained in different ways, it is vital to look at the whole repertoire of 
strategies that aim at maintaining political rule. Besides legitimation, repression is also 
used to stabilize a regime in crisis. It is understood as containing challenges to political 
rule through constraining or incapacitating potential contenders. The variance of repres-
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sive measures as regards forms, targets and degrees leads to different effects. This may 
have important consequences for the outcome of other strategies that are simultaneously 
used. Therefore, repression strategies have to be included in any account of regime sur-
vival in a challenging situation.  
A crisis of legitimacy offers the chance for recalibrating the relation between the state 
and society through setting new rules of the game. Therefore, cases of interest are those 
instances where protests did not lead to a change of the regime, which is understood 
according to Fishman’s definition (1990: 428), i.e. referring to the structure of rule, ac-
cess to power, and the relation between the elites. It makes a large difference which 
strategies were used and whether they were successful in order to secure stability for the 
longer term. While in a breakdown situation it is obvious that legitimacy did not exist to 
a sufficient extent, the reverse is not true. Merely having survived a crisis does not mean 
that legitimacy was restored. A closer look at the society is necessary to find out about 
possible responses to strategies of political rule, as most of these strategies are ad-
dressed towards a specific subset of the population. Only on the level of the individual 
measures is it possible to assess their success or failure from the addressees’ perspec-
tive. Process tracing serves to establish which strategies were successful and which 
failed. Then, these findings can be re-aggregated in order to make more general state-
ments. This makes it possible to interpret whether successful legitimation or other fac-
tors account for regime survival.  
This thesis studies how regimes that survived the Arab uprisings dealt with the crisis of 
legitimacy. In a nutshell, the central research question is: Which strategies of political 
rule that were used in the regimes surviving the Arab uprisings were successful? For 
answering this complex question, various steps are necessary. The assumption that 
serves as the starting point of the analysis is that the more citizens regard their incum-
bent elites as legitimately holding power, the less likely they are to protest on a large 
scale. The intensity of a crisis is a function of the scope of demands and the size of pro-
tests. Another important factor is not only how many people, but which groups protests.  
The first task is to find out how severe the crisis of legitimacy was that the Arab upris-
ings constituted to the respective regime. This requires a look at the protest movements 
and course of events especially in early 2011 in regimes that have survived the Arab 
uprisings. Which strategies of legitimation were used? Why could elites use these strat-
egies, and under what structural circumstances (social, religious, ethnic conditions, etc.) 
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did they use which measures? To examine the success or failure of strategies of political 
rule, it is vital to go beyond the regime perspective “from above”. We therefore turn to 
the societal side in order to find out about the addressees’ responses to the different 
strategies of legitimation. In a further step, what strategies of repression were used, and 
against whom? Were other strategies more or less successful than strategies of legitima-
tion? Finally, how did all of these strategies impact on the crisis of legitimacy? Did they 
aggravate it, does it continue to exist in a different form, or could they solve it?  
This thesis takes its point of departure in pre-Arab spring research on authoritarian sur-
vival that is still considered to be highly relevant despite recent developments (see e.g. 
Schlumberger 2007; Heydemann 2007; Bellin 2004; Gandhi 2008). The persistence of 
authoritarian politics in countries that experience uprisings and the dominance of such 
structures across different regime types demonstrate that the so-called post-
democratization literature still serves best to explain political processes in the non-
transitory Arab states. Previous literature has already described different strategies of 
legitimation and attempted to categorize them (see i.a. Heydemann 2007; Albrecht and 
Schlumberger 2004; Bank 2004). This thesis puts forward a typology that grasps the 
current strategies of legitimation in categories that are partially established, partially 
new, but bringing together and combining more analytical dimensions than previous 
research. Moreover, the study of these measures will be complemented by the often-
neglected strategy of repression. This comes almost necessarily with the focus on ad-
dressees. On the one hand, some strategies of political rule serve as legitimation in rela-
tion to a certain group, but have a “dark side” of excluding or repressing others. On the 
other hand, legitimation is not sufficient for capturing the whole range of strategies for 
stability. This study neither claims to offer an in-depth regime analysis focusing on de-
cision-making processes during the Arab uprisings nor does it only consider the societal 
perspective. Rather, it seeks to investigate the links between regime strategies and their 
effects on the respective target groups. In this sense, the thesis is situated between re-
gime analysis and state-society relations.  
The approach is strictly qualitative and does not seek to quantify the concept of legiti-
macy, as real life has failed the only truly comparative attempt at offering a numeric 
scale of legitimacy, as the introductory section on Gilley’s assessment of Arab states 
showed. Moreover, as legitimacy is shaped by political culture and recent political his-
tory, it is highly context-sensitive. Therefore, an integrated analysis of strategies 
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through process tracing offers the possibility for discovering causal mechanisms. The 
following subsection explains the research design in more detail.  
 
1.2. RESEARCH DESIGN 
During the Arab uprisings, it was obvious from the beginning that the protests implied a 
crisis of legitimacy and a threat to ruling elites. However, despite the regional contagion 
effect that the protests had, they were not a uniform phenomenon triggering the same 
effects in every state. The scope and intensity of the protesters’ demands varied in dif-
ferent settings, as did the rulers’ reactions.  
From a perspective of regime legitimacy, the events since 2011 are a unique opportunity 
to study in detail the mechanisms of how a crisis of legitimacy is tackled by incumbent 
elites. As the diverse trajectories of Arab states offer a wide variety of explanatory fac-
tors that accounted for different outcomes, this thesis seeks to concentrate on the strate-
gies proper. Notwithstanding the qualitative approach, it is desirable to make generaliz-
ing statements about strategies of political rule. Therefore, this study compares two em-
pirical cases of survivors of the Arab uprisings under very different structural condi-
tions. In the causal model which this thesis puts forward, crises of legitimacy emerge in 
states with dissimilar underlying sources of legitimacy, but the outcome, regime surviv-
al, is the same. The analysis of this study mainly focuses on the intervening variables: 
the strategies of political rule that are employed to tackle the crisis of legitimacy and 
their respective success or failure. The research design that will be used is a comparison 
following the logic of Przeworski and Teune’s most dissimilar systems design (1970), 
although not in a strict sense. The dissimilar structures allow for shedding light on the 
working mechanisms of strategies of political rule in different Arab contexts and for 
drawing more general conclusions. Moreover, the comparative analysis requires a rather 
rigid application of the conceptual framework, which enables a broader look at the two 
cases instead of focusing on one or two obvious aspects. Conceptually, a comparative 
approach helps to assess the framework’s advantages and setbacks.  
As a consequence of different structural preconditions, the intensity of the crisis varied. 
One reason is the different base of legitimacy that was used to justify political rule in 
these countries. The conceptual chapter will elaborate in more detail in how far these 
sources of legitimacy are prone to crisis. For now it suffices to state that poor republics 
were hit hardest, while the crises in rich monarchies were less intense. However, this is 
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not a clear-cut criterion, and the paths of individual countries vary greatly. As regards 
the more concrete selection of cases, it makes sense to compare cases that share each 
one stabilizing factor (monarchy or resource endowment) in combination with one risk 
factor (republic or resource poverty) in order to introduce the largest possible variance. 
The analysis will show whether these converse combinations of factors can offer addi-
tional insights into the working mechanisms and effects of similar strategies when em-
ployed under different structural conditions. 
 
1.3. OUTLINE OF THIS STUDY 
Before setting up a framework for the analysis of regime strategies during crises of le-
gitimation, in the conceptual chapter (2.) the state of research on legitimacy will be de-
scribed, beginning with the “search for legitimacy” in political science in general and 
literature on the Arab world in particular. Special attention will be given to the applica-
bility of these concepts to autocratic regimes. Focusing on crises of legitimacy, the typi-
cal sources of legitimacy in the Arab world as derived from the literature are described 
and their possible crises sketched out. Then, a conceptual framework will be presented 
that allows for the study of legitimation under authoritarian conditions. This general 
framework analyzes legitimation strategies within different types of legitimacy and can 
even serve to assess legitimacy in other world regions beyond Arab states. The method-
ological chapter (3.) discusses the challenges that empirical research in this area faces 
and presents the methods used, which are process tracing and thick description. After 
the selection of cases and comments on available sources, the framework will be applied 
to two case studies, Jordan (chapter 4) and Algeria (chapter 5) during the Arab upris-
ings. The comparison (chapter 6) of these most dissimilar cases serves to trace the caus-
al mechanisms that are responsible for the similar outcomes. Later on, more general 
conclusions will be drawn as regards the success of the different strategies, their se-
quencing, and the prospects for the near future. The uniqueness of the employed strate-
gies and the Arab uprisings in the first place will be discussed through recourse to the 
previous crises of legitimacy Jordan and Algeria underwent. Finally, the usefulness of 
the analytical framework will be critically assessed and desiderates for future research 
formulated (chapter 7).  
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2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The following chapter lays the theoretical foundation for analyzing strategies of politi-
cal rule. As the point of departure is a crisis of legitimacy, the first part of this section 
will extensively discuss the question whether legitimacy can be attained under condi-
tions of authoritarianism in the first place. From the literature follows a working defini-
tion for the purpose of this thesis, before the concept of legitimation is located and inte-
grated in the spectrum of other strategies of political rule. Especially repression is then 
introduced as an alternative strategy. The subsequent part sketches out the previously 
prevailing sources of legitimacy in the Arab world and portrays their corresponding 
crises, including the manifestation and likeliness of these crises. Afterwards, the Arab 
uprisings as a region-wide crisis of legitimacy and the ensuing implications for research 
on the durability of authoritarianism are discussed. The framework that serves as the 
basis for the empirical analysis in chapters 4 and 5 is then presented. It consists of a 
typology of legitimation strategies and a disaggregation of repression strategies, com-
plemented by other dimensions of analysis, most importantly the addressees of these 
measures and the modes through which the strategies are implemented. The analytical 
framework serves to provide a holistic and detailed overview of strategies of political 
rule in authoritarian regimes and is so general that it can be applied to cases beyond the 
Arab region all over the world. This chapter concludes with a range of working hypoth-
eses and an operationalization of the presented concepts.  
 
2.1. STRATEGIES OF POLITICAL RULE IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 
In the almost complete absence of totalitarian rule today, authoritarianism has become a 
residual category for non-democracies. The classic definition of this regime type was 
offered by Juan J. Linz in 1964 and is in the following used interchangeably with auto-
cratic.2 Despite its many shortcomings, no other definition has been able to create 
scholarly consensus. After the “demo-crazy” trend during the 1990s (Valbjørn & Bank 
2012: 26 for the Arab world), many scholars have more recently studied authoritarian 
                                                 
2
 Linz’s somewhat blurry wording is well-known, specifying that “[a]uthoritarian regimes are political 
systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism: without elaborate and guiding ideology (but 
with distinctive mentalities); without intensive nor extensive political mobilization (except some points in 
their development); and in which a leader (or occasionally a small group) exercises power within formally 
ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones” (Linz 1964: 297). 
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regimes especially through the lens of a “new institutionalism”, as Schedler (2009) calls 
it. While this subchapter refrains from digging deeper in this literature, one of the cen-
tral questions of current research is what strategies rulers pursue to stay in power 
(Schedler 2009: 324).  
 
2.1.1. Concepts of Legitimacy – Including a Twist towards Autocracies 
In the study of authoritarian regimes, many scholars have focused on legitimacy. In re-
cent years, both conceptual as well as empirical work has been done by researchers fa-
miliar with non-democratic regions. The relevant literature on the Arab world will be 
discussed in more detail in section 2.2, but important contributions deal with other 
world regions as well. Recent works include i.a. many studies of China, but also other 
cases (on East and Southeast Asia in general: Alagappa 1995c; White 2005; Gilley 
2005, 2006, 2009; Holbig 2006, 2010; Heberer & Schubert 2008; on Africa: Schatzberg 
2001; Englebert 2000; on Latin America: Booth & Seligson 2009; Hoffmann 2011). 
Instead of giving a comprehensive overview over the vast amount of different concep-
tions of legitimacy in all their shades, this section contents itself with shedding light on 
a few landmark works that influenced research on the topic. In the history of political 
philosophy, legitimacy has most often been considered from a normative point of view. 
The classical question that already PLATO (428-348 B.C.) [1963] asked is: What consti-
tutes just rule? This question is still present in normative approaches to legitimacy. But 
from an empirical perspective, answers to this question are less satisfying. Plato actually 
regarded all existing constitutions or, in other words, political orders of his time as not 
legitimate. As a contrast, he modeled an ideal state containing utopian elements in 
which kings should be philosophers – or, to put it the other way round, where philoso-
phers rule. The ultimate goal was to realize justice which Plato understood as the propo-
sition that every free member of the polis should be part of the social “class” that ac-
corded to his nature. Plato’s disciple ARISTOTLE (384-322 B.C.) [1988] departed from 
this view. Being the first to adopt an empirical approach, he identified three types of 
legitimate rule based on the number of power-holders: monarchy, aristocracy, and 
polyarchy, as opposed to their illegitimate deviations tyranny, oligarchy, and democra-
cy. However, this distinction between the legitimate and illegitimate types of rule opens 
the door for the return of normative considerations in that the good rulers should strive 
to realize the common good. But even though this intention can be considered a norma-
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tive precondition, the focus might as well be put on the result and acknowledge some 
sort of output legitimacy, which is also possible for authoritarian regimes to attain.  
In modern social science, empirical approaches dominate research on legitimacy, alt-
hough normative understandings that imagine an unattainable ideal state are still pre-
sent. In the following, some of the most prominent approaches will be discussed, espe-
cially with reference to their applicability to authoritarian rule. Max WEBER laid the 
foundation for later empirical-analytical approaches towards legitimacy. His definition 
focuses not on objective and absolute criteria for just rule, but on the citizens’ subjective 
belief in the legitimacy of their regime (Legitimitätsglaube). He thus stripped the term 
off its normative character and transformed it into a reciprocal category (Weber 1947 
[1922]). For Weber, legitimacy is so central to politics that he bases his typology of 
political rule on the corresponding types of legitimacy: rational, traditional and charis-
matic. Rational legitimacy is based on the legal regulations that are implemented by a 
competent bureaucracy. Both the staff in the administration and the citizens in general 
bestow legitimacy upon the ruler. Traditional legitimacy denotes either the patriarchal 
or feudal types of rule where subjects rather than citizens believe in “the sanctity of age-
old rules and powers” (Weber 1968). In patriarchal – patrimonial or sultanistic – re-
gimes, loyalty to the ruler’s person is all-decisive. Charismatic rule is based on the be-
lief in a ruler’s extraordinary qualities. However, this kind of legitimacy is hard to insti-
tutionalize and uphold, especially in the case of succession. In the real world, traditional 
legitimacy occurs more frequently than charismatic legitimacy, and empirical instances 
of rule are mixed forms of these ideal types. 
Weber’s concept has not remained without criticism. E.g., Mattei DOGAN claims that 
Weber’s typology encompasses no more than one quarter of states existing today, i.e. 
democracies based on legal-rational legitimacy. In his opinion, Weber’s other two cate-
gories have become devoid of empirical cases. According to Dogan, the majority of 
non-democratic states falls either into a “quasi-legitimacy” type of authoritarianism or is 
“totally illegitimate” (Dogan 1992: 188). This, however, does not take into account the 
ideal typical nature of Weber’s categories. Moreover, the predominantly charismatic 
and traditional (i.e. feudal or patriarchal) types of rule definitely characterize non-
democratic regimes. As Weber does not assert a hierarchy between the different forms 
of rule, in his typology autocracies have the same chance of appearing legitimate in the 
eyes of the population as democracies. However, he does not elaborate on how the dif-
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ferent bases of legitimacy interplay in their individual mix. To some extent the elements 
of the mix might contradict each other and thus have a mutually weakening effect or at 
least impact negatively on stability.3 This problem is taken up by Juan LINZ, who refers 
to Weber in his classical work on authoritarian Spain and discusses the possible nega-
tive consequences of such competing “legitimating formulae”, which he regards as a 
typical element of authoritarian rule (1964: 322). 
Seymour Martin LIPSET also built upon Weber’s notion of Legitimitätsglaube in a sim-
ple and often used definition: “Legitimacy involves the capacity of a political system to 
engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appro-
priate or proper ones for the society” (Lipset 1959: 86). However, as Lipset’s considera-
tions revolve around the question of democracy and its maintenance, his manifold hy-
potheses concerning legitimacy tend to overestimate the impact of democracy on the 
effectiveness of a political system and thus economic development, which in turn helps 
sustain democracy. If one ignores the bias towards the economy-democracy nexus, ac-
cording to Lipset’s considerations authoritarian regimes at least have a chance for at-
taining output legitimacy,4 even though their stability is lower than that of democracies 
(Lipset 1960: 82).  
Carl FRIEDRICH also claims that “legitimate rule… is more effective rule, other things 
being equal, than nonlegitimate rule” (1963: 239). His definition serves “to denote 
whether a given rulership is believed to be based on a good title by most of those sub-
ject to it” (ibid.: 246), adding a quantitative element and even a measurement by degree 
to the empirical notion. He proposes four subtypes, which are religious, “juristic (philo-
sophical)”, traditional, and performance-based legitimacy (ibid.: 236). For rulers to at-
tain legitimacy, Friedrich claims they can either adapt “to the prevalent belief” or try to 
indoctrinate the population (ibid.: 239f.).  
David EASTON’S structural functionalist approach claims it can be applied to political 
systems all over the world. His systems theory is therefore equally valid for the analysis 
of democracies and autocracies.5 In terms of legitimacy, Easton differentiates between 
two types of support. First, consent to decisions reached by the political system trans-
                                                 
3
 In contrast, if these mixes had an additive effect, authoritarian regimes would even have an advantage 
over democracies as they usually include legal-rational elements. However, the opposite hypothesis bears 
much more plausibility. 
4
 Englebert (2000) uses Lipset’s approach for analyzing legitimacy as “state capacity” in Africa. 
5
 E.g., Westle (1989) draws on Easton’s model for an analysis of legitimacy in West Germany and differ-
entiates further between the diffuse and specific forms of support and various objects of legitimacy.  
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lates into specific support (Easton 1965). This can also be called output legitimacy in 
contrast to input legitimacy, which would be diffuse support in Easton’s language and is 
close to the aspect of “belief”. Easton furthermore distinguishes between two subtypes 
of diffuse support, which are trust6 and legitimacy belief in the Weberian sense (1975: 
447). So actually his work comprises two different understandings of legitimacy, one as 
support and one as a subtype of one type of support, leaving us with incoherent levels of 
analysis. But as the flow model of a political system in systems theory is a continuous 
cycle entailing a feedback loop, it is anyway hard to completely disentangle the differ-
ent kinds of support and completely cut off input from output legitimacy. In his “diffuse 
support”-subtype of legitimacy, Easton distinguishes between ideological, structural, 
and personal types (Easton 1965: 287). This functional typology is more abstract and 
therefore more generally applicable than Weber’s historically informed categorization. 
In each of Easton’s types of legitimacy, the authorities and the political system as a 
whole can be the objects of support. Easton also emphasizes the possibilities of political 
authorities to tailor strategies that fit in the different subtypes (ibid.: 289).7  
After some standstill in the study of legitimacy, in the last two decades it has come back 
to the attention of scholars. One of the more prominent works is David BEETHAM’s 
monograph “The Legitimation of Power” (1991). Beetham criticizes Weber’s definition 
because “it leaves the social scientist with no adequate means of explaining why people 
acknowledge the legitimacy of power at one time or place and not another” (Beetham 
1991: 10). Although he claims that his own concept is applicable to societies in all 
times, his work is frequently marked by a bias towards Western democracies. 
Beetham’s own definition combines three factors “for power to be fully legitimate […]: 
its conformity to established rules; the justifiability of the rules by reference to shared 
beliefs; the express consent of the subordinate, or of the most significant among them, 
to the particular relations of power” (ibid.: 19). He replaces Weber’s aspect of belief, 
which he regards as incommensurable and therefore inadequate, by actions that in his 
opinion are better suited to express legitimacy. However, the underlying motives for 
actions are just as hard to verify as beliefs. Especially under authoritarian rule, citizens’ 
“acts of consent” may be driven by fear, indifference, or anything else besides legitima-
cy. According to Beetham’s logic, however, authoritarian elections with favorable re-
                                                 
6
 A more detailed differentiation between similar concepts follows in part 2.1.4 below. 
7
 This consideration is central to the conceptual framework that will be suggested later. 
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sults for incumbents of around 99% would not prove fraud and intimidation, but the 
population’s consent.  
Corresponding to his three criteria of legitimacy, Beetham proposes the following 
“forms of non-legitimate power”: illegitimacy defined as illegality, a “legitimacy defi-
cit” in terms of shared beliefs, and delegitimation as the withdrawal of consent (ibid.: 
20). While this seems logically consistent, the fact that the absence of only one factor 
already leads to illegitimacy in general heavily restricts the scope of the concept’s em-
pirical applicability. For most authoritarian regimes, legitimacy is out of reach if one 
follows Beetham’s approach. One example is based on the first criterion: the non-
constitutional assumption of power makes a government “illegal” and therefore illegit-
imate for all times, no matter how power is maintained later. So the concept can in the 
first place be applied to established democracies. One empirically quite debatable ex-
ception is Iran, for which Beetham seems to neglect the illegality criterion and states “a 
congruence between the religious purpose and the basic principles of political authority” 
(ibid.: 202). The same applies to a quite different case, Saudi Arabia, which he main-
tains is founded on “purely traditional legitimacy” because of its hereditary rule (ibid.: 
196). Stating legitimacy in these cases seems absurd within his own framework, be-
cause acts of consent such as elections under the given forms of authoritarianism are 
either non-existent (Saudi Arabia) or do not touch upon the political order as such 
(Iran). Rather, the argumentation savors of culturalist notions in an orientalist and es-
sentialist tradition along the lines that Muslims would accept any political justification 
through Islam – in the mentioned cases especially in a strict interpretation that does not 
allow for alternative worldviews. 
Despite these conceptual and empirical shortcomings, Beetham’s concept has often 
been referred to in recent research. The most notable contribution of the last few years is 
Bruce GILLEY’s (2006) attempt at quantitatively measuring legitimacy, comprising a 
comparative ranking of 72 cases from all world regions. His definition of legitimacy 
reads as follows: “a state is more legitimate the more that it is treated by its citizens as 
rightfully holding and exercising political power” (Gilley 2006: 500). The relativity 
implied in this definition allows for degrees and captures the dynamic process of con-
stantly seeking and maybe also receiving legitimacy. But then, Gilley follows Beetham 
in using his three components of legitimacy: “views of legality, views of justification, 
and acts of consent” (2005: 33f.). Gilley treats these components as constitutive sub-
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types of the concept of state legitimacy and then suggests indicators for attitudes and 
actions related to each of the components (2006: 504). He uses existing surveys con-
cerning attitudes towards the political system, human rights, the police and civil service. 
For actions, he draws on data on the incidence of violent political protests, voter turnout 
and the payment of quasi-voluntary taxes (ibid.: 506-509). Heike HOLBIG (2010) builds 
on Gilley’s approach and complements it by introducing an international dimension, the 
recognition of external actors of a regime or its policies as legitimate.  
Christian von HALDENWANG defines the legitimacy of a given political order as “ac-
knowledgment of the societal functionality of its regulatory outputs” (1999: 368, au-
thor’s translation). His point of departure for the generation of legitimacy is thus regula-
tion, and he disentangles the elements during the stages of its formation: 1. the material 
content of a decision directed at a certain addressee, 2. values and order of preferences 
within society, 3. the author of a decision, that is a person or 4. authority, 5. institution-
alized procedures and 6. underlying norms or principles. The legitimacy of each element 
can be questioned. Assessing the importance of those factors leads to a distinct profile 
of a given political order’s characteristics (von Haldenwang 2009). Apart from that, the 
strategies of legitimation are not only directed towards the broader public, but also to-
wards strategic groups such as the administration and thus parts of the elites (von 
Haldenwang 1999: 375f.). His approach to the measurement of legitimacy takes into 
account both sides involved in the cycle of legitimation. The relevant elements to be 
studied are attitudes and behavior of individual citizens as well as of collective actors 
such as different social groups on the side of addressees. On the incumbents’ side, their 
legitimation strategies and legitimating discourses can be analyzed. Von Haldenwang’s 
approach is noteworthy for its processual and cyclical understanding of legitimation and 
for taking addressees seriously. Moreover, its analytical openness offers heuristic poten-
tial and leads to a purely empirical understanding of legitimation. 
 
2.1.2. Definition and Elements of Legitimacy 
From the just discussed approaches towards legitimacy some similarities and differ-
ences can be distilled. As has become clear, the question of who or what the object of 
legitimacy is can be conceptualized in different ways. Legitimacy might be directed 
towards political rule (Weber), the state (Gilley), political power (Beetham), political 
institutions (Lipset), the political order (von Haldenwang), the political system, its au-
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thorities or the regime (Easton).8 In the following the regime will be referred to as the 
object of legitimacy. This choice is taken because regime characteristics are central for 
the elites’ decisions which strategies of political rule to choose. According to one of the 
most commonly used definitions, the concept of a regime comprises “the formal and 
informal organization of the center of political power, and of its relations with the 
broader society. A regime determines who has access to political power, and how those 
who are in power deal with those who are not” (Fishman 1990: 428).  
The subject of legitimacy is less disputed in the literature: the citizens of a given state, 
either as individuals or society as a whole, bestow legitimacy upon the regime. In this 
understanding, legitimacy is closely connected to Weber’s notion of political rule, since 
it is a matter of the relationship between rulers and the ruled. However, various concep-
tualizations presuppose a uniform consensus among the citizens, which is illusory to 
attain in a heterogeneous, pluralistic society. Therefore, it is useful to add an intermedi-
ate category on the meso level between the micro and macro perspectives of individual 
citizens and society, i.e. certain social groups, as suggested e.g. by von Haldenwang. A 
differentiation between addressees has also been employed in empirical approaches 
towards legitimation strategies (Bank 2004; Schlumberger 2010: 236f.). This is justified 
by the nature of legitimation strategies which are often not directed towards the com-
plete population, but aim at the support of specific groups. Moreover, for the mainte-
nance of rule it is not necessary to attain legitimacy with the complete population 
(Ezrow & Frantz 2011: 55; Beetham 1991: 10).  
Besides analyzing the types and addressees of legitimation, it is important to examine 
how exactly the strategies under investigation are pursued (Schlumberger 2010: 239). 
This dimension captures the modes of legitimation. Up to now, empirical research on 
legitimacy has not explicitly offered a systematic elaboration of different modes. David 
Easton included this dimension into his framework of political systems analysis, and the 
analysis of modes of specifically authoritarian legitimation was suggested again by 
Schlumberger. Easton subdivides outputs in two modes, statements and performances 
(Easton 1965: 353). He further distinguishes between the outputs’ qualities as either 
binding (“authoritative”) or non-binding (“associated”). The performances are either 
                                                 
8
 Kane, Loy, and Patapan hint at the “difficulty of distinguishing the source of legitimacy from the object 
of legitimation (e.g., is a king’s monarchical authority both the source and object of legitimation?)” (Kane 
et al. 2010: 386). 
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binding actions or benefits, while statements comprise laws and policies (ibid.). As au-
thoritarian regimes implement even legal regulations arbitrarily, the second differentia-
tion is difficult to make. Therefore, this thesis adopts a rather literal understanding of 
statements as rhetoric or symbol politics and further distinguishes between performanc-
es that affect the legal framework – the legal mode – and material policies as actual out-
puts, as they might diverge even more drastically than in democracies. 
The working definition of legitimacy for the sake of this study is the citizens’ ac-
ceptance of the incumbents’ claim to rule.9 The difference between legitimacy and 
legitimation consists in the dynamic, process-oriented character of the latter.10 Efforts 
by regime elites to attain legitimacy directed towards different addressees, be they 
individuals, groups, or the whole population, are called strategies of legitimation. 
This understanding follows the principle of methodological individualism: according to 
the model of Coleman’s boat or bathtub, “the proposition system begins and ends at 
macro levels, but in between it dips to the level of the individual (Coleman 1994: 8). 
Adapting this perspective, legitimation strategies are part of politics on the macro level, 
but are targeted towards the micro level of individual citizens, besides the meso level of 
societal groups and society at large. The cumulated effect of the strategies’ success or 
failure again has repercussions on the macro level. Successful strategies of legitimation 
result in legitimacy according to the definition, i.e. acceptance; a failure of legitimation 
means the rejection of the incumbents’ claim to rule.  
The domestic political system constitutes the context in which this interaction takes 
place. In the literature, the international arena is often treated as a further addressee of 
legitimation efforts (see among others Albrecht & Schlumberger 2004; Hoffmann 2011; 
Holbig 2010; Sedgwick 2010). The primary addressees of strategies of international 
legitimation are international organizations or foreign governments, rather than the do-
mestic citizenry. Of course, there might be repercussions and interconnections between 
the two levels. But it is important to stress that there is no simple correlative relation-
ship between external and internal legitimacy. External legitimacy can have positive 
                                                 
9
 This formulation avoids the connotations inherent in Weber’s Legitimitätsglauben that might lead to 
misunderstandings. 
10
 This definition is in contrast to the distinction sometimes found in the literature between legitimacy as 
the state of full consent – thus ideal and never attainable – and legitimation as the process by which rulers 
try to gain legitimacy. As soon as the addressees of legitimation strategies are taken into account, legiti-
macy can be found among some of the addressees, but does not have to be present in the whole citizenry. 
This focus on addressees allows for an empirical-analytical assessment of legitimacy.  
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indirect effects on the population, e.g. when it leads to attaining more political aid, 
which raises the elites’ potential for employing strategies of legitimation through alloca-
tion. In this case, to consider both elements would effectively lead to an analysis in 
which the causal mechanism of one legitimation strategy is counted twice in an imagi-
nary “legitimation formula”. But besides this case of converging effects that leads to an 
overrating of one factor, there is also the possibility that external legitimacy in the prop-
er sense of the word as legitimacy with an external actor – the approval of foreign poli-
cy by the US, e.g. –, is a direct cause for delegitimation in the eyes of the domestic pub-
lic.11 In such a case, the addressee who actually is relevant to political rule is taken out 
of the legitimation formula and artificially replaced by an outside actor. From the schol-
ar’s view, the level of legitimacy rises, while the opposite takes place in the popula-
tion’s perspective. 
As this example shows, the effects of external legitimation are not easily predictable. 
They might always be ambiguous and work for or against domestic legitimation. So 
although strategies of external legitimation are an interesting object of research in their 
own right, they will not be analyzed separately in this study. Rather, they will be taken 
into account when they directly affect the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. 
To sum it up briefly: External legitimacy in the sense of international recognition and 
acceptance will not be dealt with, and international factors will only be considered inso-
far as they matter on the side of either those seeking or those granting legitimacy.  
 
2.1.3. Crises of Legitimacy 
Generally speaking, a crisis is a point in time at which the further direction of a devel-
opment, e.g. an illness is decided upon (Habermas 1973: 9). HABERMAS as one of the 
leading scholars on crises of legitimacy regards it from a perspective of systems theory. 
As in his understanding, legitimacy in democracies is attained through formal proce-
dures, a crisis is always linked to a dysfunction in the input of “diffuse mass loyalty” 
(1973: 68). This abstract systems theoretical terminology can to some extent also be 
applied to autocracies and would translate into blocked input channels, leading to the 
withdrawal of diffuse loyalty, and after a certain threshold to mass protests. In a similar 
vein, Catherine Warrick claims that “legitimation crisis is likely to be oriented toward 
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 One relevant example is the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty from 1994, which rehabilitated Jordan on the 
international scene, but was met with resistance inside the country. 
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questions of values and principles that are at the foundation of the political system” 
(Warrick 2009: 36).  
A more precise attempt at defining a crisis of legitimacy is put forward by Muthiah 
ALAGAPPA: “A legitimacy crisis is a situation in which the basis on which authority has 
been claimed or acknowledged is under such severe stress that there is a strong possibil-
ity of its destruction and transformation” (Alagappa 1995b: 59). This definition is ade-
quate for this study because it fits with the definitions of both legitimacy and stability 
given above and on p. 20. The possibility of the destruction of the basis of authority 
shows that a crisis is qualitatively different from the fluctuation of regime support as a 
result of day-to-day politics.12 In a similar vein and relating the crisis to stability, 
Svensson claims that the “stability of a democratic regime can only be demonstrated 
during a crisis, where challenges are threatening the continuity of the identifying char-
acteristics of the regime […]” (Svensson 1985: 137). Alagappa’s definition makes clear 
that a crisis of legitimacy is more than a mere divergence between regime rhetoric and 
performance. While attempts to evaluate whether a government lives up to its own 
standards are useful for purposes of accountability, such a performance gap exists in 
every regime in the real world.  
To illustrate this, I will briefly discuss a classical and universal threat to legitimacy, 
protracted economic crisis. LIPSET was one of the first scholars to point to the interrela-
tion between the effectiveness and legitimacy of a political system, effectiveness to him 
meaning “constant economic development” (1959: 91) and thus capturing the economic 
side of what could be called “performance legitimacy” nowadays (Brooker 2009: 135). 
Lipset claims that economic crises are crises of effectiveness (Lipset 1959: 86).13 
KANE, LOY, AND PATAPAN state for Asia that “[i]n the absence of any other strong 
planks of legitimation, economic crises can easily become crises of political legitimacy” 
(Kane et al. 2010: 385). The maintenance of overall legitimacy is then crucially depend-
ent on other sources of legitimacy or alternative ways of legitimation.  
In a recent contribution on legitimacy in China, Heike HOLBIG and Bruce GILLEY put 
yet another emphasis on this issue by claiming that “[…] economic crises should not be 
regarded as an immediate threat to regime legitimacy […] the emergence of legitimacy 
                                                 
12
 Those common ups and downs are also captured by Dowding and Kimber’s notion of stability (1983: 
232ff.).  
13
 However, what Lipset calls crises of legitimacy are conflicts rooted in the historical formation of states 
and do not concern day-to-day politics. 
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deficits depends on how the crisis is framed by the incumbent regime” (Holbig & Gilley 
2010: 400). But the success of such framing can be questioned.14 It might work if eco-
nomic losses could be ascribed to external actors, taking the blame off incumbents. 
However, when political leaders claim credit for positive economic developments, they 
might meet problems in staving off responsibility during bad times. The same logic can 
be theoretically true for other situations. The predominant manifestation of crises in 
authoritarian regimes is expected to be mass protest, as this is often the only way of 
voicing dissent.15 
The end of a crisis doesn’t require a restoration of the status quo ante of the same 
source of legitimacy. Political elites may embark upon strategies of compensation by 
employing new strategies pertaining to the same source of legitimacy or by stressing 
other sources of legitimacy. Even the introduction of entirely new legitimation strate-
gies in other areas may lead to the disappearance of crisis symptoms. However, the 
causal link is hard to establish, let alone measure. Again, we encounter the problem of 
how to correctly assess behavior: the cessation of previous dissenting behavior or pro-
test involves ambiguity about the true reasons for the changed behavior. E.g. when mass 
protests end, it is not easy to judge whether the crisis of legitimacy has come to an end 
because of sheer repression, or because the protest movement has lost momentum in 
terms of mobilization, or because legitimacy has actually been restored through other 
means. A qualitative look at the chosen strategies and their success is necessary to rea-
sonably explain the outcome. 
 
2.1.4. The Relationship between Legitimacy and Stability 
As has become apparent from the discussion of the literature, the close relationship be-
tween legitimacy and regime stability is undisputed. Regime stability is a term that is 
often used similarly to or even interchangeably with concepts such as persistence, resili-
ence, survival, maintenance, and durability.16 This multitude of denotations makes some 
conceptual clarifications desirable. Some of the mentioned concepts basically describe 
for how long a regime has endured and can therefore be measured as a time dimension. 
Survival presupposes the existence of a crisis that could be considered as a reason for 
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 For a discussion of the consequences of framing theory results for authoritarian legitimacy cf. Schlum-
berger 2010. 
15
 Other empirical manifestations of crises are described below in 2.2.2. 
16
 Bank (2009: 35) lists some of the terms that are currently used in the literature.  
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breakdown, but the term does not allow for statements about the qualities of the regime 
in question. Stability also encompasses this element, but goes beyond this meaning to a 
qualitatively different level. It can be defined as “the state in which the probability that a 
regime will experience breakdown is low” (Josua 2012: 4).17 Of course, stability accord-
ing to this definition is difficult to assess. The only existing unambiguous indicator tells 
us that stability was obviously absent: the case of self-induced regime breakdown.  
Legitimacy can be regarded as a sufficient condition for stability, but is not an absolute-
ly necessary one.18 In other words, when legitimacy is present, the regime tends to be 
stable. But it would be logically misleading to deduce from a regime’s non-breakdown 
that legitimacy is present. Lipset claims that illegitimate political systems can maintain 
their stability through effectiveness (Lipset 1959: 90f.). More importantly, especially in 
times of crisis, rule may be sustained through the use of repression. Schlumberger offers 
a formal approach in order to demonstrate that stability is a composite of legitimacy and 
repression (S = L + R; Schlumberger 2004b; see also Albrecht & Schlumberger 2004). 
From a regime perspective, repression is clearly on the flip side of legitimacy: Whenev-
er the degree of legitimacy falls, the need for repression rises, if stability is not supposed 
to be threatened. However, the notion of stability as a simple dichotomous category is 
hard to reconcile with strategies of political rule which are dynamic and the success of 
which can be a matter of degree. The first preference of incumbents and hence the over-
all aim of their policies is to stay in power. In order to maintain political power and con-
tain challenges to their rule, they employ both legitimating and repressive means, which 
together I call strategies of political rule.19 While the word strategy may be understood 
as implying a conscious directedness and intention, I will use the term in a much broad-
er sense and subsume both long-term and short-term measures under this somewhat 
simplifying term (whereas e.g. military studies would differentiate between strategies 
and tactics).  
On the other side, it is disputed whether repression is the sole other factor that combines 
with legitimacy to produce stability. In a model describing “three pillars of autocratic 
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 Such a proposition was first made by Torsten Matzke. For different approaches towards the concept of 
stability see Dowding and Kimber (1983). 
18
 This is along “Goertz’s First Law: For any research area one can find important necessary condition 
hypotheses” (Goertz 2003: 65f.). On necessary and sufficient conditions in general, cf. Goertz and Starr 
(2003). 
19
 This terminology is preferred over the less neutral term of “survival strategies” (cf. most prominently 
Brumberg 2002) that presupposes a permanent struggle.  
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stability”, scholars such as Wolfgang MERKEL and Johannes GERSCHEWSKI claim that 
legitimation, co-optation, and repression all contribute to stability under authoritarian 
conditions. These “pillars” induce citizens to accept a regime due to varying motives: 
belief, material benefits and fear (Gerschewski 2013: 33).   
Transitology literature tells us that the lack of (perceived) alternatives in authoritarian 
regimes is another factor conducive to stability (Przeworski 1991; von Haldenwang 
1999: 376). While democracy gains part of its legitimacy from the perception following 
Churchill’s argument that it is the least bad of all forms of government, authoritarianism 
can benefit from the attitude that bad rule is better than no rule at all, which would lead 
to chaos and – instability. This mental mechanism works especially in heterogeneous 
societies with competing factions of the population or in post-war societies. On a more 
tangible level, political alternatives in authoritarian regimes are most often scarce, as 
rulers seek to minimize the potential and number of contenders. As competition about 
holding ultimate power is already an exception in stable authoritarian regimes, in 
personalist regimes the personalities that could be widely regarded as better rulers hard-
ly exist. Under conditions of limited pluralism in autocracies, opposition leaders are 
often complicit in maintaining the status quo, and are therefore not regarded as credible 
alternatives.  
Regarding the variety of strategies beyond legitimation, the literature offers different 
approaches. On the side of the citizens, it is not always easy to tell whether acts of con-
sent can be understood as an expression of legitimacy on the citizens’ part. Gilley utiliz-
es the term “compliance” for non-resistance which he sees as different from the 
acknowledgement of legitimacy as “support due to personal payoffs or coercion” (2005: 
30). Notwithstanding the connotation of support in systems theory, compliance thus 
means the individual citizens’ resignation due to their awareness of the regime’s repres-
sive capacities and/or the high costs of resistance. This may have paradoxical effects. In 
a referendum, for example, when it is clear from the outset that the official result will be 
99% yes votes regardless of turnout and actual vote, a rational choice perspective can 
better explain an individual’s decision to vote in terms of a cost and benefit calculus20, 
as abstention from the vote would raise suspicion and oftentimes there are material 
goods available in exchange for casting a ballot. But even if voting is not intended as an 
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 According to Elster’s canonical principle of rationality which says that “[i]n the choice between evils, a 
rational agent will choose the lesser evil” (2007: 215). 
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act of bestowing legitimacy from the individual’s perspective, incumbents still will use 
these imaginary results for establishing their claim to legality and popular support. 
Asymmetric power relations enable ruling elites to shape public discourse at their will. 
Legitimacy can even be evoked by propaganda or “mass persuasion”, as Brady (2009) 
shows for the case of China. 
On the side of the decision-makers, von Haldenwang talks about strategies that can take 
pressure from the regime (“Entlastungsstrategien”) in order to process societal de-
mands, often in an ad hoc manner. He gives the examples of political exclusion (repres-
sion), the channeling of demands, e.g. co-optation, and the satisfaction of particular in-
terests (von Haldenwang 1999: 376). As other factors contributing to stability that are 
different from legitimacy he names fear, personal interest, and loyalty. In a similar vein, 
HEBERER and SCHUBERT (2008) claim a different meaning of the term loyalty as op-
posed to legitimacy. In their view, loyalty describes “the maintenance of global trust” 
despite disappointments and is directed towards a group of people or an organization, 
not the regime or political order itself. They also maintain loyalty is primarily motivated 
by subjective interests (Heberer & Schubert 2008: 36f.). The broad understanding of 
legitimacy adopted in this thesis also includes loyalty, be it towards a leader or the re-
gime. The additional element of subjective interests can nevertheless be adequately 
grasped by a specification of legitimation which the following section deals with in 
more detail: co-optation.  
 
2.1.5. Co-optation: Legitimation with Benefits21 
Co-optation is a mechanism of political rule that is commonly employed in authoritarian 
regimes to substitute for democratic participation by ensuring the inclusion of strategi-
cally important parts of the population into politics. Inclusion, in turn, is crucial because 
it contributes to stability. The main function of co-optation is the silencing of dissent by 
giving certain individuals or groups a stake in the status quo. The objects of co-optation 
can be already existing members of the elite as well as new individuals or groups who 
are tied to the regime. In other words, this effectively means either the strengthening or 
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 This section builds on a paper presented at the 3rd General Conference of the European Consortium for 
Political Research, Reykjavik, 24-27 August 2011 under the title of Co-optation as a Strategy of Authori-
tarian Legitimation – Success and Failure in the Arab World which is currently under review for publica-
tion (Josua 2012). 
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widening of the regime base.22 As from a regime perspective these two possibilities 
yield different effects, it makes sense to analytically distinguish between them by con-
struing two subtypes of co-optation according to the addressees of such strategies. I 
therefore conceptualize co-optation as all measures by ruling elites with the aim of 
strengthening and/or widening the societal base of a regime by giving relevant individ-
uals or societal groups a stake in the status quo. 
The distinction between the different addressees of co-optation strategies is fruitful in 
order to assess the consequences for the regime and its base. If we contrast these two 
subtypes, a first hypothesis is that the “strengthening the regime base”-subtype of co-
optation is more sustainable than the “widening the regime base”-subtype, due to the 
stabilization of expectations from either side. For sure, a widening of the base might be 
considered equally important or even bearing more potential for overall stability in case 
the old base declines. But the loss of former supporters is more dangerous than missing 
a chance to gain new ones because they might not only stop to support the ruler. More 
importantly, they could turn to supporting a challenger for power and change the bal-
ance of power in favor of a previously marginalized opponent who without them could 
never gain upper hand. As elites are privileged members of society and group leaders, 
such an alternative alliance-building would be more dangerous to stability than if the 
support of citizens who apparently play a less important role in the political sphere was 
lost. Of course, flawed perceptions among the elites might lead to a miscalculation re-
garding the importance of certain groups or their potential for a challenge. But assuming 
a previous state of relatively stable rule, the inclusion and therefore the continuous co-
optation of the regime base proper always has to be a priority in authoritarian politics, 
as the discontent of suddenly excluded groups may trigger unforeseen dynamics.  
So far, it is obvious what the rationale on the part of regime elites is for engaging in co-
optation. But why would somebody like to be co-opted? The most important reason is 
probably access to resources in the broadest sense of the word. It means raising the so-
cial capital (and most often pecuniary capital as well) of the individual or groups co-
opted, along with giving them some degree of influence and, at times, even decision-
making power. 
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 It might result in a zero-sum-game though if simultaneously other parts of the elites or social base are 
neglected or marginalized. 
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Co-optation in its broadest sense can be described as a non-repressive mode of securing 
power and thus contributing to regime stability. However, the question as to whether co-
optation itself is part of legitimation or a third element besides legitimacy and repres-
sion is answered differently by different scholars. Gerschewski (2013) conceptualizes 
co-optation as one of three pillars that account for the stability of autocracies, distinct 
from both legitimacy and repression. In contrast, authors such as Albrecht and Schlum-
berger (2004) regard co-optation as a subtype of legitimation strategies as opposed to 
repression. Within his category of the politics of participation and inclusion, André 
Bank also finds co-optation to be a pattern of legitimation in Arab states (2004). Why 
do scholarly assessments of the nature of co-optation differ although there definitively 
seems to be a relation between the concepts discussed? 
One decisive reason for the common separation of co-optation from legitimation stems 
from the distinction between the different addressees of the respective mechanisms. 
Legitimacy is frequently understood as a category that refers to society as a whole and 
legitimation is thus a general pattern of rule, whereas co-optation primarily focuses on 
certain strategically important groups or individuals. The general impression one might 
get from the way the term is used in research is that legitimation tends to entail certain 
contents, while co-optation is focused on specific persons. But from an empirical under-
standing of legitimation, the individual citizen and his or her belief and behavior are 
central. In contrast, the decision to co-opt certain people on behalf of incumbents might 
lie beyond their personal qualities insofar as it can primarily be motivated by their roles 
as representatives of certain societal forces – strategically important groups.  
What both mechanisms do have in common is their non-repressive nature and the effect 
of appeasing the addressees and removing opposition or resistance to the regime, be it 
by creating loyalty and acceptance, even collaboration, or just eliminating issues that 
might generate dissatisfaction. The difference between these two patterns becomes even 
less significant when taking into account that also many strategies of legitimation are 
not directed towards the commonalty, but only towards certain groups within the popu-
lation, such as parts of the regime base or certain elites. This is due to the empirical un-
derstanding of legitimacy as a reciprocal analytical category as spelled out by Schlum-
berger (2010: 234; 236) which leaves no foundation for a normative concept of legiti-
macy as an ideal (utopian) state. The reasons for the often found distinction between 
“universal” legitimation and “targeted” co-optation strategies are thus less convincing in 
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practice than it may seem at first sight. Again, both strategies can be summed up as non-
repressive mechanisms of maintaining power, and both result in the inclusion of a cer-
tain group of people, often at the expense of others.  
To put it even more clearly, legitimation is a strategy that seeks an individual’s ac-
ceptance of rule. Co-optation is a strategy that also seeks an individual’s acceptance of 
rule and additionally offers an incentive to ensure that this end is realized. For legitima-
tion, it is irrelevant whether an incentive comes with the strategy or not. As legitimation 
is the more general concept, it follows from the elaboration above that co-optation can 
be framed as a subset of legitimation strategies. When we adopt a definition that takes 
into account the different addressees of legitimation strategies, co-optation is one of 
various ways to attain a higher degree of legitimacy, i.e. with the groups or individuals 
co-opted – but it is the job of incumbent elites to choose the objects of co-optation wise-
ly enough to ensure regime stability. 
 
Figure 2.1: Co-optation as a Subset of Legitimation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 illustrates this perspective with the help of the corresponding levels of ab-
straction: for the less extensive concept of co-optation, one aspect is added to the defini-
tion of legitimation.23  
Co-optation is a concept on a medium level of abstraction: it is narrower than legitima-
tion, but does not yet denote the specific way a measure is implemented. Climbing 
down the ladder of abstraction, various mechanisms of co-optation are possible, e.g. by 
inclusion in formal institutions, direct funding, informal inclusion into decision-making 
processes, policy concessions, patronage, (positively) discriminating policies, etc. Such 
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 For the working mechanism of the ladder of abstraction see Sartori (1970: 1040 ff.).  
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tangible incentives for maintaining the status quo forestall any oppositional activities 
through non-repressive means, i.e. through creating loyalty.  
 
2.1.6. The Role of Repression24 
Repression represents the “dark side” of strategies of political rule. Mostly, repression is 
seen as a last resort when legitimacy resources are not sufficient or available. However, 
the decision for repression is not such a simple calculation, but depends on certain char-
acteristics within the regime, the state, and the threat that the crisis of legitimacy consti-
tutes (Josua & Edel 2014).   
For all strategies of political rule, the question of addressees is important. In research on 
repression, Mason (1989) differentiates between three target groups, namely opposition 
leaders, activists, and the politically inactive population. In terms of the forms of repres-
sion, a common dichotomy in the literature is the distinction between “soft” (non-
violent) and “hard” (violent) repression (Davenport 2007: 487) or high- and low-
intensity coercion (Way & Levitsky 2006). However, regarding the effects the strategies 
have, it is analytically more fruitful to start from the question whether continued conten-
tion is possible than to ask whether the repression measures are violent or non-violent. 
Therefore, we have suggested a disaggregation of repression deriving from the respec-
tive effects they result in. The proposed dichotomy differentiates between a constraining 
and an incapacitating effect. Constraining repression raises the individual’s cost for tak-
ing part in contentious action. Incapacitating repression prevents any action altogether 
by jailing, killing, or exiling the target person or group.  
These considerations lead to our definition of repression as “the sum of all strategies by 
ruling elites to contain challenges to their rule by constraining (raising the costs of con-
tention for) or incapacitating opposition leaders, rank-and-file activists, or parts of the 
politically inactive population” (Josua & Edel 2014: 4, original in italics). Successful 
repression means that the potential or actual challengers could be deterred; repression 
fails when contentious behavior continues, and all the more so when it even increases. 
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 This section is based on a paper I have written jointly with Mirjam Edel for the Annual Conference of 
the German Political Science Association (DVPW) – Section for Comparative Politics, Marburg, 29-31 
March 2012 under the title To Repress or Not to Repress. Varieties of Regime Survival Strategies in the 
Arab Spring, a shortened version of which has been published in Terrorism and Political Violence (Josua 
& Edel 2014).  
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Taking a closer look at addressees, an ambiguity becomes apparent. Just as the co-
optation of certain groups has the effect of simultaneously excluding others, the repres-
sion of some might find their rivals’ approval. To put it more explicitly, repressing a 
certain target group could serve to create legitimacy in the eyes of others. Besides, the 
repression itself needs to be regarded as adequate by some parts of the population. Ac-
cording to von Haldenwang, this is a prerequisite for the use of state force (1999: 375). 
Therefore, one cannot speak of clear-cut black and white strategies when there are two 
sides of a medal – opposite effects resulting from a single measure. One way to deal 
with this dilemma would be to show the legitimizing effects of all observed strategies. 
This, however, might mean that everything could be regarded as legitimation, stretching 
the concept beyond its meaning. For analytical purposes, I will focus on describing the 
directly observable strategies and regard their indirect effects as secondary.  
Gerschewski proposes a model of stabilization in autocracies based on different pillars 
of stability. While he suggests different ways of conceptualizing their relationship as 
“neutral, substitutive, conflictive, or complementary” (Gerschewski 2013: 27), the con-
siderations above show that repression can have contradictory effects and therefore the 
relation between legitimation and repression is often conflictive. The general proposi-
tion of conceptualizing stability as based on a combination of legitimation and repres-
sion hints at the temporary possibility of substitution. However, Gerschewski himself 
suggests complementarity without justifying this simplification of his own ideas, claim-
ing that the pillars reinforce each other (2013: 27). Of course, the qualification is that 
not all forms of repression go well with all forms of legitimation and mutual effects are 
often unclear. While this simplifying approach does not allow for the analysis of more 
fine-grained dynamic processes within single countries, it may help explain macro-
political structural variance in large-N comparisons (Gerschewski 2013: 28 f.). 
 
2.2. STRATEGIES OF POLITICAL RULE IN THE ARAB WORLD 
The following subchapter offers an overview over relevant literature on the strategies of 
political rule from research on the Arab world. As these strategies were employed as a 
response to crises of legitimacy, the formerly relevant sources of legitimacy are present-
ed in more detail. Furthermore, the manifestations and likeliness of the crises of each of 
those sources are assessed. This serves as a backdrop for evaluating how prone to crisis 
different regimes were later when facing the Arab uprisings. 
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2.2.1 Literature on Legitimation and Repression in the Arab World 
The Arab world is probably not the first region in which to search for legitimate rule. 
Area-specific research on legitimacy has long been a relatively neglected field which 
has only recently come to the fore again. Existing literature in this domain focuses on 
two central themes, which will be discussed in more detail below: crises of legitimacy 
and strategies of legitimation. Apart from these contributions by area specialists, the 
Arab world usually does not figure prominently in quantitative comparative datasets. 
One noticeable exception is the work by Bruce GILLEY (see above), which includes the 
Arab cases of Morocco, Egypt, Jordan and Algeria. In this medium-to-large-N study, 
the Arab cases range among intermediate levels of legitimacy. The highest and lowest 
ranks are held by Denmark and Russia with 7.62 and 2.27 respectively. All Arab cases 
are situated between 4.48 and 5.25, thus falling in Gilley’s “medium-legitimacy” group 
(Gilley 2006: 16). Obviously, these cases are the ones that happened to be included in 
the World Values Survey (WVS), Gilley’s most important primary source for his da-
taset. While these countries comprise the majority of the Arab population, they are but a 
small percentage of the total number of states in this region. As the decision about 
whether to have the World Values Survey conducted inside a country is dependent upon 
the general level of political freedoms, first of all the findings are not representative for 
the region. Secondly, the results of the World Values Survey have to be treated with 
caution as the usual problems of polling are even exacerbated when dealing with poli-
tics in authoritarian regimes.25 Especially the fact that Egypt and Jordan have the exact 
same value in Gilley’s legitimacy index for the late 2000s, with Egypt experiencing a 
regime breakdown only a few years later, shows the debatable validity of his approach. 
Experts on the region offered a diverging assessment already before the Arab uprisings. 
Most clearly, Sedgwick (2010) was able to show that a very low degree of legitimacy in 
Egypt was apparent even before the toppling of the Mubarak regime.26  
Regarding the literature on crises of legitimacy, the authoritative text of the 20th century 
was written by Michael HUDSON (1977). He perceives a legitimacy gap in the Arab 
world that results from the existing structures of legitimacy. Following Easton’s typolo-
gy, these structures are personal or even charismatic, ideological, and structural (institu-
tionalized) sources of legitimacy. The different structures correspond with empirical 
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 For a more detailed methodological critique of the World Values Survey, see chapter 3.1.  
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 See also below. 
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regime types, as “modernizing monarchies” and “revolutionary republics” possess tradi-
tional-personal and ideological legitimacy respectively. In Hudson’s normative and in-
stitution-centered view, however, Arab states nevertheless suffer from a lack of legiti-
macy because of the absence of democratic institutions. He thus states a threefold crisis 
of legitimacy in the Arab world: a crisis of authority, a crisis of identity and a crisis of 
equality (1977: 4). 
More recently, Emma MURPHY (1998) was among the first to notice an increased crisis 
of legitimacy due to economic problems. The decline of previous massive flows of oil 
rents into the Arab region posed a threat to the states’ allocative capacity during the 
1980s. At the dawn of the 21st century, rulers had begun to employ new strategies to 
attain legitimacy. In the wake of the recent post-democratization trend in comparative 
politics, legitimacy has been brought back in various contributions. ALBRECHT and 
SCHLUMBERGER (2004) described some of the newer strategies in detail that were sup-
posed to compensate for the loss in structural legitimacy (traditional-religious, material, 
and ideological legitimacy) and helped re-equilibrate authoritarianism. The authors re-
jected the expectation of democratization in the Arab world that was widespread after 
liberalization processes of the 1990s as “Waiting for Godot”. Instead, they point at re-
cent strategies of legitimation that partly used liberalization in order to indefinitely off-
set calls for democratization, in other words change in regime to prevent a change of 
regime (Albrecht & Schlumberger 2004: 375). While the classical sources of legitimacy 
are treated as an overarching variable and complemented by external legitimation, the 
newer strategies are elite change (both rotation and maintenance), ‘imitative’ institution 
building along Western models but with different functions, co-optation in order to wid-
en the power base through inclusion rather than allocation, and the transformation of 
external constraints into opportunities for rent-seeking (Albrecht & Schlumberger 2004: 
376 ff.). Rolf SCHWARZ (2004) described similar new strategies of legitimation, focus-
ing on the aspect that they are used in both republics and monarchies, the regime types 
that had hitherto been analyzed as distinct from one another.  
The probably best-known account of modern forms of authoritarian governance in the 
Arab world is by Steven HEYDEMANN (2007). Under the title “Upgrading Authoritari-
anism” he differentiates between five areas in which new strategies in varying mixes are 
observable: “1. Appropriating and containing civil societies; 2. Managing political con-
testation; 3. Capturing the benefits of selective economic reforms; 4. Controlling new 
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communications technologies; 5. Diversifying international linkages” (Heydemann 
2007: 5). These pioneer contributions relayed anecdotal evidence from a multitude of 
countries in order to illustrate the region-wide, general prevalence of the mentioned 
strategies. While they did not offer a coherent, theoretically guided categorization for 
the analysis of the described strategies, let alone an operationalization, it is these works’ 
credit to put the scholarly focus on relevant processes.  
In a more focused vein, HOSTRUP HAUGBØLLE AND CAVATORTA (2012) analyzed 
one sector of authoritarian upgrading, new private media in Tunisia, and through study-
ing the societal response showed how strategies that are devised as top-down policies 
can have unintended consequences. In this case, the display of a higher degree of plural-
ism in a previously tightly controlled field may have played a role in actually encourag-
ing non-mainstream opinions and competition, although in apolitical domains. While 
the approach that includes the societal response is highly commendable, parallel politi-
cal developments such as repressive measures in the same field are only casually men-
tioned (Haugbølle & Cavatorta 2012: 110). The focus on possible social change does 
not make up for the fact that consequences in the political realm can hardly be traced 
(ibid.). In this sense, the mechanism through which a contagion across areas could have 
taken place remains obscure. 
Among the more systematic approaches towards legitimacy in the Arab world, Oliver 
SCHLUMBERGER and André BANK (2002) have made an explicit attempt at measuring 
legitimacy in Jordan despite the acknowledged difficulties. They were able to detect an 
increase in overall legitimacy from the rule of King Hussein until 1999 to his successor 
Abdullah II. They did so by diachronically analyzing the different components of legit-
imacy and legitimation and found the maintenance of old sources of legitimacy and 
simultaneous introduction of additional strategies. BANK (2004) went further in setting 
up a framework for systematic comparative analysis which he used to analyze legitima-
tion strategies of three new rulers. His categorization entails three areas that cut across 
policies in classical analyses: rent-seeking and allocation, the politics of participation, 
and the politics of symbolism.  
Further approaches to the phenomenon of non-democratic legitimacy can be discerned. 
Peter BURNELL (2006) links the different bases of legitimation to possibilities for inter-
national democracy promotion. Oliver SCHLUMBERGER (2010) elaborates on theoreti-
cal aspects of the nature of non-democratic legitimacy and distinguishes between four 
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different approaches to its study as an outline for further research: a focus on address-
ees, the measurement, sources, and modes of legitimation. Schlumberger focuses on a 
discussion of the sources or types of legitimacy present in the Arab World from an em-
pirically informed perspective. Both Mark SEDGWICK (2010) and Julie PRUZAN-
JØRGENSEN (2010) offer different general taxonomies of legitimacy and apply these 
comprehensively to one case study each. Sedgwick uses his typology as a checklist to 
assess the level of legitimacy in pre-revolutionary Egypt and finds it to be very low – an 
assessment that was proven correct only one year afterwards. Pruzan-Jørgensen takes a 
different point of departure in choosing one specific policy issue, the 2003 reform of the 
personal status law in Morocco, examining the legitimation strategies that accompanied 
the ensuing political process. Moreover, she grasps justifications towards different in-
volved actors and accounts for the reciprocal character of legitimation by analyzing the 
perceptions that these societal actors held towards the various strategies. However, it is 
problematic that Pruzan-Jørgensen departs from the various societal groups and tries to 
establish which type of legitimacy they bestow to a particular policy. For the purpose of 
categorization, her focus is on the narrative of addressees of strategies instead of the 
strategies themselves. This on the one hand helps reveal the balancing act inherent in 
catering to different audiences through one single policy issue. On the other hand, it 
leads to confusion on an analytical level and makes the study more prone to misunder-
standing. One example is that Pruzan-Jørgensen frames a statement by an Islamist 
leader as bestowing ideological legitimacy on the king, while the framing is actually 
purely religious, just different from the argumentation of other religious actors (2010: 
281).27 Moreover, it is methodologically problematic to treat the statements of elites or 
sub-elites towards a foreigner as objectively valid regarding their real intentions or atti-
tudes, as open criticism of authoritarian structures can only be expected to a very lim-
ited degree. What is after all an important finding is how the Moroccan king conveys to 
each group what they want to hear. The consequence that the accompanying contradic-
tions entail the risk of losing overall credibility is somewhat underrated. In a similar 
vein and focusing more on the ambivalence of targeting strategies, Catherine WARRICK 
(2009) analyzes the interplay of legitimacy and political culture in Jordan within the 
policy area of gender politics. She investigates gender-related regulations in the legal 
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system and seeks to account for the lack of modern legislation, focusing on tradition in 
the sense of “sociocultural legitimacy” as the “cultural appropriateness” of rule (2009: 
4). Her study shows the ambiguity of legitimation strategies in Jordan “which safe-
guarded the monarchy’s power by offering a way for nearly every subject to find some-
thing legitimate about it”, a quality that does not lead to stability from her point of view 
(ibid.: 35). While this mechanism grasps a general pattern of Jordanian politics, the nar-
row focus of the analysis leaves lots of room for further research.  
Regarding repression, there are fewer contributions on the Arab region than on legitima-
tion. This is strange enough, as the Arab states have been known to rank among the 
most repressive regions in the world (Spinks, Sahliyeh & Calfano 2008) and therefore 
constitute a “natural” area of research. However, repression is at least as difficult to 
study as legitimation, as it means touching upon a very sensitive topic. Therefore, quali-
tative studies are rare. Eva BELLIN (2004) elaborates on the coercive capacity of Arab 
states, invoking it as the most important factor contributing to the durability of authori-
tarian regimes. According to her argumentation, moreover the will to repress is decisive, 
which is more likely in (neo)patrimonial regimes because of a close relation between 
the coercive apparatus and regime elites, which makes the continuity of repressive insti-
tutions dependent upon the survival of the regime (Bellin 2004: 150). Especially in the-
se cases of low institutionalization of the military, the latter is more inclined to defend 
incumbents than to serve a national mission (ibid.: 145f.).28 Jason BROWNLEE (2005) 
also stresses the capacity to repress as the main reason for regimes’ survival in political 
crises. In particular, he finds that “brutal rule can make a regime more, not less, dura-
ble” (Brownlee 2005: 58).  
 
2.2.2. Crises of Former Sources of Legitimacy in the Arab World 
As has become clear from the discussion of the literature above, both legitimacy and 
legitimation had already been prominent topics in research before the Arab uprisings 
and were set to remain one of the promising avenues of post-democratization research 
(Valbjørn & Bank 2010). The following section discusses possible sources of legitima-
cy in the Arab world, first elaborating on their contents and then focusing on potential 
or actual crises of legitimacy. These manifestations of the decline of former sources of 
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legitimacy induce the political elites to embark upon strategies of compensation, either 
by activating hitherto neglected sources of legitimacy, stressing other sources of legiti-
macy or introducing entirely new legitimation strategies.  
The literature sometimes refers to so-called sources of legitimacy, mostly without elab-
orating on what this actually entails. The word “source” alludes to the possibility that it 
flows from itself. However, from the more dynamic point of view adopted here, even 
existing sources need activation and reference by elites in order to function.29 No coher-
ent attempt has thus far been made to explicitly link and integrate sources of legitimacy 
with crises and strategies of legitimation. The “classical” sources can be regarded as 
constraining variables that prestructure possible strategies of legitimation. They deline-
ate the historical trajectories upon which current leaders can build – or, to put it more 
negatively, either country-specific constraints or the path dependency that the regime’s 
setup has to follow because it is interwoven with natural conditions or the state-building 
process. The sources are thus the foundations that have to be taken into account and 
upon which elites build when designing their strategies of legitimation. A conceptual-
ization of the link between sources and strategies of legitimation therefore provides a 
more integrated and holistic picture of legitimacy as an analytical category. 
The following sections deal with the sources of legitimacy that were relevant for the 
Arab world in the second half of the 20th century. As was already hinted at in the intro-
duction, Schlumberger classified Arab states according to their type of rule and endow-
ment with natural resources (Schlumberger 2002: 6-10). This mapping of the situation 
prior to the 1990s covers all of the legitimating sources of tradition, material legitimacy, 
ideology, and religion (Albrecht & Schlumberger 2004: 376f.; Schlumberger 2010: 
239). The matrix can either be seen as depicting regime types and resource endowment, 
or, alternatively, classifying types of legitimacy. If the bases of legitimacy replace the 
existing categories, first, the regime type of Arab monarchies can be subsumed under 
traditional legitimacy. In revolutionary republics (Hudson 1970: 27ff.), ideology consti-
tutes the respective source of legitimacy. Moreover, the degree of allocative capacity 
and thus the potential for material legitimacy is indicated by the availability of re-
sources. For the sake of completeness, religious legitimacy as an additional separate 
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category is added to the matrix in table 2.1, indicated by an asterisk.30 These are the 
region-specific sources that will be dealt with in the following sections.  
 
Table 2.1: Sources of Legitimacy in Arab States31 during the 20th Century  
(following Schlumberger 2002: 10; with modifications) 
 Monarchies 
= traditional legitimacy 
Revolutionary republics 
= ideological legitimacy 
resource-rich  
= high material legitima-
cy 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi-Arabia*, UAE 
Algeria, Iraq, Libya 
resource-poor 
= low material legitimacy 
Jordan*, Morocco* Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, 
Yemen 
 
*religious legitimacy 
Modifications within regimes in the Arab world that have been observed since the 
1990s have challenged the continued analytical usefulness of the matrix presented 
above. The strategies that political elites have embarked on in order to maintain stability 
display surprising similarities throughout the region, which suggests a certain conver-
gence between the features of states that were hitherto classified as belonging to differ-
ent regime types, so that former categorical boundaries seem to become increasingly 
blurred (Schwarz 2004; Bank 2004). However, the Arab uprisings show that even this 
rough analytical distinction still bears explanatory potential.  
The remainder of this chapter deals with the sources of legitimacy prevalent in the Mid-
dle East as identified above. The contents of these sources have recently been described 
in detail by Oliver Schlumberger (2010). The main focus of the section is on sketching 
out the manifestations and likeliness of possible crises.32 While these crises are empiri-
cally well-known, they have so far not been analyzed in such detail. 
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 Albrecht and Schlumberger blend together “traditional religious legitimation” (2004: 377), however, I 
consider it more useful to disentangle the two into separate elements in order to grasp both traditional 
sources of legitimacy that are confined to monarchies and religious legitimation strategies that might be 
used in any kind of regime, but not necessarily in all monarchies (although admittedly more often there). 
Warrick also supports the separation of tradition from religion because they “appeal to different sources 
of authority – the sacred divine versus the sacred past” (2009: 8). 
31
 Lebanon and the Palestinian Occupied Territories are left out of this table because of non-applicability 
of the categories and limited sovereignty. 
32
 Also Peter Burnell stresses the “vulnerabilities” of different bases of legitimation (2006). 
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2.2.2.1. Traditional Legitimacy 
Generally, traditional legitimacy constitutes a factor that is not susceptible to sudden 
change, so the probability of a crisis is relatively low. This quality of tradition is already 
inherent in its classical definition as “the sanctity of age-old rules and powers” (Weber 
1947). Usually, the regime base consists of traditional forces such as tribes or other in-
digenous groups. The mechanism of legitimation is associated with ritualized forms of 
reference to tradition. Legitimacy can be evoked by traditional mechanisms of rule, e.g. 
an oath of allegiance (bai‘a or wila’) as in Morocco or Jordan, but also by using tradi-
tional symbols, adhering to traditional customs and referring to traditional values such 
as paternalism. Of course, traditional values embodied by ruling elites don’t necessarily 
correspond to values that are current on the addressees’ side, and vice versa, especially 
in heterogeneous societies. In Bahrain, e.g., the ruling family’s pseudo-traditional be-
havior, such as the breeding of camels, would maybe impress a tiny minority, but be 
ridiculed by the bulk of society (Niethammer 2007: 35). Other leaders succeeded in na-
tion-building in the sense of “inventing tradition” upon their consolidation and were 
thus able to actively construe traditional legitimacy over time, as was the case in Oman 
(Valeri 2007).33  
Of course, there are numerous examples of monarchic regimes in the Middle East that 
were swept away in the 20th century, including Egypt, Libya, Syria, Iraq, and later on 
Iran. These instances, however, did not constitute crises of traditionally legitimated 
leaders, on the contrary. Historically seen, most monarchs in the region had been in-
stalled by colonial powers rather than being rooted in their respective societies. They 
therefore had dim chances of claiming traditional legitimacy in the first place. The rea-
son for their failure was connected to the lack of social base and the distorted societal 
conditions that accompanied industrialization and socioeconomic developments after 
the fall of the Ottoman Empire.34  
What does a crisis of traditional legitimacy look like? A crisis directly related to tradi-
tion has to do with the issue of succession, since the ruling dynasty or family is central 
to claiming traditional legitimacy. However, dynastic successions in the Arab world 
have taken place rather smoothly in the last two decades. Contested successions con-
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 It is important to bear in mind that traditional legitimacy in Weber’s sense reflects purely subjective 
perceptions that don’t have to match historical facts. 
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 For a comparative study analyzing the survival and breakdown of Middle Eastern monarchies, see 
Bank, Richter & Sunik (2013). 
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cerned the timing or designated successor rather than the foundation of tradition and 
have so far always been resolved within the ruling elite.35 The most obvious manifesta-
tion of a crisis that indicates a divergence between the regime and the citizens’ norms as 
regards tradition would be the emergence of a republican or revolutionary movement 
directed against traditional leaders. In any case, traditional rule might only become en-
dangered when anti-monarchist tendencies are incorporated in a larger social (or Islam-
ic) revolutionary movement. Even if such perceptions existed, nowhere in the region is 
the public voicing of popular discontent with a monarch legally permitted, but instead it 
is prevented by harsh regulations stipulating the king’s sanctity.  
As some of the mid-20th century movements calling for the establishment of a republic 
were directed against non-traditional monarchs in the Middle East (Bank, Richter & 
Sunik 2013: 14), with the exception of Bahrain there is no current instance of such a 
crisis in this region. While Huntington predicted a “king’s dilemma” during the process 
of modernization, this hypothesis turned out to be unfounded in the Arab region since 
numerous monarchies have survived the past forty years (Huntington 1968). Quite to 
the contrary, the viability of tradition seemed to be generally appreciated, as dynastic 
developments in former revolutionary republics suggested. While obviously, monar-
chical regimes are the places to search for traditional legitimacy, trends of dynastic suc-
cession that were envisaged in numerous Arab republics, albeit only realized in Syria in 
2000, represented a new strategy of legitimation that aimed at creating the new tradi-
tional legitimacy of a ruling family in republics (Schlumberger 2010: 243). The onset of 
the Arab uprisings seemed to thwart all aspirations in this direction, most notably with 
the ousting of Gamal Mubarak from the core elite during the last days of his father’s 
rule.36 Despite all this, it is one of the most striking features of the Arab uprisings that 
republics are affected to a much larger extent than monarchies. Therefore, the likeliness 
of a crisis of genuine traditional legitimacy seems very low nowadays. 
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 Examples include Kuwait, where the designated ruler was gone over for health reasons in 2006, and 
Qatar, where the son of the ruler couldn’t wait for his father to pass away and staged a palace coup in 
1995. 
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 Dynastic succession is a viable pattern in other world regions, the most recent example being the trans-
fer of power in North Korea to Kim Jong Un in 2011.  
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2.2.2.2. Material Legitimacy 
While traditional legitimacy concerns the very foundations of rule, material legitimacy 
as the provision of welfare is more of a matter of policy and can thus to a certain extent 
be better influenced and generated by ruling elites.37 Of course, the chance of having a 
substantial amount of money at one’s disposal for allocation is determined by a variety 
of factors that lie outside the power of individual leaders. In the Arab world, the single 
most important source of state income accrues from natural resources such as oil and 
gas. As theories on the rentier state claim, resource-rich states have a structural privilege 
in that they can allocate money to their citizens instead of extracting resources from 
society through taxes (Luciani 1987). This allocation works according to political con-
siderations and serves to privilege first of all the regime’s constituency, but also the 
broader population. While semi-rentier states are less endowed with natural resources, 
they essentially function in a similar way. However, they have the task of securing their 
income on a regular basis through external rent-seeking. The capacity for material legit-
imacy is thus far more dependent on the political leaders’ skillful rent-seeking behavior 
than on the actual presence of resources (Pawelka 1994). Unwise international alliance-
making may thus quickly develop into a crisis of material legitimacy.38  
Apart from this problem that mainly concerns semi-rentier states, it has been questioned 
whether allocation can generate legitimacy in the first place. Scholars arguing from a 
normative perspective have reservations against the very idea of material legitimacy 
which they regard as purely guided by self-interest. The underlying question is whether 
legitimacy can be “bought” at all, as Luciani (1987: 78) claims. Can the distribution of 
material goods function as a source of legitimacy or does it just serve the self-interest 
and patronage of the population or privileged groups? The latter view would also affect 
everything that can be labeled output legitimacy and in any way serves the addressees’ 
interest. More importantly, no mechanic understanding of spending money and garner-
ing legitimacy should be presupposed. From an empirical perspective the functioning of 
this mechanism can be questioned in terms of the success or failure on the addressees’ 
side. Niethammer found that again in Bahrain efforts to attain material legitimacy are 
partially futile. While the government allocates considerable amounts of money and 
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 Cf. Laurie Brand’s work on Jordan’s international alliance-building motivated by rent-seeking which 
aims at attaining budget security (1994). 
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goods to its strategically important social base, a large part of the population doesn’t 
accept allocation as a strategy of legitimation. One reason for this surprising finding is 
that Bahraini citizens compare their ruler’s generosity to that of the resource-richer and 
thus even more generous rulers in Qatar and Kuwait (Niethammer 2007: 150). More 
generally, Gilley showed that not the provision of welfare per se, but welfare gains cor-
relate strongly with legitimacy (Gilley 2009: 44f.). The citizens’ perception of material 
improvement rather than abstract economic growth is the decisive factor, a finding 
which is also in line with the Bahraini experience and explains the underlying cross-
national comparative disadvantage. 
Crises of material legitimacy are easy to imagine and very likely. For the Arab world, 
Emmy Murphy (1998) was the first to elaborate on the problem economic crises pose to 
legitimacy. The declining oil revenues during the 1980s led to budget crises, resulting in 
a reduced allocative capacity and thus a structural loss of legitimacy. The implementa-
tion of Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programs reduced the rulers’ pat-
ronage power (Murphy 1998: 80). Under such conditions, the social contract between 
rulers and ruled comes into danger, meaning support in exchange for the provision of 
welfare in terms of legitimacy (Murphy 1998: 79). A crisis of material legitimacy be-
comes manifest in the reduction of social services and the discontinuity of welfare pro-
vision, the cutting down of subsidies on basic foodstuff and important consumer goods 
etc. if these measures trigger strikes, demonstrations, or even violent unrest, so-called 
bread riots.39 The selective implementation of Economic Reform and Structural Ad-
justment Programs in which subsidy cuts are frequently postponed or even reversed 
highlights the centrality this factor represents for regime legitimacy. In semi-rentier 
states, material crises have been prevalent in recent decades and continue to be highly 
likely. But even in resource-rich states, the high level of welfare provision cannot be 
maintained forever given growing populations. 
 
2.2.2.3. Ideological Legitimacy 
While ideology is a very general term, the ideologies Hudson identified as sources of 
legitimacy in the Arab world had their heyday in the middle of the 20th century. They 
can be specified in the context of social revolutions as different shades of socialist-
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 In order to determine the existence of a crisis, it is a more reliable way to look at the manifestation of a 
crisis than just to register decreased state spending, as Richter (2007: 192) proposes.  
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inspired Pan-Arabism (Hudson 1977: 20ff.). Emma Murphy distinguishes between anti-
colonialism and anti-imperialism, Arab nationalism and populism as shared values that 
used to generate ideological legitimacy (Murphy 1998: 73ff.). While in terms of realpo-
litik, ideology had already given way to pragmatism during the 1970s and 1980s, the 
crisis that gave the final blow to ideological legitimacy arrived with the fall of the Sovi-
et Union and the end of the Cold War. The reversal of economic policies such as im-
port-substituting industrialization and alignment with Western countries lent a hollow 
sound to previous rhetoric.  
It is somewhat demanding to discern the manifestation of a crisis of ideological legiti-
macy. One indicator might be a changed regime discourse that increasingly neglects 
ideology, especially when this ideology used to be central for the regime. If the discrep-
ancy between regime action and discourse becomes too blatant, this might lead to a cri-
sis. In the public space, a debate on the appropriate ideological orientation of the regime 
is a very strong indicator for a crisis, given the ample opportunities for control over the 
media in the Arab world. However, this could also serve to justify a shift towards an 
alternative ideology. On the addressees’ side, emerging alternatives to the former ideo-
logies are an important indicator for a crisis. Most prominently, ever since the 1970s, a 
revival of religion has been observed throughout the region (and in other parts of the 
world, for that matter). The dominant argument is that Islam, especially in its political 
activist form, has filled the vacuum left by the demise of Socialism and Pan-Arabism. 
The discernable growth and strength of Islamic movements might serve as an indicator 
for ideological crisis in this respect. Public demonstrations demanding political reform 
on the basis of Islamic values prove the loss of state hegemony in terms of agenda set-
ting and the spreading of norms.  
The recent development can be seen as paralleling social movements in the demising 
Ottoman Empire, when transnational actors started oppositional activism based on an 
ideological amalgam of Islamism and nationalism in the sense of anti-imperialism. The 
crucial and striking difference, however, is that nowadays there is no alternative ideolo-
gy that appeals to the masses. In earlier times, Islamist transnational actors competed 
with liberal, nationalist and communist groups – even though their popularity was rather 
limited. The advent of an ideological crisis of legitimacy therefore seems likely and 
hard to avoid. Still, the Arab uprisings challenge the idea that there must be an ideology 
in order to achieve mobilization. 
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2.2.2.4. Religious Legitimacy 
Religious legitimacy refers either to the perception of the ruler as a religious authority 
or to the use of religion as an ideological and/or institutional foundation of the state. For 
the first case, in the Arab states as part of the Muslim world the element of legitimacy 
that applies is descent from the prophet’s family, which the monarchs of both Morocco 
and Jordan claim for themselves. While such a claim leaves few possibilities for dispute 
– as long as the according historical narrative is plausible or at least widely accepted – 
there are further ways of appealing to the pious populace. Another way of meeting the 
people’s expectations is the public display of the ruler’s piety by the performance of 
religious rites such as the pilgrimage to Mecca or public prayer, especially during Ram-
adan. A further common element is the integration of sharia law into a state’s legal 
system. This is the case in most Arab states, especially in domains where sharia law 
provides detailed regulations, which primarily concerns personal status law.  
However, this source is in danger as soon as the divergence between the elites’ rhetoric 
and their own behavior is perceived as unbearable, which was the case in Saudi Arabia. 
When rulers literally gamble away their moral and thus religious credibility, a crisis 
might occur. The 1979 attack on and occupation of the Grand Mosque in Mecca was the 
most obvious example of such a crisis. It is somewhat hard to measure a lesser crisis of 
religious legitimacy, but it might exist whenever citizens start to pray in illegal mosques 
and join outlawed Islamist parties or demonstrations. However, the mere existence of a 
strong Islamic movement doesn’t constitute a crisis as long as it acts within the limits 
set by the regime, as some sort of loyal opposition. But if Islamist activists call for the 
overthrow of a ruler who tries to use religion as a source of legitimacy, as was the case 
in Saudi Arabia in 1979, we can certainly speak of a crisis.  
 
Summarizing the results of the previous subchapters, table 2.2 lists the different sources 
of legitimacy as well as the likeliness and manifestations of their possible crises. 
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Table 2.2: Crises of Classical Sources of Legitimacy in the Arab World 
Source Likeliness and type of crisis Manifestation of crisis 
tradition low: crisis of succession power struggles, popular de-
mands for a republic 
religion medium: growing incongruence of 
regime’s and citizens’ norms 
 
elites’ disregard of sharia 
loss of credibility, (growth of 
oppositional Islamist move-
ments) 
growing militancy of Islamists 
collectivist 
ideology 
high: decline of ideology,  
acting against ideology  
emergence of alternatives  
Islamist demonstrations 
material 
legitimacy 
low in rentier states: decline of state 
revenues 
reduction of social expenditures 
high in semi-rentier states: increas-
ing external debt, state bankruptcy 
bread riots, calls for accountabil-
ity 
 
 
2.3. THE ARAB UPRISINGS AS A CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY 
The following subchapter first sketches out some general consequences the Arab upris-
ings had for the question of legitimacy and then relates the crises back to the different 
sources of legitimacy. It goes on to discuss scholarly assessments of these new devel-
opments, touching upon the question what role regime types played in general. Finally, 
some of the literature that continues to study authoritarian strategies of political rule is 
presented, including some of the more innovative research that seeks to account for re-
cent phenomena. 
The Arab uprisings had an ambiguous effect on politics. On the one hand, new political 
norms became viral. Even though the transformation processes in other Arab states did 
not necessarily result in democratization, the long-held perception that only authoritari-
anism was a viable form of political rule in the region faded away. The political analyst 
Muhammad Abu Rumman spoke of an “Arab democratic wave” in his column in the 
Jordanian independent daily newspaper Al-Ghad (31 March 2011). A new principle of 
legitimacy that had only been evoked in top-down discourse before now became tangi-
ble for Arab citizens to claim themselves. On the one hand, this meant that it became 
harder to censor open resistance against autocratic rule. On the other hand, the unrest 
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and civil war that soon emerged in other countries made it clear that the costs of depos-
ing rulers have been very high and might be too high even for reform activists.40  
Depending on what kinds of protests took place, the intensity of the crisis of legitimacy 
rose. Economic protests resulted in the least intensive crisis of legitimacy. But frequent-
ly, political added to economic grievances. It was yet a further step to call for an over-
throw of the political structures than for mere changes within an existing regime. Relat-
ing the demands voiced during the protests back to the straightforward classification of 
political systems, it becomes obvious that generally speaking, the resource-poor repub-
lics were most affected by protests during which the people demanded the fall of the 
regime (Arabic: isqat an-nizam). Not only were different regimes more or less prone to 
crisis, but also the respective governments’ strategies for managing the Arab uprisings 
diverged in the various settings. Figure 2.2 below roughly illustrates the main tenden-
cies that characterize the protests in Arab countries with different regime characteristics 
that also correspond to certain combinations of sources of legitimacy. 
 
Figure 2.2: Regime Types and Intensity of Crisis during the Arab Uprisings 
 
Monarchy Rich Monarchy Poor Republic Rich  Republic Poor 
Saudi Arabia  Jordan   Algeria  Tunisia 
Kuwait  Morocco  Iraq   Egypt 
Bahrain     Libya   Syria 
Oman         Yemen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regimes that have survived the uprisings tend to be found on the left side and in the 
middle. On the “stable” side, it is hard to study crises when there is little indication for 
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their existence in the first place.41 A higher degree of crisis management is necessary 
when protests actually take place than in the low-intensity cases.  
As this figure shows, the sources of legitimacy described above are in some respects 
still relevant for understanding the Arab world. They especially help explain the level of 
protests and intensity of the existing crises of legitimacy. However, they are neither 
intended nor fit to grasp newer strategies of political rule that are part of recent and on-
going events. The choice of strategies is contingent upon many different factors, such as 
structural constraints and the preferences of actors involved. While a clear analytical 
separation would be desirable, the factors that make a crisis more or less likely also play 
a role in the decision through which strategies the crisis is solved.  
Michel Camau suggests taking the crises of legitimacy as the point of departure for 
studying the prevention and management strategies that incumbent elites employ 
(Camau 2012). However, he differentiates between crises of legitimacy – which all re-
gimes suffer from, at least in the eyes of some – and crises of legitimation. The latter 
exist when large parts of the population engage in open contestation and seek revolu-
tionary change, therefore only Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria fall in 
this category (ibid.).  
After the Arab uprisings, a debate quickly emerged, of course guided by the public, 
whether the post-democratization strand of literature was still relevant or, given the col-
lapse of authoritarian regimes, based on wrong assumptions. As in several countries the 
durability and stability of authoritarian rule had suddenly come to an end, many schol-
ars claimed that it had been grossly overestimated in the strands of research discussed 
above (see e.g. Gause 2011a, 2011b; Teti 2012; Pace & Cavatorta 2012). Various new 
and long neglected objects of study came center stage. Among them were the conten-
tious politics of both well-known and new social actors, including political parties, un-
ions and online activists.42 Some of these works focused on economic grievances, ways 
of mobilization and the role of new technology. In a different vein, the military gained 
new prominence as an object of research.  
As one of the proponents of post-democratization literature (cf. Valbjørn & Bank 2010), 
Morten VALBJØRN critically reviewed the previous research agenda and found that by 
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than the last few decisions taken by an almost ousted ruler. Moreover the effects of such strategies can 
better be studied when they are not lost in turmoil. 
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 The revised edition of Beinin and Vairel’s (2013) work on social movements is one case in point. 
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and large, “this strand within Middle East scholarship has not become obsolete” 
(Valbjørn 2012: 26). Especially the fact that processes of democratization are much 
more rare than other forms of regime change leads to his “less optimistic” outlook, as-
suming less change than continuity for the near future (Valbjørn 2012: 29). While on 
the level of possible research interests and relevance of topics a broader perspective on 
politics seems to be appropriate, one desiderate now is “to understand how the changed 
regional and domestic contexts and the general re-politicization affect the choice of re-
gime survival strategies, including their potential for success” (Valbjørn 2012: 33). This 
is also the point of departure of this thesis. Especially for the “null cases” without major 
changes, which Bellin refers to as “a ‘silent spring’ in the Arab world, […] there is no 
better place to begin to explain their incidence than in the persistence of authoritarian-
ism literature” (2012: 143). 
Also in the francophone political science, a 2012 special issue of Revue Internationale 
de Politique Comparée continues to analyze legitimation strategies of authoritarian re-
gimes, including comparisons of Egypt and Morocco as well as of Oman and Bahrain 
(Valeri 2012), in order to explain the latters’ resilience (see Gatelier & Valeri 2012). 
One argument VALERI brings forward is that the former scattering of the opposition in 
Bahrain now prevents a negotiated exit strategy even for the king (2012: 117). The per-
sonal legitimacy of the rulers of Oman and Bahrain has suffered as they were perceived 
as being disconnected from the population (ibid.: 119). Finally a strategy in Oman is to 
stress the existing stability as a comparative advantage in the region (ibid.: 122).  
One current discussion in the literature that has gained new prominence in the context of 
the Arab uprisings revolves around the question whether monarchies have an advantage 
over republics, and if so, why. Sean Yom and Gregory Gause deny any monarchical 
legitimacy with reference to the overthrown Arab kings of the 1950s and 1960s and 
seek to falsify the existence of traditional legitimacy altogether by hinting at previous 
crises of legitimacy during the tumultuous 1970s (2012: 77f.). They attribute monarchic 
stability to three factors that are mainly valid for the Gulf monarchies: the existence of 
historical cross-cutting coalitions, the availability of hydrocarbon rents, and foreign pa-
trons (Yom & Gause 2012: 81-84). According to their findings, at least two out of the 
three factors are present in every Arab monarchy, with foreign patrons being the com-
mon element in all of the cases (cf. table 2 in ibid.: 86). While empirically the analysis 
is certainly valid and points at important issues, the argument the authors want to make 
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is not convincing at all, but rather backfires. None of the elements that are supposed to 
account for royal “exceptionalism” is in any way specific to monarchies. Instead, they 
can also be found in Arab republics (and may serve to explain their stability in some 
cases as well). So in order to back their theoretical claims, the authors should rather 
have compared monarchies with republics in order to carve out the crucial differences 
between these regime types.  
In his statistical cross-time analysis, Victor Menaldo finds that “political instability for 
the MENA monarchs is considerably less frequent than for the republics. The only ex-
ception is 1955 to 1957 and 1972 to 1975” (2012: 709). Tribalism as the most important 
feature of a “unique political culture has provided the region’s monarchs with legitima-
cy” (ibid.). Argumentation-wise, his analysis does not offer any convincing further ex-
planation that can be used in the following.43 Sean Yom stresses the kings’ autocratic 
statecraft, particularly their ability to stand above politics and therefore better manage 
the opposition (2012: 3). Michael Herb (2012) deconstructs the claim that oil is the 
monarchies’ stabilizing factor through empirical counterevidence. Instead, he adopts a 
legitimation-oriented view by hinting at tradition, and conversely also explains the Bah-
raini uprising through a lack of legitimacy. He suggests the kings’ “ability to promise 
reform” as an outstanding element in that they have leeway for making credible conces-
sions on the long and fictitious road towards constitutional monarchy. Moreover, Herb 
prominently brings up the matter of intra-regional comparison as “the sense amongst 
their citizens that […] monarchical rule was better than the republican alternatives” be-
cause it delivers “less-bad results” (Herb 2012). Both in terms of the intensity of the 
crisis and of the consequences, the patterns are relatively clear: demands were framed in 
a more uncompromising way in republics, and all forced regime changes happened in 
republics. Nevertheless, monarchies were affected by protests, due to a regional conta-
gion which in itself is worth studying. 
Kurt WEYLAND (2012) offers an explanation for the fast spreading of protests across 
the Arab region that is informed by cognitive psychology and posits causal mechanisms 
on the individual level. The “heuristics of availability and representativeness” are two 
inferential shortcuts that replace rational decisions in situations of dramatic and sudden 
events like the Arab uprisings (Weyland 2012: 921). In the heuristic of availability, 
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“[s]tunning events have an excessive impact on perception and thinking, leading people 
to overestimate their likelihood” (ibid.). The representativeness heuristic has two rele-
vant effects: it makes people “believe that patterns visible in limited samples are ‘repre-
sentative’ of the whole population” (ibid.). The second effect is the representativeness 
of the example they see in other contexts, leading them to overestimate similarities and 
discard relevant differences that make the same event unlikely in their own case. Ac-
cording to Weyland and grounded on empirical evidence, the Tunisian model of depos-
ing a president was emulated by Egyptians against all odds. Such a decision for protests 
despite unfavorable circumstances is especially likely when the protest movement lacks 
an organizational leadership that would act much more rationally (ibid.: 922ff.). While 
the protesters in Egypt also achieved their primary goal, the cognitive heuristics are held 
responsible for rather futile demonstrations in other Arab countries: the structural con-
straints and differences were underestimated under the impression of the sudden Tunisi-
an and Egyptian examples. This micro-level approach helps explain why the protests 
spread so quickly across the region, but were mostly unsuccessful. Another mechanism 
accounting for failed protests is the perception by elites that is also informed by the 
events in other countries, leading them to adapt their tactics as to prevent similar devel-
opments (ibid.).  
In a similar vein, LEENDERS AND HEYDEMANN (2012) add a regional dimension to 
Social Movement Theory to explain the onset of protests in Darʻa in Syria. They argue 
that Syrians perceived of external events in Tunisia and Egypt as of changing opportuni-
ty structures in their own countries (Leenders & Heydemann 2012: 141). The authors 
stress how important it was for protesters to actually frame the developments in neigh-
boring countries as new domestic opportunities (ibid.: 143).  
In an earlier contribution, HEYDEMANN AND LEENDERS (2011) had already gone be-
yond mainstream works on the Arab uprisings in not only studying the uprisings, but 
also the “regime responses” in the sense of authoritarian learning. They detected conta-
gion effects not only with the protesters who had real examples of achieving change, but 
also learning effects among those rulers who tried to deal with the political crises and 
aimed at stabilizing the situation. One of their arguments is that in the cases of delayed 
protests, the rulers had the opportunity to learn from their overthrown peers and were 
thus better prepared to evaluate their options and, in most cases, quell the uprisings 
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(Heydemann & Leenders 2011: 651). At this point, the repression of protests in general 
gained new scholarly interest.  
The developments of the Arab uprisings were among other things characterized by the 
decisive role of military behavior and gave a boost to the study of the military and secu-
rity forces after decades of scholarly negligence.44 Building on her previous work on 
repression which has already been discussed above in 2.2.1., Eva Bellin (2012) repeated 
her argument about how the military’s will and capacity to repress come about. One of 
the strengths of her contribution is that she offers a region-wide explanation of military 
defection or non-defection. While the capacity to repress is determined by fiscal health 
and international support networks, the will to repress depends upon the institutionaliza-
tion of the military and popular mobilization (Bellin 2012: 128f.). In the following, 
Bellin discusses reasons for popular mobilization which are more specific to recent 
events, mentioning grievances, emotional triggers, the new-found sense of impunity, 
and social media (ibid.: 136).  However, as she tries to answer two questions at the same 
time (i.e. when does the military defect, and why was there a surge in popular mobiliza-
tion), her analysis of repression falls short of including other strategies that are em-
ployed simultaneously, although she mentions “the ‘right’ mix of repression and coop-
tation” in the introduction. Moreover, neither are the target groups of repression consid-
ered nor are agents of repression besides the military forces analyzed.  
Not only was the behavior of the security forces decisive for the outcome of regime 
change or not, but it also affected the dynamics between protests and repression on a 
lower level. Ryan posits that “in every case where the civilian pro-democracy and pro-
reform demonstrators were peaceful, the degree of violence was determined not by 
them, but by the responses and actions of government security forces” (2012: 155).  
Josua & Edel (2014) offer a more holistic explanation of the decision for repression, 
considering characteristics of the state, the regime and the challenge posed by oppo-
nents in an integrated framework. After offering an addressee-oriented definition of 
repression, which has already been cited above, we tested various hypotheses regarding 
the circumstances under which more repression is likely. The disaggregation of repres-
sion also took into account different types that are employed and the target groups. 
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However, as repression was studied as the dependent variable, our analysis did only 
marginally consider its effects. 
Having shed light on some current contributions on strategies of political rule during the 
Arab uprisings, it has become clear that there are many innovative approaches, but also 
loose ends. The analytical framework which will be presented in the next subchapter 
seeks to bind together some of these in order to approach a more holistic model.  
 
2.4. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.4.1. An Alternative Framework for Analyzing Legitimation 
The aim of the following section is to broaden the perspective from merely region-
specific sources of legitimacy to a more general framework of analysis that is applicable 
both to the study of crises during the Arab uprisings and other cases around the world. 
A variety of taxonomies for classifying subtypes of legitimacy has been offered, both in 
the standard literature as reviewed above and in recent approaches (for the latter see i.a. 
Sedgwick 2010, Pruzan-Jørgensen 2010, Murphy 1998). However, from the elabora-
tions above follows a slightly different focus as regards the importance of the suggested 
types and also a different categorization. In order to broaden the picture again and to 
gain a more holistic perspective on the mechanisms of strategies of political rule in Ar-
ab states today, first an alternative typology of legitimation is presented that takes into 
account the considerations of the discussion of the literature.  
An integration of the classifications by Weber and Easton in their empirical-analytical 
tradition serves as the basis for the framework of types of legitimation. As mentioned 
before, Easton distinguishes between the structural, ideological and personal types of 
legitimacy (Easton 1965: ch. 19). His typology remains on a very abstract level. In order 
to gain more substantial categories, Easton’s types are supplemented and/or specified 
according to the elaborations on the region-specific sources described above, taking into 
account the contents of legitimation that are predominant in the region and cases under 
investigation. The subcategories chosen for the sake of this study are partially derived 
from the discussion of “classical” sources of legitimacy above: structural, traditional, 
identity-related, material, and personal legitimacy.  
This typology mends the various shortcomings of other approaches: it is empirically 
more relevant than Weber’s categorization and is situated on a level of abstraction be-
tween Easton’s grand general categories and more fine-grained analyses.  
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
48 
 
In addition, the typology offered here points directly at the structural opportunity for 
translation into strategies of legitimation, according to Easton’s claim that “the sources 
that feed and fortify sentiments of legitimacy can also be interpreted as devices through 
which the members of a system may seek to arouse or maintain a minimal level of sup-
port” (Easton 1965: 289). This means that the basic resources and possibilities for gar-
nering support in the various fields can be assessed and subsequently the various strate-
gies that are actually employed are investigated. This additional step may illustrate 
where there is potential for which strategies or not. The following paragraphs spell out 
the particular meanings that are connoted to my usage of the terms.   
Structural legitimacy describes “the extent to which they [the authorities, M.J.] are per-
ceived to occupy valid roles in the political structure, to have been selected in accord-
ance with the norms of the regime, and to wield their power in the manner prescribed by 
these norms and by the regime goals” (ibid.: 298f.). Structural legitimacy as it will be 
used here partly corresponds to Weber’s notion of rational legitimacy, albeit in a modi-
fied sense that more aptly grasps its function in authoritarian regimes. It refers to formal 
and informal institutions that are present in any regime. Easton’s terminology is pre-
ferred over Weber’s legal-rational legitimacy which would be misleading in the Arab 
world due to the dominance of informal institutions and practices despite the existence 
of codified laws in neo-patrimonial regimes. Of course the concept of neo-
patrimonialism explicitly refers to legal-rational elements, especially the bureaucracy, 
and thereby differs from patrimonialism proper. But these institutions do not work ac-
cording to the rational principles Weber envisioned, and legitimacy does not accrue 
primarily from the regime’s rationality, but from tradition and the provision of welfare 
services (Pawelka 1985: 24f.). Although rulers constantly refer to laws, these laws do 
not serve as the foundation and restriction of rule. Rather, laws are created and rede-
signed to fit the ruler’s needs as his tools. Therefore, rule is not rational in Weber’s 
sense. Structural legitimacy as it will be used here concerns the setup of the polity, in-
cluding institutions reminiscent of democracies such as parliaments, elections, and other 
“imitative institutions” (Albrecht & Schlumberger 2004: 380 ff.). As to the mode of 
symbol politics, talking about democracy in the domestic public sphere and referring to 
the political system as a democracy in discourse are strategies that are supposed to fos-
ter this type of legitimacy. One often mentioned possibility for structural legitimation in 
the sense of co-optation is the widening of political participation. This never amounts to 
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participation in a democratic sense, but rather implies the responsiveness of elites. 
Common strategies are granting citizens a greater say in politics and including hitherto 
underprivileged groups into decision-making structures. One important addressee of co-
optation is the legal opposition.45 
Traditional legitimacy in the classical Weberian sense is understood in the same way it 
has been used in area studies as described above, although separate from religious 
claims. Traditional legitimation is more credible and thus more likely to be successful in 
monarchies than in republics. The political culture is especially important, as rulers can 
strive to attain the crucial congruence46 of traditional norms with their self-
representation and other strategies of rule, such as paternalism.47  
Easton’s category of ideology is much broader than the notion of ideological legitimacy 
described above in the specific historical context of the Arab region. For Easton, ideol-
ogy is “[o]ne of the most stable sources of support for a regime” (Easton 1965: 293) in 
that it also possesses potential for manipulation by the regime (ibid: 296f.). In order to 
avoid confusion with the above mentioned area-specific ideological legitimacy and to 
grasp a broader array of strategies that concern the construction of citizens’ identities, 
this type is called identity-related legitimacy. Concerning the according strategies of 
legitimation, there are two important subtypes; one refers to nationalism, the other to 
religion.48 For garnering identity-related legitimacy in a nationalist vein, symbol politics 
are of utmost importance, e.g. by creating a narrative around an “imagined community” 
(Anderson 1983). Probable addressees for nationalist legitimation strategies are ethnic 
groups or individuals with a nationalist ideology or agenda. Minority politics might play 
a role here. In the religious sector, on the legal level one possibility is to introduce or to 
strengthen regulations that are in accordance with religious law. On the discourse level, 
regime elites may adopt religious arguments for legitimating their policies or display 
their personal piety. As to co-optation in the domain of religion, binding religious lead-
ers to the regime is a standard strategy of religion politics. But even ideological currents 
                                                 
45
 The overlap with the legal regulation mode becomes clear when considering that both strategies are 
implemented by using or introducing elections, parliaments, and other formal and informal institutions. 
46
 See Pickel and Stark (2010) for the general relation between political culture and legitimacy in auto-
cratic regimes. 
47
 Schatzberg (2001) presents an empirical study of the relation between political culture and legitimacy 
in Africa. 
48
 Pickel (2010: 198) also cites ideology as a source of legitimacy, comprising nationalism, equality, reli-
gion and shared norms.  
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that are incompatible with the officially promoted interpretation of religion might be co-
opted through adopting a laisser-faire approach. 
Material legitimacy is a twofold category that needs further specification in relation to 
its ideological background and outlook concerning economic aims. Two dominant 
mindsets may serve as guidelines for which strategies to pursue: either equality-oriented 
mass allocation in a collectivist sense, which is attained through state-led development, 
or modernization in a neo-liberal vein which is supposed to foster economic growth in 
terms of macroeconomic indicators. Material legitimacy comprises a large part of what 
might elsewhere be subsumed under the label of performance legitimacy (Easton 1965, 
Brooker 2009). Performance legitimacy generates specific support in Easton’s termi-
nology. It is neglected in the suggested framework because policies are treated as a dis-
tinct mode of legitimation (see below) that can be applied in all different types of legit-
imation strategies and is therefore already sufficiently accounted for in this framework. 
Material legitimacy, by contrast, aims only at the citizens’ welfare, or at least a sub-
group of them. 
Personal legitimacy flows “from the estimate of the personal merit and worth of the 
authorities rather than only from the validity of their position in the system or their 
compatibility with the ideological premises of the members” (Easton 1965: 303). Again, 
this broad category is preferred over Weber’s more specific and empirically rare char-
ismatic legitimacy, which in the Arab world may only be ascribed to Nasser and proba-
bly Gaddafi. A stretching of this concept occurs frequently, referring to what should be 
categorized more generally as personal legitimacy. It is based on the ruler’s credibility 
and personal abilities.49 In the predominantly neo-patrimonial Arab regimes, personal, 
even familial ties and the ruler’s personal qualities are central. One important element 
here is to portray a ruler as a modern personality with a genuine intention to reform etc., 
leading other credible persons, e.g. opinion leaders, to endorse his words and deeds.  
 
Legitimacy is not only contextual in relation to the norms and rules of a specific society, 
the respective society is also embedded in a regional environment of surrounding socie-
ties which share some features, but differ with respect to others. As the example on ma-
terial legitimation showed, legitimacy is not only assessed in relation to previous times. 
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 For Albrecht and Frankenberger, merito-personal legitimacy is a defining core trait of authoritarian 
regimes in general (2010: 57f.). 
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Moreover, citizens perceive of legitimacy also in comparison to the characteristics of 
other regimes. This creates an opportunity for the respective rulers to present them-
selves as more liberal, more secular or more pious, safer or better than those of sur-
rounding states (see Schlumberger 2008: 173f. for the basic idea). The existence of op-
position and the possibility of dissent fulfill the function of proving the liberal orienta-
tion of a regime in comparison to other authoritarian regimes (Albrecht 2005: 391).  
The way regional conditions influence the public perception of a regime’s legitimacy 
brings an international dimension into the analytical framework.50  
Such a cross-national advantage as a relational element is not a legitimizing factor of 
its own. Rather, it plays a role in the citizens’ perception of each strategy when there are 
points of comparison. Cross-national comparisons have become even more relevant 
after the successful uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. The example of regime change has 
become present in the minds of Arab citizens and poses a perpetual threat to incum-
bents. During the Arab uprisings, Michael Herb claims that “the monarchs benefited 
from the general sense among the Arab public that the monarchs were not so bad as the 
presidents” (Herb 2012). But this mechanism works also in a cross-time dimension. The 
empirical analysis seeks to show what role the “cross-national advantage” plays in the 
success of strategies, under which conditions it works and to what extent it is 
instrumentalized by the rulers themselves. 
The typology presented above makes it possible to capture the variety of legitimating 
factors in every Arab state. All legitimation strategies within different types might be 
employed at the same time. This conceptualization tells us something about the quantity 
and variety of legitimation efforts. Although it does not allow for a weighting of factors, 
the relative importance of single strategies might be deduced from the frequency and 
intensity of legitimation measures. 
The first advantage of this framework is its universal applicability because it is situated 
on a relatively high level of abstraction. Second, as it is open to content-wise specifica-
tions, it has the potential to integrate more factors and thus to offer more detailed infor-
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 Matters are complicated further when thinking of transnational personalities who themselves enjoy 
legitimacy in countries other than their own and thus negatively affect the citizens’ perception of their 
national elites. This is especially true for figures with some kind of religious background, such as 
Hizbullah’s leader Hassan Nasrullah (Schlumberger 2010: 244; Sedgwick 2010: 259ff.). This aspect, 
however, is only peripheral to my research questions and will thus not be tackled in this thesis. 
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mation than other typologies without adding more categories. The framework aims at 
covering the complete repertoire of strategies at a given point in time.  
As a further dimension of the framework, the addressees of the strategies are taken into 
account. The addressees that were mentioned in the working definition of legitimation 
are individuals, groups, or the whole population. The working definition of repression 
also differentiated between these three levels and specified opposition leaders, rank-
and-file activists or the politically inactive population. Depending on the type of the 
strategy and its content-wise area, the relevant groups differ. Those groups or persons 
who play a role in the crises of legitimacy as either being part of the regime base or be-
ing challengers are taken into account in the empirical part.  
For assessing the success or failure of the strategies of political rule under investiga-
tion, the addressees’ possible reactions or responses are relevant. Table 3 gives an over-
view over the strategies and the addressees’ different reactions. As explained before and 
demonstrated in figure 2 above in section 2.1.5, co-optation is seen as a more specific 
subset of legitimation. In the same vein, the successful result of co-optation, loyalty, is a 
subset of acceptance. On the negative side, the failure of co-optation (opposition) is a 
more specific subset of the failure of general legitimation strategies, which would be 
rejection on a more abstract level. Table 2.3 below illustrates the varieties of possible 
responses.  
 
Table 2.3: Strategies of Political Rule and Addressees’ Responses 
 
Legitimation Repression 
 
Success 
Co-optation 
 
Failure 
 
Success 
 
Failure Success Failure 
Acceptance Loyalty Opposition Rejection Deterrence P/rotest cont’d 
 
Lastly, the modes of legitimation are a further dimension of analysis. I propose a struc-
ture along three modes of legitimation: a legal mode, a symbolic mode, and a policy 
mode. The first mode refers to institutionalized regulations, grasping in the first place 
formal institutions and legal changes. The second mode covers Easton’s “statements” 
and deals with discourses and symbol politics, taking into account speeches, rituals, and 
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other symbolic acts. The third mode describes material policies, referring to the more 
tangible output of the political system, which also includes informal institutions. The 
differentiation according to modes serves heuristic purposes. But it also reveals more 
detailed insights about the strategies. More than one mode can be employed at the same 
time for the implementation of a strategy, which can serve as an indicator for the seri-
ousness which is ascribed to it. Other than a complementary logic, when various modes 
are used, contradictions between them may arise. Such contradictions between strategies 
within the same type of legitimation might be resolved when the potentially different 
addressees are taken into account.  
 
All in all, the framework allows for an analysis of three levels (although depicted in two 
dimensions in Table 2.4) in that it categorizes strategies according to the underlying 
type of legitimacy, the mode of legitimation, and further differentiates between the 
strategies’ addressees. It combines the analysis of three out of the four possible focuses 
of research on legitimacy that Schlumberger had proposed, except for a numeric or 
quantitative measurement (2010: 236ff.). 
 
Table 2.4: Framework: Types, Contents and Modes of Legitimation in Autocracies  
 
 
Type 
          Mode 
Subtype/ 
Content 
Legal mode:  
legal regulations, 
formal institutions 
Symbolic mode: 
discourse, 
symbol politics 
Policy mode : 
material policies, 
output 
structural     
traditional     
identity-
related 
nationalism    
religion    
material  collectivism    
neo-liberal 
modernization  
   
personal     
 
2.4.2. General Hypotheses 
In the considerations above, various hypotheses have already been presented that refer 
to different points in the causal chain that is to be analyzed. First, most pertinent are 
those hypotheses that directly relate to the main research question of how successful 
different strategies of political rule have been. For the solution of the crisis of legitima-
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cy, it is decisive to use strategies that are successful in the end. Therefore few successful 
strategies may be more effective than many failing strategies. But still, the likelihood of 
achieving success rises with the number of strategies employed. The underlying as-
sumption is that the more strategies are used, the higher the chance that at least some are 
successful and the greater the chances for overcoming crises of legitimacy (Hnumber). 
When legitimation strategies are concentrated on a few addressees, the chance for suc-
cess might be higher, but at the expense of the others’ approval (Hfewaddressees). As it is 
easier to prevent a shift of previously loyal citizens to the opposition than to attract for-
mer contenders, the co-optation that aims at strengthening the regime base is more like-
ly to be successful than attempts at its widening (Hbase). Repression is expected to be 
more successful if it is precisely targeted and not employed in an indiscriminate way 
(Htarget). Moreover, when directed at groups that are excluded anyway, repression is 
more likely to be regarded as legitimate by others than if it targets the former regime 
base (Hlegrepression).  
The more different addressees the strategies are directed towards, the higher is the 
chance for overall survival. However, inconsistencies might arise from the employment 
of contradictory strategies, as Linz (1964: 322) hints at the competition of legitimizing 
formulae, possibly affecting the success of otherwise working strategies (Hcontradictions). 
Therefore, special attention will be given to the question whether such strategies add up 
and thus complement or rather neutralize each other. 
One hypothesis concerning the “cross-national advantage” is that under conditions of 
war or insecurity in a neighboring country, legitimacy is expected to rise since the popu-
lation is reminded of their interest in physical security which their ruler can still provide 
(Hadvantage). 
Moreover, the perception of a lack of viable alternatives as regards political personnel 
and the regime as such is expected to raise legitimacy (Halternatives). 
More specific hypotheses that follow from the elaborations on the sources of legitimacy 
will be tested in the empirical comparison of a resource-rich republic versus a resource-
poor monarchy. Traditional legitimation is more credible and thus more likely to be 
successful in a monarchy than in a republic (Htradition). Material legitimation can mainly 
be successful in those cases where no immediate regional comparative disadvantage is 
present (Hmaterial). It is however hard to foretell which combination of factors allows for 
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more successful strategies overall, the empirical analysis can hopefully shed light on 
this question. 
Apart from the immediate research question, some hypotheses have been discussed that 
are central to the protesters’ calculations and are therefore relevant for the course of 
events and the regime strategies that are taken. Several hypotheses can be derived from 
Weyland’s (2012) work, embedding the protests in a larger regional context. Reversing 
one of his arguments for mobilization, as long as the heuristic of representativeness 
does not take hold in a country, mass protests on a large scale are rather unlikely 
(Hrepresentativeness). However, the more citizens regard their domestic structures as similar 
to those in a case of successful protests, the more likely they are to engage in conten-
tious action (Hsimilar). Therefore, in the Arab context republics should generally be more 
prone to protests than monarchies (Hrepublic). Moreover, the better organized the protest 
movement is, the less likely are radical demands (Weyland 2012: 924). This depends on 
the question of how quickly the demonstrators organize and whether they are unified at 
all (Horganization). 
While this multitude of hypotheses could be distilled from the diverse literature and 
own considerations, the focus of the empirical analysis later will not be on testing them 
all in a rigorous way. Rather, the aim of the comparison is to analyze the strategies and 
then relate them back to the hypotheses in a theory-building manner. They serve as a 
starting point for the inductive generation of new hypotheses. 
 
2.4.3. Operationalization 
The main task in the empirical analysis is not only to analyze the various regime strate-
gies, but to elaborate if they match the preferences or demands of addressees and thus 
can be deemed successful. The overall aim is to show whether the strategies of legitima-
tion actually work and thus legitimacy is attained or not and to what degree. The strate-
gies within the framework of different types of legitimation sketched out in section 2.4. 
above will therefore be described along with the addressees of these strategies. Regard-
ing all three modes, each strategy will be considered as a response to certain demands. 
When the measures aim at answering a demand of the addressees, an assessment of their 
effectiveness in meeting the respective need or satisfying the demand should enable us 
to state whether the strategy worked.  
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Legitimation: Many attempts at operationalizing legitimacy take their point of depar-
ture in Easton’s two types of support (Gerschewski 2013, Westle 1989). The work by 
Gerschewski comes closest to the research design proposed here in suggesting a gener-
ally applicable framework for measuring legitimation, repression, and co-optation. He 
follows the Eastonian subdivision in the subtypes of diffuse and specific support for 
measuring legitimacy. Specific support is operationalized as the elites’ performance in 
the economic, social, and public order areas (Gerschewski 2013: 20). Diffuse support 
could according to Gerschewski be measured either “via qualitative assessments of 
country experts”, or as the gap between “official legitimacy claims” and “the social real-
ity” (Gerschewski 2013: 21). While such a gap of perceptions exists even in democra-
cies, this approach seems too rough and abstract and therefore of little use for qualita-
tive research. For the purpose of this thesis it makes more sense to go on a more fine-
grained level of single measures and look for patterns after re-aggregating these factors.  
An alternative approach Gerschewski proposes is to measure the absence of legitimacy, 
quantified as the number of protests (Gerschewski 2013: 20). For studying the Arab 
uprisings as a time of politicization, the sheer number of protests is definitively signifi-
cant. However, the intention, size, and demands of demonstrations are decisive for as-
sessing whether they are indicative of a lack of diffuse support. Especially when it 
comes to socioeconomic demands, many protests that are counted are limited both in 
size and demands and bear little potential for unification, as they are organized by 
groups representing only particular interests. For assessing the symbolic mode of legit-
imation strategies, measuring the frame resonance would be the ideal way to find out 
about success or failure.51 As it is empirically impossible to establish statements from 
directly asking the addressees, I constrain myself to evaluating the empirical credibility 
of the framing as one indicator for frame resonance as suggested in the literature 
(Benford & Snow 2000: 619ff.).  
Regarding the various types of strategies, different indicators are important, some of 
which can be named, although for the purpose of this qualitative study a quantitative 
measurement is omitted. However, a deviance from the status quo before the crisis of 
legitimacy manifested itself in protests serves as the threshold for initiating the explica-
tion of strategies. For strategies of structural legitimation, processes of legislative re-
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 For an overview of the conceptual background of studying framing processes see i.a. Benford and 
Snow (2000). 
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form are an indicator on various levels: the output as well as the discourse about new 
legal measures and the process of policy-making itself all need to be studied in order to 
assess the effectiveness of the measures. The triangulation of different modes within 
one type is important for detecting contradictions and therefore a good predictor for the 
actual success a single strategy can have in the first place. 
The measures taken have to be embedded in the structural circumstances that are given 
in the respective country, which includes social, religious, ethnic, and economic condi-
tions, besides rather historical factors such as the political culture and events of the re-
cent past. One further aspect that should be paid attention to is whether the strategies are 
intensified or even new, thus demonstrating a qualitative difference of the response to 
the Arab uprisings in comparison to previous crises.  
As regards the operationalization of co-optation as a subtype of legitimation, again a 
qualitative approach is adopted in looking at the co-opted groups or individuals. As al-
ready mentioned, Gerschewski conceptualizes co-optation differently from legitimation 
as formal institutionalization and informal patronage (2013: 22f.). While it is hard to 
measure such concepts anyway, these elements are included in the framework of legiti-
mation presented above. According to the definition given above (2.1.5), the addressees 
of co-optation strategies are given a stake in the status quo, which decreases the proba-
bility that they will voice dissent or act against the regime. Co-optation can therefore be 
deemed successful when we observe a shift in behavior by the group or person ad-
dressed by the strategy towards more pro-regime actions and discourse. For already co-
opted groups or individuals, the equivalent is when there appears to be reason and an 
opportunity for a shift towards a more oppositional stance, but this move is not taken.52 
This allows for the conclusion that co-optation has worked and continues to work.53 
Particularly the acceptance of official posts is a visible sign of co-optation. Whenever 
statements are available, it should be possible to trace whether people that used to dis-
play an antagonistic stance towards the regime moved to a more compliant one. For 
previously apolitical groups, the question is if people shifted from a silent stance to 
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 Measurement in a strict methodological sense would require the identification of all potential address-
ees of co-optation beforehand, then finding out whom elites actually tried to co-opt, and finally assessing 
a change in the behavior of co-opted persons or groups after the measure has been put in place. As the 
analysis is done ex post, such a procedure is impossible to pursue in the context of this thesis.  
53
 I am grateful to Johannes Gerschewski for pointing out this aspect. 
  
openly supporting the regime.
optation through drawing individuals or groups closer to the center of power, with the 
concentric circles depicting the elites grouped around the ruler.
The issue of how sustainable this new attitude is also needs to be addressed. In 
co-optation to be deemed successful, it is assumed as working as long as no open opp
sition against the ruling elites is voiced. Failed co
hough a strategy of co-optation was implemented by ruling elites, a pe
give up on his or her oppositional or dissenting viewpoint, or continues to voice it ope
ly. Moreover, when the change in behavior intended by co
successful, but is not sustained for more than a few weeks or mon
speak of failure.   
 
Figure 2.3: Conceptualizing Co
 
Strategies of repression that do not in the first place serve the purpose of legitimation 
will be analyzed in separate chapters after the analysis of legitimation. Regardi
measurement of repression, only very vague indices are available.
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albeit in a more public or visible sense.
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 The concentric circles are inspired by Bill & Leiden’s depiction of patrimonial administration (1974: 
113) 
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estimation, I have used the Political Terror Scale (Gibney, Cornett, Wood & Haschke 
2014), which ranks countries from 1 (very low repression) to 5 (very high repression).57 
For both the incapacitating and restraining subtypes of repression, first attention will be 
given to the targets according to the working definition in order to evaluate how broadly 
or specifically targeted the measures are. For assessing the repression strategies in the 
restraining subtype, laws that restrict the civil freedoms, obstacles to political participa-
tion and oppositional activity, surveillance and intimidation of the population and the 
use of physical force will be considered. Managing dissent through emergency laws and 
trying activists in military instead of civil courts are common in security states with a 
high level of repression. Regarding the incapacitating subtype of repression, the number 
of detained, killed, and exiled persons during protests is relevant, as are the target 
groups. As any reliable sources are hard to obtain and measurement is especially diffi-
cult in this sensitive field, the focus will not be on an exhaustive empirical analysis 
based on quantitative data, but on the question whether the strategies are employed at 
all. So for some of the strategies, illustrative evidence will suffice to establish that rele-
vant measures were taken.  
As the analysis of legitimation strategies is guided by an addressee-oriented approach, 
the flip side of such measures is oftentimes the exclusion of other target groups – be it 
intentional or not. Therefore, the delegitimizing aspects of measures, wherever discern-
ible, will be described in the same sections.  
 
2.5. SUMMARY  
This chapter has given an overview over the study of legitimacy in general and strate-
gies of political rule in Arab autocracies in particular. I have presented various empiri-
cal-analytical approaches to legitimacy and established working definitions of legitima-
cy and legitimation, co-optation (as a subtype of legitimation) and repression. Moreo-
ver, various typologies have been presented and then reorganized and integrated into a 
distinct analytical framework. The result is a categorization of domestic strategies of 
legitimation according to the underlying type of legitimacy, mode and addressees, 
which is important to later evaluate their success or failure. In a further step, as this 
study seeks to give an exhaustive overview over different strategies, the analysis of le-
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gitimation would be one-sided without taking also repression into account, an under-
studied factor in recent qualitative political science. A more fine-grained disaggregation 
of repression into different subtypes, again with a focus on addressees complements the 
analysis and enables an investigation of the interrelations between the different strate-
gies. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
 
The following short chapter briefly discusses some of the challenges that empirical re-
search on strategies of political rule in the Arab world faces. It then goes on to present 
the methods used, which are process tracing and thick description. In the following, the 
comparative research design including the selection of cases is justified. Afterwards, the 
relevant sources are described. The chapter concludes with an overview over the struc-
ture that guides the empirical analyses in chapters 4 and 5.  
 
3.1. METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES 
In authoritarian polities characterized by opacity (Schedler 2013: 40), the black box of 
political decision-making is even blacker than elsewhere. This is not only true for find-
ing out about how strategies of political rule are chosen, but even more so for those as-
pects of politics that include the opinions of citizens in authoritarian settings. First, it is 
hard to gather all the information necessary and relevant for understanding internal re-
gime dynamics, especially when informality plays a decisive role in politics (Barros 
2005). This is the case in all Arab countries. Regarding the second point, “objective” 
statistical data that could give information on the results of policy implementation is 
often manipulated, incomplete or simply non-existent. Choosing indicators in order to 
trace changes in the degree of legitimacy is extremely difficult already due to conceptu-
al problems, but it is even exacerbated due to insufficient or biased opinion polls. Gath-
ering information about the legitimation of a non-democratic regime is extremely sensi-
tive as it touches the core of political rule. Incumbents themselves are aware of an in-
herent lack of legitimacy, in any case in comparison to democracies. Thus, although the 
central premise of this thesis is that non-democracies do enjoy a certain degree of legit-
imacy (Pawelka 2002: 437), it is hardly feasible to conduct survey research in the Arab 
world in a Western fashion, asking blunt questions about the attitudes of ordinary peo-
ple towards their regimes (Tessler 1987, Tessler & Jamal 2006). In the MENA region 
such field research can hardly be conducted without provoking the suspicion of intelli-
gence services. The degree of liberalism or openness of a political system is not even 
relevant for this matter. For example, citizens’ attitudes toward their authorities have 
been measured in various waves of the World Values Survey around the globe since 
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1981. However, only few Arab countries have been covered since the fourth wave of 
data collection, which started in 1999. Yet, in some of the countries where the survey 
was allowed, specifically political questions were left out of the questionnaires (Egypt, 
Jordan, Morocco, and Iraq).  
But even if data are available, they are hard to interpret. One reason for this is the way 
in which data is collected. The aim of the World Values Survey is a global comparison, 
which is difficult due to political, cultural and linguistic settings, in which the same an-
swer can mean very different things. Apart from this general problem of cross-
nationally transferring concepts and terms, it has already been shown that a large part of 
variation in results is rooted in methodological problems (Heath, Martin & Spreckelsen 
2009: 310). The questionnaires used in Arab countries are in Modern Standard Arabic, 
which differs from vernacular language and in some cases even the respondents’ native 
language. Citizens with low levels of education or illiterates are unfamiliar with the pro-
cedure of answering closed questions, which is aggravated by the formal language.58 A 
cultural bias can distort the answers as it is considered polite to answer in the affirma-
tive.  
Another common problem in survey research, the effects of social expectancy, is rein-
forced by the effects of “political expectancy”, that is respondents expecting intelligence 
services to learn about their answers due to restricted freedom of opinion and conceal-
ing their true opinions due to fear of the consequences.59 For example, results that show 
overwhelming trust in security services can either mean that authorities are respected – 
or simply that the people who were asked didn’t want to arouse any suspicion, did not 
trust the interviewer or the way their questions would be handled. This doesn’t mean 
that all results of quantitative surveys have to be rejected altogether. It depends on how 
sensitive the topic under investigation is. Unfortunately, the question of legitimacy is 
the very heart of politically sensitive topics. Therefore, the validity and usefulness of 
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 I happened to accompany a survey team conducting interviews with questionnaires in a refugee camp 
in Jordan, where the discrepancy between the style of questions, the way of asking and the real existing 
setting of the interviews became very tangible, with children screaming, the telephone ringing, neighbors 
passing by and a respondent who could not care less about the survey. 
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 The authors of a survey undertaken in Algeria indicate that some young men were unwilling to com-
plete questionnaires, “saying that the Algerian authorities were the mastermind behind it and that the 
objective was mainly to single out extremists and control them” (Khemissi, Larémont & Taj Eddine 2012: 
557).  
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quantitatively collected material is limited and its pitfalls should always be borne in 
mind.  
In case results are hard to believe, there are various ways to interpret them apart from 
the reasons given above. They might be captured in the Gramscian notion of hegemony, 
expressing the fact that one interpretation of the world actually attained predominance, 
or hegemony.60 Political socialization and framing play their roles in shaping citizens’ 
opinions up to a point at which it might become hard to tell the difference between 
one’s own opinion and official discourse. 
 
3.2. METHODS USED 
As described in the conceptual chapter above, the research interest of this thesis focuses 
on addressee-oriented strategies of political rule. Neither the identification of strategies, 
their categorization into the framework nor the evaluation of the success or failure of the 
specific measures can be tackled through quantitative measurement. Instead, a qualita-
tive approach is necessary. For choosing an appropriate method, it is important to first 
establish what this thesis is about. This concerns the research question and the phenom-
enon to be studied about which more general statements are sought (George & Bennett 
2005: 77). 
The class of phenomena of which the research object is an example is the management 
of a crisis of legitimacy. More specifically, the subclass of this phenomenon is tempo-
rally defined as the distinct period of legitimacy crises during the Arab uprisings. For 
assessing the empirical success or failure of strategies of political rule, detailed case 
studies using the method of process tracing are well suited. Process tracing as it has 
been described by George and Bennett (2005), David Collier (2011) and others is a 
qualitative method that is especially apt for the social sciences as it serves to detect 
causal mechanisms, which is in line with the goal of this study. George and Bennett 
offer the following definition: “The process-tracing method attempts to identify the in-
tervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an inde-
pendent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable” (2005: 206). 
It is worth noting that a thorough application of this method is by no means less de-
manding than the rigorous procedures in quantitative social sciences because ideally, 
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 Schlumberger (2010: 235) hints at this aspect. See Martin (1997: 38ff.) for the interplay of hegemony 
and legitimation in Gramsci’s thought.  
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“all the intervening steps in a case must be as predicted by a hypothesis” (ibid., italics in 
original). One task of this study is therefore to derive as many hypotheses as possible 
from existing theories and deduce the implications that follow from them in order to test 
them against empirical evidence.  
The overall aim of the analysis is a contribution to theory-building in the field of regime 
survival strategies. After establishing the empirical basis in the following chapters, it is 
necessary to move up the ladder of abstraction for explaining stability (Sartori 1991). In 
the words of George and Bennett, “[W]hen explanations for the outcome of individual 
cases vary, the results can be cumulated and contribute to the development of a rich, 
differentiated theory about that phenomenon” (2005: 216). Of course, there is always 
the danger of establishing competing theories that together overdetermine the empirical 
evidence (ibid.: 218). There are no straightforward solutions to this general problem of 
qualitative social science which is also connected to the small-N problem: there are too 
many variables and too few cases. The focused comparison of two cases takes up this 
criticism through the MDSO design (see below). Process-tracing is especially suitable 
for this thesis also because it “encourages the investigator to be sensitive to the possibil-
ity of equifinality” (ibid.: 215). This is in line with the logic underlying the most dissim-
ilar systems design with similar outcome which is employed here. 
Regarding the delicate question of causality in social science, “process-tracing is one 
means of attempting to get closer to the mechanisms or microfoundations behind ob-
served phenomena” (George & Bennett 2005: 147). Regarding the levels of analysis, as 
has already been mentioned in the theoretical part, this study follows the principle of 
methodological individualism, which entails the so-called “micro-to-macro problem” of 
inferring from individuals’ actions to a systemic level (Coleman 1994: 6). In order to 
trace causal mechanisms, the micro level is indispensable for analyzing the impact of 
strategies and reactions towards them.  
The procedure for building the causal process is to establish “a good narrative or […] a 
timeline that lists the sequence of events. One can then explore the causal ideas embed-
ded in the narratives, consider the kind of evidence that may confirm or disconfirm the-
se ideas, and identify the tests appropriate for evaluating this evidence” (Collier 2011: 
828f.). More precisely, “[e]vidence that a given stimulus caused a given response can be 
sought in the sequence and structure of events and/or in the testimony of actors explain-
ing why they acted as they did” (Van Evera 1997: 65). Process tracing draws the re-
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searcher’s attention to crucial events that mattered for the development as turning 
points, “which in turn permits good analysis of change and sequence” (Collier 2011: 
824). This objective is also intended for studying the sequencing of legitimation and 
repression that is one of the focuses in the empirical chapters. Furthermore, these turn-
ing points will be analyzed through another method which originates from social an-
thropology, ethnographic description. Thick description as described by Clifford Geertz 
(1973) shall serve to understand the specific context in which protests took place in de-
tailing the circumstances and course of events. In Geertz’ own words, “we gain empiri-
cal access to [symbol systems] by inspecting events” (1973: 17). This procedure should 
be actor-oriented in “setting down the meaning particular social actions have for the 
actors whose actions they are” (Geertz 1973: 27).  
Of course, process tracing is not the ultimate method for solving all problems of social 
sciences. One disadvantage is that it does not allow for statements about necessary or 
sufficient conditions and/or the relative weight of independent variables for an outcome 
(ibid.: 203).61 And as a caveat, process tracing is a demanding method in the context of 
this thesis because “human agents […] may be doing their best to conceal causal pro-
cesses” (George & Bennett 2005: 207) – which is especially true in authoritarian re-
gimes where decision-making processes are even more secretive than elsewhere, bring-
ing us back to where we started.  
 
3.3. CASE SELECTION 
For the purpose of comparison, I follow the logic of Przeworski and Teune’s most dis-
similar systems design (1970) in choosing two cases with a similar intensity as regards 
the crises of legitimacy and similar subsequent outcomes of regime survival under dis-
similar structural conditions in terms of sources of legitimacy. A most dissimilar sys-
tems design usually serves to identify the one common independent variable that ac-
counts for a similar outcome, given a multitude of differences. In this study, the primary 
goal is not to establish one independent variable that is responsible for the outcome. 
Rather, the aim is to look more closely into the causal mechanisms leading to a similar 
outcome and thus to contribute to theory-building. Following these research objectives, 
two cases will be selected as “building block” studies in the sense suggested by George 
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and Bennett. These types of studies serve to “identify alternative causal paths to similar 
outcomes when equifinality is present” (George & Bennett 2005: 76). It makes sense to 
study more than a single case because a higher number of cases enables a researcher “to 
chart the repertoire of causal paths that lead to a given outcome and the conditions un-
der which they occur – that is, to develop a typological theory” (ibid.: 207). Typological 
theorizing means “the development of contingent generalizations about combinations or 
configurations of variables” in the sense of identifying pathways that lead to certain 
outcomes (ibid.: 233). Again, a MDSO design fits very well as the focus lies on “the 
variety of causal patterns that can lead to the outcome of interest and determine the con-
ditions under which these patterns occur” (ibid.: 244; italics are mine). 
As regards this thesis, comparing a resource-rich republic with a resource-poor monar-
chy introduces the greatest possible variety in the foundations of legitimacy. Variance is 
thus present in the structures of legitimacy, the precondition for elites choosing strate-
gies. The consequences as regards the scope of protests, demands, and the intensity of 
the crisis are similar. This comparative background of the analysis enhances the possi-
bility for tracing the mechanisms of single strategies and to uncover in how far they are 
context-dependent. The design is supposed to show under what conditions similar strat-
egies are successful or not and thus whether and how the potential variance materializes 
in actual policies.  
As to case selection, existing cases of resource-poor monarchies include Jordan and 
Morocco; resource-rich republics are Algeria, Iraq, and Libya. The outcome of relative 
stability is definitely not present in Libya, where a civil war in combination with a mili-
tary intervention resulted in a change of regime. Among the republics, Iraq represents a 
rather atypical case in the Arab uprisings, as the aftermath of the US invasion and the 
ensuing civil war together with power struggles between the different sects overshad-
owed the short-lived protests in terms of a regime crisis. This leaves us with Algeria as 
the only remaining case of a resource-rich republic that was affected by the Arab upris-
ings but preserved its regime stability. Among the poor monarchies, the Moroccan re-
form efforts have been hailed in an overly enthusiastic way, undermining the protest 
movement even by outside actors. The challenge the Moroccan king faces appears to be 
relatively manageable. Unlike Morocco, Jordan has seen a higher level of recurrent pro-
tests and therefore seems to have experienced a greater crisis of legitimacy. It qualifies 
also by its dire economic situation, especially due to its precarious geographical situa-
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tion next to Syria and its dependence on energy from external sources. These factors 
make it a more “shaky” case in need of good crisis management strategies. The setup of 
both cases in terms of classical types of legitimacy is thus:  
Algeria:  ideological and material legitimacy 
Jordan:  traditional and religious legitimacy  
Scholarly works that explicitly compare these two countries are scarce. By and large, 
they touch upon more narrow and specific topics rather than macropolitical factors.62 
Mostly, in previous qualitative works the two states were chosen as case studies among 
other Arab countries, but the comparison hardly focused on the two.63  
A thorough comparison of Jordan and Algeria during the Arab uprisings has not been 
undertaken up to this point. This is somewhat surprising since both states share similari-
ties as regards their respective crises of legitimacy. Both Jordan and Algeria experi-
enced a similar level of protests and a similar setup of protest movements, which could 
not build momentum in either state. Instead, the regimes have remained relatively sta-
ble. Both have also been described as already living their second “Arab spring” in 2011, 
after the democratic opening in Algeria in the elections of 1991-1992 following the 
1988 riots and the political liberalization in Jordan following the 1987 bread riots. This 
parallel development also serves as a backdrop for a final within-case comparative 
checking that is supposed to shed light on the distinctiveness of strategies in the Arab 
uprisings – or in the negative case to show they are typical reactions to any regime cri-
sis.  
In the analysis that follows, special attention will be paid to the sequencing of different 
strategies of political rule. It is important to study both legitimation and repression in 
the context of the protests that posed the most tangible challenge to the respective re-
gimes. Therefore, a detailed “thick description” of the key events in the sense of Geertz 
(1973) will be offered in both case studies, focusing on the most important demonstra-
tions that were crucial for setting the course of the protest movements. In Jordan, this 
was the youth movement’s demonstration on March 24 and 25. In Algeria, the protest 
on February 11 was the key event that was decisive for later developments. 
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 Recent examples include Gail Buttorf’s (2011) study on electoral boycott; Hogan & Cavatorta’s (2013) 
work on macroeconomic policy changes after critical junctures; again Cavatorta & Elananza (2008) on 
the relationship between religious and secular actors in civil society; and Tessler & Robbins (2007) on 
support for terrorist acts against the U.S. among ordinary citizens.  
63 Cf. e.g. Schlumberger (2004) and Tessler (2002).  
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3.4. SOURCES 
To find out which strategies of legitimation are being used, I draw on openly available 
sources such as newspaper articles64, other media coverage, online news websites,65 
official statements, reports by local and international organizations, and secondary liter-
ature in order to analyze public discourses and to categorize policies according to the 
framework.66 Moreover, I conducted field trips to Jordan in spring 2011 and to Algeria 
in fall 2013. Further sources are qualitative semi-structured interviews that I conducted 
with analysts from various academic disciplines and consultancy, journalists and activ-
ists in different societal organizations, ranging from current and former members of 
reform movements to functionaries of political parties and autonomous trade unions.67 
In Jordan, I conducted the interviews mostly in English, but sometimes partly in Arabic. 
In Algeria, the working language was French. During the interviews, I took extensive 
notes instead of recording the statements in the hope to encourage more open answers.68 
As authoritarian rule is still in place in both countries, I have decided to keep my inter-
view partners anonymous and identify only their position.69 In contrast, the names of 
speakers in public events and discussions are given in the footnotes.  
Turning to the side of addressees, I resort to a combination of qualitative and quantita-
tive data. Firstly, as to the attitude and behavior of citizens, existing surveys focusing on 
different topics are used, such as those conducted by i.a. the Center for Strategic Stud-
ies, Arab Barometer, and the International Republican Institute (IRI). This means that 
there is some data on the attitudes towards e.g. different political institutions available 
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 For Jordan, especially the Jordan Times as the semi-official English daily newspaper is pertinent. For 
Algeria, the newspapers I used the most are El Watan, Liberté, and Le Quotidien d’Oran. Le Soir 
d’Algérie is also respected, although its appearance is less elitist. “[N]ewspapers help us to recapture the 
perspective of officials at the time.” Deborah Welch Larson 2001: “Sources and Methods in Cold War 
History: The Need for a Theory-Based Archival Approach.” In: Elman, Colin & Miriam Fendius Elman 
(eds.): Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relation. 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 327-350, cit. in George & Bennett (2005: 108, Fn 32).  
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 The most important online news platforms in Jordan are Ammonnews.net and Ammannet.org, while 
various Algerian platforms gather news from other sources, most prominently DjaZairess 
(http://www.djazairess.com).  
66
 I have tried to include relevant scholarly articles that were published until spring 2014.  
67
 The lists of questions that guided the more general interviews especially at the beginning of my re-
search in each country can be found in the appendix. In both countries, over a dozen interviews were 
conducted, in addition to more informal personal communication and participant observation in public 
events. As the field research took place during different phases of the uprisings – in Jordan at the height 
of protests, in Algeria more than two years afterwards – the contents of the interviews also differed. The 
questions posed to representatives of certain groups were more specific and usually only included some of 
these issues. Instead the groups’ possibilities for action were a further pertinent topic in those interviews.  
68
 On the manifold dilemmas of doing field research in the Middle East, cf. Clark (2006). 
69
 The lists of interview partners is not included in this document, but can be provided upon request.  
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for Jordan. In Algeria, however, there is no independent or even semi-independent re-
search institute that conducts opinion polls (Dris-Aït Hamadouche 2009). Regarding the 
behavioral aspect, I include election results and turnout, as far as this can be evaluated 
as significant. Due to the empirical intricacies of authoritarian elections, these data are 
interpreted through qualitative assessment.  
Also, as there are various addressees of legitimation strategies, it would not be advisable 
to conduct interviews with a random sample. Questioning a representative sample of 
each case for all strategies is a logistic impossibility and could not be attained due to 
lack of time and resources. Instead, I conducted in-depth interviews with representatives 
of different parts of the spectrum of society (see above) for purposes of illustration. As 
Geertz claims, “it is not necessary to know everything in order to understand some-
thing” (1973: 20).  
According to the concept laid out above, a more qualitatively informed approach is em-
ployed, complementing aggregate data with interview-based information. Taking the 
different addressees apart from the population as a whole into account, strategically 
important groups are identified and their behavior analyzed, again using both the inter-
views and secondary sources. One of the challenges of this procedure was to identify 
and delimit relevant groups in a way that other researchers might approve of. 
The questions also tackled the disadvantages of neighboring countries. This strategy 
served two purposes: On the one hand, an additional piece of the puzzle of legitimacy 
could be analyzed. On the other hand, the delicacy of direct political questions and an-
swers – at least concerning the regime of the respective country – was avoided. The 
validity and range of the results of this strategy is of course limited. In order to increase 
the validity of results, as many different sources as possible will be taken into account 
for every issue area so that contradictions, especially those caused by biased answers in 
interviews, can be better detected.  
Regarding the timing of my field research, the stay in Jordan fell exactly into the most 
exciting time when the public space was still opening up and a feeling of hope and new 
opportunities was around – more so in March than in April 2011. In Algeria, it was al-
ready much more difficult to find interview partners. Many former activists had disen-
gaged and assumed new roles. Moreover, a feeling of suspicion kept even scholars from 
talking openly about politics or talking to a foreign researcher in the first place. In an-
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other sense it was possible to gain substantial insights because many interview partners 
held multiple positions in different relevant organizations and had a close network.  
In a couple of instances, participant observation of public debates on different topics 
pertaining to political reform was feasible in Jordan. I attended various roundtable dis-
cussions organized by youth activists, a local radio network, and others, all in Arabic 
language. Additionally, I taught seminar sessions on legitimacy in two different M.A. 
level courses at the University of Jordan’s Faculty of International Studies (in the ab-
sence of a political science department), during which I not only tried to find out what 
the students knew about the topic from a conceptual perspective, but also what they 
thought about it in the context of their own political situation. In a way, this setup im-
plicitly resembled a focus group discussion. In Algeria, an informal talk with youth 
likewise turned into a focus group interview. Furthermore, I attended a press conference 
in which societal organizations presented a petition. 
Whenever possible, different sources are triangulated to make sure that possibly biased 
sources are balanced out and that evidence gains validity. 
 
3.5. STRUCTURE OF THE ANALYSIS 
In the following two empirical chapters, the two case studies will be preceded by an 
introductory part that outlines the countries’ basic features before the period of investi-
gation. This includes a short note on important historical backgrounds and the nature of 
the regime in place, referring to strategic groups and the setup of the population in gen-
eral. Moreover, the regime’s bases of legitimacy and the level of repression are present-
ed (subchapter 1). Subchapter 2 deals with the protests before and during the Arab up-
risings beginning in 2010/2011. It offers a thick description of the single most important 
demonstration in each country, which can be regarded as the critical point in the evolu-
tion of protests. Afterwards, the detailed analysis of the strategies of political rule fol-
lows along the typology developed in the conceptual chapter. Different structures are 
thinkable, such as following a chronological order, the mode of legitimation strategies, 
the addressee targeted, or the source of legitimacy. As the point of departure of this the-
sis focuses on the latter, this is the line along which the strategies are structured. The 
second dimension of structuring employed throughout the chapters is the mode. Within 
the subchapters, the procedure is thematic, which sometimes results in a chronological 
and sometimes addressee-related order. First, the challenge of the Arab uprisings to the 
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respective type of legitimacy is delineated. Then, the analysis of the strategies proceeds 
according to the three modes of legitimation and explicates the various addressees as 
well. At the end of each section, the addressees’ response is assessed, as far as this is 
possible, and summarized in a table that recapitulates the strategies employed towards 
different target groups. Following the part on legitimation, the strategies of repression 
are analyzed separately before a brief conclusion completes the respective chapter. Last-
ly, the timeframe taken into account for analyzing the strategies stretches from the first 
protests that can be counted as part of the Arab uprisings until the first parliamentary 
elections afterwards that followed renewed rules of the game and were presented as the 
outcome of a political reform process in both countries. The respective time spans are 
January 2011 through May 2012 in Algeria and January 2011 until January 2013 in Jor-
dan.  
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4. EMPIRICAL STUDY I: JORDAN 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was created from scratch in the tumultuous begin-
ning of the 20th century.70 Not all inhabitants are originally from within the country’s 
borders (so-called Transjordanians), as various flows of refugees from Israel and Pales-
tine, Iraq and Syria have swept the country ever since 1948. The bulk of Jordanian citi-
zens today are of Palestinian origin.71 Although many Palestinians still live in refugee 
camps, most have long become an integral part of Jordanian society supporting the sta-
tus quo.72 The regime’s main base is among the Transjordanian tribes, who are 
overrepresented in the public sector, but also among well-situated businessmen of Pal-
estinian descent.73 According to the logic of rent-seeking and political favoritism, the 
Palestinian bourgeoisie belonging to the upper-class private sector is successful insofar 
that it belongs to networks including top bureaucrats and contacts to the palace (Wils 
2003). Moreover, there are various ethnic and religious minorities, such as Chechens, 
Circassians, and Christians, who are loyal and are represented in parliament through 
quota seats. Another cleavage is between Bedouins (Transjordanian and formerly also 
Palestinian) and city dwellers, with over 80% now living in urban areas. Peters and 
Moore argue that, generally speaking, the Jordanian state builds on a broad ruling coali-
tion (2009: 256).  
Large minorities without special protection or participation are Iraqi and Syrian refu-
gees, foreign laborers such as domestic workers from Asia and workers in construction 
and service from Egypt. Most citizens live in the capital Amman, whereas the rural are-
as – i.e. the desert in the south and provincial towns in the hilly areas in the north – are 
mostly inhabited by Transjordanian tribes.74 
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 For a historical overview cf. Robins (2004) or Milton-Edwards & Hinchcliffe (2009).  
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 While reliable statistics are unavailable and sometimes official numbers of 43% of the total population 
are presented, it is widely assumed that the share of Palestinian Jordanians has reached about 70%.  
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 On the relationship between Transjordanians and Palestinians cf. among others Abu Odeh (1999), who 
looks at the international implications of the Palestinians’ position, and Brand (1999) and Frisch (2002) 
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 On elite patterns and especially the “economization” of the elite cf. Bank and Schlumberger (2004).  
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 On tribes in Jordan cf. Fathi 1994.  
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The reigning and ruling king of Jordan, Abdullah II, has been in power since 1999. De-
spite some hopes for liberalization upon his succession, the result of his first decade in 
power was “ten more years of autocracy” (Yom 2009). Jordan can be characterized as a 
linchpin monarchy (Herb 1999; in more detail cf. Lucas 2004: 108), which means that 
in contrast to the Gulf monarchies, the royal family does not dominate the political elite. 
Instead, the regime is neopatrimonial with the king ruling alone. Still, some members of 
the royal family exert influence over areas that are not part of high politics or the “min-
istries of sovereignty” (wizarat as-siyada) (Herb 1999: 8). Charity, religious and wom-
en’s organizations and associational life in general are dominated by royals, impeding 
the development of an independent and autonomous civil society (Brand 1995; 
Wiktorowicz 2002). Although formal institutions present the façade of a modern polity 
with a system of checks and balances, the king dominates all three branches of power. 
Decision making takes place in the Royal Court rather than the prime ministry, not even 
to mention parliament. Parliament consists of an upper house, the Senate, the members 
of which are designated by the king, mainly former politicians. The lower house is 
elected, however does not meet the principle of representation. It is dominated by tribal 
forces in the rural areas, which are massively overrepresented in comparison to the ur-
ban constituencies that are mostly inhabited by Palestinian Jordanians due to an elec-
toral law that is designed to guarantee the formers’ predominance.75 Instead of legisla-
tion, the main function of parliament is the maintenance of clientelist networks from the 
center to the regions. This mechanism has been described as “competitive clientelism” 
by Ellen Lust (2009) who found that usually those candidates are elected who are most 
likely to effectively draw state resources to their constituency. In this sense, the func-
tional logic of parliament is not to check the executive, but to be as close as necessary 
and possible to where the allocation of resources is determined. Although official dis-
course maintains the monarchy was “constitutional”, the constitution gives all power to 
the king rather than circumscribing his competences. 
Since the beginning of its existence, Jordan has been dependent on financial aid from 
abroad. In the absence of significant natural resources, political rents first from the 
United Kingdom and later from the USA and the Gulf states have ensured the king-
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 Already for the 1989 elections, Lucas showed the overrepresentation of tribal areas and religious/ethnic 
minorities (Lucas 2005: 29). A similar picture is still valid during the 2000 years: Ellen Lust presents an 
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dom’s financial survival.76 This income has been allocated according to the logic of a 
semi-rentier state through state-led development, employment in the public sector, in-
vestment in infrastructure, and subsidies on basic foodstuff, fuel, cooking gas, etc. in 
order to garner material legitimacy. However, in the wake of economic reform and 
structural adjustment programs imposed by international financial institutions, the 
state’s welfare function has suffered. Instead, many kinship-based mutual aid organiza-
tions have formed to provide for their needy members, covering at least 40% of the 
population (Baylouny 2010: 100). The economic reforms have had ambiguous effects 
on the population: “the specific rights being actively advanced, prioritized, and protect-
ed by the government are those related to a neoliberal vision of economic growth (for-
eign investment and cosmopolitan consumerism), at the expense of other rights (such as 
the freedom of political expression, popular participation, and assembly for the purpose 
of political protest)” (Schwedler 2012: 266).  
For most of the Arab world, legitimacy had become precarious long before mass pro-
tests toppled leaders. But in Jordan, a relatively higher number of possibilities for legit-
imation than in others states has been noted (cf. i.a. Schlumberger & Bank 2002). 
One important source of legitimacy in Jordan is tradition. The monarchy has survived 
for almost a century, despite a tumultuous neighborhood and critical domestic develop-
ments. In Jordan, traditional legitimacy is interwoven with religion. Religious legitima-
tion is available to the monarch as he is a member of the prophet’s family, the 
Hashemites. Members of this tribe used to be the caretakers of the holy sites of Mecca 
and Medina for a millennium. This noble ancestry sets the Hashemites apart from other 
Muslims and therefore justified their authority over the inhabitants of Transjordan even 
as foreigners. In another vein, the Hashemites also played the leading role in the strug-
gle for independence from the Ottomans during the Great Arab Revolt until 1918.77 
Although their success was thwarted by the Sykes-Picot-Agreement, the mandate cha-
rade led to a Hashemite emir in Transjordan who had credentials for the Arab cause. 
Not only official discourse upholds this historical fact, a recent comparative research 
project finds that “strong historical-religious claims to legitimate their rule” are decisive 
for the survival of both the Jordanian and Moroccan monarchies (Bank, Richter & 
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Sunik 2013: 23). Russell Lucas (2005) also stresses the monarchical character of Jorda-
nian authoritarianism especially with its ability to shape and manipulate institutions in a 
way to ensure regime survival. The monarchical form of rule is uncontested even among 
most democracy activists.  
After a long period of political deadlock, in 1989 riots led to a political liberalization 
including the reinstatement of parliament, the formation of political parties on a limited 
scale, and a higher degree of civil liberties. This opening was subsequently reversed 
later, when the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty was concluded in 1994 and met harsh re-
sistance by the Islamist movement.  
The only political party that deserves the name is the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the 
political arm of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood. Its relation to the government can 
best be described as that of a “loyal opposition” (Milton-Edwards & Hinchcliffe 2009: 
52). This means that the IAF does not seek the overthrow of the system in place, but 
works within it - as long as Israel is not concerned, since the party opposes the peace 
treaty. Although it has sometimes boycotted elections, the party leaders are eager to 
demonstrate their allegiance to the king not least by displaying his picture on their of-
fices’ walls, just as it is the case in all public buildings. As a general tendency, more 
Jordanians of Palestinian background can be found in the IAF in comparison to the 
Transjordanian-dominated elite.  
Among the official opposition, virtually nobody can be counted as anti-systemic. There 
are various small parties with different ideological backgrounds, the more active of 
them with a leftist ideology, but most of them are co-opted and even more regime-
friendly than the IAF. The professional associations have often been cited as a source of 
opposition, comprising about 13% of the Jordanian workforce (Baylouny 2010: 88). 
They also have Islamist leanings in combination with Palestinian-Jordanian dominance 
and some degree of internal competition mechanisms through elections.78  
The only tangible threat used to come from Salafi Jihadists, even though this was a se-
curity rather than a political problem.79 However, the Iraqi suicide bombers that perpe-
trated the attacks on three hotels in Amman on November 9, 2005 acted upon the order 
of the Jordanian leader of al-Qa’ida in Iraq, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi (Abu Rumman & 
Hanieh 2013: 327). The geographical situation with long borders in the desert allows for 
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easy infiltration by foreign fighters. But on the political level, the potential challenge to 
the regime in place was very low.  
Both in terms of security and employment, the different branches of the security appa-
ratus play an important role in Jordan. The manpower of the armed forces, police and 
security stands at about half a million (Associated Press, 23 January 2013). In Sean 
Yom’s words, “a quarter of the entire national labor force already carries a gun on the 
job” (2013: 132). The military has always been crucial to regime and even state surviv-
al. Beginning with the creation of Transjordan and the attainment of sovereignty 
through the expulsion of British officer Glubb in 1956 by the young king Hussein, the 
Arab legion has symbolized national strength. Before, it had served to integrate nomad-
ic Bedouins into the newly founded state and to assure their loyalty (Watkins 2014: 35). 
Jordan is one of the most heavily militarized countries in the world, which can only be 
partly attributed to its precarious geographic situation.80 Politically, the armed forces 
played a role in the expulsion of the PLO in the 1970 Black September. It was probably 
also vital in ensuring a smooth succession from Hussein to his unprepared son Abdullah 
II who did not have more than two weeks in his office as crown prince before ascending 
to the Hashemite throne. The king is the supreme commander of the armed forces and 
used to be commander of the Jordanian army’s Special Forces, as he was a career sol-
dier before surprisingly becoming crown prince and then king.81 The Special Forces 
have been boosted in recent years, not least with the establishment of the high-tech 
“King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center” in 2009 where military units 
from around the world undergo anti-terror training.82  
In 2006, the king had the first military parade in 30 years organized in order to celebrate 
Army Day (Schwedler 2012: 260). Many regard the army as a prestigious institution 
and the fact that it is dominated by Transjordanians from loyal tribes adds to its cohe-
sion. In some rural areas, more citizens are employed in the armed forces than in any 
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other sector of the economy,83 and more than a third of all Jordanians benefit directly or 
indirectly from a military health insurance.84 So apart from traditional loyalty, material 
benefits add to the cohesion of the armed forces. Moreover, the National Committee of 
Military Veterans is said to represent no less than 140,000 members (Vogt 2012: 63). 
There are 87 supermarkets run by the “Military Consumer Corporation” which offer 
subsidized prices for military personnel (The Jordan Times, 24 June 2011).  
Besides the army, the police’s manpower in the Public Security Directorate was esti-
mated at about 25,000 (Tell 2004: 6). Since 2008, the newly created Gendarmerie 
(darak) forces have been separate from the regular police, numbering around 15,000 
personnel. They perform special operations and are active among other things in riot 
control.85  
The third pillar of security, the intelligence service looms large and is one of the forces 
that dominate also the political sphere through extensive surveillance and interference in 
citizens’ everyday life.86 The General Intelligence Department (GID) was not least in-
volved in rigging the 2007 parliamentary elections.87 But even on a more general level, 
societal activities are monitored through umbrella organizations and tight regulations 
leaving hardly any space for autonomous organization, so that Wiktorowicz (2000) talks 
of “Civil Society as Social Control”. 
The State Security Court, a military court, has extensive jurisdiction even over civilians 
in manifold areas considered to affect security in its broadest sense. The offences of 
“undermining the political regime” and “inciting resistance” to the government in article 
149 of the penal code are listed in the “terrorism” section (Human Rights Watch 
2012b). 
Thousands of civilians were detained without trial (Amnesty International 2011). Tor-
ture is used as “widespread and routine practice” (UN Office of the High Commissioner 
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for Human Rights 2010: 3). In 2010, 321 complaints of torture were filed with the 
Board of Grievances of the Public Security Directorate. However, only in eleven cases 
were police officers actually tried, and this took place under the internal jurisdiction of 
the Police Court (Ammannet, 30 June 2011).  
Up to the beginning of the protests, in the regional context the regime derived part of its 
legitimacy from the fact that 7 was not as harsh as in neighboring states, most notably 
Syria. This fact was pointed out as a positive factor by many interview partners even 
before the civil war started in Syria.88 While incapacitating repression is not as overt as 
in other countries, restraining repression has still remained on a high level under King 
Abdullah’s rule. From 2005 through 2010, the Political Terror Scale rating was predom-
inantly 3 (5 denoting the highest level of repression), while the Amnesty International 
reports of 2008 and 2010 even suggested a rating of 4 (Gibney, Cornett, Wood & 
Haschke 2014).  
 
4.2. THE PROTESTS IN JORDAN 
4.2.1. Protests before the Arab Uprisings  
The political climate in Jordan had begun to become rougher already in 2010 when an-
gry military veterans protested against the allegedly growing influence of Palestinians 
and especially targeted the queen.89 These attacks not on the king himself, but on the 
person closest to him were some of the first signs of an unusual emerging threat to the 
status quo.  
As in other Arab countries, the initial reason for demonstrations in Jordan was the so-
cio-economic situation. The youth unemployment rates were considerable, in 2010 ac-
cording to official numbers 23.8% of young men from 15-24 years were unemployed, of 
young women even 46.8%.90 At the same time, the youth bulge was also enormous, as 
of the total population counting approximately 6,249,000 Jordanians, 37.3% were under 
the age of 15 (Jordan Statistical Yearbook 2012: ﺝ). In Jordan, the cost of living is 
among the highest in the Arab world, while wages are modest. The average annual in-
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come from employment per household was 3,842 JD in 2010.91 While in Amman, the 
income was slightly higher, living costs in the capital amount to Western standards. The 
number of socioeconomic protests rose, with day laborers in the public sector who 
could easily and instantly be fired staging regular sit-ins (Adely 2012: 36).  
In November 2010, parliamentary elections were held as the king had dissolved the 
lower house one year before due to allegations of corruption among deputies. The Is-
lamic Action Front boycotted the elections and subsequently lost the six mandates it had 
won in the 2007 elections, which had already been regarded as extremely manipulated 
(Al Arabiya, 4 November 2010). These were signs of a growing alienation between the 
IAF and regime actors (Bank 2010: 5). In December 2010, the government headed by 
Prime Minister Samir ar-Rifai won a vote of confidence in the lower house with a rec-
ord 111 out of 119 votes (The Jordan Times, 24 December 2010). This was regarded as 
a ridiculous “theater”, with one analyst talking of a one-party parliament (The Black 
Iris, 26 December 2010), further eroding the perceived legitimacy of political institu-
tions.  
 
4.2.2. The Beginning of the Arab Uprisings in Jordan  
In the wake of anti-regime protests in Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt, protesters took to the 
streets in Jordan as well. However, protesting groups and their grievances were mani-
fold and never unified at any crucial time to attain the momentum that was reached in 
Egypt in February 2011.  
After the first demonstrations in Tunisia, the Arab uprisings in Jordan started off with 
protesting day laborers led by Muhammad Sunayd in the provincial town of Dhiban in 
the beginning of January 2011. According to a political observer, the location of this 
first protest was the result of a conscious choice to “test” what the reactions would be 
like before becoming active in the large cities.92 The protest movement consisted of 
public sector workers subcontracted by private firms, thus lacking any employment se-
curity despite working for ministries (Adely 2012: 36). They demonstrated for better 
work conditions, against a hike in prices, unemployment and corruption. According to 
official statistics, 44.6% of working Jordanians earned less than 300 JD per month in 
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2011 (The Jordan Times, 6 March 2013). Taking the high costs for living into account, 
such an amount of money is not even enough for one person, not to speak of providing 
for a family. Economic grievances were the primary motive for taking to the streets, but 
political demands were added soon. Various groups began to form, focusing on differ-
ent topics. The awareness of precarious living conditions was raised, e.g. in a newspaper 
article on a university graduate who works as a cleaner (Al-Ghad, 3 March 2011). As 
the dynamic of protests unfolded, just like in other countries, the demands did not re-
main restricted to higher wages, subventions on basic foodstuff, or affordable housing. 
After some time, political demands added to economic grievances.  
Over the spring months, many loosely organized groups calling for reform took to the 
streets. On 14 January, a Friday protest in downtown Amman was organized as the “day 
of rage” (Bustani 2011). The student association Dabahtoona (literal meaning: “you 
have slaughtered us”) protested particularly against the security services’ interference in 
university life.93 One of the other movements that formed, the “Movement of the 1952 
Constitution”, wanted the political system to become a constitutional monarchy in the 
real meaning of the concept. In the activists’ view, the Jordanian constitution in its orig-
inal 1952 version had been rather liberal from the outset and was only subsequently 
amended to vest all powers in the king. Another loose associations of interest groups 
called itself “The Jordanian Campaign for Change – Jayeen” (roughly: “we are com-
ing”), although the goal remained diffuse at first (Ryan 2011a: 382). The most im-
portant demand that was voiced was the downfall of the government led by Samir ar-
Rifa‘i, who was considered too neo-liberal and detached from average Jordanians. After 
a few weeks, the IAF joined the weekly Friday protests in the capital, further politiciz-
ing the protests. Although the prime minister was sacked quite swiftly on 1 February, 
the protest movements did not stop their actions. In the largest demonstration in mid-
February 2011, one week after Mubarak’s fall, some 18,000 protested on the streets of 
downtown Amman close to the King Hussein mosque.94 The police forces tried to con-
vey a benign image through handing out water and juice to protesters instead of em-
ploying water cannons, as their counterparts in other countries did, as if to demonstrate 
once more the exceptional harmony in Jordan (Bustani 2011).  
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Most demands did not call for the open overthrow of the system, but for political re-
form. While protesters claimed they did not want the king to abdicate, nevertheless on 
an analytical level the introduction of a solely representative function of the monarch 
would equal a regime change. Still, the self-restraint in wording and actions made the 
reform movements look comparatively harmonious. It is also important to note that the 
protesters remained peaceful. Moreover, the role of the pervasive security services in 
political and everyday life was discussed openly. A further important demand was end-
ing corruption.  
The organizers of the demonstrations included political parties of various orientations, 
such as communists, Baath parties, and the IAF. Just as in Egypt, however, the Islamists 
kept low profile during protests. Bustani cites a Muslim Brotherhood statement that 
stressed “the Islamists in Jordan call for reform, not a total change. We acknowledge the 
legitimacy of the regime” (Bustani 2011). The calls for political reform centered on the 
role of existing political institutions, which should gain more weight and representa-
tiveness. An especially striking lack of legitimacy was apparent in the electoral law, 
which protesters demanded to be more representative of the population. Such changes, 
however, would dampen the influence of the tribes and thus disenfranchise the king’s 
former power base.  
The more significant number of protests was organized by the different professional 
associations, who are well organized in contrast to other institutions in Jordan, or pro-
fessional groups demanding the right to organize. Moreover, demonstrations were held 
in front of different embassies to show solidarity with citizens in other Arab countries, 
most prominently Egypt and later also Syria.  
What was remarkable about these demonstrations was that a previously depoliticized 
and disillusioned population took to the streets.95 More importantly, during the months 
following the first demonstrations, “some very important red lines have been crossed”, 
e.g. as regards criticism of the royal family.96 Both the scope and some of the forms of 
contentious politics were unprecedented, culminating in the development of a youth 
movement that tried to emulate its counterparts in other Arab countries.  
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4.2.3. The March 24 Youth 
The Jordanian youth movement held its key sit-in on March 24, taking on the name of 
this date, just as many movements in the other Arab countries that experienced protests 
(Arabic: shabab 24 adhar). The March 24 Youth served as a loose umbrella for previ-
ously formed organizations such as Jayeen and the 1952 Constitution movement, but 
according to their self-image anybody who attended the sit-in belonged to the group. 
There was no strongly institutionalized structure. The demonstration by the self-
proclaimed “free youth of Jordan” had been announced about a week earlier through a 
newly set up Facebook site which quickly gained more than 30,000 “likes”.97 The 
youth‘s demands were summed up under the slogan “The people want the reform of the 
regime” (al-sha’b yurid islah an-nizam), thus departing from the pan-Arab demand for a 
“downfall of the regime” and adapting it to the monarchic Jordanian context. More spe-
cifically, the desired reforms included: “1. a parliament that represents the people, 2. an 
elected national government, 3. real constitutional reforms, 4. trying the corrupt in 
court, 5. reform of the tax system, 6. lifting the security grip, 7. the realization of na-
tional unity”.98 The youth’s plan was to stage an indeterminate sit-in, to be held until 
their demands were met. Obviously, not so much the size or demands of the protest, but 
the announcement of an open-end demonstration seemed to be a challenge that threat-
ened the status quo (Tobin 2012: 102). The location of the protest at the “Ministry of 
Interior circle” (duwwar ad-dakhiliya) was very symbolic in many respects. It took 
place where reform is needed the most and where the introduction of a democratic order 
would make a large difference. Still, the location under an overpass bridge of the round-
about epitomized the lack of public space in which larger gatherings were possible, let 
alone permitted.  
In the attempt to demonstrate the movement’s unifying and pan-Jordanian character, no 
banners, flags or political symbols other than the national flag were allowed on the pro-
test site. Slogans that were chanted included “the people want the dissolution of parlia-
ment”, “the people want an elected government”, “with our souls, with our blood we 
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sacrifice for you, oh Jordan”, and “leave us alone, intelligence service”.99 All of these 
slogans remained within the limits set by the demands presented above.  
The March 24 Youth had their sit-in broadcast online through a video live stream. The 
peaceful protesters defied the heavy rain that day, but the next day, the demonstration 
turned violent when another group showed up protesting against them. The protesters, 
less than 2,000, were far outnumbered by self-proclaimed “loyalists” who simultaneous-
ly gathered at a pro-regime demonstration in the King Hussein Park, numbering 20,000 
participants from all over the country, some of them allegedly brought in buses from the 
southern regions.100 The youth movement’s tent camp on the Interior Ministry Circle 
was not large in terms of size, as many Friday marches in the weeks before had been 
larger. Although the sit-in did not pose an immediate threat to anything except the flow 
of traffic, it was attacked by thugs and participants of the loyalist demonstration. It is 
noteworthy that although the streets had been closed off and were secured by police, the 
thugs were allowed to pass through to the protesters. On March 25, even the gendarme-
rie forces assisted the thugs in violently dispersing the demonstration, using water can-
nons, sticks and batons. The live stream then showed young thugs (and partly darak 
forces) dancing to nationalist songs, celebrating their victory.  
The forceful end of the sit-in left at least one person dead, a middle-aged man who ac-
cording to official statements had suffered a heart attack and thus died of a natural 
death, which was denied by family members who claimed the police had beaten him 
(The Jordan Times, 30 March 2011). Many more suffered injuries, mainly from rocks 
that had been thrown at them. 87 protesters were arrested for resisting police officers 
and sent to the Criminal Court, rather than any of the assailants (Ammonnews, 8 April 
2011). The vilification of peaceful demonstrators was met with indifference by large 
parts of the population.  
Even a member of the March 24 Youth admitted that the movement suffered from a 
communication problem relating to a wider audience and making their concerns under-
stood.101 Other young people complained that the demands had not been articulated 
publicly and clearly enough beforehand.102 Also, the clenched fist which was the revolu-
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tionary symbol on the Facebook site might not have been the ideal picture to convince 
the broader public of the peaceful and gradual approach the March 24 Youth actually 
pursued. This led to mistrust by the general population and a susceptibility to believe 
official discourse.  
 
4.2.4. The aftermath and the subsequent development of protests  
After March 25 the gendarmerie was increasingly regarded as a problem103 and it tried 
therefore to regain its standing. Even a report by the government-affiliated National 
Centre for Human Rights “noted that the Gendarmerie used force to end the sit-in”, but 
of course presented this as legitimate and necessary (The Jordan Times, 20 April 2011). 
It also accused the protesters of having “raised slogans that were against national unity” 
(ibid.).  
The radical Islamist strand of jihadist Salafis had been allowed to appear on the political 
stage in 2011, of which they made use in calling for the release of prisoners and for the 
first time employing a more political language (Abu Rumman & Hanieh 2013: 434). On 
April 12, they staged a peaceful demonstration at the duwwar ad-dakhiliyah in Amman, 
where they were met by darak forces wearing combat gear and face masks. On April 
15, they held a demonstration in the northern industrial city of Zarqa and were subse-
quently attacked by conspicuously unarmed gendarmerie personnel and thugs. In the 
clashes, some 80 security officials claimed to be injured – even though injuries caused 
by teargas can hardly be attributed to the Salafis (The Jordan Times, 17 April 2011). It 
was quite obvious that this clash was staged in order to convince the broader population 
of the threat the Salafis posed and to gain sympathy for security personnel.  
One of the most drastic examples of regional demonstration effects was the self-
immolation of a 45-year old man on April 7, 2011, in front of the Prime Ministry, fol-
lowing the example of Mohammad Bouazizi of Tunisia’s Sidi Bouzid (Ammannet, 7 
April 2011). The sad event remained without consequence, however. During the time 
span under consideration, three further men died after having set themselves on fire, 
protesting against their suffering from economic hardship.  
A much anticipated and noteworthy development of the protest movement followed in 
May 2011. Former prime minister and director of the intelligence service Ahmad 
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Obeidat attempted to unify the rather diverse protest camp (the IAF, the youth move-
ment, leftist parties, women’s union) under one umbrella organization called the Na-
tional Front for Reform. Beginning in summer, the National Front for Reform staged 
various demonstrations. This development of a former “insider” uniting different oppo-
sition groups seemed to give a boost to the protest movement and to pose a threat to the 
regime. However, its influence was limited due to its elitist and urban base. Political 
protests were held regularly throughout the year, but without attracting a critical mass of 
followers. Instead, they were supposed to demonstrate visibility in the sense of specta-
cle politics (Tobin 2012: 102).  
Still more dangerous were protests by tribes in the rural regions, described by Yom as 
“the most credible threat during the Arab uprisings” (2014: 236). These former back-
bones of the regime tried to resist the marginalization that resulted from neoliberal poli-
cies and centralization (International Crisis Group 2012). In various provincial cities, 
approximately forty youth groups formed under the banner of Hirak, which literally 
means movements (Yom 2014: 234). Notably, the tribal youth emerged as an actor with 
political demands and rejected the rent-seeking mentality that their more established 
relatives displayed (ibid.: 246). The Hirak approach could be observed in demonstra-
tions which especially addressed privatizations on a so-called “Friday to return lands”, 
referring to tribe-owned land from the Ottoman time (The Jordan Times, 23 December 
2011).  
In June 2011, disenchanted youth in the southern town of Tafileh threw bottles at the 
king’s motorcade while he visited the governorate. In order to avoid the image of being 
attacked by the inhabitants of the town that all other Jordanians joke about as provincial, 
official reports only talked of a cheering crowd. Meanwhile, the Amman office of 
Agence France Presse, which had published the different reading, was devastated by 
unidentified persons (The Jordan Times, 16 June 2011; Tobin 2012: 102).  
The Hirak and the National Front for Reform joined forces in staging protests, but splits 
between the different groups occurred soon enough, in part sown by regime forces.104 In 
October 2011, the attacks on reform activists grew harsher. Laith Shubailat, an opposi-
tional Islamist, was attacked by thugs blocking his way to a reform rally in the village of 
Sakeb near Jerash (The Jordan Times, 3 October 2011). Stones were thrown at some 
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1,000 people waiting for Shubailat’s speech (ibid.). Few weeks later, Hirak members of 
different tribes held a conference on combating corruption jointly with the National 
Front for Reform, including IAF representatives, in Salhoub close to Jerash (Al Akhbar, 
18 October 2011). Ahmed Obeidat, who was also present, reported that he had been 
warned in advance not to attend the meeting (ibid.). The participants were attacked by 
thugs who fired shots and demolished cars, injuring some thirty of the conference par-
ticipants (The Jordan Times, 18 October 2011). The mistrust between rather urban Is-
lamists and tribal forces could not be removed, with the Hirak fearing that the Muslim 
Brotherhood pursued its own agenda (Yom 2014: 246). In a large rally in October 2012, 
the National Front for Reform and professional associations along with the Karak 
branch of the Hirak surprisingly did not participate, with the IAF providing the bulk of 
the 10,000 protesters (The Jordan Times, 8 October 2012). In November 2012, the alli-
ance finally split, as the small leftist parties decided to run in the parliamentary elections 
instead of heeding the Front’s call for boycott (The Jordan Times, 13 November 2012).  
Apart from the pro-reform movement, other protesting groups were even more vocal 
when taking to the streets. Most notably, the members of different professional associa-
tions or groups protested in order to have their economic and social demands fulfilled. 
In 2012, an estimated total of 760,000 workers participated in various forms of conten-
tious action, which is more than 10% of the total population (The Jordan Times, 21 Feb-
ruary 2013). The bulk of the protests remained socioeconomic.  
Finally, the fuel riots in November 2012 constituted the most heated and violent part of 
street politics in Jordan. After an attempt to cut subsidies on fuel and gas, which is also 
used for cooking, the fuel prices rose by 15%, while the price for cooking gas cylinders 
rose from 6 to 10 JD. Teachers went on strike in solidarity (The Jordan Times, 15 No-
vember 2012). The riots were at first thought to be a game-changing next level of pro-
tests since for the first time in Amman, the slogan “the people want the downfall of the 
regime” was chanted in front of the Ministry of Interior (The New York Times, 13 No-
vember 2012).105 However, no official protesting group embraced this extreme demand. 
Instead, the organized opposition soon resorted to the usual calls for reform.  
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4.3. STRATEGIES OF LEGITIMATION IN JORDAN106 
4.3.1. Structural Legitimation 
As discussed above, many of the reform protesters’ demands pertained to structural is-
sues and the relative weight of political institutions. The king responded to the chal-
lenge of facing protests with demands increasing almost each week by using rather old-
fashioned tactics. 
Legal mode  
One immediate response to the demonstrators’ demands was the sacking of the unpopu-
lar Rifa’i government, only few weeks after it had gained a ridiculously high number of 
votes of confidence in parliament. However, the decision to replace him with Ma’rouf 
al-Bakhit, who was known to be a hardline military officer, did not evoke any positive 
reactions.107  
The next step was an amendment of the public gatherings law which changed the sys-
tem of organizing public protests to simply notifying the authorities in advance instead 
of seeking their explicit permission (The Jordan Times, 24 March 2011). While the 
elimination of the previous regulation was a positive sign for the protest movement, 
another controversial clause was introduced. The definition of public gathering was 
stretched to private events that “discuss any topic related to public policy” (The Jordan 
Times, 27 April 2011). This stipulation illegalizes any discussion of politics about 
which the ministry of interior is not informed.   
The most important measure that signaled actual reform was the establishment of a Na-
tional Dialogue Committee (NDC) in March 2011. The NDC’s task consisted in for-
mulating drafts for a new elections law and a political parties law, as these two areas 
were deemed crucial for tackling potential allegations of illegitimacy.108 After the only 
well-organized political party in Jordan, the IAF, had boycotted the November 2010 
parliamentary elections, the representativeness of parliament was even lower than it 
would have been in case of its participation (Lust & Hourani 2011). Fifty-three individ-
uals were chosen to participate in the NDC, the establishment of which was ordered by 
the prime minister. The personalities picked were mostly politicians and officials, but 
                                                 
106
 Some parts of the analysis that refer to co-optation strategies during early 2011 are taken from a con-
ference paper that is currently under review for publication (Josua 2012). 
107
 Various personal interviews, March 2011, Amman. 
108
 Survey results show that both parliament and political parties rank among the least trusted institutions 
in Jordan (Arab Barometer 2005). 
4. EMPIRICAL STUDY I: JORDAN 
 
88 
 
also included representatives of syndicates and other unions as well as journalists. Some 
Islamists from the IAF were also designated, but they never showed up at the meetings, 
citing that they had not been asked to participate.109 The creation of the NDC was an 
attempt at co-opting influential individuals who were not yet part of the regime elite. 
The “reformist bloc” of fifteen relatively “new faces” was enthusiastic at first because 
of the potential for real change that the regional window of opportunity had opened, 
although the committee’s mandate was limited and the process of its creation was criti-
cized: they would have preferred a creation through the king himself. Inside the NDC, 
interesting dynamics were observable. Some of its members fought for the right to for-
mulate general principles for political reform that might serve as a blueprint for intro-
ducing constitutional changes.110 A youth activist suggested that through these “reform-
ers”, the March 24 Youth had the possibility to influence the NDC in the absence of any 
other legitimate form for them to freely express their opinions.111 However, he already 
doubted the NDC’s mandate for really tackling the decisive questions and the king’s 
readiness to renounce some of his competences.  
Also members of parliament felt even more marginalized after the NDC subcommittees 
had taken up their work of proposing changes to the electoral and political parties law as 
well as drafting constitutional amendments. In every aspect, the NDC resembled previ-
ous committees that had been called into existence since the beginning of the 1990s, 
such as the National Charter Committee in 1990 and the Jordan First Committee in 
2002 (Lucas 2008: 287ff.; Bank 2004: 165). Somewhat expectedly, when it came to the 
actual formulation of recommendations for the legal modifications, the initial dynamic 
that had characterized the NDC was stopped by the overwhelming majority of regime 
elites in all subcommittees. Furthermore, in order to prevent any substantial implemen-
tation of the potentially far-reaching recommendations, another committee was estab-
lished, this time by a royal decree. The task of the new ten-member “Royal Committee 
on Constitutional Review” was to examine the NDC’s recommendations and to draft the 
actual laws to be submitted to parliament. The fact that this committee held its first 
meeting at the Royal Court shows the higher importance that was attributed to it (The 
Jordan Times, 3 May 2011). The establishment of the additional committee was resent-
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ed by NDC members and buried their last hopes about any tangible outcome of their 
work.  
The measure that was presented as the most comprehensive legal change was the con-
stitutional reform. Even though in authoritarian systems the letter of laws hardly mat-
ters in everyday politics112, the symbolic power of acknowledging a development to-
wards the separation of powers would matter for legitimacy. Personalities close to in-
cumbent elites were bragging about the high number of changed articles (forty-two, one 
third of all articles), praising it as the most comprehensive update in Jordanian history, 
or even a “quantum leap” (The Jordan Times, 16 August 2011). However, the contents 
of these articles were not equally high-profile. The main novelties were the introduction 
of an Independent Elections Commission (IEC), the establishment of a constitutional 
court, and some limitations on the possibility to rule without parliament. Most im-
portantly, “[t]here is no mention of even a symbolic restriction of the king’s absolute 
power” (Bank 2012: 32). His competences are left intact, including the right to appoint 
the prime minister (article 35).  
Chapter 5 (articles 58-61) of the revised constitution stipulates the establishment of a 
Constitutional Court to “monitor the constitutionality of laws and regulations in force” 
(The Jordan Times, 8 October 2012). Theoretically, the establishment of a constitutional 
court might seem as a significant step towards the separation of powers. In practice, its 
impact is hardly felt since according to article 60 only the two chambers of parliament 
or the government can appeal to the court.113 In October 2012, the Constitutional Court 
replaced the previously existing Higher Council for the Interpretation of the Constitu-
tion, which had been a paper tiger. As usually, the official press cited an elitist journalist 
with the words that the move “‘fulfil[led] the requests of the popular movements who 
have been calling for political reform’” (ibid.). 
The new law on political parties was supposed to allow for an easier registration for 
new parties in order to revive the political landscape, in which parties besides the IAF 
did not yet play an important role. The NDC’s subcommittee had suggested lowering 
the minimum number of founding members to 100 (The Jordan Times, 13 April 2011). 
The lower house changed the number to 250, and finally the senate intervened and put 
the number back to the previous 500 (The Jordan Times, 31 May 2012). In combination 
                                                 
112
 For a general discussion of Arab constitutions cf. Brown (2002). 
113
 It almost goes without saying that the king appoints the court’s judges (article 58 of the constitution). 
4. EMPIRICAL STUDY I: JORDAN 
 
90 
 
with the required geographical distribution of members, this made it hard for new par-
ties to be established. Moreover, the licensing of parties should be the task of a commit-
tee headed by the Minister of Interior instead of remaining the sole domain of the same 
ministry (The Jordan Times, 31 May 2012). In a nutshell, this law also failed to be a 
quantum leap for political life. Moreover, its impact has to be assessed in relation to the 
electoral law.  
The suggestion for a modified elections law that the NDC finally proposed to parlia-
ment was of very little substance. The main point of criticism of Jordanian electoral 
regulations has always been the single-non transferable vote system, which results in the 
population voting for relatives or tribes members. While it is hard to figure out whether 
the low profile of political parties is the reason or the effect of this elections law, party 
politics used to be marginal at best. This was announced to be changed through a new 
logic in the electoral system. The major novelty of the revised electoral law should be a 
mixed system with two votes instead of one, abolishing the notorious single non-
transferable vote and introducing a second vote for political parties. However, this step 
towards a more egalitarian representation of the population in parliament was thwarted 
by the details of the suggested law.  
While the number of parliamentary seats was raised from 120 to 150, the bulk remained 
reserved for candidates outside of the list system. The number of mandates that were 
supposed to be distributed through party lists was as low as seventeen out of 150 seats. 
This watering down triggered the outrage of the opposition movement so that the king 
himself intervened and ordered the government to raise the number of list seats. The 
number that was finally decided upon was not significantly higher: twenty-seven seats, 
still allotting more than 80% of the total share of mandates to candidates that were ulti-
mately elected because of primordial ties rather than party programs. The reason behind 
this weak concession was that in the absence of other organized parties, the IAF would 
most probably win the bulk of the party mandates.114  
Instead, in the face of this less than superficial reform, the IAF and other parties belong-
ing to the National Front for Reform, such as the Communist Party, decided to boycott 
the following parliamentary elections, making it clear that they saw no significant 
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changes compared to the pre-Arab uprisings elections (Christophersen 2013: 8). The 
Hirak also called for a boycott. On the other side, some long-standing politicians sud-
denly discovered their heart for party politics and started their own one-man-show par-
ties in the run-up to the elections. At any rate, established candidates were advantaged, 
as parliament rejected a proposition by the government to lower the minimum age for 
candidates from 30 to 25 years in article 70 of the amended constitution, ensuring that 
the lower house would not become representative of the population (The Jordan Times, 
29 September 2011).  
The government took great pains at mobilizing voters in order to prove to the world 
that the elections would be a turning point in the history of Jordanian politics – despite 
the non-participation of the largest political party. First, the time span for registration as 
a voter was extended several times. On elections day, January 24, 2013, the voting time 
was extended by one hour to increase the chance for a higher turnout. This measure ob-
viously did not succeed. Instead, the solution was to calculate the turnout as in the pre-
vious election, taking into account only the percentage of registered voters rather than 
the share of the whole electorate.115 Therefore, official discourse proclaimed a rather 
high turnout rate of 56.5% in spite of the boycott, whereas it stood at something be-
tween 35 and 39% of the population entitled to vote.  
An aspect that was supposed to boost popular confidence in the election process was the 
newly established Independent Elections Commission (IEC) which was assigned the 
role of managing and overseeing the elections.116 The fact that a number of deputies 
proposed the IEC’s chairman for the post of prime minister only a little time later shows 
that independence was not the ultimate goal of his position. Moreover, the setup of the 
institution resembled many Jordanian bodies: it consisted purely of former ministers 
(Christophersen 2013: 9). 
The IEC performed its task in handing over candidates who allegedly tried to buy votes 
to the authorities, i.e. police and courts (The Jordan Times, 16 January 2013). However, 
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this neither impressed the candidates nor the voters: at least three arrested candidates 
were actually elected while still in custody (The Jordan Times, 25 January 2013). In a 
representative survey commissioned by the International Republican Institute, only 20% 
of all respondents were convinced that vote buying was not widespread (IRI & 
MEMRC 2013: 18). A very telling episode was relayed by Marc Lynch on the online 
platform Twitter, quoting another user: “Favorite moment in yesterday's Jordanian elec-
tion when a boy, around nine years old, asked if we wanted to buy his vote.”117 Moni-
toring observers by the Arab League also complained about the massive presence of 
security personnel outside the polling stations, reported to number 47,000 (The Jordan 
Times, 25 January 2013).  
Moreover, the vote counting did not proceed in a completely smooth way. The an-
nouncement of final results was delayed. In several instances, winners were announced 
who after a recount of the votes had not won a mandate. This led to riots in many pro-
vincial towns, the blocking of roads, burning tires, and attacking polling stations by en-
raged relatives of the losing candidates. The police tried to disperse the protests using 
tear gas (Al Hayat, 25 January 2013). The youth movement affiliated with the Muslim 
Brotherhood announced a protest on the day after the elections in Amman, contesting 
the legitimacy of parliament in the light of the flawed electoral law (The Jordan Times, 
25 January 2013).  
The lower house of the Jordanian parliament, the national assembly, is generally 
known to be the home of clientelism rather than law-making (Lust 2009). Voters base 
their choice of candidates on the requisite that they provide services to their constitu-
ents, which 94.7% responded in a study on the previous parliament (Identity Center 
2010). Beyond that, Yom claims – albeit without giving any references – that “the GID 
regularly bribes deputies in order to influence their public positions” (Yom 2013: 134). 
In the protests, it was one demand to strengthen the legislative vis-à-vis the executive. 
Heeding the royal call to move in this direction deputies organized themselves in fac-
tions, which was observed with higher interest after the 2013 elections than before. In 
2009, only 34% of citizens who were asked in a poll whether they knew parliamentary 
blocs existed had answered in the affirmative (Al-Quds Center for Political Studies 
2009). The twenty-seven seats that were subject to party contestation were taken by 
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twenty-three different micro-parties, with only one party, the Islamic Centrist Party 
(known as Wasat), winning three mandates and three other parties taking two seats each 
(The Jordan Times, 28 January 2013). This splintering of the apolitical landscape 
demonstrates strikingly how unimportant the political parties are. Moreover, the relative 
“victory” of the Islamic Centrist Party, which had won the bulk of its sixteen seats 
through direct mandates rather than through the party list despite its unpopularity (Abu 
Rumman & Hanieh 2013: 23), shows that political Islam regardless of its organizational 
form constitutes an ideological current preferred by many voters. Among the elected 
MPs, only three women reached parliament outside of the women’s quota of fifteen 
guaranteed mandates (Christophersen 2013: 10). About three quarters of all deputies 
were elected to parliament for the first time (Ryan 2013: 3).  
The novelty of the 2013 parliament was that it was granted the right to be consulted on 
the selection of the prime minister, a former prerogative of the king. What appeared as a 
shift of competence from the executive to the legislative power did not materialize how-
ever since a majority of deputies suggested that the prime minister appointed by the 
king stay in office (see also below in 4.3.5.). The status quo is thus preserved, or, in 
Sean Yom’s words, “[how] could anyone want power to devolve from the monarchy 
into the hands of such petty squabblers?” (Yom 2013: 136).  
The Press and Publications law is another parameter that is regularly adjusted as a 
survival strategy (Lucas 2003). It was amended in September 2012 to introduce “profes-
sionalism” in the online press, having before triggered the resignation of the Minister of 
State for Media Affairs and Communications (see also below in 4.3.5.). The amended 
law tightened the grip on online websites that had mushroomed in Jordan and covered 
local news in a rather independent and outspoken manner. According to the new regula-
tions, online media basically have to abide by the requirements that also govern print 
media through registering with the Ministry of Information’s Press and Publication De-
partment for a fee of 1,000 JD.118 The law’s intention was to contain allegations of cor-
ruption through prohibiting the publication of “defamation” and imposing a fine (article 
38 §D). Moreover, the website owners were to be held accountable for their users’ 
comments, which they were ordered to moderate and delete if deemed inappropriate, but 
nevertheless to archive for the authorities’ use. Furthermore, all websites were obliged 
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to nominate an editor-in-chief who had been a member of the Jordan Press Association 
for at least four years (7iber 2013). Websites that couldn’t fulfill these requirements 
could be blocked (which then happened to 300 out of 400 existing news sites in June 
2013; ibid.). These stipulations impeded all attempts by local and young citizens to pub-
lish independently and drastically restricted freedom of information.  
Symbolic mode  
When studying the symbolic mode of structural legitimation, the most important point 
to look at is the king. While it is obvious that all authoritarian rulers use the guise of 
democracy rhetoric, the way in which they present their arguments paves the way for 
citizens accepting actual policy outcomes and is telling not of their real intentions, but 
of what they want the audience to believe is their real intention.  
In Jordan, especially democratization and the particular road to democracy as a gradual 
reform process were stressed in semi-official op-eds and in the king’s speeches (The 
Jordan Times, 25 January 2013). In King Abdullah II’s most eagerly anticipated speech 
in June 2011 on the combined festive day remembering the “Arab Revolt, Army Day & 
Coronation Day”, he was eager to hint at the difference between a desired process of 
reform, which would be led by himself, as it had always been the case, and “the risks of 
chaos and fitna” in which particular groups would hijack democratic transformation 
processes (Abdullah II, 12 June 2011).119  
The king also had a particular vision as regards the ideal political landscape, which 
should see the emergence of “two to five political parties representing left, right and 
centre as quickly as possible” (The Jordan Times, 23 September 2011). Such a setup 
would not least perfectly match his politics of divide and rule. 
The “committeeisation” of politics (Bank 2004: 170), meaning the referral of reform 
issues to committees under the auspices of the king, was not only used for the purpose 
of control and co-optation, but also meant a delegitimation of protesters who voiced 
their demands on the street instead of participating in what was coined “constructive 
dialogue”. In the same vein, officials condemned demonstrations that were held in plac-
es where they would “disrupt normal life”, as the dominant discourse put it (The Jordan 
Times, 28 March 2011). Also the sometimes co-opted secretary-general of a small left-
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wing party, Abla Abu Olbeh, denounced demonstrations as a means of politics during a 
public debate on political reform, telling the youth not to take to the streets.120  
After the parliamentary elections, the king himself did not shy away from selling the 
low turnout, which was calculated to be higher, as a success in a meeting with some 
international monitors of the elections. He was quoted as praising it as a sign of “’Jor-
danians’ commitment to expand their participation in political life and the decision-
making process” (The Jordan Times, 25 January 2013).  
More relevant was the anti-corruption discourse, since it is the single most important 
issue around which all Jordanians could rally and also the factor that would unite oppo-
sitional forces.121 It was also massively taken up by parliamentary candidates in their 
campaigns for a lack of more refined programs. But besides being perceived as counter-
ing corruption, it seemed of great importance to elites to control and channel allegations 
of corruption. Not least the king stressed that Jordanians should avoid corruption charg-
es “on the basis of rumours and gossip at the expense of countering it through the judi-
cial system and active monitoring institutions” (Abdullah II 2011), probably hinting at 
the allegations that had been made against the queen and her family.  
Policy mode 
Curtis Ryan describes the failed co-optation of the IAF in the following words: “The 
regime was in full crisis mode, attempting to mollify both traditional bases of support 
and traditional sources of opposition” (2011a: 388). Government members and even the 
king began talks with the IAF, offering their loyal opposition a ministerial post for the 
first time during Abdullah’s reign (ibid.). Obviously, the IAF refused in order to contin-
ue claiming that the government is not representative of the Jordanian people – which it 
still would not have been even with one IAF member among some thirty other minis-
ters. The IAF preferred not to be part of a government it perceived as illegitimate over 
co-optation and a higher degree of recognition. The failure of co-optation thus put the 
IAF in a very comfortable and credible position. Still, the Islamists never challenged the 
king’s legitimacy, and they constantly demand reform of the regime instead of a change 
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of regime.122 The problem they presented was therefore limited, although a major at-
tempt at widening the regime base through structural co-optation failed. Again in Octo-
ber 2011 the IAF rejected an offer to participate in the Khasawneh government (The 
Jordan Times, 25 October 2011). After the parliamentary elections, the Islamists repeat-
edly declined participation in a “national salvation” government, which was little sur-
prising after they had boycotted the elections (The Jordan Times, 7 February 2013). 
However, it was a recurring phenomenon that the IAF stopped its street protests when-
ever reform activities were underway only to resume them after the government 
measures turned out to be useless from the party’s point of view – which they usually 
were. It thus kept a steady oppositional role and effectively created an equilibrium of 
stabilized expectations on both sides.  
As a classical measure of co-optation, the youth was a target of the committeeization in 
view of inclusion. The Higher Youth Council, a body created mainly to cooperate with 
international institutions, held a national conference in April 2011 under the unwieldy 
title “The translation of the noble royal vision of the role of the youth in reform” (Ara-
bic: tarjama ar-ru’ia al-malikiya as-samia li-daur al-shabab fi-l-islah), in Al-Hussein 
Youth City.123 Already the title made the top-down approach evident.  
One of the main points of structural legitimation in the policy mode was the actual 
fighting of corruption, which lagged behind the rhetoric. The escape of business tycoon 
Khalid Shahin who had been jailed for corruption, but disappeared on a “medical trip” 
to London enraged the Jordanian public in early 2011.124 Two ministers resigned over 
having allowed him to leave the country (The Jordan Times, 4 November 2011). The 
Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) headed by Samih Bino had already been set up 
in 2006, but by the time of the uprisings seemed to investigate more important cases, 
following the age-old royal directive that the fighting of corruption should be a “top 
priority” (The Jordan Times, 8 March 2011). The consequences for those convicted of 
corruption were not too harsh, after all. A “five-star prison” consisting of five villas had 
                                                 
122
 Personal interview with high-ranking IAF member, April 2011, Amman. 
123
 Petra 02.04.2011: “PM urges youth to use electronic media to safeguard domestic peace”, online:  
http://www.petra.gov.jo/Public_News/Nws_NewsDetails.aspx?lang=2&site_id=1&NewsID=27274&CatI
D=14  rev. 03.04.2011. 
124
 Shahin had donated a large sum to the dubious UN-organization “Intergovernmental Institution for the 
Use of Micro-Algae Spirulina against Malnutrion”, which appointed him as a goodwill ambassador and 
provided him with a diplomatic passport (Ammonnews, 11 July 2011). Ironically, his own health prob-
lems which he claimed could not be treated in Jordan were obesity-related. 
4. EMPIRICAL STUDY I: JORDAN 
 
97 
 
been built in a pine forest close to Salhoub near Jerash, where Khaled Shahin and senior 
officials convicted of corruption had been held (The Jordan Times, 10 January 2012). 
While officials gave a capacity number of 60 prisoners, other reports suggest that “each 
villa houses two persons” (Al Arabiya, 5 December 2010). However, the prison trig-
gered a popular outcry and was closed after slightly more than one year.  
Even though the ACC was in charge of gathering information on corruption cases, the 
prosecution was in part the task of the State Security Court that operates outside of the 
civil judicial system. It is by no means certain that the trials are fair. One of the show 
cases was made against the former mayor of Amman, Omar Maani, for “failure to per-
form his official duties”, a rather diffuse accusation. Some felt the trial’s end was to 
present a scapegoat and “opportunities for the state to appear serious without having to 
actually be serious about it” (The Black Iris, 4 January 2012). In the opposite direction, 
the eagerness of the director of the Central Bank of Jordan to combat corruption was not 
welcome at all, and he was forced to resign, despite belonging to the Hashemite family 
(The Black Iris, 20 September 2011). 
The handling of another case involving former and sitting prime minister Ma’rouf al-
Bakhit sparked an uproar in parliament, resulting in the resignation of various MPs (The 
Jordan Times, 30 June 2011). It was al-Jazeera and the Guardian who had brought to 
light the extent to which ministers were involved in a secret deal to build a casino in the 
Aqaba Special Economic Zone as a tourist attraction, while gambling is illegal in Jor-
dan.125 When the investigations became serious, it turned out that the former and current 
prime minister Ma’rouf al-Bakhit was involved.  
In 2012 even the husband of Royal Highness Princess Basma, Walid Kurdi, came under 
the ACC’s scrutiny. Kurdi had headed the Jordan Phosphate Mines Company, a former-
ly state-owned enterprise which was privatized in 2006. After being accused of having 
embezzled some 40 million USD, his assets were frozen and he fled the country 
(Ammonnews, 30 December 2012).126 This case is noticeable because of the close fa-
milial relation to the king. It might be interpreted as a concession that not even the royal 
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family is off limits and as a proof for the seriousness of counter-corruption. Still, Kurdi 
was “only” an in-law.  
A politically important show case was made against General Muhammad Dahabi, who 
had been the GID’s director from 2005 to 2008. He was arrested in February 2012 on 
charges of embezzling and laundering money and exploiting public office and was de-
nied bail at least 16 times (The Jordan Times, 17 July 2012). In November, he was 
found guilty and sentenced to 13 years imprisonment with hard labor as well as a 21 
million JD fine (Al Arabiya, 11 November 2012). However, this case arose out of polit-
ical opportunity and seemed like another fig leaf that was supposed to demonstrate that 
even the (outdated) big fish would not get away with corruption any longer.127 The un-
derlying, all-pervasive structures were never tackled. In the Shahin case, after some 
grass had grown over the scandal, the case was even settled out of court in return for 
him paying back “millions of dinars to the Treasury” (The Jordan Times, 25 January 
2013), which then could be justified towards the public as being to everyone’s benefit. 
By contrast, culprits in another case that was also linked to him were sentenced exactly 
on the day of the parliamentary elections as a rather symbolic signal for the will to pros-
ecute corruption (ibid.) – probably inspired by the candidates’ slogans, which all cen-
tered on this issue.  
Responses 
Regarding the manifold strategies that were part of structural legitimation, different tar-
get groups can be identified. In general, of course all measures of reform in the legal-
formal mode could be sold to external audiences, but this is not the point in this thesis. 
Some strategies affected all citizens, while others served to appease protesters, the offi-
cial opposition and reformist elites.  
While the sacking of the Rifa’i government generally found the citizens’ approval, the 
installment of Ma’rouf al-Bakhit, a retired major-general and former national security 
chief, as prime minister was received as a signal that security instead of reform was the 
king’s preference (cf. Ryan 2012: 158). Many people remembered the role al-Bakhit 
had played in the infamous 2007 parliamentary elections and therefore doubted his will 
to implement reforms. 
                                                 
127
 Another former GID director, Samih Battikhi, was ousted and then charged with embezzlement in a 
similar way in 2003 (Bank 2004: 162). However, he could serve his five-year sentence under house arrest 
(El-Shamayleh 2012). 
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As could be shown, the opposition headed by the IAF welcomed all suggestions for 
reform, but after seeing the process and especially the meager results voiced criticism 
regarding all outcomes. Through their electoral boycott, the Islamists signaled that the 
reform package was not even satisfactory for a loyal opposition. The most important 
political party thus rejected the attempt to restore legitimacy through elections (Yom 
2013: 130). Also elites closer to the government were dissatisfied with the new elec-
tions law. Three months before his appointment as prime minister, Abdullah Ensour 
was quoted as criticizing the non-change with the words: “It seems that authorities be-
lieve the Jordanian spring is over and that we can return to the way things were before 
January 2011” (The Jordan Times, 11 July 2012).128 Not least the low turnout rate at the 
parliamentary elections shows that the population did not buy the reform either. While it 
was doubtable from the beginning how far-reaching the actual reforms would be, the 
watering down of especially the proposed electoral law was a blow to even the 
skepticists.  
Opposition forces from the IAF saw the establishment of the Royal Constitutional 
Committee as an affirmation of their decision to boycott the NDC, the recommendations 
of which the opposition did not expect to be implemented129 – which turned out to be a 
correct assessment. The IAF was also disappointed by the limited nature of the constitu-
tional changes. Even the head of the government-controlled National Centre for Human 
Rights complained that the amendments were introduced without including the citizens 
in the process (The Jordan Times, 3 November 2011). The secrecy surrounding the 
Royal Constitutional Committee was also criticized by Ahmad Obeidat (The Jordan 
Times, 1 February 2012). Only slightly more than a third of a representative opinion 
poll conducted in September 2011 responded they knew about the amendments in the 
first place (CSS 2011c: 4). Obviously, no effort at conveying their contents to the public 
was made, but then there was not too much to be conveyed.  
The fact that the constitutional court’s members are appointed by the king was criticized 
by Ahmad Obeidat as not guaranteeing independence (The Jordan Times, 1 February 
2012). Furthermore, he complained about the lack of possibilities for citizens to appeal 
to the court (ibid.). 
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 Of course, Ensour’s appointment is a classical measure of co-opting a personality that is credible as a 
reformer. 
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 Personal interview with high-ranking IAF member, April 2011, Amman. 
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In protest against the new press and publications law, hundreds of Jordanian websites 
displayed a black page in late August, and even Queen Noor, the wife of the late king 
Hussein, endorsed the protest in a tweet (Ammonnews, 29 August 2012). Also the Jor-
dan Press Association supported the website owners’ campaign (The Jordan Times, 9 
October 2012). Even the former minister of state for media affairs and communications 
complained that journalists employed too much self-censorship in not even daring to 
cover the full scope of protests (The Jordan Times, 28 December 2011). 
The divergence between the symbolic announcement and the legal-formal implementa-
tion of reform was vexing to reform activists. First, despite the eased public gatherings 
law and the legal possibility to protest without official permission, protesters could not 
voice their demands peacefully, but were not protected from attacks. A youth activist 
explained that since the reform talk without tangible outcome had been around for 
roughly 20 years, there was no trust in the elites’ intention anymore.130 When the March 
24 Youth called for an open-end sit-in at the Duwwar ad-Dakhiliya, the irony was that 
the protesters mainly echoed the king’s own demands. So, differentiating between the 
three modes, the March 24 Youth actually tried to support and enforce on the output 
level what the king voiced – but obviously never really intended – in the discourse 
mode. 
On the other side, official excuses for the delay of reforms seem to resonate with some 
citizens: To give one example, nationalist twitter user PrincessPetra81 claimed that po-
litical reform in Jordan had been postponed over “10 years 1.intifada 2.iraqwar 3.two 
terror attack on jo 4.lebanesewar 5.gazawar 6.global finance crisis 7.jo stock fraud” 
(http://twitter.com/PrincessPetra81, on 5 April 2011). Notably, only two domestic rea-
sons, none of them of political nature, for a domestic political problem were given.  
An opinion poll conducted in May 2011 shows that a majority of the population actually 
followed the argument that demonstrations disrupted normal life; with a much smaller 
number of citizens considering dialogue to be the only viable way for reform instead of 
street politics (CSS 2011b). 55% of the representative sample said they opposed demon-
strations because they lead to chaos, whereas only 8% brought forward the official ar-
gument that dialogue was the right way to tackle these problems. However, the percent-
age of supporters for this argument was as high as 24% among opinion leaders that were 
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asked (ibid.). The concept of dialogue is obviously an elitist matter with the sole aim of 
co-opting new elites. This shows that the concept of dialogue was not really accepted in 
the public. 
Moreover, youth criticized the NDC for only comprising elderly (and male) elites and 
thus not being representative of the young population. The Minister of State for Media 
Affairs and Communications resorted to the response that “many members have similar 
aspirations, ideas and concerns of Jordanian youths” (The Jordan Times, 5 April 2011).  
To sum it up, the opposition could not be appeased through the reforms and kept on 
protesting. However, it was less optimistic its demands would be heard. The broader 
public showed resignation instead of mobilizing. The tried and tested strategies that the 
ruling elite recycled in the structural domain kept the political landscape stuck in stag-
nation.  
 
Table 4.1: Structural Legitimation Strategies in Jordan  
 
4.3.2. Traditional Legitimation 
As mentioned before, traditional legitimation in Jordan is on the one hand based on the 
monarchy and on the other hand on the historical alliance with the tribes, which are ex-
tended families based in the country’s southern desert and northern hilly areas.131 The 
latter relation had experienced cracks already before the Arab uprisings.  
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 For the role of tribalism in Jordan for legitimacy in general, cf. Al Oudat and Alshboul (2010). 
Addressees Legal mode Symbolic mode Policy mode Success? 
All citizens 
Parliamentary elections 
Press law reform 
Fighting  
corruption 
Fighting  
corruption 
Yes? Contra-
dictions! 
Pro-reform 
protesters 
Public gatherings law  
Firing prime minister 
Electoral reform 
Constitutional reform 
Reform rhetoric  No 
Formal oppo-
sition (IAF) Electoral reform  
Attempted  
co-optation No 
Reformist 
elites 
Creation of NDC 
Monitoring elections  
Political parties law 
Constitutional court 
Reform rhetoric   Partly 
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Although tribal law was abolished in 1976, in some areas traditional settlement of con-
flicts is still prevalent and even pursued jointly by police and tribal judges, some of 
whom are officially recognized by the Palace (Watkins 2014: 33; 38). Temporary truces 
between families in which a relevant crime was committed are even registered with lo-
cal police departments, and state representatives increasingly take roles that tribal elders 
used to play (ibid.: 40; 43).132 Tribalism is encouraged by the state, and accordingly, 
“the prestige associated with Bedouin identity has encouraged other sectors of the popu-
lation, including Palestinian Jordanians and Circassians, to embrace tribal customs” 
(ibid.: 41). However, the focus on business elites under Abdullah II meant for tribal 
forces that “the door to the king had been closed”.133 
Tribal conflicts have become more frequent already since 2009.134 In early 2011, not the 
king himself, but a person rather close to him became the focal point of dissatisfaction. 
Some tribal figures (36 to be precise, only one of whom had been heard of before135) 
wrote a letter to the king complaining about the queen’s family.136 In a hardly disguised 
anti-Palestinian tone, allegations of corruption were made, particularly pertaining to the 
expropriation of tribal lands to the benefit of her family members, who are of Palestini-
an origin. The second accusation referred to having illegally given Jordanian citizenship 
to some 80,000 Palestinians; both allegations were unusually harshly repudiated by the 
court (Petra, 10 February 2011). The letter could be read as the fear of the traditional 
regime base to be disadvantaged.  
Legal mode  
The “king’s advantage” means on a very basic level that a king is harder to challenge 
than a president who occasionally has to stand in elections, rigged as they may be. Tra-
ditional legitimation is enshrined in the principle of dynastic succession in the constitu-
tion and the definition of the state as Hashemite (articles 1 and 28). The king’s immuni-
ty is guaranteed in article 29 of the constitution. His sanctity is legally prescribed in the 
constitution, as publicly insulting the king or “undermining his majesty’s dignity” is a 
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 Nevertheless, Watkins estimates roughly one half of all crimes in tribal areas are resolved through 
customary law (ibid.: 45). 
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 Interview with political analyst, April 2011, Amman. 
134
 Personal interview with political analyst, April 2011, Amman. 
135
 Personal interview with political analyst, April 2011, Amman. 
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 In secret, she was even compared to other Arab first ladies notorious for their lavish lifestyle (personal 
interview with political analyst, March 2011, Amman). This is in line with the “region-wide trend of ‘first 
ladies’ under ever closer public scrutiny” which Ryan (2011b: 573) noted.  
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criminal offense that is prohibited by the Penal Code (article 195). Violations are prose-
cuted by the State Security Court, with sentences ranging from one to three years (Hu-
man Rights Watch 2012a). During the uprisings, these articles were frequently evoked 
to indict outspoken Hirak activists who ridiculed the king or even burnt his portraits 
(The Daily Star, 12 January 2012). Surpassing these spontaneous acts, Ahmad al-
Oweidi al-‘Abbadi, a former MP who had already been jailed before, predicted the es-
tablishment of a republic in a talk show on a private internet-based TV channel. The 
State Security Court had him arrested in February 2012 and charged him with “subvert-
ing the system of government”, which is penalized under article 149 of the penal code 
(Human Rights Watch 2012b). 
Paradoxically, the king also made use of his prerogative to grant royal pardon to the 
convicted youth who had burnt his portrait (Yom 2014: 235). Through this means they 
even owed their freedom to him in spite of the offenses and he had another possibility to 
reinforce his image as a tolerant and clement ruler.  
The electoral law that benefits tribal areas has already been mentioned. Another meas-
ure of allocation was the municipalities’ reform. After the number of municipalities had 
been reduced from 328 to 93 in 2001, a new law gave areas with a population of over 
5,000 inhabitants the right to establish a municipality (The Jordan Times, 13 October 
2011), and in 2011 the cabinet decided to establish 99 new municipalities for the alloca-
tion of central resources.137 This led “smaller and less influential tribes” which had not 
been included in the plan to protest for the establishment of their own municipalities 
through blocking roads and burning tires (Clark 2012: 367; 373). The next day already, 
the establishment of 123 new municipalities was announced in order to stop the protests 
(The Jordan Times, 14 October 2011).  
Symbolic mode  
As dynastic succession is one of the central points of traditional legitimation, the young 
crown prince Hussein is already very present in the Jordanian public, with his portrait 
hanging in all public offices next to his father’s and grandfather’s. The seemingly prem-
ature grooming of the future king Hussein II embodies the inevitability of monarchic 
rule. The outlook on further stability thus strengthens his father’s rule as well.  
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 These changes had rhetorically even been sold by members of the Senate as “decentralization” 
measures (The Jordan Times, 9 September 2011). 
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At the beginning of his rule, Abdullah had tried to emulate his father’s practices to ben-
efit from the latter’s popularity, paying surprise visits to poor villages and paternalisti-
cally ordering the authorities on the spot to provide services or allocate money. After 
the uprisings started, he reactivated his uncle, Prince Hassan, for meetings with elder 
tribesmen (Yom 2014: 235). This is an ironic development, as the former crown prince 
had been regarded as too intellectual and detached from the people, but obviously, in 
comparison to the current king, he seems to have the advantages of age.  
As has been mentioned before, the king’s noble inheritance makes him the uncontested 
leader in a society shaped by diversity, and he is therefore seen as superior to all citi-
zens. Many acknowledge him as a ruler standing above the different tribes which 
wouldn’t accept a peer as a leader on the one hand and above different ethnic groups 
(Palestinians and Transjordanians) on the other hand. Abdullah II himself mentioned 
this in his speech in June 2011, saying it was his “responsibility and duty […] to stand 
at an equal distance from all” (Abdullah II 2011). 
In an effort to prove the tribes’ fear of being disadvantaged unfounded, the king toured 
the entire country during the spring of 2011. This was part of a massive campaign to 
have the formal pledge of allegiance (wila’) to his rule from the different tribes and cit-
ies renewed and at the same time provided an opportunity to allocate funds to the vari-
ous regions.  
Policy mode  
In a partial reversal of previous policies, some privileges for tribes were reinstated. 
Most tangibly, the king made use of an allocation tool called makrama, which can 
roughly be translated as a royal favor, which was mainly directed towards the military, 
veterans, or their family members, and tribes. E.g. on the king’s 49th birthday, the army 
announced a makrama to establish the so-called “Royal University for Medical Scienc-
es” which is supposed to be affiliated with the army (The Jordan Times, 1 February 
2011). Moreover, a “Military Credit Fund” under another makrama should favor mem-
bers of the security apparatus (ibid.). These measures were also a response to grievances 
the veterans had voiced already in 2010 (David 2010). The makrama is distinct from 
ordinary measures of allocation as it has the connotation of a gift granted by a tradition-
al leader.138   
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Responses  
During the March 24 sit-in, one random but telling observation was that a radio station 
in Amman transmitted a tribal song praising the king instead of playing the usual pop 
songs to contrast the youth protest with the regime base’s demonstrative support.  
Regarding the surprise visits to villages and favors, one interview partner hinted at the 
general problem that there should not be the need to hand out aid packages, and some 
20 years ago such a measure had simply not been necessary.139  
This strengthening of the regime base through traditional rituals seemed to be quite suc-
cessful. The only exception would be the protests that accompanied the king’s tour in 
Tafileh. The ICG’s assessment was that the youth’s demands all revolved around alloca-
tion measures and were a classical example of tribal rent-seeking intending to get a 
larger piece of the cake and thus proved the functioning of this classical co-optation 
measure (ICG 2012: 11). Probably this interpretation is too simple, and the continued 
protests of tribe members are a reason for worry to the king. Tribal discontent frequent-
ly led to a spiral of protest and repression, “cyclic contentions in which arrests of young 
protesters touch off more demonstrations and […] more police clampdowns” (Yom 
2013: 135). 
The use of the makrama had ambivalent effects. Yom cites a young Hirak activist com-
plaining they did not want makrama, but instead “political rights as a citizen” (2014: 
243). University students suffered from the makrama policy that lowers the quality of 
academic education and leads to tribal campus violence. A recent study found that in the 
four years between 2010 and 2013, almost 4,000 students were involved in campus vio-
lence, leading to seven deaths (The Jordan Times, 16 February 2014). This makes cam-
pus violence more lethal than politically motivated demonstrations.  
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Table 4.2: Traditional Legitimation Strategies in Jordan  
 
4.3.3. Identity-related Legitimation 
Given Jordan’s complex societal structure which comprises many ethnical groups, as 
outlined above, the question of identity is a delicate matter. For much of the 20th century 
with manifold changes in Jordan’s territorial characteristics, the national identity was 
deliberately kept “fuzzy” out of security concerns (Frisch 2002: 100). The national char-
ter of 1991 “defines the nation based more on a ‘civic’ definition of being loyal to the 
monarchy” (Lucas 2008: 291). Besides, religion plays an important role for the citizens’ 
identity.  
 
4.3.3.1 Nationalism 
In the nationalist subtype of identity-related politics, the strategy employed during the 
relevant time span seems to be a classical divide et impera strategy geared towards 
deepening the divide between citizens of Transjordanian and Palestinian origins. 
Legal mode 
The newly introduced constitutional amendments stipulate that high officials in various 
positions may not hold any citizenship beside the Jordanian one. This regulation came 
into force retroactively, which means that sitting members of parliament and ministers 
were no longer allowed to hold dual citizenship. Politicians were forced to either revoke 
their citizenship of another state (such as e.g. the USA, Canada or Syria) or resign from 
their post (see e.g. The Jordan Times, 13 October 2011). This measure on the one hand 
resonated with a general growing suspicion of foreigners and “foreign agents”. On the 
other hand, it posed “significant challenges for political inclusion for some of the most 
Addressees Legal mode Symbolic mode Policy mode Success? 
All citizens King’s  
constitutional role Dynasticism  Yes 
Tribal  
regime base 
 wila’ tour 
makrama 
Municipality re-
form 
Yes 
Tribal  
protesters 
Royal pardon  makrama No? 
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educated and well-trained Jordanians” (Tobin 2012: 97), not least those with a Palestin-
ian background, who tend to have a double citizenship more often than Transjordanians. 
Symbolic mode 
Rather than referring to his religiously relevant lineage, until today King Abdullah II 
tries to invoke the nation-building aspect in statements such as “the legitimacy of the 
Hashemite dynasty stems from their historical legacy and their achievements” (The Jor-
dan Times, 2 July 2012). There were many official campaigns intended to forge a na-
tionalist sentiment in the 2000 years, most prominently Jordan First (al-Urdunn 
awwalan). Although Jordan First was not even designed by Jordanians and thus not 
considered a Jordanian campaign, it proved to be rather long-lasting in public spaces 
(Schwedler 2012: 262ff.).140 Other large campaigns included the National Agenda and 
“We are all Jordan”. However, they not only failed in bringing about a common identity 
(Tobin 2012: 105), the elites willingly used the ambiguity of many citizens’ self-
perceptions and contending identities for creating mistrust among the different groups.  
A youth activist explained the lack of popular support for the protests by the 
Transjordanians’ fear that any changes towards democracy would lead to Palestinians 
ruling the country.141  In order to counter this fear, Palestinian Jordanians have always 
exerted some sort of political self-restraint, choosing rather not to protest. In Tobin’s 
words, “Palestinians would not protest unless the ethnic Jordanians were already pro-
testing” (2012: 98). The lack of consensus about who would actually benefit from polit-
ical changes was subsequently exploited by the government.142  
The sectarian card was obviously played by regime thugs who physically and verbally 
attacked the protestors of the Jordanian youth movement during their sit-in on March 
25, calling all of them “Palestinians” – which was meant as an insult. It was obvious 
that many, if not most of the protesters had an East Jordanian background and all dis-
played patriotic behavior (Ryan 2011b: 574). Already in earlier protests, Schwedler had 
noticed that “efforts of the protest organizers to frame the demonstrations as pro-
Jordanian ultimately produced a powerful and spontaneous framing contest that chal-
lenged the government and its agencies to match the patriotism of the demonstrators’ 
slogans” (2005: 156). Beyond using the label of “Palestinian”, the prime minister simul-
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 Personal interview with political analyst, Amman, March 2011. 
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 Personal interview with youth activist, Amman, April 2011. 
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 Personal interview with youth activist, Amman, April 2011. 
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taneously referred to the protesters as Islamists and even Salafis (The Jordan Times, 27 
March 2011), thus provoking latent resentments among the broader population against 
both pro-reform activists and Palestinians at the same time and blaming the Muslim 
Brotherhood for inciting violence (The Black Iris, 29 March 2011). 
The other side, consisting of self-proclaimed “loyalists” to the king, was 
instrumentalized to induce a wave of nationalism which was supposed to raise doubts 
about the pro-reform demonstrators’ loyalty to the nation. The name under which the 
loyalists rallied was “the call of the homeland” (Arabic: nida al-watan), as if Jordan had 
to be saved from democracy activists. The area of nationalist identity-building was thus 
characterized by a strategy of division and exclusive mobilization.  
Policy mode 
A probably unexpected move that was intended to appease the Islamist movement was 
the rapprochement with Hamas in late 2011 and 2012. The king received the organiza-
tion’s leader Khaled Mash’al for the first time after having expelled the leadership in 
1999; the visit had been brokered by Qatar (Al-Jazeera, 30 January 2012). Prime Minis-
ter Khasawneh called the earlier expulsion a “constitutional and political error”, but 
excluded any political activities of the organization in Jordan (Al Arabiya, 30 January 
2012). This remained the only noticeable event, as Mash’al went back to Qatar. 
Responses  
Regarding the foundation of national identity, the official discourse did not make every-
body happy. A teacher complained in a public debate that he has to teach that what 
keeps the Jordanian mosaic together is the Hashemite family.143 
The new stress on national identity resonated somewhat with many citizens, as already 
between March and April 2011 a marked rise in the number of national flags that were 
displayed in public, on cars and in shops could be noticed. It sometimes even seemed to 
become a competition regarding who was carrying the biggest flag. More critical voices 
felt somewhat insulted that the question of loyalty was mixed with the call for political 
reforms. Random conversations with people I met in the weeks after the March 24 pro-
test showed that some of the regime discourse was believed. A secular-minded Palestin-
ian Jordanian was convinced that the Muslim Brotherhood had organized all of the 
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demonstrations and feared that Islamists would hijack any political changes.144 In con-
trast, an apolitical Transjordanian, likewise with a high educational level, was unsettled 
by the regime discourse and remarked that all reform activists were Palestinians, while 
another one even claimed that the March 24 youth consisted of “Salafis and jihadists” 
who wanted to “make trouble, destroy the country, the intelligence and the police”.145 
Even though these individual observations certainly do not claim representativeness, 
they still illustrate that the employment of the nationalist strategy seemed intimidating 
to ordinary citizens so they would continue to refrain from protesting instead of becom-
ing politicized and mobilized.  
While the IAF was pleased with the normalization of relations with the Hamas, its lead-
ers were anxious not to meet Khaled Mash’al in order to maintain their identity as a 
national Jordanian rather than a Palestinian movement (The Jordan Times, 1 February 
2012). Moreover, there was some suspicion that the visit was designed to sow friction 
between the Hirak and the IAF through eliciting the former’s fear of a Palestinian-
Islamist predominance (ibid.). Through remaining separate, the two Islamist movements 
tried to maintain their chances for potential future election successes, as the boycott had 
not been decided upon yet.  
Regarding the ambivalence of the identity question, Ryan concludes that “[t]he regime 
does indeed talk at length […] about national unity, but divide and rule strategies re-
main part of the state’s tactics and strategies, especially when it is challenged” (2011b: 
569). However, the multiple dimensions in which Jordanians of Palestinian origin were 
excluded, presented as disloyal and put under general suspicion in order to intimidate 
them and to appease some Transjordanians also included a more evil discourse than in 
many years before.  
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Table 4.3: Identity-Related Legitimation Strategies in Jordan – Nationalism  
 
4.3.3.2 Religion 
The identity-related legitimation strategies that involve religion are by far less precari-
ous than the question of national identity in Jordan. The sectarian composition is char-
acterized by the dichotomy of an overwhelming Sunni majority and a Christian minority 
of about 6% of the population, cutting across ethnic cleavages (CIA World Factbook 
2014a). As in almost all Arab states, the constitution stipulates that Islam is the religion 
of the state (article 2). For matters of personal status law, there are Sharia courts and 
equivalents for other religious communities (Abu Rumman & Hanieh 2013: 31f.). 
Moreover, a Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs oversees mosques and religious ed-
ucation. Even the armed forces have their own section for issuing fatwas and previous 
grand muftis were recruited from this office (ibid.: 66). While the Muslim Brotherhood 
is the most important societal organization in the realm of religion, state-sponsored Is-
lam tries to impose a moderate perspective. 
Besides, quietist Salafis are tolerated despite their radical, but apolitical ideology, and 
sometimes even encouraged by the government in order to counter the Muslim Brother-
hood (Abu Rumman & Hanieh 2013: 20). In contrast, those Salafis who also employ 
radical, i.e. violent, means and are commonly referred to as jihadist Salafis are prose-
cuted.146  
In the realm of identity-related legitimation with a focus on religion, there were hardly 
any changes observed in the legal mode. The reopening of a legal case seemed to aim at 
                                                 
146
 Cf. the study by Abu Rumman and Hanieh on the jihadist Salafis in Jordan (2009) and on the Salafi 
movement in general by Wiktorowicz (2001). Their movement is characterized by informal ties and by a 
tribal, lower-class base in comparison to the Muslim Brotherhood, which has a more middle-class base 
(Abu Rumman & Hanieh 2013: 403). 
Addressees Legal mode Symbolic mode Policy mode Success? 
All citizens  Nationalist  rhetoric  Yes 
Transjordanian 
nationalists 
Only Jordanian  
citizenship for  
officials 
Defaming protesters 
as “Palestinians”  
Yes (but 
sidelining 
Palestinians) 
Pro-reform 
protesters 
 
Accusation of dis-
loyalty   
Yes (but 
negative) 
IAF   Rapprochement with Hamas No 
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appeasing radical Islamists. In 2011, a ridiculous lawsuit in absentia was allowed to be 
staged against the Dane Kurt Westergaard and others who were blamed for the 2005 
cartoon crisis, which had led to major riots in various Arab countries. The file was re-
vived after many years, charging the accused with “defaming prophets, publishing car-
toons insulting and slandering Muslims and inciting sectarianism and racism” (The Jor-
dan Times, 18 April 2011; see also The Copenhagen Post, 16 May 2011).  
Symbolic mode  
The king has an elevated and undisputed religious position as a biological descendant of 
the prophet Muhammad. This argument of his noble ancestry gives the king a natural 
advantage not only over tribal, but also Islamic actors, who in other countries claim the 
monopoly on religious authority. Of all government institutions, the welcome page of 
the Ministry of Interior’s website had been displaying a picture of the praying king 
along with a qur’anic verse147 for more than three years at the time of writing.148 In gen-
eral, Abdullah II did not invoke his religious legitimacy more often than necessary 
(Schlumberger 2010: 241). The Arab uprisings have not changed this. 
One of the foremost concerns of the palace is to portray and promote Islam as a moder-
ate religion. The former crown prince Hassan is most prominent in his interfaith activi-
ties on a global scale.149 The emphasis on moderate Islam was in line with portraying 
Salafis as a danger, who, in early 2011, suddenly were allowed to appear in public after 
having kept a low profile for years, demanding the release of jihadist prisoners in vari-
ous sit-ins. When regime thugs attacked a peaceful demonstration by Salafis on April 15 
in the northern town of Zarqa under the eyes of gendarmerie forces, scores of protesters 
and security personnel were left injured. But this time, even the Minister of Interior took 
the blame of traditional Salafis, who usually adopt a quietist, apolitical stance, instead 
accusing jihadists of “terrifying people”, well aware of the fact that many people do not 
differentiate between the various strands (The Jordan Times, 26 April 2011). On their 
part, Salafis did not take the chance to complain about the role of the security apparatus 
in this violent incident. Instead, representatives of “mainstream” Salafism visited in-
jured members of the gendarmerie in hospital, thus de facto accepting the official dis-
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 It is a part of sura 2:126 (al-baqara) saying “My Lord, make this a land secure, and provide its people 
with fruits” (transl. A.J. Arberry).  
148
 The website was accessed on 3 April 2011 and 17 May 2014. 
149
 His political role has been taken by Prince Ghazi, who has more Sufist leanings (Abu Rumman & 
Hanieh 2013: 73). 
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course (The Jordan Times, 18 April 2011). So the regime managed to send a message to 
the Salafis that was at the same time violent and conciliatory, but they chose to remain 
non-oppositional.  
Another problem emerged in preparation of the sit-in on 15 July 2011, when the hawk-
ish former IAF deputy Muhammad Abu Faris, a professor of Shari’a, issued a fatwa 
saying that “whoever dies in a protest […] is considered a martyr … even non-
Muslims” (The Jordan Times, 14 July 2011). He was subsequently countered on state 
television by the grand mufti, the prime minister and a Salafi cleric with the argument 
of sowing fitna (The Jordan Times, 15 July 2011). This incident seemed so grave that 
the representatives of state Islam, the government and quietist Salafism united in de-
nouncing the fatwa.  
Policy mode 
Regarding policies on religion, there were hardly any noticeable changes. Most im-
portantly, the state funds the pervasive building of new mosques. This is one of the 
strategies that is supposed to respond to higher religiosity, but is preferred over uncon-
trolled private organizations that could harbor extremist thought. Moreover, the state 
pays the income of religious personnel, and here an interesting development can be de-
tected. The number of imams on the state’s payroll jumped by 22% from 2011 to 2012 
(Jordan Statistical Yearbook 2012: 202). This is an indicator for an increase of alloca-
tion that goes hand in hand with greater control. 
Responses  
The Jordanian group that had campaigned against the Muhammad cartoons was split in 
its reactions to the trial, as their leader hailed it, while a former member complained 
about the “political reasons” that were behind the reopening of the case (The Jerusalem 
Post, 8 May 2011).  
As has already been described, the instrumentalization of the jihadist Salafis worked 
well in unsettling the population. In contrast, the traditional Salafis used the chance to 
deepen their unlikely alliance with the government.  
Obviously, in spite of the fatwa and counter-fatwa regarding martyrs’ deaths in protests, 
no martyrs were made on July 15.  
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Table 4.4: Identity-Related Legitimation Strategies in Jordan – Religion  
 
4.3.4. Material legitimation 
The general patterns of material legitimation in Jordan heavily depend upon the strate-
gies’ addressees. The upper classes profit from business opportunities, and especially 
the military has profited from structural adjustment measures (Baylouny 2008). The 
dominant strategy towards the regime base and the broader population is allocation 
through employment in the public sector and subsidies on consumer goods (Peters & 
Moore 2009: 280). The measures that were taken in response to the uprisings were dom-
inated by collectivist-inspired allocation, as economic grievances were the initial de-
mands that brought people out on the streets.150 The protests showed that the previously 
dominant pattern of material legitimation based on neo-liberal modernization seemingly 
proved a failure, as the outcomes of these economic policies had alienated parts of the 
former regime base.151 This is especially true for Transjordanians employed in the pub-
lic sector who were laid off in the wake of privatization of formerly state-owned enter-
prises, which e.g. affected workers in the southern potash and phosphate industries 
(Yom 2014: 245).  
Legal mode 
In the legal-formal domain of material legitimation, a restructuring of the social system 
was attempted to adapt the social contract to economic realities and to turn away from 
the rentierist allocation at least in one field. However, the government first tried every-
                                                 
150
 In February 2011, a survey conducted by the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) showed that 85% of 
the population considered economic issues to be the biggest single problem for Jordan (33% rising prices, 
25% unemployment, 19% poverty, 8% the general economic situation), in contrast to only 1% who 
thought political reform to be the most pressing issue (CSS 2011a). 
151
 Two thirds of employees in the newly created Qualified Industrial Zones are non-Jordanians 
(Abugattas-Majluf 2012: 238). 
Addressees Legal mode Symbolic mode Policy mode Success? 
All citizens  
 
 
  
Religious  
population 
 
Promotion of  
moderate Islam 
More state 
imams ? 
Salafis  Westergaard case 
Appeasement of 
traditional Salafis 
Countering jihadists 
 No?  
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thing else (described below under policy) before being forced to resort to structural 
changes. The subsidies on fuel derivatives that posed an ever heavier burden on the state 
treasury were supposed to be replaced by a cash transfer system that would benefit truly 
needy citizens (The Jordan Times, 3 September 2012). Rich Jordanians or even foreign-
ers who own various cars and consume the most profit more from subsidies on fuel than 
do poor citizens or even refugees without a car of their own. The subsidies can therefore 
be seen as a way of also appeasing the privileged classes. This inefficient practice has 
always been criticized by international financial institutions (IMF 2012b). In the face of 
a growing budget deficit, in the summer of 2012 a standby agreement with the IMF 
provided the Jordanian government with a 2 billion USD credit (The Jordan Times, 26 
July 2012). The lifting of subsidies should be paralleled by the first round of distributing 
cash payments to needy families as a compensation for the rising prices in November 
2012. However, as described before, the significant hikes of fuel and cooking gas prices 
led to massive street riots. The amount of money handed out to lower and middle in-
come households (under 800 JD per month) was merely 70 JD per year (The Jordan 
Times, 4 March 2013).  
The bizarre way of dealing with the fuel riots was the government’s decision to set up a 
pricing committee consisting of ministry officials and representatives of the Jordan Pe-
troleum Refinery Company that determines at every month’s beginning ad hoc what the 
fuel prices for the respective month will be, taking into consideration world market 
prices (The Jordan Times, 19 November 2012).152 The reintroduction of government 
control and setting monthly fixed prices is a very statist and even paternalistic approach 
and completely contradicts the logic that led to the systemic change envisaged above.  
Symbolic mode  
The discourse of modernization and social responsibility that had dominated before fad-
ed into the background. In November 2010, the king had lauded Jordan’s macroeco-
nomic indicators in his speech from the throne and predicted that “improving the per-
formance of the economy will continue to top our priorities”. For more than two years 
that followed, the discourse on political reform completely took over.153  
                                                 
152
 Such a procedure had already been in place until 2011 (IMF 2012b: 14). 
153
 The texts of all speeches are online at 
http://kingabdullah.jo/index.php/en_US/speeches/listing/cid/1.html rev. 19.05.14. The neglect of neo-
liberal ideology lasted until the opening of the newly elected parliament in the beginning of 2013 and was 
subsequently reversed again.  
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In order to boost domestic income, 2011 saw a new campaign aiming at domestic tour-
ism. The launching of the “Jordan is Beautiful” campaign was supposed to compensate 
for cancellations from tourist groups who booked regional packages including Syria 
and/or Egypt – countries that were increasingly becoming too unsafe to travel. The Ara-
bic name of the tourism campaign, “al-Urdunn ahla”, literally meaning Jordan is more 
beautiful, neatly mirrors the attitude that in every aspect, Jordan is a more convenient 
place to be than any other Arab country.  
Policy mode 
One of the king’s first measures during the uprisings, rotating the prime minister Samir 
ar-Rifa’i out of office, can either be seen as a populist strategy of directly responding to 
popular pressure or as the first symbolic move away from co-opting the neo-liberal 
business elite. The mass allocation measures that followed came at the price of sacrific-
ing some of the previously co-opted individuals – or at least of a lower profile role for 
them. However, as there were no larger structural changes to the set-up of the elite, a 
successful allocation policy would still result in an overall “plus” for material co-
optation. 
The government reacted to the protests predominantly through employing the region-
wide standard strategy of raising the public servants’ salaries and at first keeping subsi-
dies in spite of a tight state budget and rising external debts. In 2011, 1.4 billion JD 
were spent on subsidizing wheat, gas, fuel, electricity and water (The Jordan Times, 9 
September 2011).154 The 2011 budget was changed after the demonstrations had started; 
according to the revised draft, overall expenditures were projected to increase by ca. 
10% in contrast to 2010 to 6.36 billion JD (The Jordan Times, 7 March 2011). Effec-
tively, the budget reached 6.8 billion JD by the end of the year and over 7 billion JD in 
2012 (IMF 2012b: 35).  
A grave weight on the budget was the purchase of diesel for generating energy. This 
problem of securing cheap energy resulted from recurrent attacks on the gas pipeline on 
the Sinai peninsula which transports gas from Egypt to the Levant, including both Israel 
and Jordan. The share of Egyptian gas that was used for Jordanian electricity generation 
dropped from 80% in 2009 to merely 18% in 2012, raising the cost of subsidies for elec-
tricity to between 800 million and 1 billion JD (The Jordan Times, 19 November 2012 
                                                 
154
 The IMF numbers are slightly lower, indicating 567 million JD for fuel and 217 million JD for food 
subsidies (IMF 2012b: 35). 
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and 21 March 2013). In September 2012, the government had already tried to enact a 
fuel price rise, but upon protests led by both Hirak and Muslim Brotherhood, the king 
reversed the decision (The New York Times, 3 September 2012). Consequently, rela-
tions with Iraq were strengthened, which materialized in plans for a new pipeline and a 
minor, but symbolic grant of crude oil from Iraq (The Jordan Times, 28 November 
2012). 
Of course, resources for mass spending came from external sources. Both the USA and 
the Gulf states played a crucial role here with their vital interest in preserving stability 
in Jordan. Jordanian elites unscrupulously play on this concern by “portray[ing] Jordan 
as constantly on the brink of collapse” (Yom 2013: 130), which financially speaking is 
true. This cost-intensive strategy was supposed to be further sustained by Jordan’s en-
visaged accession to the Gulf Cooperation Council, which would then be transformed 
into the Arab monarchy’s club against revolution. However, after a 5 billion USD fund 
had been set up for Jordan and Morocco in late 2011, no further steps towards institu-
tional cooperation were made (The Jordan Times, 21 December 2011).155  
Meanwhile, the different professional associations, which have always had a high de-
gree of organization in Jordan, began staging strikes and sit-ins one after the other.156 
Their demands were substantial increases in salaries and other gratifications. Profes-
sionals working in the public sector demanded the right to organize in unions and to be 
paid as much as their counterparts in the private sector. The resentment of 
Transjordanians working predominantly in the public sector versus Palestinians that are 
driven into the private sector was tangible. However, the public sector restructuring that 
was supposed to “improve” the salaries of some 200,000 employees came with the re-
duction of overpaid employees at so-called “independent public institutions”. The fact 
that of the 8,000 employees affected by the original restructuring plan only 6,000 were 
talked of after a month shows their successful lobbying – the elites obviously decided to 
continue the co-optation of some of their base (The Jordan Times, 31 May 2011; 29 
June 2011). Nevertheless, the higher public sector salaries and benefits charged the 
2012 budget with 60 million JD (The Jordan Times, 16 May 2012). 
Mostly, the demands of protesters were partially met and thus protests could be ended 
quite quickly. Other random groups who stopped their work during the same time were 
                                                 
155
 For more details on the accession plans, see Ryan (2014). 
156
 E.g., the engineers’ association organizes about 100,000 members (The Jordan Times, 1 July 2012).  
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pharmacists and shop-owners. Most importantly, in early 2011 also teachers went on 
strike and demanded the right to found an association along with a salary raise of 150% 
plus more guaranteed university places for their children (The Jordan Times, 20 March 
2011). In the summer of 2011, an additional makrama benefiting the children of teach-
ers was introduced, covering their university tuition fees and stipends (The Jordan 
Times, 7 July 2011). Upon adoption by parliament and a royal decree, a teachers associ-
ation law was passed in autumn (The Jordan Times, 14 October 2011). Under the public 
sector salary restructuring for 2012, the teachers’ salaries were supposed to increase by 
70%. In early 2012, teachers again protested for ten days until they obtained a total 
100% pay raise (Petra, 21 February 2012). Later in November 2012, the new Jordan 
Teachers Association staged an open strike to support the fuel riots (The Jordan Times, 
15 November 2012). In all, the expenditure for wages and salaries had risen from 835 
million JD in 2010 to 950 million JD in 2011 and 1.177 billion JD in 2012 (IMF 2010: 
23; IMF 2012b: 35; IMF 2014b: 43). 
In order to escape the state’s control structures in the seven official unions, workers 
increasingly started to organize in independent trade unions, counting six by June 2011 
and even countered the corporatist structures through creating their own umbrella or-
ganization, the “General Federation of Independent Unions” (Adely 2012: 37).  
As mentioned before, the support of the armed forces is crucial for any authoritarian 
leadership. The Jordanian Armed Forces provide services for their members even be-
yond active service, e.g. through university stipends. Army and other security personnel 
benefit from the Military Credit Fund that offers loans for housing etc. (The Jordan 
Times, 1 February 2011). Also the military veterans, who had been unsatisfied for quite 
some time, were appeased through allocative means, especially those organized in the 
“Economic and Social Association of Retired Servicemen and Veterans”. Their pen-
sions were raised, charging the budget with another 30 million JD in 2012 (The Jordan 
Times, 16 May 2012).  
In the absence of other noteworthy natural resources, tourism is an important sector of 
the economy with a comparatively high employment rate.157 It is one of the primary 
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 The sector has among other things profited from foreign direct investments (Abugattas-Majluf 2012: 
242). 
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sources of external income for the Hashemite Kingdom.158 Jordan hosts the traces of 
ancient civilizations, various biblical sites, and remains of different Islamic dynasties. 
Many of those tourism sites are located in the tribal regions that used to be regime 
strongholds. The most prominent of them is to be found in Petra, since 2007 also ranked 
among the “New Seven Wonders of the World”, attracting more than half a million for-
eign tourists per year. The rent character of tourism rents as accruing from external 
sources can be seen wherever the tickets for foreigners multiply the prices that Jordani-
an citizens have to pay – which is the case on many sites. In Petra, the difference is es-
pecially striking, as ticket prices for day visitors were raised from 40 JD to as high as 90 
JD within 9 months,159 in order to capitalize on well-off tourists. In contrast, the en-
trance fee for Jordanians is only 1 JD.160 As only in 2011 a bylaw was drafted to allo-
cate a share of entry fees to tourism sites for maintenance, up to that point all revenues 
had been directed to the state treasury (The Jordan Times, 23 September 2011).161 Fur-
thermore, the Ministry of Tourism in despair tried to engage Jordanian citizens in pro-
moting Jordan as a safe destination, including bloggers and other social media (The Jor-
dan Times, 22 March 2011). 
Responses  
Although many protests began to run out of steam after a few months, it is hard to tell 
whether the reason was the success of allocation. The developments of late 2012 show 
that buying time through buying off protesters is the least sustainable strategy one could 
possibly imagine. In Bank’s words, the “crisis management only scratches the surface 
of the structural socio-economic problems of mass unemployment, underdevelopment 
and lack of prospects for the youth” (Bank 2012: 33). The fuel riots are the starkest in-
dicator for the fact that the plans to rebuild the social system were neither sufficiently 
communicated nor accepted. According to a World Bank-led survey, not only is 80% of 
the population’s poorest quintile not covered by any social security measures, but half 
                                                 
158
 Thomas Richter and Christian Steiner categorize income accruing from tourism as a particular sort of 
rent because there is a comparative advantage and an attraction that does not correspond to any sort of 
investment (Richter & Steiner 2008: 943). 
159
 The official explanation was “maintenance costs”, cf. http://petrapark.com/visitor-center rev. 
03.04.2011. 
160
 Even from the tickets for foreigners, only 2 JD are spent on site conservation, online: 
http://petranationaltrust.org/UI/ShowContent.aspx?ContentId=196 rev. 02.04.2014. 
161
 The cities in which the sites are located did not receive any of the income, although being responsible 
for hosting the tourists (Clark 2012: 362). 
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of the total population is not even aware of existing measures (The Jordan Times, 28 
November 2012).  
On the positive side, the military veterans’ protests were evaluated as having “quieted 
down remarkably” following their pension increase (Yom 2014: 243). As regards the 
strikes, the success can only be assessed some time after the increased salaries turned 
out to be sufficient. However, the heightened inflation that results from higher wages 
destroys the gains, making it a zero-sum games for employed consumers, while it poses 
a real problem to all those that do not profit from formal sector employment. This one-
sided policy therefore increases societal inequality. Also, “many of the labor demands 
are linked to wider grievances about neoliberal economic policies, corruption and gov-
ernment accountability”, which cannot be resolved and will continue to emerge as rea-
sons for protest (Adely 2012: 37).  
Jordanian citizens were largely unaware of the domestic tourism campaign. Despite the 
efforts at drawing tourists, the number of visitors to Jordan dropped dramatically. While 
in 2010 over 8 million visitors had come to Jordan, in 2011 the number fell under 7 mil-
lion to reach only 6.3 million in 2012, and the figures for the first months of 2013 show 
a further decline.162 So this dangerous trend seems to be rather stable. Especially the 
numbers of day tourists who booked regional packages fell most drastically by about 
25% from 2011 to 2012. Yet, revenues from tourism only fell “by 16.5 per cent in the 
first 11 months of 2011” (The Jordan Times, 9 January 2012), as tourists who stay in 
the country for a longer time spend more money anyway, and also probably due to af-
fluent tourists from the Gulf countries. This development made the tourism board de-
crease its budget (The Jordan Times, 23 December 2011). At any rate, it was the first 
time in many years that the tourism sector shrank, laying off staff in hotels near Petra 
(ibid.) and in tourist restaurants.163 But already again in 2012, the official figures show 
an overall rise in employees.  
However, this recovery was only confined to one sector and could not keep up with the 
demographic development, as the annual growth rate of 2.2% leads to an absolute popu-
lation growth of about 100,000 persons per year. This does not even take into account 
the number of Syrian refugees, which at the end of the time span under consideration 
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 Official numbers by the Jordanian Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities are available online: 
http://www.tourism.jo/en/Default.aspx?tabid=132  rev. 02.04.14. 
163
 Cf. the Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities’ Table 1.1 “Number of Employees in different Tourism 
Activities, 2005-2013”, online: http://www.tourism.jo/en/Default.aspx?tabid=132  rev. 02.04.2014. 
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stood at 150,000 registered persons.164 The number of newly created jobs even de-
creased between 2010 and 2012 from 62,812 to 48,069.165 The logic behind the alloca-
tion was to protect vested rights rather than creating sustainable solutions. As has been 
described before, also keeping the subsidies is a very unsustainable way of addressing 
the social hardship of an increasing number of citizens. 
 
Table 4.5: Material Legitimation Strategies in Jordan 
 
4.3.5. Personal Legitimation 
The king’s personal legitimacy suffered during the Arab uprisings, first when his wife 
and her family came under attack from tribal forces. The dissatisfaction with his style of 
rule became tangible in the rumors surrounding possible alternatives to his rule. His 
half-brother Prince Hamza and his uncle, the former long-time crown prince Hassan 
were discussed as potential successors who would allow for a “new” beginning.166 
However, the idea of exchanging unpopular rulers remained low-profile.  
Legal mode: The king’s personal legitimacy is strengthened on the legal base of the 
constitution which vests all powers in him. As the relevant regulations apply to all 
Hashemite kings instead of being suit-tailored, they have already been dealt with in the 
chapter on traditional legitimation (4.3.2.).  
                                                 
164
 Half a year after this time, the number had already tripled and surpassed half a million refugees. All 
data are provided by the UNHCR, online at http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107 rev. 
19.05.14. 
165
 All numbers are taken from the Jordanian Department of Statistics’ website, online: 
http://www.dos.gov.jo/dos_home_e/main/ rev. 02.05.14. 
166
 To some, Prince Hamza may also have the advantage over Crown Prince Hussein of not having a 
mother of Palestinian origin (Pelham 2011).  
Addressees Legal mode Symbolic mode Policy mode Success? 
All citizens 
Pricing committee 
for fuel and gas 
Shift away from 
modernization 
discourse 
Keeping subsidies 
No  
(not long-
lasting) 
Public sector 
employees 
  Salary raises Yes 
Tribal regime 
base 
 Boosting tourism No 
Lower classes 
Attempted  
transformation of 
subsidy system 
  No 
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Symbolic mode 
On the symbolic level, the ruler’s personal credibility is central for his legitimation. 
Yom suggests that in 2012 the king tried to lower his personal profile to preclude possi-
ble criticism, in a way that even “the palace did not publicly celebrate his birthday for 
fear that official portraits of him would be defaced” (Yom 2013: 128). Another ob-
servance is that the queen took a less prominent role from 2011 on and largely concen-
trated on charitable work in the field of education, partly reacting to the public dismay 
at her lifestyle.  
The armed forces are an important addressee to cater to. The king paid frequent visits to 
security forces and would even bring then underage crown prince Hussein along, both 
wearing military fatigues (The Jordan Times, 17 March 2011). 
In various speeches, the king claimed to lead the reform process, as has partially been 
discussed under structural legitimation (4.3.1). What helped to promote his image of a 
reformist king was a paper written by former foreign minister and deputy prime minister 
Marwan Muasher for the Carnegie Endowment in May 2011. It suggested the king was 
working hard on reform, while his efforts were constantly undermined by “ossified” 
elites (Muasher 2011: 4). The addressee of such a discourse is largely an audience 
abroad without deeper knowledge of power relations within Jordanian politics. Howev-
er, this kind of assessment from presumed “independent” policy advisors can also be 
used to domestically support the prevailing rhetoric.167  
The king’s self-proclaimed role did not seem to be taken seriously. In an attempt to bol-
ster his argument, Abdullah began to publish reform papers in late 2012 outlining his 
vision for politics in Jordan, beginning with a document entitled “Our Journey to Forge 
Our Path Towards Democracy”.168 In the second paper published shortly before the par-
liamentary elections, he sketched out what a “transition” to a parliamentary system 
could look like, not least preparing the citizens for a slower pace. 
 
                                                 
167
 A similar strategy backfired in March 2013, when The Atlantic published an article based on a journal-
ist’s off-the-record conversations with the king and also the queen, in which Abdullah II bluntly spoke out 
against basically all important societal actors (The Atlantic, 18 March 2013). In a half-hearted attempt to 
calm down the Jordanian public, which of course also had access to the piece, the Royal Court released a 
declaration simply denying the king’s statements. Abdullah also gave an interview to Associated Press 
(Ammonnews, 20 March 2013) to offer alternative publicity, but it was too late (The Black Iris, 20 March 
2013). 
168
 All discussion papers, four between December 2012 and June 2013, can be accessed on the king’s 
website, online: http://kingabdullah.jo/index.php/en_US/pages/view/id/244.html rev. 18.05.14. 
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Policy mode 
Regarding the policy mode of personal legitimation, elite rotation and maintenance de-
pending on loyalty are the most important element of personal legitimation. This is a 
common pattern of Middle Eastern politics as part of neo-patrimonial rule, especially in 
the linchpin monarchies without family rule.  
Bringing together the protesters’ demands with the issue of personal legitimacy, one 
core pattern of political rule in Jordan came under threat. In theory, the protesters’ call 
for an elected government has a potentially larger effect than just curbing the king’s 
influence on everyday politics through appointing officials. It would interfere with his 
position as a neo-patrimonial “ultimate arbiter”, as Waterbury (1970) described the po-
sition of the Moroccan king, to whom all elites are accountable. The loyalty of members 
of an elected government could principally be to their own constituencies. The institu-
tions available for the shuffling of elites would be confined to the Senate and the Royal 
Court. Also, the most important and powerful tool to secure his rule would be taken out 
of the king’s hands. Although it is unlikely that an oppositional or disloyal person 
would ever become prime minister, an alternative center of power of its own right (or 
worse: the people’s right) might emerge from such a constellation.  
Elite rotation has long been the central feature of power politics and has also been “in-
herited” by King Abdullah II from his father King Hussein (Bank 2004: 163). This neo-
patrimonial mechanism resulted in an average term of a minister’s or even prime minis-
ter’s service of only 11 months and decreased further during the months of the uprising, 
even confusing experts: while Curtis Ryan identified this development as “political in-
stability” in one sentence, he described the reshuffling of elites as a strategy for stability 
in the next (2014: 145).  
If one wants to make sense of the speeding up of rotation, the appointment policy shows 
a pattern of alternation between recycling security-oriented, hardline personalities and 
introducing moderate or reformist new faces in order to boost credibility with reform 
activists and the external audience. After Samir ar-Rifa’i’s sacking in February 2011, 
Marouf al-Bakhit’s term lasted for 8 months. The security apparatus was indirectly 
strengthened by shuffling a former head of the General Intelligence Directorate into the 
office of prime minister. After him, Awn al-Khasawneh, a former judge at the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in The Hague, was praised by a royal advisor as having “a clean 
slate”, which is a telling criterion in itself (The Guardian, 17 October 2011). He lasted 
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for 7 months, with the unusual exit of resigning himself while abroad. This decision 
came as a result of the hastened way in which the king tried to push through the parlia-
mentary elections in Khasawneh’s absence sidelining him (Al Arabiya, 1 May 2012). 
The controversial electoral law and the short time frame for the electoral commission to 
be set up fell short of any meaningful reform (Abu Rumman 2012). After Khasawneh’s 
resignation, another “hardline” government with a familiar face was formed under 
prime minister Fayez Tarawneh. His cabinet did not even include a Minister of Youth 
anymore (The Jordan Times, 3 May 2012). The intention from the beginning was that 
Tarawneh should administer the affairs of the state until the elections, which resulted in 
a five months’ term. The fact that his government received the lowest approval rates 
ever during Abdullah II’s regency was probably another reason for his short term (CSS 
2013: 11f.). Somewhat surprisingly, in October, the rather reformist Abdullah Ensour 
was appointed, who had heavily criticized the electoral law before. The way in which he 
was astoundingly also “elected” by the 2013 parliament has already been described. 
And again, it was Tarawneh who led the talks with members of parliament in his new 
(old) position as Royal Court Chief.  
As could be shown, the actual implementation of the envisaged empowerment of par-
liament ensured the continuation of politics as usual. The prime minister was selected 
from the members of parliament elected in January 2013, which the IAF had boycotted. 
Thus, the personalities the prime minister was to be chosen from assembled the usual 
suspects. Moreover, the procedure that the chief of the Royal Court – who was Fayez al-
Tarawneh at the time – conducted the talks with MPs to find out about their preferences 
shows that the King was not willing to let the matter be taken out of his hands (The Jor-
dan Times, 11 February 2013). The fact that many parliamentary blocs endorsed the 
incumbent prime minister as their “own” candidate demonstrated the weakness not only 
of their actual, but even of their perceived role (The Jordan Times, 28 February 2013). 
Eventually the “new” prime minister who was chosen after consultation was the old 
prime minister, Abdullah Ensour.  
Personal co-optation on the level of sub-elites was primarily addressed towards influen-
tial opinion-makers whose expertise is in demand in order to keep public discourses 
under control. This channeling of (minor) dissent contributes to the picture of the gov-
ernment as a pluralistic entity in which good will is present and failure can be attributed 
to reform-unwilling segments. One example of these co-optation measures was the ap-
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pointment of the former editor-in-chief of a large daily newspaper, Taher Odwan, to the 
position of minister of state for media affairs and communications and government 
spokesperson in the February reshuffle.   
While the establishment of the NDC has already been discussed under the category of 
structural co-optation, it also implied personal co-optation. The reformist bloc of fifteen 
actually temporarily left the NDC after the violent attack on the demonstration on 
March 25, 2011, in order to express their anger about regime-tolerated violence and the 
treatment of pro-reform activists. They only came back to join the committee after a 
face-to-face meeting with the king during which he promised them to personally guar-
antee the outcome of the recommendations and offered them the right to propose consti-
tutional amendments.169 As shown before, these promises were not kept.170  
Responses  
Regarding the success of the personal strategies of legitimation, a youth activist com-
plained that because the discourse about reforms had been going on since 1993 without 
tangible achievements, all trust in these promises had been lost.171 A lack of commit-
ment was evident in the gap between discourse and action throughout all legal changes 
that were enacted. Even if sometimes the king “stepped in” and had regulations changed 
towards a less conservative direction, these measures of “labor division” fell short of 
impressing activists.  
Nevertheless, the king still enjoyed personal trust in the sense that everybody is aware 
of his crucial role for achieving policy outcomes. One of the reasons that the Islamists 
gave for boycotting the NDC was that it had not been set up by the king himself, which 
already gave a clue that recommendations would not be implemented.172 This argumen-
tation is perfectly sensible in the Jordanian context, but always comes at the expense of 
low trust in formal institutions. 
In commenting the king’s reform speech in June 2011, blogger Naseem al-Tarawnah 
complained about the fact that the complete socialization process makes all citizens fo-
cus on the king instead of acting themselves. According to him, it did not matter wheth-
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 Personal interview with member of the NDC, April 2011, Amman. 
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 Ironically enough, another attempt at appeasing one of the most vocal journalists from the reformist 
bloc might have been making his brother the new spokesperson of the government and state minister for 
media affairs and communication in the July reshuffle (The Jordan Times, 4 July 2011).  
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 Personal interview, 10 April 2011, Amman.  
172
 Personal interview with high-ranking IAF member, April 2011, Amman. 
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er the king’s professed desire for reform was genuine, because the citizens were deliber-
ately kept in a state of immaturity (The Black Iris, 15 June 2011). 
Regarding personal co-optation, one example given above of the minister of state for 
media affairs and communications, Taher Odwan, was not successful, as he himself 
resigned from his office after only four months (The Jordan Times, 22 June 2011). He 
protested among other things against the restrictive amendments to the press law, there-
by causing a major crisis for elites and necessitating a government reshuffle (not affect-
ing the prime minister). 47% of an opinion leaders sample indicated that the lacking 
implementation of demanded reforms was the main reason for Jordan going into the 
wrong direction (CSS 2013: 9).  
 
Table 4.6: Personal Legitimation Strategies in Jordan 
 
4.3.6. Preliminary Conclusion: Success or Failure of Legitimation Strategies? 
Summing up the strategies of legitimation, especially those that targeted political pro-
testers and the opposition failed, most notably as regards the IAF. In contrast, the 
measures that aimed at strengthening the regime base seemed to be more serious and 
were pursued in even more different types of legitimation. They were mostly successful 
in the expensive allocation strategies, although these could hardly be upheld even for 
two years only. In some instances, it was hard to detect any response at all.  
One noticeable feature is that quite some strategies, especially in the identity-related 
sphere, had a divide-and-rule rather than a legitimating effect. An entrenchment that 
profits the regime base seemed to be the overall goal, risking the alienating of the bulk 
of the population, notably citizens of Palestinian origin. While a vocal minority includ-
Addressees Legal mode Symbolic mode Policy mode Success? 
All citizens  
 
 
Alternating 
rotation 
Yes? 
Pro-reform 
protesters 
 
King leading re-
form 
No? 
Reformist 
elites 
NDC promises 
 
 
No 
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ing the Hirak still protests, the majority is silenced, and patronage ties continue to work. 
In early 2013, the share of citizens who believed Jordan generally to be moving in the 
wrong direction was constantly growing (CSS 2013: 8). 
Tobin furthermore critically remarks that “[h]olding elections, sacking and reappointing 
government representatives, and increasing economic purchasing power all heighten 
consumerism and provide political distraction” (2012: 104). But those who would not 
be distracted and persisted in their demands also faced a different strategy of political 
rule: repression.   
 
4.4. REPRESSION IN JORDAN173 
As mentioned before, Jordan is known to be one of the less repressive countries in the 
Arab world. Put extremely, “[t]he consensus was that the Jordanian police will kick you 
but will not kill you” (Tobin 2012: 106). Still, rule is maintained with the help of an 
extensive security apparatus. Curtis Ryan describes the GID as “one of the region’s 
most sophisticated intelligence services” (2014: 148). During the Arab uprisings, the 
level of repression remained lower than elsewhere, also due to the less threatening chal-
lenge. Still, various repression measures targeted protesters and other groups. Conse-
quently, the Political Terror Scale’s ratings remained at 3 (Gibney et al. 2014).  
 
4.4.1. Constraining Repression 
The large Friday protest on 18 February 2011 was the first that was attacked by thugs 
(Bustani 2011). During protests, security forces exerted more violence than necessary to 
disperse demonstrators, but mostly the dirty work was done by civilian thugs. On March 
25, the gendarmerie forces known as the darak helped the loyalist thugs to violently 
disperse the youth movement’s demonstration, using water cannons, sticks and batons 
(The Jordan Times, 27 March 2011). 62 civilians and 58 security forces were said to 
have suffered injuries (ibid.). One activist who was hospitalized as a result of severe 
beating reported that the “boxing fest” stopped because the police officers were afraid 
he could die under their hands. Nevertheless, he announced he would not follow Am-
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 Some parts of this section are based on a paper co-written with Mirjam Edel, “To Repress or Not to 
Repress – Varieties of Regime Survival Strategies in the Arab Spring”, which was presented at the Annu-
al Conference of the German Political Science Association (DVPW) – Section for Comparative Politics, 
Marburg, 29-31 March 2012. The modified version which was published in Terrorism and Political Vio-
lence (Josua & Edel 2014) does not include the case study on Jordan anymore. 
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nesty International’s advice to file suit (Ammonnews, 28 March 2011). Apart from pro-
testers, also journalists covering the demonstration were beaten both by thugs and darak 
forces, who demolished their equipment (Committee to Protect Journalists 2011). The 
local Al-Jazeera bureau received anonymous death threats after having covered the pro-
tests in Amman (ibid.). 
It is important to note that the repression on March 25 was also regarded as legitimate 
by some. One Transjordanian I accidentally met explained to me: “you know, I was 
with the ones throwing stones”.174 He ridiculed the perception of the darak as aggres-
sive by referring to security personnel who guarded a sports event and denied that the 
darak had attacked the pro-reform protesters at all. 
Another incident in which the government used loyal forces to push its agenda ensued 
from a visit by the prime minister to the Palestinian refugee camp of al-Baqaa, after 
which he visited the powerful tribe that owns the land, telling members of the tribe to go 
to the camp and warn its inhabitants against demonstrating.175 
On April 15, 2011, the Salafis’ demonstration in Zarqa was attacked by highly untypical 
unarmed gendarmerie forces and thugs. In the clashes, some 80 security officials 
claimed to be injured – although injuries by teargas can hardly be attributed to Salafis 
(The Jordan Times, 17 April 2011). It was quite obvious that this clash was staged in 
order to convince the broader population of the threat the Salafis pose and to gain sym-
pathy for security personnel. The picture that was widely circulated in news reports af-
terwards showed a bearded, wild looking man raising a sword in fury.176 This image of 
the impersonation of evil was truly scary and the decision to publish such an unrepre-
sentative picture was certainly deliberate. Abu Rumman and Hanieh also talked of “em-
ploying the ‘Jihadis’ as a scarecrow to deter people away from demonstrations and from 
popular demands for reform” (2013: 436).  
Pro-reform rallies continued to be attacked by suspected “loyalist” thugs. Again in July 
2011, gendarmerie forces attacked a demonstration and especially targeted journalists – 
who had been handed orange vests in order to single them out (Center for Defending the 
Freedom of Journalists 2011). Moreover, in June the office of the press agency which 
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 Personal communication, Amman, April 2011. 
175
 Personal interview with member of the tribe, Amman, April 2011. 
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 It was circulated by Associated Press and can still be seen online under 
http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/islamists-attack-jordan-police-with-swords/story-e6frf7jo-
1226040059766 rev. 19.05.14. 
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had published the story of a harmless attack on the king’s motorcade in the south was 
destroyed (The Jordan Times, 16 June 2011). The bureau chief, Randa Habib, was 
threatened in an anonymous phone call. During a sit-in organized by a MP, protesters 
chanted “the people want the downfall of Randa Habib” (The Jordan Times, 30 June 
2011).  
Intimidation of journalists and Islamists turned out to be a dominant strategy. The IAF’s 
general secretary, Hamzah Mansour, was threatened early on and put under police “pro-
tection” (The Jordan Times, 14 March 2011). The party headquarters were broken into 
and a few days later attacked by a man wearing a fake explosive belt (The Jordan 
Times, 5 April 2011).  
A case of online repression was a reaction to the local news site Ammon News that had 
published the letter of the 36 tribal figures criticizing the state. When upon the GID’s 
request the website owner refused to delete the letter, subsequently the website was 
hacked and deleted, and both personal and work-related e-mail accounts were blocked 
(Freedom House 2012: 11). In February 2012 within a couple of hours two young activ-
ists were stabbed after having posted online articles critical of former Crown Prince 
Hassan (The Jordan Times, 25 February 2012). One of the two was a female student 
who was stabbed in the stomach by a masked man who told her not to publish on poli-
tics anymore, while the Public Security Department issued a defamatory statement say-
ing that she had a “deteriorating relationship to a young man” (Ammonnews, 21 Febru-
ary 2012).  
After voicing critical comments on the electoral law in a political talk show on the pri-
vate satellite channel JoSat in July 2012, participants as well as the anchor were accused 
of “incitement against the regime” and “undermining the King’s dignity” (The Jordan 
Times, 7 February 2013). Moreover, the TV channel was blocked (Human Rights 
Watch 2012c).177  
In the wake of the fuel riots, security forces employed more violence than before during 
protests, where they once had protesters attacked by dogs, and also in jail, where torture 
increased (Human Rights Watch 2012d).  
In a more subtle vein, the locations that had been used as protest sites in the absence of 
a suitable public space were closed off in order to prevent rallies. First, the Duwwar ad-
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 Interestingly, the news anchor, Roula Hroub, was elected to parliament in 2013 through the list 
“Stronger Jordan”. Her case was subsequently dropped (The Jordan Times, 20 February 2013). 
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Dakhiliyah and later the 4th circle in West Amman close to the Prime Ministry was 
fenced off after an open-ended sit-in by orphans and planted with roses (Hiari 2012). 
The roundabouts in politically sensitive areas were thus made physically impossible to 
access and to use as a space for protest.  
To sum it up, target groups of restraining repression were all rank-and-file reform activ-
ists and Islamists, and to some extent even their leaders. Salafis were hit hardest, how-
ever, in this case the repression was probably regarded as legitimate by other groups in 
the population. Moreover, even politically inactive Palestinians were a rather indiscrim-
inate target of repression. At protests and through restrictive legislation, journalists were 
intimidated and prevented from reporting freely. 
 
4.4.2. Incapacitating Repression  
As mentioned before, the number of persons who were killed during protests was low, 
with one on March 25 and two casualties during the fuel riots (The Jordan Times, 27 
March 2011). Instead arrestments dominated the incapacitating subtype of repression.  
The flipside of a higher degree of freedom of expression was discussed during the first 
public debate on the role of security services in public life, when one of the speakers 
only partly sarcastically remarked that surveillance had now become easier because 
agents only had to watch the live video broadcast in order to decide whom to jail subse-
quently.178 Activists were arrested for mainly limited time spans. In the street battle on 
25 March 2011, 87 of the pro-reform protesters were arrested for resisting police offic-
ers and sent to the Criminal Court, rather than any of the thugs, let alone riot police, 
who had assaulted them (Ammonnews, 8 April 2011). The leader of the day laborer 
movement, Muhammad Sunayd, was arrested four times between the summers of 2010 
and 2012. Also in the provinces, high-ranking activists of the labor movement were 
detained (Adely 2012: 36). 
After the violent clashes in April 2011, 230 Salafis were charged with i.a. “terrorism” 
and unlawful gathering, about fifty of them were jailed, and one hundred kept in custo-
dy, some in solitary confinement over months, and charged before the State Security 
Court (Wilcke 2011). According to their lawyer, two leaders of the Salafi jihadists were 
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 Remark by lawyer Sufian Obeidat at the 4th HashtagDebate, April 2011, Amman. While the atmos-
phere was rather tense in general, the present observing agents were civil enough to present themselves to 
the organizers before the start of the event. 
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moved to solitary confinement because they had refused to clean the prison toilets, 
which of course the authorities denied (Ammonnews, 24 August 2011).  
The handpicked Royal Constitutional Committee had proposed an amendment to the 
constitution, according to which the State Security Court’s jurisdiction over civilians 
was supposed to be restricted. This proposition was voted down by parliament (The 
Jordan Times, 23 September 2011). As already mentioned, in February 2012 a propo-
nent of republicanism was arrested for “subverting the system of government” under 
article 149 of the penal code (HRW 2012b). Between March and October 2012, almost 
seventy activists were accused of this offense and tried in the State Security Court 
(Ammannet, 23 September 2013).  
Another wave of arrests followed after the fuel riots, targeting over 300 protesters with-
in two weeks. According to a report, also peaceful protesters were indicted, and 107 of 
them were charged before the State Security Court (Human Rights Watch 2012d).  
 
Table 4.7: Repression in Jordan 
 
Targeted persons/groups 
Opposition 
leaders 
Rank-and-file  
activists 
Politically inac-
tive population 
Form of 
repression 
Constraining Islamists,  jihadi Salafis 
Journalists, pro-
reform activists, 
Islamists, Salafis 
Palestinians,  
Salafis 
Incapacitating Jihadi Salafis Pro-reform activ-ists, Salafis ---- 
 
So although Jordan’s death toll in the Arab uprisings was very low, constraining repres-
sion has not been the government’s only answer. Instead, the arrestment of protesters 
was conducted in a rather broad manner, although it targeted more rank-and-file activ-
ists than opposition leaders. Again, incapacitating repression targeted most strongly the 
Salafis, more precisely the jihadist Salafis, with the authorities detaining at times 10 or 
even 20 percent of all known members of the movement.  
The repression of reform activists sometimes came in an uneasy mixture with co-
optation, so the red lines that had been stretched since the beginning of the uprisings 
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were tightened again. But as the mix of charges and dropped charges, imprisonment and 
pardons showed, authoritarian regimes trying to reassert themselves do not at all times 
send unambiguously clear messages about where the red lines are. The wish to present 
an image that is both strong and tolerant hardly works in crises, as the tolerance is ex-
ploited by protesters, triggering an even fiercer response. Therefore, the repression 
measures became more intensive and harsher over time. 
 
4.5 CONCLUSION: SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF STRATEGIES OF POLITICAL RULE IN 
JORDAN  
In a concluding assessment, Sean Yom states that “the political scene of early 2013 
looks much like it did before the Arab Spring” (Yom 2013: 127). While this is certainly 
true on the surface if one looks at the polity, beneath the surface there is much more 
potential for unrest simmering. First and foremost owing to dramatic developments in 
the region on the one hand and hesitant and divided protest groups on the other hand, 
meaningful reforms could be avoided so far. The relative regional advantage of stability 
is, in a somewhat circular dynamic, reinforced by reference to this very fact. As Tobin 
notes, “the regime has also encouraged comparisons to neighboring countries” (Tobin 
2012: 105). As Jordan was a latecomer in the Arab uprisings, it could observe the de-
velopments in neighboring countries and learn that by March 24, the regional momen-
tum had already been lost. Ryan laconically concludes: “Jordan had managed to survive, 
as usual, without a revolution of its own” (2014: 151).  
Taking a closer look at the processes of political reform, in some respects all initiatives 
were outmaneuvered by different political institutions. Propositions by the National 
Dialogue Committee were watered down in the Royal Constitutional Committee, the 
lower house of parliament rejected many propositions by the Royal Constitutional 
Committee, and the upper house vetoed decisions by the lower house. It is not even 
worth mentioning that the king regularly blames all prime ministers for unpopular deci-
sions which he “directed” them to implement in the first place. What seems like a com-
plex institutional imbroglio at first sight can hardly veil the impression that any an-
nounced reforms are procrastinated for as long as possible through a system of labor 
division that always puts the blame on others.  
It is striking that many negative strategies were employed, such as bringing up the na-
tionalist question of loyalty, the demonization of protesters and even of Palestinians in 
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general, who form the majority of the population. Mistrust was sown, while the provi-
sion of services was re-concentrated on the former regime base. State employees and 
tribes benefited the most from various measures and mostly also rewarded these policies 
with loyalty.  
Regarding the sequencing of the strategies, as piecemeal concessions were rejected, 
repression was stepped up. While an increase in repression could be detected over time, 
it was not always clear whether the rejection of legitimation strategies was a reason for 
or a consequence of repression. The ambiguities that sometimes arose out of the sym-
bolic and policy modes could be resolved through a look at measures in the legal mode 
that were clearly designed to delay change for as long as possible and to sooner or later 
restrict the citizens’ room for maneuver.  
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Table 4.8: Summary of All Measures in Jordan  
 
 
Legal mode Symbolic mode Policy mode Success? 
All  
citizens 
Parliamentary elections 
Press law reform 
King’s constitutional role 
Pricing committee for fuel 
and gas 
Fighting corruption  
Dynasticism 
Nationalist 
rhetoric 
Shift away from 
modernization dis-
course 
Alternating 
rotation  
Fighting  
corruption 
Keeping  
subsidies 
Yes? 
Contra-
dictions! 
Pro-
reform 
protesters 
Public gatherings law  
Firing prime minister 
Electoral reform 
Constitutional reform 
Reform rhetoric 
King leading reform 
Accusation of  
disloyalty 
Alternating 
rotation  
No 
+ Repres-
sion 
Formal  
opposition 
(IAF) 
Electoral reform  
Attempted  
co-optation 
Rapprochement 
with Hamas 
No 
+ Repres-
sion 
Reformist 
elites 
NDC 
Monitoring elections  
Political parties law 
Constitutional court 
Reform rhetoric   Alternating 
rotation  Partly 
Tribal 
elites 
 wila’ tour 
makrama 
Municipality 
reform 
Yes 
Tribal 
protesters 
Royal pardon  makrama No? + Re-pression 
Transjord
anian na-
tionalists 
Only Jordanian citizen-
ship for officials 
Defaming  
protesters as  
“Palestinians” 
 
Yes (but 
sidelining 
Palestini-
ans) 
Religious  
population 
 
Promotion of  
moderate Islam 
More state  
imams ? 
Salafis Westergaard case 
Appeasement of 
traditional Salafis 
Countering jihadists 
 
No?  
+ Repres-
sion 
Public 
sector 
employees 
  Salary raises Yes 
Lower 
classes 
Attempted transformation 
of subsidy system   No 
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5. EMPIRICAL STUDY II: ALGERIA 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
The People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria gained independence from French coloni-
alism in 1962 after a bloody war of independence that had lasted for eight years. Algeria 
had been the only colony that was considered to be French soil, so the struggle for self-
determination was fought in an extraordinarily fierce manner. The war of independence 
became the founding myth that legitimized the rule of the Front National de Libération 
(FLN) through its army generals during the following decades.179 Regarding the stand-
ing of the armed forces, Mortimer conveys the telling quote that “in most countries the 
state has its army, but in Algeria the army has its state” (1993: 37). However, Steven 
Cook refrains from calling the regime a military dictatorship, rather speaking of “mili-
tary-dominated states” in which officers do not openly rule, but only prove to be “the 
locus of power” in times of crisis (2007: 15). The center of power, also known as le 
pouvoir, is hard to locate, but said to consist of an unknown number of army generals, 
resembling a “deep state”180 (Joffé 2013: 209).  
Until today, the liberation struggle serves as the “register of legitimation” (Dris-Aït 
Hamadouche & Dris 2012). In the terminology of the former sources of legitimacy, this 
equals ideological legitimacy. One of the FLN’s goals to strengthen its standing was to 
repel the French culture from public and cultural life. In the economic domain, a strate-
gy of socialist-inspired development was pursued (Elsenhans 1977). This included an 
“agrarian revolution” and steering the economy with the help of state-owned enterpris-
es. The statist logic still prevails despite more recent and rather hesitant strategies of 
liberalization.181 The fact that five year plans for production exist savors of a planned 
economy. As Algeria is one of the world’s largest oil producers, also the oil sector was 
nationalized in the 1970s. Algeria qualifies as a rentier state par excellence with all its 
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 On the consequences of colonial rule for creating a national identity in Algeria cf. Hill (2009). For 
general, concise introductions to Algeria’s social and political history see i.a. Ruf (1997), Entelis (1986).  
180
 This concept has frequently been used to describe the military’s involvement in politics in Turkey, but 
served to analyze the power structure in Egypt after the fall of Mubarak. In the meantime, also scholars 
such as Werenfels have come to use it for Algeria (2014: 5). 
181
 On the political economy of privatization cf. Werenfels (2002). Also Dillman analyzes the beginning 
of privatization, showing how also private business actors engaged in rent-seeking (2000). Likewise, 
Schlumberger (2004a) demonstrates the continued rentierist character of the economy. On the hesitant 
reforms in the agrarian sector cf. Aghrout (2004). The behavior of the state class is analyzed by Ouaissa 
(2009). 
5. EMPIRICAL STUDY II: ALGERIA 
 
135 
 
advantages for the political elite and disadvantages for sustainable development.182 The 
oil sector is the most important industry, with hydrocarbon products making up almost 
40% of the GDP, 60% of budget revenues and more than 97% of all exports.183 The 
second source of legitimacy therefore was material allocation, for as can be expected 
from rentier state theory, “the regime’s legitimacy [...] from the beginning was based on 
distribution” (Werenfels 2007: 33). Allocation of rents was among other things man-
aged through employment in public enterprises, which were completely unproductive, 
even amassing large sums of debt (Kichou 2009: 68f.). In contrast, the oil sector’s share 
in employment is only 2%, to the IMF’s chagrin (Algérie1.com, 14 March 2013). Most 
employment is in the informal sector, which is said to comprise 50% or even 60% of the 
economy and to cover about 22% of all employment, with higher numbers in the com-
mercial sector (Dris-Aït Hamadouche & Dris 2012).184 Despite these impressive and 
unambiguous figures, the production of oil has declined by more than 20% in the past 
seven years, according to the estimation of a former minister of finance, Abdelatif 
Benachenhou (El Watan, 13 February 2013). This development casts doubts on the eco-
nomic strength in the middle and long term. Current officials deny this figure and indi-
cate a decline of 5-6% only (ibid.). The impressive numbers regarding external revenues 
could be sustained through high prices on the world market. Nevertheless, domestic oil 
consumption is projected to double between 2008 and 2018 (Mekideche 2009: 162). On 
the negative side, the productivity of manufacturing has gone down by half between 
1989 and 2007, while at the same time expenses for infrastructure tripled to benefit pri-
marily foreign workers from Asia (Kichou 2009: 81f.). The sale of gas has become 
more prominent over the past years, with Algeria possessing the world’s tenth largest 
gas reserves (CIA World Factbook 2014b). Nevertheless, Algeria’s position is strategi-
cally not ideal, as the “Euro crisis” states of Italy and Spain account for 72% of all 
sales.185 
The Arab socialist approach was also tangible in the political sphere in the form of the 
ruling single party, into which the FLN evolved after the war, still comprising former 
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 See Beblawi and Luciani (1987) for the general theory and Henry (2005) for the effects of rentierism 
in Algeria. 
183
 In all, the exports in 2011 earned 73 billion USD, of which only about 2 billion were not oil-related 
(Dris-Ait Hamadouche & Dris 2012). On the hydrocarbon sector in Algeria cf. Aïssaoui (2001).  
184
 Even the IMF gives the rate of 46% for 2010 (IMF 2013: 42). 
185
 According to a newspaper report, Italy receives 44% of all gas exports, followed by Spain (28%), 
France (12%) and Turkey (8%) (Liberté, 27 February 2013). 
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independence fighters. On the societal level, mass organizations with close connections 
to the FLN offered a controlled institutional structure for citizens’ activities. Most 
prominent among them was the corporatist union for workers in the public sector, 
UGTA (Union générale des travailleurs algériens).  
The population has grown steadily, comprising 37 million inhabitants in 2012, as op-
posed to 30 million inhabitants in 2000 (El Watan, 18 April 2013). The percentage of 
citizens under the age of 15 was around 27% (ibid.). The Algerian state pursued its ef-
fort to form a national identity based through a strategy of Arabization as opposed to 
French culture. However, this development came at the expense of the Berber/Amazigh 
population who make up about 20-30 percent of Algerian citizens and are predominant-
ly present in the coastal region east of Algiers (Kabylia). Consequently, state policies 
were met with resistance in different forms. Kabylians protested in the so-called Berber 
Spring of 1980 and later, notably in 1988. 2001 saw another Kabyle uprising known as 
the Black Spring, which was harshly repressed by security forces.186 Finally, the Berber 
language Tamazight was recognized as a “national” (as opposed to official) language in 
a constitutional change in 2002 (article 3 bis of the Constitution). 
The distinct national identity furthermore comprises Islam as the civilizational founda-
tion of the state in contrast to French values. Zoubir (2010: 182ff.) claims the coexist-
ence of secular and religion-based legitimation undermined the elites’ credibility, play-
ing into the hands of more radical Islamists. The results of this policy were evident to-
wards the end of the 1980s, when the newly founded Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) 
emerged as the winner of free elections first on the municipal level in 1990 and then in 
the first round of the national parliamentary elections in late 1991.187 Many scholars 
claim that the protests that preceded the stalled transition of 1988-1992 equaled “Alge-
ria’s own aborted ‘Arab Spring’” (see e.g. Sadiki 2012). Indeed, the riots in October 
1988 had started in a similar way as did the Arab uprisings through mass protests 
caused by price hikes following the economic crisis in the late 1980s which had forced 
austerity measures on the country. Notably, youth protests which were at first violently 
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 For a brief presentation of the Kabylian identity and movement cf. Willis (2008). 
187
 A monumental study on the Islamist movement in Algeria and especially the FIS’ rise was written by 
Willis (1996). Volpi (2003) studies the FIS as well as the other Islamist groups in a perspective of Islamic 
political thought.  
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repressed paved the way for a liberalization of political and social life.188 While the 
population happily made use of its new power, the consequences of free elections were 
unacceptable to both the FLN and the pouvoir.  
The military staged a coup in January 1992 and stopped what could have been a real 
democratization process. The ban on the FIS led to a bloody civil war as different Is-
lamist jihadist groups formed and radicalized themselves, not least fostered by the gov-
ernment security services that sought to delegitimize their contenders and legitimize 
their own brutal responses.189 The GIA (Groupe Islamique Armée) and GSPC (Groupe 
Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat) perpetrated atrocious massacres not only 
against government forces, but also against the civilian population. In all, according to 
official numbers at least 150,000 Algerians were killed in the so-called black decade 
(décennie noire) beginning in 1992, and many more have “disappeared” until today. 
Many officers accused of having perpetrated severe human rights abuses, such as acts of 
torture and forced disappearances, are still in active service (Addi 2011: 94).  
After the official end of the civil war, Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected as president in 
1999. Bouteflika had already served as foreign minister from 1963 until 1979 and upon 
becoming president assumed the office of defense minister.190 He tried to reestablish 
Algeria’s international standing and introduced a national reconciliation law, according 
to which former jihadist fighters who surrendered to the authorities could get an amnes-
ty without any criminal prosecution (Joffé 2008). This initiative was backed up by a 
referendum, but did not amount to a real process of truth-finding and reconciliation due 
to the fact that also security forces were exempt from any accountability.191 In return, 
the army tacitly granted the president more leeway (Joffé 2008: 217). Only 7,500 for-
mer “terrorists” made use of the offered amnesty, and even less cases of disappeared 
persons were identified and their families compensated (ibid.; Dris-Aït Hamadouche & 
Dris 2012).  
With the beginning of the civil war, movements associated with political Islam were 
largely banned from political life. However, the state still needed to have a credible ally 
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that would support its interpretation of religion to present an alternative to the jihadist 
groups (Hill 2009: 195). Only one moderate Islamist party with the Arabic acronym 
Hamas (Mouvement pour la Société et la Paix, MSP) remained and was even included 
in the government coalition, holding ministerial portfolios since 1995.192 After the ban 
of the FIS, no viable opposition forces were present on the political scene. Through a 
strategy of divide-and-rule, ruling elites provoked a fragmentation of the political land-
scape. According to Werenfels, this involved repression, co-optation, and the resem-
blance of competition between parallel institutions (2009: 184). Oppositional parties 
therefore always remained “weak and divided” (Zoubir & Aghrout 2012: 70). Instead, 
the FLN shared power with its offshoot, the Rassemblement National Démocratique 
(RND), which had been founded in 1997 and served as a fig leaf for the would-be mul-
tiparty system. The RND has been part of the government alliance and its party member 
Ahmed Ouyahia acted as prime minister during various periods ever since. Other known 
political parties included the leftist Parti des travailleurs, which is co-opted and busy 
supporting the government. A Berber-dominated party is the RCD (Rassemblement 
pour la Culture et la Démocratie), which at times has an oppositional stance, but sup-
ported the military coup of 1992. More credible is the FFS (Front des Forces 
socialistes), which is also Berber and had initially formed as a guerilla group to counter 
cultural and linguistic discrimination (Hill 2009: 198).  
In contrast to the political parties, ever since the opening twenty-five years ago, the 
press landscape has been remarkably diverse, counting about one hundred regular publi-
cations in both French and Arabic (Dris 2012). While the press is flourishing, boasting 
four serious independent daily French newspapers and at least one Arabic counterpart, 
the freedom of information and speech is guaranteed to a larger degree than the freedom 
of association.193 After the 1988 liberalization, independent trade unions were allowed 
to form, breaking the monopoly of mass organizations. The number of associations sky-
rocketed to almost 80,000, nevertheless associational life is more tightly controlled and 
the authorities often impede politically relevant activities by societal organizations 
(Dris-Aït Hamadouche 2012a: 165).194  
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Although more parties were allowed to compete in ballots since the early nineties, both 
parliamentary and presidential elections remained manipulated.195 Trust in parliament 
was very low according to the first wave of the Arab Barometer (see also Zoubir & 
Aghrout 2012: 67). Consequently, vote abstention became a common feature of politics. 
Louisa Dris-Aït Hamadouche (2009) shows that even the official turnout figures in elec-
tions on all political levels dropped steadily and heavily between 1990 and 2007.196 At 
that time, “the rate of participation was an all-time low, highlighting the lack of both the 
legitimacy of the regime and the credibility of the elections” (Zoubir & Aghrout 2012: 
75).  
Bouteflika slowly tried to assert his standing among the other centers of power to move 
closer to the neopatrimonial mode of exercising power as in most other Arab countries, 
first of all by reducing the army’s influence. The former predominance of the Eastern 
“clan” of elites hailing from Batna, Tebessa and Souk Ahras (commonly known as 
BTS) has been replaced by the president’s Western clan which bears the acronym TNT, 
referring to the cities of Tlemcen, Nedrouma, and Tiaret (Dris-Aït Hamadouche 2009). 
Moreover, the processes of economic liberalization and structural adjustment that be-
came necessary in the 1990s benefited a group of army bureaucrats who evolved into a 
new business elite (Werenfels 2009: 182). The regime’s opaque and messy structure is 
nicely captured by Werenfels, who claims that “[i]n Algeria, cacophony, contestation, 
contradictions, and divisions are inherent in the functioning of the authoritarian state 
system with its multiple power centres” (2013: 13).  
The level of constraining repression was very high in some domains. Algeria’s overall 
rating in the Political Terror Scale was 3 on the eve of the uprisings (Gibney et al. 
2014). The aftermath of the civil war could still be felt in the state of emergency and a 
lack of civil liberties. 
The Algerian security apparatus is well-known for its large capacity, which was even 
further expanded during the civil war: “Since the mid-1990s, Algeria has quadrupled its 
security forces, from 50,000 police officers in 1994 to about 200,000 officers in 2012” 
(Achy 2013: 12). From 2010 to 2011 alone, the number rose by 20,000, leading to a 
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ratio of one policeman per 180 citizens (Dris-Aït Hamadouche & Dris 2012). The Alge-
rian security forces’ international cooperation in combating terrorism has been rewarded 
with new equipment (ibid.). Moreover, “[o]fficers are well paid – their minimum wage 
is 65 percent more than the minimum wage in the public civil service ($470 compared 
to $280 per month) – and enjoy good career prospects, making it unlikely they would 
turn against the government” (Achy 2013: 12). In this sense, in Algeria heavy policing 
is not only due to security concerns, but also reflects an employment policy. In the pub-
lic space at least in the capital, excessively more police than needed stand around idly in 
groups of three at every official or important building and at every intersection or corner 
of the road without performing any obvious tasks. The expansion of the police forces 
came at the expense of the other branches of the security apparatus who had tried to 
limit Bouteflika’s scope of action, most notably the secret service, which is by some 
thought to be the inner core of le pouvoir (El Watan, 15 March 2011).  
The intelligence service played a very important role behind the scenes of Algerian poli-
tics. The Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité (DRS) is the agency notori-
ous for extensive surveillance of the citizens, increasingly seeking to establish itself as 
an independent power center besides the military. While its pervasive activities are 
well-known, its head since 1990, General Mohamed Médiène, known as Toufik, keeps a 
secretive aura through never appearing in public. Some consider him to be Algeria’s 
most powerful individual, although not even his face is known (Keenan 2010).  
As already mentioned, the armed forces (People’s National Army) are the other central 
pillar of the regime, numbering “approximately 140,000 active members and 100,000 
reservists” (Achy 2013: 12). Due to its historical role, the first generation197 of post-
independence officers still dominates decision-making (Jabi 2012: 29), and the army is 
even said to include in its ranks “the world’s eldest soldier” (Liberté, 4 June 2013).  
Fights between Islamist jihadist groups and different branches of the security apparatus 
are ongoing despite the end of the civil war. Attacks by the former GSPC, renamed Al-
Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, and the arrest or death of alleged terrorists were still 
reported in the news on a daily basis.198 This gave ruling elites an “‘Islamist card’ […] 
to play effectively on the international stage” (Volpi 2006: 444). Under the label of 
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fighting terrorism, Islamists were the main targets of incapacitating repression. Espe-
cially after 9/11, Western allies appreciated the Algerian “expertise” in the fight against 
terror. During the early years of the civil war, special courts had condemned thousands 
of Islamist fighters and activists to decade-long prison sentences or even to death, and 
many of them are still imprisoned despite the dissolution of the special courts 
(Echorouk, 7 June 2014).  
 
5.2. THE PROTESTS IN ALGERIA  
5.2.1. Protests before the Arab Uprisings  
In Algeria, already 2010 saw a very high level of socioeconomic protests. Associational 
life had been confined to very narrow boundaries with hardly any room for autonomous 
maneuver, leaving instead street protests as the main avenue of contestation. The title of 
a paper by Bennadji calling 2010 “the year of 1001 riots” even understates the numbers 
that he finds: between 9,000 and 10,000 riots and “public incidents” were staged and 
police forces had to intervene on smaller scales over 100,000 times (Bennadji 2011).  
One of the reasons for popular outrage was the ongoing terrorist activities by jihadist or 
maybe simply criminal groups who perpetrated attacks and kidnapped businessmen in 
Kabylia, against which citizens protested (Reuters, 22 November 2010).  
Other than that, reasons for protesting were the same as in the remainder of the Arab 
states: discontent on both the political and socio-economic levels due to corruption, po-
litical deadlock and a growing economic imbalance. The price of basic commodities had 
jumped enormously in 2010 due to rising world food prices, and migration into cities 
led to higher living costs.199 Unemployment especially among the youth was rampant, 
although official figures probably grossly underestimated reality, suggesting that 21.5% 
of all men from the age of 15-24 years and 37.6% of women of the same age were un-
employed in 2010.200 For the total population, an illusionary number of 10% was given. 
The low labor force participation rates show that the lack of jobs is even more extreme 
than official unemployment figures suggest. Men had a participation rate of 68.9% in 
2010, with youth in the age of 15-24 years only reaching 46.5%. As regards women, the 
total rate stood at 14.2%, young women reaching only 8.9%. The economic downturn 
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was also a consequence of unequal distribution, in spite of the general assessment of a 
former activist that the 2000 years had witnessed “more money and fewer liberties”.201 
The existing political crisis was described by sociologist Daho Djerbal in the sense that 
protesters sought “a restoration of human or the people’s dignity by a reevaluation and a 
reformulation of political legitimacy” (2011: 11, author’s translation).  
 
5.2.2. The Beginning of the Arab Uprisings in Algeria  
The more specific “Arab spring protests” in Algeria started quite early on January 5, 
2011, shortly after the beginning of the demonstrations in Tunisia. The rising costs of 
sugar and cooking oil triggered riots in Oran and Algiers. The price of sugar had gone 
up from 80 to 130 Algerian Dinars (DA) during a few months in 2010 (Le Quotidien 
d’Oran, 5 January 2011). On January 5, youth in Oran and some minor cities started to 
burn tires, block roads, throw stones etc. (Le Quotidien d’Oran, 6 January 2011). Pro-
testers also targeted buildings owned by the largest company that has a quasi-monopoly 
on basic foodstuffs, Cévital (Dris-Aït Hamadouche & Dris 2012). On January 7, after 
the Friday prayers youth started to throw stones. Riot police armed with batons reacted 
by using water cannons and tear gas (BBC, 7 January 2011). Hundreds suffered injuries 
and three persons were killed during the protests that quickly spread throughout the 
country (Le Quotidien d’Oran, 9 January 2011). Also in provincial cities in the East, 
official buildings were raided by rioting youth. In order to preclude more unrest, foot-
ball games were cancelled.  
These alarming developments immediately led the government to inject millions into 
the market in order to keep the prices stable. For eight months, the costs of the subsidies 
for sugar and oil alone as well as a tax exemption on the import of these goods were set 
at 300 million Euros (Le Quotidien d’Oran, 12 January 2011). On January 11, advocates 
met and united in order to support about 2,000 youth who had been detained during the 
riots.202 
However, it soon turned out that there was more behind the riots than disenchanted 
youth. According to a new law effective from 1 April, trade should become more for-
malized. Wholesale merchants were obliged to register their businesses, pay sums of 
more than 500,000 DA per check or through other written and traceable payment meth-
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ods, pay taxes, and present annual accounts (Le Soir d’Algérie, 8 January 2011). This 
ran counter to the interests of merchants who mostly operate informally.203 In anticipa-
tion of higher expenditures, they raised the prices of basic foodstuff. So-called barons of 
the informal sector had the idea of spreading rumors about food shortages and instigat-
ing popular riots in order to overturn the law, which would enable them to keep their 
profits in the shadows.204 However, they had miscalculated the regional momentum of 
protests and the small riots quickly got out of control, as a domino effect was anticipat-
ed.205 Although the anomic micro-riots could be stopped quite quickly, another dynamic 
had already set in.  
Similarly to Tunisia, young protesters in many Algerian cities employed the drastic 
means of self-immolation. These incidents was prevalent mainly in January, with 50 
people trying to set themselves on fire and three of them dying because of their injuries 
(Amara 2012: 56). In the city of Annaba, even four young people at once threatened to 
set themselves on fire because of unemployment and marginalization (Le Quotidien 
d’Oran, 12 February 2011). The Minister of Religious Affairs and a Salafi sheikh swift-
ly condemned the immolations as unislamic (Magharebia, 28 January 2011).  
In various places, young protesters blocked roads (ibid.). The security forces did not 
prevent this, instead concentrated their work on protecting central government buildings 
in the more sensitive areas (Volpi 2013: 107).  
The new dynamic also led former FIS leader Ali Benhadj to become active again. He 
was arrested by the police after he had been tried to politicize the rioting youth in the 
popular neighborhood of Bab el Oued. He was subsequently tried in court for “inciting 
an armed rebellion and harming the security and integrity of the state”, but was acquit-
ted after a few days on January 19 (Algérie1.com, 19 January 2011).  
Very quickly, one week after the departure of Ben Ali from Tunisia and even before the 
demonstrations in Egypt catalyzed developments in other Arab states, various opposi-
tional movements united in an alliance. This alliance called Coordination pour le 
Changement et la Démocratie (CNCD), founded on January 21, was initiated by the 
independent Algerian human rights organization, Ligue Algérienne pour la Défense des 
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Droits de l’Homme (LADDH).206 Besides the LADDH, it included NGOs, autonomous 
trade unions by public administration workers and teachers, an association of the unem-
ployed, the neighborhood committee of Bab El Oued, and apart from minor leftist polit-
ical parties also the Berber RCD (Communiqué de la CNCD 2011).207 The movement’s 
demands included the cancellation of the state of emergency, freedom of press and par-
ticipation, and the release of the persons detained during the riots (Zoubir & Aghrout 
2012: 68). Ali Yahia Abdennour, honorary president of the LADDH and one of the ini-
tiators of the CNCD, also wanted the president to step down (ibid.: 69). The fact that 
President Bouteflika already held office for a third legislative period for which the con-
stitution had to be suit-tailored made him an easy target, as he resembled the 
gerontocratic rulers that had been ousted in other countries. However, many organizers 
emphasized that the meaning that was ascribed to the CNCD especially from outside 
observers was somewhat exaggerated in the sense that they did not meet to plot the top-
pling of the regime.208 
In parallel, various professional associations and workers protested for socioeconomic 
reasons. Different professional groups held strikes, notably many from the public sector, 
including paramedics, workers in public enterprises and clerks working in the legal ser-
vice, among others. But although there were many different protesting groups, they 
competed for the same resources and therefore hardly unified around common goals, 
thus remaining scattered and weak.  
At the same time, lots of squatters in irregular housing areas (so-called bidonvilles) 
throughout the country were evacuated from occupied houses that were destined for 
social housing programs, in order to allocate them to entitled persons to end their pro-
tests (Le Quotidien d’Oran, 14 February 2011). As one example, citizens who had been 
on the waiting list for being allotted housing by the state organization responsible for 
distribution of living space (Agence Nationale pour l’Amélioration et du 
Développement du Logement) for ten years forcefully entered the company’s headquar-
ters and made their demands heard (Le Quotidien d’Oran, 22 January 2011). The alloca-
tion of apartments proceeds in an opaque way and the “manipulation of lists” of benefi-
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ciaries is common, which is only one of many reasons why the state cannot live up to its 
own promises to provide for decent (and free) living (Safar Zitoun 2012: 98). 
In the regions and even in Algiers, unemployed citizens began to stage sit-ins. They 
organized in the “Comité national pour la défense des droits des chômeurs” (CNDDC) 
(Le Soir d’Algérie, 5 February 2011). In Kabylie, a so-called “Coordination des comités 
des villages et des quartiers de Tizi-Ouzou” formed (Le Soir d’Algérie, 25 January 
2011). Also students protested throughout the country. 
On January 22, the Berber political party RCD tried to hold a march, which had been 
banned in advance under the law of emergency, as are all demonstrations in the capital. 
The few RCD activists were besieged by the police in the party’s headquarters in the 
main street of downtown Algiers, Rue Didouche Mourad, and were not even able to 
leave the building in order to reach the starting point of the march. The security forces 
took extreme preventive measures, even trains were stopped outside the capital (Le Soir 
d’Algérie, 23 January 2011). In clashes with the police forces, 42 protesters suffered 
light injuries (Le Soir d’Algérie, 24 January 2011). In contrast, in the Kabylian town of 
Béjaïa, a non-authorized march on 29 January was tolerated, drawing thousands of sup-
porters (El Watan, 30 January 2011). On February 11, when Mubarak was ousted, doz-
ens of RCD supporters celebrated the Egyptian revolution in front of their Algiers head-
quarters, chanting the pan-Arab slogan “the people want the downfall of the regime” 
(Le Soir d’Algérie, 12 February 2011). The regional wave of euphoria reached its peak, 
and exactly at this point the decisive demonstration of the Algerian protest movement 
was timed. 
 
5.2.3. The February 12, 2011 Demonstration 
The CNCD had decided to stage a protest march in the capital, which signified crossing 
a red line. The march was not authorized by the wilaya of Algiers, instead the organiz-
ers were offered the possibility to hold a rally in a closed hall, which they refused (Le 
Quotidien d’Oran, 8 February 2011). Also the Minister of Interior as well as the vice 
prime minister had tried to “cancel” the march (Le Quotidien d’Oran, 10 February 
2011). Parties belonging to the presidential alliance distributed flyers saying “no to vio-
lence” in order to counter the mobilization attempts by the CNCD activists and to 
spread fear among citizens of the demonstration turning violent (El Watan, 11 February 
2011). From the initiators’ perspective, the demonstration on February 12 was supposed 
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to be “the beginning of popular contestation” (Le Quotidien d’Oran, 12 February 2011). 
However, the security forces did their best to contain the demonstration and to keep it 
under control at any time.209 The largest demonstration in Algiers was overshadowed by 
an even larger presence of riot police forces belonging to the Unités républicaines de 
sécurité. 
The envisaged route of the protest was to start at the Place du 1er Mai and to end at the 
Place des Martyrs, a couple of kilometers apart, passing through the vital squares of 
central Algiers which would encourage as many citizens as possible to join the march.  
From the authorities’ perspective, this plan was to be thwarted at any cost. In prepara-
tion of the protest, all public transport to the capital was stopped, including trains, bus-
es, and highway routes. Public servants and students were advised not to pursue their 
work in Algiers in order to keep the streets as empty as possible (Le Soir d’Algérie, 13 
February 2011). Even inside the capital, security was very tight, checking cars and bus-
ses and preventing demonstrators from reaching the central meeting point at the Place 
du 1er Mai. All available measures of control were put into place in order to hinder any 
mobilizing momentum that would make the people overcome their fear of the security 
apparatus (and/or state power), as had happened in Egypt on January 25 (Le Quotidien 
d’Oran, 12 February 2011). Even internet access was blocked in Algiers and some other 
cities throughout the day, while some activists claimed their Facebook accounts had 
been deleted (The Telegraph, 12 February 2011). Many protesters, especially known 
activists, were arrested early on, according to some reports more than 300 persons, 
among them about 50 female activists (El Watan, 14 February 2011). The Minister of 
Interior tried to play down the number to a highly unlikely “14” (El Watan, 13 February 
2011). They were held in custody at police stations and interrogated and released on the 
evening of the same day after the demonstration was over.210 Even members of parlia-
ment from the RCD were detained shortly after the beginning of the protest, among 
them Tahar Besbès (ibid.). Those who were held for the longest time were leaders of the 
autonomous unions and online activists (ibid.).  
Besides the police forces on the ground, also a police helicopter kept the protesters un-
der surveillance. Only about 500 demonstrators were able to gather in the Place du 1er 
Mai on the morning of 12 February and were instantly surrounded by a number of po-
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licemen at least three times as high. The protesters included former FFS party leaders, 
former prime minister Ahmed Benbitour and a couple of other former ministers and 
members of parties close to the pouvoir (ibid.). Also a well-known singer, son of a 
Kabylian resistance fighter, joined the crowd with other musicians and was greeted en-
thusiastically (ibid.). As it was impossible to gather in one place, mainly smaller groups 
formed in various areas and chanted their slogans.  
According to the CNCD’s communiqué, the protesters’ demands comprised “change, 
democracy, the lifting of the state of emergency, the freeing of persons detained during 
protests, the opening of the media and the political scene, and social justice” (Le 
Quotidien d’Oran, 12 February 2011). Most prominently, protesters chanted the pan-
Arab slogan “the people want the downfall of the regime” and “Djazair hurra, 
dimuqratiya” (a free, democratic Algeria), as well as “Yesterday Egypt, tomorrow Alge-
ria” (Le Quotidien d’Oran, 13 February 2011; The Guardian, 12 February 2011). The 
decidedly anti-regime stance was also evident in the mixed Algerian-French slogan “get 
out, le pouvoir” (“barra barra ya l’pouvoir”, see El Watan 13 February 2011). The pro-
testers also decried the president and his prime minister as “terrorist” (“Bouteflika-
Ouyahia, hukuma irhabiya”; ibid.), and some posters said “Boutef out” – Boutef being 
the derogatory abbreviation for the president's name – or “down with dictatorship” (El 
Watan, 11 February 2011). On other posters, a multilingual regional reference was 
made: “One: Tunisie. Two: Egypte. Three: Viva l’Algérie!” (El Watan, 13 February 
2011). Moreover, local grievances by organizations of the disappeared during the civil 
war added to the general slogans (Le Quotidien d’Oran, 13 February).  
A minor counter-protest of regime supporters appeared on the scene (ibid.). Participants 
reported that youths tried to disturb the peaceful protest as agents-provocateurs who had 
presumably been paid by a member of the communal assembly to taint the movement’s 
reputation (El Watan, 14 February 2011). The thugs chanted “Bouteflika is not Mubar-
ak”, but they also heatedly debated with protesters (El Watan, 13 February 2011). Po-
lice wrested posters from activists and arrested them instead of the thugs, nevertheless 
more people joined the protest (ibid.). 
Besides the usual suspects organized in the CNCD, former FIS vice president Ali 
Benhadj appeared at the protest site, accompanied by supporters chanting slogans prais-
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ing him.211 However, many of the other demonstrators were outraged at his arrival and 
tried to keep him out of their ranks, fearing that the whole protest would be discredited 
through the participation of such a controversial personality. Considering the control the 
security forces exerted over the demonstration and the fact that most youth activists 
were arrested early on, it can be assumed that it was an intentional decision to let him 
appear at the protest exactly to create this kind of division and public fear of the FIS’ 
return.212 
According to newspaper reports, repressive measures especially targeted the protest 
leaders. Most prominently, the elderly former leader of the LADDH, Ali Yahia 
Abdennour was mistreated, as well as female protesters (Le Quotidien d’Oran, 13 Feb-
ruary 2011). When a group tried to march to the Ministry of Youth and Sports, close to 
the Place du 1er Mai in the Rue Belouizdad, police fired tear gas grenades.  
In all, the protest had endured from 8 to 16 o’clock (El Watan, 13 February 2011). As a 
result of the heavy police presence, turnout was comparatively modest. This triggered a 
heated debate within the CNCD whether to keep up the protests on a weekly basis (Le 
Quotidien d’Oran, 14 February 2011). Some considered the demonstration as a “success 
on the political and media levels”, also because it had united citizens from different so-
cial backgrounds (El Watan, 14 February 2011). Although some participants viewed it 
as the decisive protest that had made the people fight the “wall of fear” (ibid.), they 
could not overcome the wall of security forces. To other observers, the fact that 30,000 
policemen were probably necessary to prevent the mass rally did not prove the regime’s 
strength, but demonstrated the elites’ panic and weakness (Le Soir d’Algérie, 13 Febru-
ary 2011). One of the organizers admitted that the weight of the demonstration in terms 
of turnout did not merit the media attention it received.213 But obviously, the govern-
ment assigned such an importance to the protest that it felt the need to dramatically in-
crease the number of people on the Place du 1er Mai – even though they were security 
personnel. 
Also in Oran the local offshoot of the CNCD had organized a minor protest in front of 
the municipal assembly, which was dispersed by police forces within one hour. Some 
30 protesters were arrested and released later on, among them also academics (El 
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Watan, 13 February 2011). In Annaba, unemployed youth besieged the administration 
building of the governorate and demanded instant job creation (El Watan, 14 February 
2011).  
 
5.2.4. The Aftermath and the Subsequent Development of Protests 
Commenting on the demonstration, the Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mourad 
Medelci referred to the low turnout as the proof that the protest movement represented a 
“minority” (El Watan, 14 February 2011). He was eager to stress that “Algeria is not 
Tunisia, Algeria is not Egypt” (ibid.).  
The protest movement tried to continue the demonstrations, expecting a “snowball ef-
fect” that would encourage citizens to join (El Watan, 19 February 2011). However, one 
week afterwards, on February 19, the picture in Algiers was largely the same: very 
heavy police presence hindered now only dozens of protesters from moving from the 
Place du 1er Mai (Le Quotidien d’Oran, 20 February 2011). The slogan that prevailed 
was unmistakably anti-regime: “pouvoir assassin” (ibid.). Counter-protesters again tried 
to provoke the peaceful demonstrators, this time bringing along posters of Bouteflika 
and throwing firecrackers at the anti-regime demonstrators (ibid.). Police forces pre-
vented a physical confrontation of the two groups. Again one week later, at the demon-
stration on February 26, the counter-protesters were even more aggressive, throwing 
stones under the eyes of the police (Le Quotidien d’Oran, 27 February 2011). Notably, 
participants of both demonstrations carried national flags, so the decidedly anti-regime 
protesters still showed their patriotism (ibid.). But even the nationalist framing did not 
help mobilize citizens. One organizer lamented that the more demonstrations were held, 
the less people showed up.214 
The CNCD soon faced serious internal disputes around which strategies to pursue and 
also regarding the participation of different groups. E.g., the independent trade unions 
were offended by the presence of student associations close to the political party RCD 
(Le Quotidien d’Oran, 23 February 2011). The RCD’s participation in general was re-
sented by many who remembered the party’s backing of the military coup in 1992 and 
thus doubted its democratic credentials.215  
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The CNCD also discussed the possibility of calling for a general strike (El Watan, 14 
February 2011). In their crisis meeting following the repressed protest, state television 
showed up and wanted to cover the heated discussions. This infuriated the activists, as 
the national TV channel had already presented the demonstration in a negative light (Le 
Quotidien d’Oran, 14 February 2011). Their rage, in turn, did not serve to let them ap-
pear in a more favorable way. Finally, the members could not unanimously and effec-
tively decide whether to hold further protest marches. Instead, the alliance split into two 
groupings, with the political wing known as CNCD-partis politiques comprising the 
RCD and most prominently Ali Yahia Abdennour, who were determined to keep pro-
testing even if only very few people would participate in the marches. On the other side, 
the CNCD-Barakat consisting of the LADDH, the unemployed and other civil society 
organizations realized that due to bad timing and mobilization the conditions in Algeria 
were not ripe for a popular revolt. Instead, they wanted to prepare society for a demo-
cratic future through creating awareness and political education. To this aim, they held 
public meetings in different cities to discuss their vision for reform with local citizens 
(El Watan, 15 March 2011). The CNCD-Barakat remained faithful to this societal ap-
proach and refused any dialogue with le pouvoir. 
One similar and highly relevant group that took to the streets for better payment were 
the communal guards, who had been recruited as auxiliary security forces besides the 
Gendarmerie in the rural areas during the civil war (Volpi 2013: 109). Of their total 
number of 94,000, their protest in March 2011 had an impressive turnout of over 10,000 
and took place in downtown Algiers. When the prime minister refused to take care of 
their demands, they even broke through the deployed security forces to reach the build-
ing of parliament (El Watan, 8 March 2011). So their potential as challengers was con-
siderable. Their demands were purely socioeconomic, however, as they sought a retro-
spective pay raise and indemnity. The positive slogan they chanted, “Bouteflika is the 
solution”, and the posters they carried showing his portrait, illustrates the non-political 
character of their protest, although some of them were wearing their military fatigues 
(Jeune Afrique, 7 March 2011). It is quite obvious that although they broke the taboo of 
holding a demonstration not only in the capital, but near political institutions, their loy-
alty to the political order was not questioned. However, deployed police would at any 
rate avoid pictures of security forces struggling against each other, which would evoke 
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the impression of a civil war, and rather let them declare their allegiance to the presi-
dent.  
While the number of protests had already been impressive in 2010, in 2011 demonstra-
tions were staged in every single governorate (wilaya) of the country - nevertheless, 
they remained spatially and temporally confined instead of developing into a permanent 
threat (Dris-Aït Hamadouche & Dris 2012). Reasons were diverse and could be as min-
imal as the suspension of a driver’s license or power outages. During the first nine 
months of 2012, 4,500 protests were held, two thirds of which ended in violence (Free-
dom House 2013). The number of self-immolations remained at a high level, with 32 
persons dying from fire in 2011 (Liberté, 10 November 2012).216  
Some stirs in the formal political scene were also noticeable. In anticipation of the par-
liamentary elections, the Islamist party MSP left the government coalition in the begin-
ning of 2012 in an attempt to position itself strategically, as in other Arab states Islam-
ists had won post-Arab spring elections in a landslide (Layachi 2014: 141).217 The MSP 
tried to reverse its co-optation and formed the so-called Green Alliance with other Is-
lamist parties to compete in the elections.  
 
5.3. STRATEGIES OF LEGITIMATION IN ALGERIA 
As in most Arab states, the elites’ reaction to the protests was “a combination of ap-
peasement and force” (Zoubir & Aghrout 2012: 70). As could be seen, the actual chal-
lenge the Algerian regime faced was far from the ground-shaking developments in the 
1990s. Accordingly, the government responses were highly targeted and primarily de-
signed to prevent any further mobilization.  
 
5.3.1. Structural Legitimation: General Patterns and Crisis-specific Strategies 
The demands showed that political grievances were at the heart of the legitimacy crisis 
in Algeria, challenging the pouvoir as a whole, but also single institutions. Generally 
speaking, no new strategies could be detected, and measures stayed behind the liberali-
zation employed in 1989, rather reversing this opening on the legal level. The first and 
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foremost rhetorical strategy for containing the dynamics on the streets was accordingly 
to equate the uprising with the last comparable wave of protest and thus to deter protest-
ers through evoking the previous outcome: civil war. 
Legal-formal mode 
The president announced to lift the state of emergency that had been in place since 
1992 as one of the first measures already on February 3, 2011. This was not only a re-
sponse to one of the protesters’ most important demands, but had even been a proposi-
tion by a group of parliamentarians from a wide range of political parties, including the 
ruling FLN (Le Quotidien d’Oran, 3 February 2011). Shortly after his announcement, 
on February 23 Bouteflika issued the presidential decree abolishing the state of emer-
gency. This positive development was however marred, as at the same time he intro-
duced new regulations that basically had the same effect and were in part even more 
draconian in charging the armed forces with the fight against terrorism and “subver-
sion”, whatever that meant. Also, suspects could be held for three months with two pos-
sible extensions. Effectively, under the guise of legal changes responding to popular 
demands the same procedures as before remained legal (Le Quotidien d’Oran, 26 Feb-
ruary 2011). Already three days after the decree was announced, during a demonstration 
in Algiers the futility of the measure could be felt by protesters who were beaten by the 
police even harder than on previous occasions (Le Quotidien d’Oran, 27 February 
2011).  
In responding to the protesters’ demands, parliament set up an investigation committee 
to find out about the sugar and oil shortages, with the results primarily blaming the large 
industrial food producers (Dris-Aït Hamadouche & Dris 2012). The approach was very 
superficial in the sense that the reasons for discontent were only searched for in the eco-
nomic realm, and there only in the formal domain, veiling the true reasons behind the 
“sugar and oil riots” as sketched out above. The food companies, most prominently 
Cévital, did not even feel the need to react to the parliamentary commission’s hearing 
invitation (La Tribune, 14 November 2011).218 
An ad hoc institution was set up in May 2011 to recommend reforms, the “Commission 
Nationale de Consultations sur les Réformes Politiques”. It was presided over by the 
speaker of the upper house of parliament, Abdelkader Bensalah, and came to be known 
                                                 
218
 The head of Cévital was said to be “close to the anti-Bouteflika camp in the army” (Werenfels 2007: 
65). 
5. EMPIRICAL STUDY II: ALGERIA 
 
153 
 
as the Bensalah Commission. Due to this very fact it was not expected to present any 
audacious recommendations, moreover it was staffed with the president’s advisers 
(Layachi 2014: 140). Bensalah was a founding member of the second regime party 
RND and had already been the spokesman of the national dialogue committee during 
the civil war. The Bensalah commission invited organizations such as the UGTA, wom-
en’s associations and well-known personalities to listen to their suggestions for reform. 
Effectively, the bulk of the participants were actors close to the ruling elites or elites 
themselves. Among the personalities who were consulted was i.a. General Khaled 
Nezzar, who had served as Minister of Defense from 1990 to 1993, was one of the mas-
terminds behind the military coup and had later been part of the ruling military junta. 
Interestingly, hardly any of the consulted persons and groups even found it necessary to 
make their suggestions accessible to the public (L’Expression, 25 June 2011).  
Due to the lack of credibility that was ascribed to the Bensalah commission from the 
outset, it was boycotted by many former politicians, even high-ranking ones such as 
former presidents and prime ministers, and political parties, notably the RCD and FFS 
(Jeune Afrique, 23 June 2011). Also the LADDH was asked to participate, but refused, 
as did other organizations that were part of the CNCD and the Berber movement (Le 
Quotidien d’Algérie, 19 June 2011).219 In contrast, young Algerians were not invited at 
all (Tout sur l’Algérie, 24 May 2011). A newspaper article scoffingly presented the pic-
tures of self-proclaimed representatives of dubious youth organizations “which even 
Google didn’t know”, all well closer to the age of 50 than 40 (El Watan, 10 June 2011). 
After one month only, the commission presented its results to the president, which con-
sisted basically of suggestions and demands by different actors. Ironically, despite the 
limited variance of consulted citizens and organizations, the suggestions still went be-
yond intended concessions. They included the dissolution of the unrepresentative par-
liament, a return to the limitation of the presidential term to a maximum of two man-
dates, and even the establishment of a constituent assembly (El Watan, 23 June 2011). 
To nobody’s surprise, the propositions were shelved.220  
The parliamentary elections were not held early. However, a battery of legal changes 
was promulgated in January 2012: the laws on elections, political parties, associations, 
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and information. In the run-up to the parliamentary elections to be held in May 2012, a 
new electoral law was put in place raising the number of mandates in the lower house 
from 389 to 462 (Zoubir & Aghrout 2012: 75). This can be regarded as a classical 
measure of co-opting potential opposition figures by enlarging the number of individu-
als that directly profit from the political structures, as deputies receive a salary that is 
“twenty times the Algerian minimum wage” (Dris-Aït Hamadouche & Dris 2012). The 
age of eligibility was also lowered from 28 to 23 years (article 78 of the electoral law), 
which before had been a discrimination against the youth (Jeune Afrique, 26 June 
2011).  
Another reform that at first glance seemed like a boost to political life was a new politi-
cal parties law ratified in December 2011. It led to establishment of 21 new parties by 
April 2012, so that 44 parties took part in the parliamentary elections in May of that 
year (Zoubir & Aghrout 2012: 74). This development was remarkable, as in the 20 
years before only one new party formation – the FLN offshoot RND – had been author-
ized. But what looked like a step towards a more vibrant political scene was mainly the 
result of dissidents from the dominant parties who founded their own one-man shows 
(ibid.). The potential for renewal can thus be doubted, and even if some party leaders 
seem charismatic, they lack public visibility and grassroots. Volpi characterized this 
development as an “expansion of the regime’s patronage network via business politics” 
(2013: 112). In the place of internal regime mechanisms for solving conflicts and for 
rejuvenation, the proliferation of parties externalized such processes. While the presi-
dential alliance of political parties had dissolved in the run-up to the parliamentary elec-
tions, the “dumping” of well-known politicians to new parties allowed for superficially 
new power constellations that enabled a continuation of the status quo (Dris 2013). 
Most prominently, the Minister of Public Works, Amar Ghoul, left the MSP after the 
party had split from the presidential alliance in order to keep his ministerial post, and 
created his own Islamist-nationalist party with the rather pathetic name TAJ (tajammu’ 
amal al-Djaza’ir, literally “the union of Algeria’s hope”). Of course, he left the MSP 
only after winning a mandate in Algiers as the leader of the Green Alliance list and then 
took other MSP deputies to his new TAJ. In all, of six newly formed Islamist parties, 
three were spin-offs from the MSP, also in other cases led by high cadres, which gave a 
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severe blow to the party (ibid.).221 This was clearly the MSP’s punishment for having 
ended co-optation. 
In order to retain control over the political party landscape, any party must seek to “an-
chor the values and fundamental components of Algerian society, notably the values of 
the revolution of November 1, 1954” (article 11 of the law on political parties). Moreo-
ver, it is stipulated in article 9 that no party must resemble a party that has been dis-
solved. This regulation is directed towards the former FIS, as is article 5, which prohib-
its the engagement of religious personnel in political parties with explicit reference to 
the “national tragedy” (Dris-Aït Hamadouche & Dris 2012). In contrast, repenting for-
mer terrorists were allowed to form new parties (Dris-Aït Hamadouche 2012b: 61).  
The requisites for creating a new party are not exactly unattainable, as only two mem-
bers per wilaya in one fourth of the 48 governorates are required (article 19). The Minis-
try of Interior, which is in charge of controlling the establishment of new parties, can 
veto each founding member (article 29). Political parties represented in parliament re-
ceive state funding according to the number of their mandates (article 58). In all, these 
regulations were not spectacular and did not signify a game-changing level, except for 
facilitating the proliferation of micro-parties. This turned out to be extremely useful for 
the parliamentary elections that were held in May 2012. As in all elections, the mobi-
lization of voters was a hard task, this time also against calls for a boycott by the former 
FIS leaders Madani and Benhadj (El Watan, 16 March 2012). In preparation of the elec-
tions, the Ministry of Interior sent out text messages to millions of mobile phone users 
calling on them to cast their votes (Liberté, 23 January 2012). Moreover, although 
mosques were regarded as taboo places for political campaigning, even prohibited by 
law, the Minister for Religious Affairs and Endowments (awqaf) qualified the act of 
voting as the citizens’ duty commanded by Islam, which imams should mention in their 
Friday sermons (ibid.). Implicitly, he qualified abstaining from the ballot as unislamic 
behavior.222  
The RCD boycotted the elections, as the party congress overwhelmingly voted against 
presenting any candidates and called on the population to boycott likewise. Atmane 
Mazouz, former head of the RCD’s parliamentary bloc of 19 deputies who had laid 
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down his mandate in February 2011, called the elections an “insult” to the Algerian citi-
zens as nothing new could be expected and turnout promised to be low (Jeune Afrique, 
8 May 2012). 
On the day of the elections, turnout was reported as being as high as 42%, although this 
number mocked the reality many voters and observers witnessed in the polling stations 
(New York Times, 12 May 2012). Moreover, citizens were suspicious as “certain areas 
showed dramatic increases in turnout during the day’s hottest hours” (NDI 2012: 23). 
Furthermore, as the Ministry of Interior announced a turnout that topped the 2007 result 
even before the polling stations were supposed to close, it seemed to be an illogical 
move to then extend the voting time by one hour in three quarters of all governorates 
(ibid.). In the official press conference after the elections, the Minister of Interior ac-
counted for the weak participation in the populous northern part of the country present-
ing the argument that voters had used the holidays to go to the beach or camping, while 
the citizens in the South were “patriots”.223 A less ridiculous reason would be that army 
personnel were allowed to vote and many were stationed in the southern governorates 
(Le Monde, 12 May 2012). Moreover, it was suspected that army members were regis-
tered as voters both in their hometowns and “in multiple deployment sites”, leading to 
an increase of voters by 4 million in contrast to 2009 which could not be accounted for 
(NDI 2012: 18).  
The voting system stipulated the allocation of seats in each district according to the pro-
portional share of votes over 5%. Also, a women’s quota was included in the party lists, 
although it remained unclear how exactly seats would be allocated (NDI 2012: 15f.). In 
the end, women attained 146 seats, which is equivalent to 31.6% of parliamentary man-
dates, a striking rise from the 7% before, catapulting Algeria to the ostensibly most pro-
gressive place in the Arab world (NDI 2012: 29). However, the remainder of the elec-
tions outcomes decried any progressive development.  
The diversity of parties, especially of newly founded parties, allowed the ailing FLN to 
retain upper hand and attain the relative majority of seats in parliament (208 seats, 45% 
of all mandates) despite garnering only about 1,400,000 votes out of 21 million regis-
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tered voters.224 Volpi analyzes that “by encouraging an explosion of tiny new parties in 
an attempt to make the political field appear more pluralistic, the regime in fact 
(re)produced an ultradominant-party system” (2013: 113). Not impressed by absolute 
numbers, a member of the politbureau commented dryly: “Algerians have voted for 
FLN” (Liberté, 14 May 2013). The enlarged parliament also made it easier to sweeping-
ly enlarge the FLN’s bloc in the lower house to 208 mandates up from 136 that had 
been won in the 2007 elections, although back then the share of votes had been almost 
23% (Dris 2013). So amazingly, with the worst result in the FLN’s history, it still in-
creased its mandates.  
The largest “party” besides the non-voters consisted of those who cast invalid ballots. 
18% of citizens who went to cast their vote demonstrated their rejection of all political 
parties in this way, even surpassing the number of FLN voters (NDI 2012: 27). Adding 
the non-voters to the blank voters, an overwhelming majority of Algerian citizens 
mocked their elites’ quest for legitimacy. Nevertheless, due to the favorable electoral 
framework, the ruling parties retained upper hand. Adding the 6.8% of absolute votes 
for the RND, which converted into 14.7% of parliament seats, the FLN and its minor 
partner conquered 69% of the lower house through winning 24% of the national vote. 
25 other parties and independent alliances shared the rest of the mandates. This shows 
that the strategy to fragment the party landscape was both deliberate and successful. 
More than that, the FLN even crushed its own partners, as the RND had held about half 
the number of the FLN’s mandates before and was reduced to less than a third of the 
former single party’s seats (down from 61 versus 136 to 68 versus 208).  
The Islamist Green Alliance was not rewarded by the voters, who remembered that the 
MSP had remained firmly in government throughout 2011 and only left the presidential 
alliance in January 2012, when it considered how Islamic movements had gained re-
gional momentum (Volpi 2013: 113). The poor result of merely 6% of the vote, which 
translated into 10% of seats, presents Algeria as a regional outlier, but then citizens had 
experienced the consequences of Islamist electoral success before (Dris 2013). It is 
worthwhile noting that despite the enlarged lower house, the Islamist alliance won less 
                                                 
224
 To put this figure into historical context: In the legislative elections of 1991, which the FLN dramati-
cally lost to the FIS, it had won 1.6 million votes out of 13 million registered voters, as opposed to the 
FIS’ 3.2 million (Addi 1994: 176). 
5. EMPIRICAL STUDY II: ALGERIA 
 
158 
 
mandates than the MSP alone had held before.225 Dris explains this development 
through the leadership’s learning that processes similar to those in other Arab states had 
to be avoided under all circumstances. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that the suc-
cessful engineering of the elections did not come as a surprise, as the elites had never 
lost control over political processes, in contrast to states where the uprisings had result-
ed in a loss of the incumbents’ power.  
Even political parties that had been part of the CNCD, namely the Berber FFS took part 
in the 2012 elections instead of boycotting, as it had previously done on various occa-
sions. The FFS thus opted for a “normalization” of relations with the pouvoir, trying to 
benefit from membership in parliament rather than fundamental opposition. However, 
many party activists resented their leadership’s decision as complicity with and legiti-
mation of the pouvoir, and the last hopes for the emergence of an alternative to the po-
litical institutions from within the established parties vanished (Dris 2013).  
Also after the parliamentary elections, deputies, especially independent ones, defected 
to other parties. This development that had already been common practice before, bene-
fitting the two grand parties, was denounced in newspapers as “political nomadism” 
(Liberté, 5 December 2012). Many observers were outraged that the new law did not put 
an end to it (Dris-Aït Hamadouche 2012b: 61). In all, the result of the parliamentary 
elections (and likewise municipal elections which followed some months later) was 
“nothing but to reproduce the prevalent political order” (Dris 2013).  
The election process proper was monitored by a “commission nationale de supervision 
des élections”, the establishment of which was stipulated in the electoral law and which 
had also existed before. Its members were “exclusively” designated by the president 
(article 168). One of its duties is to supervise the “commission nationale de surveillance 
des élections”, which has the proper task of overseeing elections. It consists also of par-
ty members, who can oversee elections in the polling stations (article 172 of the elec-
toral law). Both boards were not independent, however. Moreover, a small team of in-
ternational observers led by the NDI was invited to lend credibility to the voting pro-
cess, in turn complaining about the “lack of clarity about the roles of the various over-
sight commissions” (NDI 2012: 7). Individuals were also allowed to monitor the elec-
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toral process at their respective polling station, but the initiative of an alliance founded 
by diverse civil society organizations for observing the elections was rejected by the 
authorities (NDI 2012: 26). The room for maneuver that domestic associations enjoyed 
had already begun to dwindle.  
Regarding the associational sphere, a new law was adopted in December 2011 which 
was more restrictive than the regulation from the liberalizing period in 1990, countering 
all potential for the development of an autonomous associational sphere.226 Even in par-
liament, several oppositional parties abstained from voting on the legal changes, notably 
the MSP and other Islamist parties (El Watan, 14 December 2011). They protested 
against the clause that religious associations should be subjected to special regulations. 
After the promulgation in January 2012, already existing associations were given two 
years to adapt to the regulations of the revised law. According to Dris-Aït Hamadouche 
and Dris (2012), more than 80,000 associations of all kinds exist in Algeria. Should the 
organizations fail to register according to the new law, article 46 stipulates prison terms 
of three up to six months for active members of unregistered or dissolved associations. 
The margin of action is circumscribed by regulations that are more than vaguely formu-
lated and invite arbitrary interpretation: associations “must not harm national sovereign-
ty, the established institutional order, national unity or the integrity of the national terri-
tory, public order and morality, the civilizational values of the Algerian people” (article 
65). One of the modifications that drew the anger of associations themselves was the 
wording in article 39 that Algerian associations were to be dissolved if they “intervened 
in the country’s internal affairs or damaged national sovereignty” (Loi relative aux as-
sociations, 12 January 2012). While the new law is anxious to separate associations 
from political parties, individual leaders from the associational sphere often run for 
elected offices as members of the ruling parties (Dris-Aït Hamadouche & Dris 2012). 
The state intervenes in subsidizing organizations on all administrative levels according 
to article 29, if “the authority recognizes the activity as being of general interest and 
public benefit” (ibid.).227 Any other funding has to be authorized in advance (article 30). 
The amended law represented the codification of illiberal policies that had been prac-
ticed before in contradiction to the legal prescriptions dating from the liberal phase of 
                                                 
226
 Personal interview with human rights activist, October 2013, Algiers.  
227
 Apparently, associations that had publicly supported Bouteflika's reelection in 2004 and 2009 bene-
fited financially (Dris-Ait Hamadouche & Dris 2012).  
5. EMPIRICAL STUDY II: ALGERIA 
 
160 
 
the early nineties (Liberté, 12 January 2014). Especially foreign associations, either in-
ternational or transnational organizations or institutions from other countries were met 
with more suspicion than before.  
Likewise, an information law was adopted on the same day, again against the MSP 
bloc’s vote, which was presented as opening up the media sphere to private TV chan-
nels etc. Up to this point, Algeria had been the only North African country besides Lib-
ya without private media (Dris 2012). What was appreciated as a positive development 
was the fact that press-related offenses should not be punished by imprisonment any 
longer (ibid.). However, articles 84 and 92 of the new law effectively curb the freedom 
of information through limiting journalist work in vaguely defined areas regarded as 
sensitive, such as military secrets, state security, national economic interests, national 
sovereignty, national identity, and national history (El Watan, 15 December 2011). As 
in the case of the associational law, the vague wording leaves the door wide open for 
interference in journalist work (Dris 2012). According to Chérif Dris, the legal text 
seeks to encourage self-censorship and to “exert total control over society”, among oth-
er things through only allowing Algerians and Algerian financing to be involved in the 
media (article 4; ibid.). At the same time, article 50 of the law establishes a regulatory 
authority to supervise the written press, of which the majority of members are to be 
nominated by parliament and other state institutions, the head is appointed by the presi-
dent, and participating journalists must have “at least 15 years of experience” (ibid.). 
Deputies who had voted against the laws and complained that they had become “devoid 
of their substance” (El Watan, 15 December 2011) tried in vain to obtain an intervention 
by the president to effectuate a second reading of the laws in parliament, but he refused 
(ibid.).  
Another measure of legal change that was announced in the president’s speech in April 
2011 and had been under discussion ever since was another amendment of the constitu-
tion. The reform package of fall 2011, however, did not include the creation of the 
promised constitutional commission. Later, when the president became incapable of 
filling his post, it was expected that constitutional amendments would be suit-tailored 
for the ailing president, foremost by introducing the post of a vice-president in order to 
make decision-making processes possible, but the actual legal process did not take off 
during the time span under consideration.  
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Symbolic mode  
The “reform” package that was passed on the legal level was flanked by democracy 
rhetoric, which at the same time also stressed the factor of stability. On 15 April 2011, 
President Bouteflika gave his first public speech after the beginning of the uprisings, 
which had been widely anticipated. However, he looked tired and indirectly conveyed 
the message that all “changes were to be superficial”, rather than radical (Dris-Aït 
Hamadouche & Dris 2012). A human rights activist suggested that the speech was pri-
marily directed towards an external audience.228 Nevertheless, it was held in classical 
Arabic.229  
Bouteflika started by praising the achievement of peace and infrastructural programs for 
improving the socioeconomic situation (Bouteflika 2011). Only then did he refer to the 
regional context, with the primary aim of demarcating the Algerian “difference”. He 
stressed the national sovereignty of each state and rejected any “foreign interference” 
and specified the wish for stability as the “position of the overwhelming majority of our 
people” (ibid.). While the president referred to “democracy, liberty, justice and rule of 
law” as “legitimate demands”, he was more occupied with talking about “legitimate 
social demands” (italics are mine) and promised socioeconomic improvements.  
The argumentation that was also employed later followed the line of incremental chang-
es to prepare society for democracy, which comes only at the end of an indefinitely long 
evolutionary process. While Bouteflika mentioned the buzzword “democracy” quite 
often, it appeared in a rather inconsistent manner as regards the question whether he 
qualified the Algerian regime as already being democratic and having to preserve this 
status or whether to “deepen” or “strengthen” democracy. In the April 2011 speech, he 
referred to pluralism not without evoking the civil war, before mentioning all measures 
of political reform that were taken in the course of that year. Notably, he stressed his 
own constitutional role and the weight of formal institutions.   
Again, in a written speech that was handed out to journalists on the day after parliament 
had passed the laws restricting the public sphere, the president talked – or rather wrote – 
of “implanting the democratic process” and enumerated all buzzwords that are associat-
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 Nait-Brahim interprets the use of classical Arabic by politicians in general as a means of excluding 
both the people who speak Algerian or Berber dialect and Francophone opposition members in an attempt 
to “control the shortest route to the hearts of the people through Islam whose sacred book is written in 
standard Arabic” (2012: 104). On the social implications of diglossia in Algeria cf. Addi (1994: 211-216). 
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ed with good governance (El Watan, 15 December 2011). However, he did not miss out 
on mentioning stability and security as his core achievements, which served as the basis 
on which a free society could be built (ibid.).  
Besides employing the standard talk, the president also used more dramatic framing. In 
his 2012 speech on the anniversary of the massacre of Sétif on 8 May 1945, which is 
commonly regarded as one of the decisive starting points in Algeria’s liberation strug-
gle, Bouteflika tried to mobilize voters for the elections by framing the latter as a strug-
gle for stability.230 In this sense, he equated the anticolonial mobilization with voter 
mobilization and also sought popular support for the reforms he had initiated the year 
before (Dris 2013). He inflated the meaning of the elections to “a proof of the country’s 
credibility” and marked them as “exceptional” (Bouteflika 2012). More specifically, he 
appealed to “our collective aspiration to establish constitutional institutions, the credi-
bility and the legitimacy of which will not be questioned” (ibid.). Notably, he held the 
speech already during the silence period before the elections in which no campaigning 
was allowed to take place anymore (NDI 2012: 22). If the timing of the elections was 
not a coincidence, it was perfectly orchestrated for offering the president the opportuni-
ty for little veiled references to the FLN’s past achievements and a last call to vote.  
The most important narrative that politicians used in order to negate and avoid a region-
al spillover effect stated that Algeria should be spared the “Arab spring” because it had 
already been the pioneer of such a movement. As one of the first, the foreign minister 
claimed that Algeria would be spared the Arab spring unrest because it had gone 
through it before in 1988 (Le Quotidien d’Oran, 27 February 2011). Also later in the 
run-up to the elections, the slogan “our spring is Algeria” was displayed on public post-
ers with the picture of a ballot box (NDI 2012: 21).  
Policy mode 
The fight against corruption was seen as one of the most important tasks for Algerian 
politics, as all observers and interview partners lamented about corruption as being per-
vasive and growing.231 And actually, over the recent years some large scandals have 
been made public. However, this did not necessarily happen in an effort to curb high-
scale corruption, but was in some instances part of an ongoing power struggle between 
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 His words were: “As the Algerian people came out on this day 67 years ago, united, mobilized […] I 
call on you all to come out in crowds on election day to initiate a new stage in the process of develop-
ment, reforms and democratic evolution in your country, Algeria” (Bouteflika 2012). 
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the president and the intelligence services, with the latter trying to discredit the former 
using their information (Keenan 2010). 
Most importantly, the corruption cases involving the state’s oil firm Sonatrach symbol-
ized the fight between different political factions or “clans” and caused a public outcry. 
It ended in May 2011 with the company’s CEO’s conviction for the misuse of public 
funds, only to be followed by the so-called “Sonatrach-II scandal” in early 2013. In this 
case “the head of Eni, a state-owned Italian oil and gas company and the leading foreign 
energy operator in Algeria, came under investigation for his alleged involvement in a 
$265 million bribery case to win contracts assigned by Sonatrach” (Achy 2013: 5). In 
the first half of 2012 alone, 510 lawsuits were dealt with in court and more than 700 
individuals were convicted of corruption (Dris 2013).   
As anti-corruption policies were obviously a function of political opportunity rather 
than transparency, citizens themselves tried to counter corruption. An “Association 
Algérienne de Lutte contre la Corruption” was already active and was met with repres-
sion by the authorities (Ennahar, 15 September 2010). On a somewhat broader basis, the 
“Association nationale de lutte contre la corruption” (ANLC) was founded in July 
2012, to which cases of corruption could be anonymously reported on its website.232 It 
is hardly surprising that the association was denied registration by the Ministry of Inte-
rior, as the aspiring civil society as a whole was going through a hard time (Le 
Quotidien d’Oran, 7 November 2012). Ironically, the fight against corruption thus be-
came illegal, as a functionary of the association complained.233 This was especially bit-
ter because the president himself had stated in his April 2011 speech that the citizens’ 
participation was needed in fighting corruption.  
Absurdly, leftist party leader Louisa Hanoune blamed large-scale corruption during pri-
vatization processes (or even only plans for privatization) solely on external incitement 
or influence (Liberté, 25 February 2013). This shows at the same time a nationalist as 
well as a state-centered approach which she expected to resonate with the population.  
Responses 
In many areas, the harsh responses towards regime strategies are a function of their ef-
fectiveness in muting opposition instead of garnering legitimacy. The lifting of the state 
of emergency can be regarded as a failure on the level of popular perception, as the me-
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dia swiftly revealed the shallow façade reform that was accompanied by the introduc-
tion of similar regulations at exactly the same time (Le Quotidien d’Oran, 26 February 
2011). Despite the opposition’s disbelief that such a measure would be sold as progress, 
the legal basis for repression remained. 
The Bensalah commission was not even mentioned by most interview partners when 
discussing the political changes two years later. Youth activists complained that the 
commission only consulted established personalities (Tout sur l’Algérie, 24 May 2011). 
The boycott by not only serious reformers, but even former top elites is a strong indica-
tor that the commission was not taken seriously at all. Ali Yahia Abdennour complained 
that the pouvoir was holding dialogue with itself instead of with the citizens (Le 
Quotidien d’Oran, 16 June 2011). In a similar vein, the RCD called it “a monologue 
against change”.234  
The attempt to mobilize voters through using religious arguments enraged Salafis who 
wanted to stage a campaign countering this practice (El Watan, 16 March 2012). Com-
menting on the low turnout in Algerian elections, Louisa Dris-Aït Hamadouche general-
ly remarks that “abstention is a default mode of contestation resulting directly from the 
failure of the political class” (Dris-Aït Hamadouche 2009). In Algeria, this gap between 
elites and the population could not be closed through the process of electoral reform, 
especially as manipulation was widespread. The alleged rise in voter turnout can at least 
serve to interpret what the elites wanted the numbers to look like and what they thought 
they could get away with. Nevertheless, the tumultuous constituting session of the na-
tional assembly, in which the Green Alliance deputies left parliament in protest, shows 
that even the part of the political class that profited somewhat denounced the electoral 
process.  
The law on associations drew basically the complete existing civil society into illegality, 
as it was virtually impossible to attain the necessary registration. This affected not only 
new foundations, but also long-standing institutions which partially lost their status. 
This state of legal insecurity drove various international organizations out of the coun-
try. Some associations presented a petition to protest against this law even before it was 
promulgated, however, with very little attention. A human rights association com-
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plained that civil society organizations were basically regarded as “enemies of the na-
tion” (El Watan, 15 December 2011).  
A larger alliance against the law was formed as late as in November 2013, when many 
civil society organizations had made the experience that they simply could not register 
anew to comply with the modified regulations. A representative of a youth organization 
made the Kafkaesque experience that first, the Ministry of Interior simply did not react 
to the application for license renewal and nobody would answer the phone in the office 
he was referred to.235 Lacking even basic information about the modalities of the appli-
cation procedure, the second attempt at registration was not positively answered ei-
ther.236 This was also due to the fact that the detailed administrative regulations on how 
the law should be applied were never publicized, not even after the transitional period 
(Liberté, 12 January 2014). A human rights activist and lawyer qualified the package of 
legal reforms an “extremely grave regression” in comparison to the texts adopted in the 
1990s.237  
In contrast to the legal changes, the non-legitimizing effect of which was obvious to the 
target groups, the symbolic mode was much more successful. All of my interview part-
ners declared that the stability discourse with the deterrent reference to the civil war 
resonated with the population.  
The third wave of the Arab Barometer from 2013 shows somewhat surprising results, 
which might be interpreted as successful relegitimation – or as resignation.238 78% of 
respondents approved of the statement that gradual reform is preferable over sudden 
reform to reach approximately the level of 2006, while in 2011 only 54% had agreed to 
this statement.239 The question is whether this can be regarded as the approval of their 
elites’ slow pace or a function of the disruptions that accompanied the very sudden 
changes in neighboring countries. Another indicator to shed more light on this matter is 
the overall satisfaction with the government, which went up from 10% in 2011 to 40% 
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in 2013 (Robbins 2014: 4). Likewise, the number of respondents who evaluated the 
state of democracy and human rights in Algeria as good went up from 6% in 2011 to 
30% in 2013 (ibid.). However, the share of respondents who assessed it as “very good” 
remained the same, at 2%. This suggests that it is less the perception of the situation that 
has changed, but the people’s inclination to show open discontent. Moreover, only 42% 
stated that the freedom to participate in peaceful protests is guaranteed to a medium or 
great extent (ibid.: 5).  
Corruption was so widely lamented that the politically motivated campaigns did not 
reach their desired effects as a fig leave.  
 
Table 5.1: Structural Legitimation Strategies in Algeria 
 
5.3.2. Traditional Legitimation 
Algeria used to be a very revolutionary republic, with progress and the virtues of the 
professional military at the center of legitimation strategies, as already described. As 
this has been the case for more than 50 years now, it might be possible to argue that the 
reference to the Algerian revolution itself has become something like a tradition. How-
ever, this stretches the meaning of tradition as employed here, which primarily rests on 
hereditary succession and in a secondary meaning on the exercise of rule in accordance 
with traditional norms and leaders. This does not mean that republics never engage in 
traditional legitimation. Other Arab republics installed dynastic succession as a tradi-
tional element of legitimation or at least tried to do so (Syria; attempts in Egypt, Libya, 
Addressees Legal mode Symbolic 
mode 
Policy 
mode Success? 
All citizens 
Parliamentary elections 
Associations and  
information law reforms 
Reform  
discourse 
Fighting 
corruption No? 
Pro-reform 
protesters 
Lifting the state of  
emergency 
Electoral reform 
  
No 
Regime elites 
Bensalah commission 
Monitoring elections 
Political party law reform 
  
Yes /  
No (MSP) 
Formal  
opposition 
Electoral reform 
  
Yes (FFS) / 
no (RCD) 
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Yemen). The uprisings put an end to familial succession plans in all of the other North 
African republics. 
In Algeria, the president’s brother Said had taken on a more active role during the past 
few years as an unofficial adviser to his 20 years older brother and assumed a central 
position as a campaign manager in his reelections. While Said Bouteflika’s informal 
influence behind the scenes was remarkable, attempts to install him as vice president or 
through a newly founded party were quickly aborted.240 Despite the president’s health 
problems, no serious efforts at engineering a familial succession to the ailing president 
could be noted during the period under investigation. So far, neither the regime structure 
nor the political culture allows for an intrafamilial succession scenario. First, the Alge-
rian regime is by far not as personalized as “real” neopatrimonial regimes. Secondly, a 
non-military leader holding a PhD in informatics who mainly has the backing of busi-
nessmen is unlikely to be accepted by les décideurs.241 At least, the leadership probably 
didn’t want to endanger its identity-related nationalist legitimation strategies of refer-
encing to the revolution through inventing tradition in the delicate domain of the struc-
ture of political rule.  
According to Dris-Aït Hamadouche and Dris (2012), traditional leaders were instrumen-
tal in containing local protests, predominantly in the periphery. They cite tribal leaders, 
Sufi sheikhs and clan chiefs especially in Kabylia. However, tribal structures only play 
a role for a minority of the population, and both mentioned groups can be subsumed 
under religious or nationalist-inspired strategies of identity-related legitimation.  
 
5.3.3. Identity-related Legitimation 
The national identity that the FLN leadership had tried to create consisted of a two-fold 
dominance of Arabic as only official language and Islam as the religion of the state, 
discriminating against the Berber-speaking and French-educated population as well as 
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 The “Rassemblement pour la concorde nationale” was founded in late 2010 (Le Quotidien d’Oran, 30 
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the tiny religious minorities. During the Arab uprisings, such identity-related grievances 
took a back seat. Protests in Kabylia were both more widespread and more tolerated 
than in Algiers, but focused on all-Algerian issues and resulted from the mobilization of 
the political parties that are active in this region. The RCD and the FFS, the most im-
portant political parties that advocate secularism and cultural equality and assemble 
many Kabyle citizens, joined the opposition. However, legitimation strategies largely 
focused on the perpetuation of the historical founding myth. The matter of cultural di-
versity was ignored, if not exploited against the protesters. 
 
5.3.3.1 Nationalism 
The foundational myth of Algerian national history, the war of liberation, is the central 
point for garnering revolutionary or historic legitimacy. As it serves to instill a sense of 
national pride and cohesion – besides glorifying the political elite which is staffed by 
former revolution fighters – it can be subsumed under the nationalist subtype of identi-
ty-related legitimation. However, already in the past difficulties arose from “promoting 
a definition of the nation that is rejected and opposed by a significant number of Algeri-
ans” (Hill 2009: 200). 
Since the mid-1990 years and throughout the 2000s, many “new ‘markers’ of collective 
memory (museums, statues, historical associations, etc.)” have been established, often 
with reference to the president’s patronage (DeGeorges 2009: 286). Veterans of the war 
of independence (mujahidin, including a religious connotation of the term) are widely 
respected and enjoy “virtual sacralisation” (Branche 2011: 437). They receive social 
benefits, pensions and prestige not least in exchange for loyalty to their former comrade 
Bouteflika (Davis & Serres 2013: 106). Over the past decades, more groups were in-
cluded in the relevant definition of beneficiaries, raising the original 6,000 maquis 
fighters to half a million profiteers by the end of the 1990s years, by then also including 
the martyrs’ children (Branche 2011: 431f.).242 Nevertheless, this glorification of the 
youth of the 1950s is at the same time a structural discrimination against today’s youth 
who have hardly experienced the civil war of the 1990s.  
The only strategies referring to nationalism that were used for legitimation during the 
relevant time span were situated on the symbolic level.  
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Symbolic mode 
In official discourse on the Arab uprisings, the quest for stability was equaled with the 
fight against terrorism during the civil war on the one hand and with the fight against 
colonialism during the war of independence on the other hand. Out of these different 
historical events which constitute important elements of a legitimation narrative, the 
elites created an amalgam which was very hard to confront for challengers.243 These 
past situations that endangered not only regime stability, but the integrity and very ex-
istence of the Algerian state are fit to invoke the memory of horrors that should be 
avoided at any cost. In contrast, the struggle against these challenges is depicted as he-
roic. In this context, the martyrs play an important role for legitimation, and the presi-
dent invoked them e.g. in concluding his politically important “reform” speeches 
(Bouteflika 2011 and 2012).  
Besides the historical momentum, the example of neighboring countries is an important 
point of reference in terms of stability. The president framed the regional “winds of 
change” in the context of denouncing “all foreign interference” in his April 2011 speech 
(Bouteflika 2011). Regarding the aspect of security, especially the Libyan border had 
become dangerous with jihadist fighters, rebel groups and Gaddafi’s friends and family 
pouring in.244 During my stay, some interview partners told me that already the fact of 
talking to a foreigner made them traitors in the eyes of some, as suspicion vis-à-vis 
strangers had increased since the beginning of the uprisings.  
What is very delicate in the Algerian case is the mélange of historical and cross-national 
comparisons: the success of Islamist parties in relatively free and fair post-Arab spring 
elections offered the perfect model for invoking a 1990s horror scenario, making it all 
the easier to exploit rhetorically. 
In adopting a “softer” approach of evoking nationalist and isolationist sentiment, the 
budget for the ministry of culture and for, inter alia, the ministry of mujahidin celebrat-
ing the 50th anniversary of Algeria’s independence in May 2012 was financed by a total 
of 560 million USD (Cazeaux 2013). The funding of cultural activities independent of 
the state through autonomous organizations has a share of only 0.2% of this sum (ibid.). 
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Besides music festivals, theater reenactments of the glorious history focusing on the role 
of state leaders were produced (ibid.). The slogan of the anniversary posters, “ma zal 
waqifin” (literally: still standing), however denounced any dynamic movement towards 
the future (Davis & Serres 2013: 104). 
A different strategy was to portray the protest movement as a Kabyle particularity. The 
factual basis was that the RCD with its long-time leader Said Saadi was a vocal part of 
the CNCD (later CNCD-partis). The depiction of the demonstrations as being con-
cerned with regionalist issues only put them in a long tradition of uprisings that the rest 
of Algerians did not care too much about (Le Quotidien d’Oran, 2 April 2011). The re-
sult that newspapers close to the pouvoir presented the protesters and indirectly all 
Kabylians as traitors to the Algerian nation was a side effect the elites seemed to accept 
in this context. Thugs not only denounced the RCD, but also called them “cross wor-
shippers” as a derogatory term for Christians, who are more prevalent in Kabylia.245 
Two non-mainstream elements of national identity were thus lumped together to create 
distance to the “normal” Algerian way of life and to evoke antipathy against all protest-
ers.  
Responses 
Offering an alternative to state discourse on the revolutionary past, the protesters tried to 
create an equivalent counter-narrative in pointing out how the aged human rights activ-
ists who had fought in previous struggles, notably after 1988, now united with the 
youth, making the protest movement a cross-generational and therefore all-national 
cause (El Watan, 14 February 2011). However, some observers were rather disillu-
sioned seeing the same activists’ faces in the protests instead of witnessing the birth of a 
truly new and younger movement.246 Kabylian activists denounced the anti-Kabylian 
polemic in the official press through filming the burning of newspapers issues that car-
ried this message.247  
Regarding the historical narrative, the elites were lucky to have at least one argument 
that resonated with the citizens’ perception, although this probably resulted more from 
personal experiences than from the government’s smart framing. As a general tendency, 
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the framing which worked due to empirical credibility was not the reference to national 
pride over stability, but the insecure situation in neighboring countries and the popula-
tion’s tiredness and trauma resulting from the civil war.248 The citizens’ own memories 
and a look around in the region made them appreciate the stability that they at the same 
time recognized and resented as stagnation.249  
 
Table 5.2: Identity-Related Legitimation Strategies in Algeria – Nationalism  
 
5.3.3.2 Religion 
The area of religion was not particularly affected by the Arab uprisings and it was only 
marginally considered in decision-making. Although the Algerian state tried to present 
itself as secular, Islam is the religion of the state and is promoted to offer a counter-
ideology to radical groups.250 Despite the disengagement of the MSP from the presiden-
tial alliance, politicians with Islamist alignment remained in the ruling elite, as especial-
ly the Islamist political parties proliferated.  
Werenfels has hinted at the rising importance of Sufi orders in Algerian society, a phe-
nomenon which is to some extent an “invented tradition” (2013: 7). The state aims at 
creating religious legitimacy through selectively allocating money to Sufi orders for 
maintaining the infrastructure of holy shrines, offering education and sponsoring cultur-
al activities (ibid.). This policy does not only serve legitimation, but has been employed 
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Addressees Legal mode Symbolic mode Policy mode Success? 
All citizens  
Nationalist campaign 
Stability discourse 
Depicting protesters as 
“Kabylians” and Christians 
 
Yes? (but 
sidelining 
Kabylians) 
Pro-reform 
protesters 
 
Accusation of disloyalty  
Reference to regional insta-
bility (towards young pro-
testers) 
Reference to civil war  
(towards older protesters) 
 
Yes (but 
partly  
negative) 
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in a divide-and-rule manner, “co-opting some to marginalise others” (ibid.: 8). Most 
importantly, Sufi orders are constituencies that engage in rent-seeking and clientelist 
networks, benefiting from state services in exchange for public support and the provi-
sion of voters (ibid.: 10). In this sense, they act as intermediary organizations. Their 
umbrella organizations have been headed by figures loyal to the president (ibid.: 8).  
As relevant religious actors, there are both quietist and politicized Salafis, the latter 
forming one wing of the outlawed ex-FIS. As mainly the political strands of grass-roots 
Islamism and jihadism are repressed, “a curious marriage of convenience may exist be-
tween the leaders of Sufism and Wahhabism in Algeria” (Khemissi, Larémont & Taj 
Eddine 2012: 556).251  
Legal-formal changes in the religious domain of identity-related legitimation were 
mainly introduced after the time span under consideration.  
Symbolic mode 
In March 2012, the Algerian government signed a deal with the China State Construc-
tion Engineering Corporation for building the world’s largest mosque outside of Saudi 
Arabia. This building is thought to be intended as Bouteflika’s religious legacy. It will 
have the world’s highest minaret, surpassing 250 meters, despite being built in an earth-
quake zone, and costs for construction are estimated at approximately one billion Euros 
(Jeune Afrique, 22 August 2012). Its monumentality, rooming a capacity for 120,000 
people, seems rather disproportionate for a mosque located in the Eastern suburb of 
Mohammadia, at some distance from the center of Algiers.252 Most reports mention the 
dimensions in comparison to the grand mosque of Casablanca built by Hassan II in Mo-
rocco, which it seems to be mainly designed to surpass (El Watan, 30 August 2012). 
While the planning had been going on since the mid-2000 years, the contract was finally 
only signed during the relevant time span (Mattes 2007: 70). 
Policy 
Many Sufi orders have become hesitant to play the game of lending legitimacy to politi-
cians, which showed in the run-up to the parliamentary elections (El Watan, 29 April 
2012). Instead, the state tried to strengthen its own control of religious life. In the first 
half of 2011, 200 new mosques were opened nation-wide. Moreover, the recruitment of 
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new imams was set to be raised from 500 to 1000 annually (Algérie-Focus.com, 31 July 
2011). This might be seen as building an organizational counterforce to prevent an 
overspill of the successes of Islamism in neighboring countries.  
While the Kabyle regions had enjoyed a somewhat greater freedom of religion and even 
a number of conversions to Christianity were reported, the state was eager to tighten its 
control there. In May 2011 out of the blue the governor of Bejaïa ordered the closure of 
seven protestant churches (Ennahar Online, 25 May 2011). Other clear-cut strategies 
that were designed towards appeasing Salafis were not observable.  
Responses 
A survey conducted in summer 2011 among Algerian youth intended to investigate 
whether the promotion of Sufism as a moderate version of Islam was successful 
(Khemissi, Larémont & Taj Eddine 2012). The percentage of respondents who indicate 
they never visit a zawiya (Sufi shrine and spiritual order) was slightly above 30%, 
which can be an indicator for either a secular or Salafi leaning, as Salafis regard this 
kind of popular religiosity including the veneration of saints as superstition (ibid.: 555). 
Although an overwhelming majority of Algerian youth identify themselves as Muslims 
(87% “strongly”, 12% “somewhat”; ibid.: 551), many are rather suspicious of mixing 
politics with religion.253 
Algerians were little pleased at the outlook of spending a vast amount of money on a 
mosque construction project that is schemed to employ 10,000 imported Chinese work-
ers instead of alleviating domestic unemployment (Jeune Afrique, 22 August 2012). 
Moreover, the maintenance costs later will signify a substantial and permanent realloca-
tion of funds to the center. Many critically remarked that the building’s dimensions 
make it quite obvious that it serves prestige much more than necessity or sense (ibid.). 
An online petition against the construction was circulated soon, but did not reach a sig-
nificant number of signatures (Algérie1.com, 28 August 2012).  
It is unclear whether the goal of raising the imams’ numbers could be met and what ef-
fects it had. At any rate, the wali of Bejaïa met strong opposition from international hu-
man rights organizations such as Amnesty International and churches protesting against 
the closure of the local congregations (La Dépêche de Kabylie, 24 October 2013). One 
month after his decision, he had to withdraw it (El Watan, 9 June 2011). The failure of 
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this strategy is therefore not measured on the side of the addressees, but results from the 
need to retract the decision. 
 
Table 5.3: Identity-Related Legitimation Strategies in Algeria – Religion 
 
5.3.4. Material Legitimation 
As already described, the rentierist allocation logic guides material legitimation strate-
gies. Besides, the economy is dominated by “opaque alliances between entrepreneurs, 
political elites and army officers” (Boubekeur 2013: 470). Despite Algeria’s oil wealth, 
the economic situation was rather dim at the beginning of the uprisings, mainly due to a 
lack of productive industries, unemployment, rising prices and demographic factors. 
Although the absolute numbers of employment have slightly risen, they cannot satisfy 
the youth bulge. In consequence, working conditions tend to be precarious and jobs do 
not profit youth with higher education. Not even half of the people who were employed 
by 2010 had permanent positions (Dris-Aït Hamadouche & Dris 2012). Still, 15% of the 
GDP was spent on public sector salaries (IMF 2012a: 19). Another important channel of 
allocation, the distribution of housing lagged behind expectations and announcements. 
In the six years between 2004 and 2010, only 62,000 housing units in the wilaya of Al-
giers were allocated to entitled families (Dris-Aït Hamadouche & Dris 2012).  
Fortunately for the Algerian elites, the oil price rose massively in 2011 after the world-
wide economic crisis had eased, leading to an increase in export revenues of 27% (IMF 
2013: 5). The upward trend of the oil price, which remained above 90 USD during the 
complete relevant time span, was more than welcome, as these windfall profits were 
swiftly used to pacify the population. The government made massive use of the oil sta-
bilization fund for covering the budget deficit caused by extra expenses (IMF 2014a: 
35). While the financial law for 2010 foresaw state spending of 2,800 billion DA, until 
Addressees Legal mode Symbolic mode Policy mode Suc-
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the complementary financial law for 2012 which was announced in February of that 
year spending had skyrocketed to 4,900 billion DA (cf. the respective laws).  
Legal-formal mode  
One legal measure in reaction to the “sugar and oil riots” was in fact a non-
implementation of a law. The decree stipulating that sums exceeding 500,000 DA 
should be paid per check or other formal bank transfers was quietly abandoned instead 
of entering into force on April 1, 2011 (La Tribune, 9 April 2011). This benefited the 
business actors of the informal sector known as the “mafia”.  
Symbolic mode 
One of the rhetorical strategies to counter political demands was to classify the upris-
ings in other Arab countries as “riots” in order to suggest purely socio-economic rea-
sons for protest (Dris 2013). This was a deliberate move to avoid any political implica-
tions and to retain the monopoly over the politicized term “revolution” – which was 
already taken for a different historical purpose in Algeria.  
Public investment programs and legitimate socio-economic grievances were the first 
issues president Bouteflika addressed in his reform speech on April 15, 2011. He 
stressed the five-year plan (2009-2014) that stipulated the building of two million hous-
ing units – of which only a negligible part had actually been constructed. After praising 
the subsidies on basic foodstuff, Bouteflika presented the microcredit programs as a 
viable way for reducing unemployment and poverty. When talking about fighting cor-
ruption, he even spoke of “fighting bureaucracy” (sic!) and invoked a favorable busi-
ness and investment climate, higher productivity, competitiveness, and economic 
growth as ultimate goals. On the rhetorical level, this speech presented a mixed bag of 
measures aimed at pleasing everybody without displaying any coherent strategy. In this 
sense it neatly mirrors the contradictory policies that were enacted.  
Policy 
State allocation continued to be the heart of material legitimation in Algeria. In the 2012 
budget it stood at 15 billion Euros (Dris-Aït Hamadouche & Dris 2012). Public spend-
ing in 2011 increased by 47% to arrive at an astounding 181% in 2012 in comparison to 
2010 spending (IMF 2014a: 35). This led to a “budget deficit of almost 34 percent of 
GDP” (Zoubir & Aghrout 2012: 70). According to Achy (2013: 13), the distribution of 
the oil rent during the years 2009-2012 on average included housing (10%), support to 
farmers (10%), food subsidies (6%), fuel subsidies (20%), civil servant wages (37%), 
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pensions to war veterans (5%), and other social transfers (12%). But what is interesting 
is in which domains spending was actually increased. 
Already on January 8, 2011, the government decided to return to the massive subsidies 
on cooking oil and sugar, the lifting of which had led to the initial riots (Zoubir & 
Aghrout 2012: 68). This turned out to be an expensive measure, as most basic foodstuff 
has to be imported, and between 2010 and 2011 the imports rose by 67% (IMF 2012a: 
4). Given the high prices on the world market, this forebodes a future burden for the 
treasury. At the same time, food supply does not really work well.254 Regarding further 
subsidies, the total bill is estimated between 2.5 and 3 billion USD annually, from 
which not only needy consumers, but also the food industries profit (Dris-Aït 
Hamadouche & Dris 2012). Moreover, fuel is heavily subsidized both directly and indi-
rectly as it is sold well below world market prices. Despite a steady rise in local con-
sumption, the price for a liter of gas stood at about 20 DA per liter in 2013 (about 0.20 
Euros).255 The expenses for fuel and gas made up almost 12% of GDP (IMF 2013: 40). 
Also electricity is sold under market prices, as since 2005 the prices have been left un-
touched (El Watan, 10 August 2012).  
The most important measure countering protests were retroactive salary raises for gov-
ernment employees and security personnel, i.e. police forces and members of the mili-
tary. Police officers benefited from an increase of their wages in crucial times, which 
ensured their loyalty. Already in December 2010, their wages had been raised “by 50 
percent and would include a three-year back-pay deal” (Volpi 2013: 111). Although this 
decision was made before the onset of the protests, it became effective in the 2011 
budget. Also the salaries of army personnel were raised by 40% in December 2011 
(ibid.). Taking into account the back payments, 2011 expenditures for public sector per-
sonnel rose by 45% in comparison to 2010 and soared to 165% in 2012, totaling 1,980 
billion DA or 12.5% of GDP (IMF 2014a: 34). The funds for the mujahidin’s pensions 
were also raised from 151 billion DA in 2010 to 163 billion DA in 2011 and 185 billion 
DA in 2012 (ibid.). 
One of the most common forms of protest was the strikes organized by various profes-
sional groups and unions. In March 2011 only, Volpi counts “at least seventy strikes 
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 During the time of Islamic holidays I spent in Algeria in 2013, there were even temporary food short-
ages, especially as regards meat.  
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 According to a GIZ study, fuel is cheaper in only seven countries in the world (Algérie1.com, 26 Oc-
tober 2013). 
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throughout the country […] from teachers to rail workers and doctors to court clerks” 
(2013: 110). What is remarkable is that these professional groups are largely employed 
in the public sector. Inter alia, employees of the state-owned Sonelgaz enjoyed a 40% 
salary raise in 2011 (Le Quotidien d’Oran, 17 May 2011). 
As already mentioned, one group was dissatisfied with the back payments for military 
and security personnel: the communal guards. Although their statutes prohibit strikes 
and the like, they staged a major demonstration in Algiers, after which they were also 
promised a pay raise (Ennahar, 7 April 2011). Besides financial betterment, the com-
munal guards sought symbolic appreciation of their work, such as awards for bravery. 
However, the Minister of Interior was quick to threaten them with exclusion from the 
corps (Le Quotidien d’Oran, 5 April 2011). Also employees in the judicial branch went 
on strike in April 2012, but when the court clerks started to protest, their salaries and 
other benefits were frozen (HRW 2013).  
In a move that on the outside appeared as a measure of pluralization, more unions had 
been allowed to form. Even relatively autonomous organizations of workers in various 
branches had been established in the 2000s. This was a move away from the unitary 
mass organization UGTA that had dominated societal life for decades. However, the 
freedom to create new associations led to a fragmentation of the field, or in the words of 
a human rights activist, an atomization.256 E.g., in the branch of teachers, eight different 
syndicates exist today. Instead of fighting together for improvements, the newly created 
associations compete against each other as well as with the statist organizations.257 Self-
organization, the fight for better working conditions and for maintaining the organiza-
tions’ legal statuses consume all of the activists’ energy. Their precarious position of 
acting within tight boundaries preempts political demands, even though many of their 
recurrent problems have political issues and decisions at their core.  
Besides paying higher wages, public authorities announced the creation of new jobs (Le 
Quotidien d’Oran, 14 February 2011). Already the five-year public investment plan 
from 2010-2014 foresaw the creation of three million jobs (Zoubir & Aghrout 2012: 
68).  
The building of two million housing units was planned under the five-year plan 2010-
2014, of which only 83 000 were actually constructed annually between 2010 and 2012 
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(Liberté, 9 February 2013). In theory, the state planned to accomplish three times as 
much. In the complementary financial law from June 2011, the expense for authorized 
programs to support access to living space skyrocketed to almost 1,300 million DA 
from just below 400 million DA in the original law dating from December 2010.  
One central instrument for allocation aiming at pacifying the unemployed youth was the 
increase in funds for the program ANSEJ, which is the acronym for “agence nationale 
de soutien de l’emploi des jeunes”. This scheme provides unemployed youth between 
the age of 19 and 35 with bank credits and loans at little or even zero interest rates to 
start their own micro-businesses. The youth’s capital contribution is at a symbolic 1% 
or 2% of the granted sum, while state-owned banks and the agency cover the rest of the 
loan, with 70% of the load weighing on the banks (Algérie-Focus.com, 14 October 
2013). The ANSEJ program had already been established in 1997, but upon a decision 
on 22 February 2011 was massively expanded to finance some 42,000 projects and gen-
erate 93,000 employments in 2011 (Dris-Aït Hamadouche 2012b: 63). As of 2012, it 
even supported 65,812 projects (Algerienews.info, 17 April 2013).258 In the agricultural 
domain alone, the number of approved projects rose from 10,000 in 2011 to over 12,000 
in 2012, at a cost of some 200 million Euros (La Nouvelle République, 24 December 
2012). Another loan scheme provided for by the state’s unemployment insurance fi-
nanced more than half of this number, so that together in 2012 over 100,000 projects 
were supported (Algérie-Focus.com, 14 October 2013). The director of this agency ad-
mitted that the banks were urged to approve of requests, which led to a jump in approval 
rates from about 30% in 2008 to an almost universal acceptance of 96% five years later 
(ibid.). The total cost of grant schemes in the state budget, including schemes for all 
ages, rose from 609 billion DA in 2010 to 989 billion DA in 2011 and then 1053 billion 
DA in 2012 (IMF 2014: 35).  
The director of the ANSEJ today is prime minister Abdelmalek Sellal, which hints at 
the political importance of this program. However, the ANSEJ framework is not even 
meant to achieve sustainable results. It is rather a one-way street to distribute oil rents: 
the loans are paid back to a very limited extent only. Within a very short period of time 
upon creation, a large share of the start up businesses faces bankruptcy. One telling 
newspaper report quoted Sellal boasting that more than 70% of the youth that received 
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credits pay the money back (Algérie-Focus, 13 November 2013). Departing from the 
official confession that about one third of beneficiaries get away with their money, it 
can safely be guessed that the real number is much higher.259 It is an open secret that the 
credits are usually spent on cars and apartments rather than on the creation of more em-
ployment.  
But there is even more to it. An article in the prestigious independent newspaper El 
Watan which was published on 10 June 2011 claimed that a large share of the money is 
embezzled by the “mafia” of the informal sector. Inside the ANSEJ agencies, mediators 
approach the applicants and offer them their services to take care of the formalities. The 
youth are happy to receive their money without having the slightest idea what their fake 
businesses are used for. In return, the mediators take 10% of the loan sum and take over 
the commercial register, enabling their bosses to launder money, make anonymous in-
vestments, and conceal dubious imports and illegal foreign exchange dealings. In many 
cases, the ANSEJ agency staff has knowledge of these procedures. Sometimes also the 
youth profit from further illegal enrichment.260 In another case, children of high func-
tionaries in Oran opened car rental services, which was a possibility to maximize profits 
(El Watan, 10 June 2011). The ANSEJ scheme thus serves to buy social peace through 
pacifying primarily those who do not want to work, while in the meantime young peo-
ple who work in one or even two jobs are considerably worse off economically.261 At 
the same time, this again indirectly benefits another hidden addressee: the informal ma-
fia.  
After the youth had been satisfied, also the retirees’ minimum pensions were raised 
from January 2012 onwards to attain 15,000 DA per month. Also other pensions experi-
enced a raise, even the high ones, although the percentage was less significant for pen-
sions above 40,000 DA (Dris-Aït Hamadouche & Dris 2012, Fn 13). The final amount 
equals an annual burden for the state budget of about 630 million Euros (Dris-Aït 
Hamadouche 2012b: 62). 
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 An anti-corruption activist estimated that 90% of the credits will not be paid back. Personal interview, 
November 2013, Algiers.  
260
 In one of the examples reported in El Watan, youth in Boumerdès bought machinery which they use in 
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Responses 
One observer of the Algerian protests judged that “[t]his is partly a revolt of raised ex-
pectations” (The Guardian, 17 February 2011). The subsidies on sugar and oil did not 
impress the political opposition at all. Veteran human rights activist Ali Yahia 
Abdennour was quoted as saying: “if le pouvoir thinks it can silence the youth by lower-
ing the food prices, it is wrong […]. They will protest until he leaves!” (Le Quotidien 
d’Oran, 27 February 2011; author’s translation) The leader of the socialist party, Louisa 
Hanoune, called for reversing the privatization of former state enterprises producing 
foodstuff to provide for food security and employment (Le Quotidien d’Oran, 6 Febru-
ary 2011).  
The cycle of protesting and concessions led to inflation and a loss of value for the Alge-
rian Dinar. Already in October 2011, food prices rose again, leading to an overall infla-
tion rate in 2011 of 5.5% (IMF 2012a: 4). In 2012, inflation soared to “a 15-year high” 
of 8.9% (IMF 2013: 4). While this development resulted in a zero-sum game for em-
ployees, persons without income suffer all the more from the price hikes, thus exacer-
bating inequality.  
In another domain, the low prices pose a major problem. The electricity price is ex-
tremely low, encouraging high and increasing consumption which the existing ageing 
infrastructure cannot manage any longer. In consequence, power outages have become a 
common phenomenon throughout the country, in turn provoking more popular protests 
(El Watan, 10 August 2012).  
It is hard to measure the effects of employment policies. One reason for this is the very 
revealing lack of detailed numbers for 2011 as opposed to 2010 regarding the age pat-
terns of unemployment and labor force participation.262 Due to the demographic distri-
bution with 45.8% of the population younger than 25 years, at least two million jobs 
would be needed annually to provide employment for the youth bulge – which is al-
ready a lot more than the five-year plan foresees (CIA World Factbook 2014b). 
While the ANSEJ scheme is a temporary good deal for those who profit from the loans, 
the injustice inherent in the program is felt by both the elder generations and those peers 
who work hard.263 The way in which the program is implemented nurtures the suspicion 
that it is not primarily designed to encourage entrepreneurship, but rather to sedate po-
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tentially riotous youth and to provide an easy way of allocation for those who want to 
profit from the oil wealth.264 Psychologically, it encourages parasitic behavior instead of 
pursuing its proclaimed aim. But even this measure is temporary and unsustainable as it 
can only be financed through continued rent income.  
Interestingly, the latest wave of the Arab Barometer shows a doubling in the share of 
respondents who say that “the current economic situation” in Algeria is good, up from 
32% in 2011 to 66% in 2013 (Robbins 2014: 2).265 Notably, the question does not refer 
to the respondents’ personal economic situation, which might actually have improved in 
the time between the data collection waves due to the success of material legitimation 
strategies. At the same time, however, the overwhelming majority of 77% indicated the 
greatest challenge that Algeria faces in the future is the economic situation (ibid.: 3). So 
these rather ambiguous answers could be interpreted as a successful short-term stabili-
zation to the benefit of some – with all actors involved knowing that it is merely tempo-
rary. 
 
Table 5.4: Material Legitimation Strategies in Algeria 
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5.3.5. Personal Legitimation 
The president’s vast powers are enshrined in article 77 to 79 of the Algerian constitu-
tion. In advance of the 2009 elections, article 74 of the constitution was changed to al-
low for unlimited re-election and Bouteflika’s third presidential term. In these elections, 
the president even ran for reelection as an independent candidate despite being the 
FLN’s honorary president. Amel Boubekeur ascribes this “unprecedented event in Alge-
ria” to Bouteflika’s “successful connections to business operators” (2013: 476f.), which 
offered him enough support to neglect the ruling party. This move can be interpreted as 
an attempt to mimic the style of other Arab presidents whose rule is neopatrimonial and 
who like to stay in power for life, if possible (Aghrout & Zoubir 2009).  
During the Arab uprisings, protesters called for the president to step down, as he be-
longs to the gerontocratic rulers out of touch with the younger generations. But they 
were also aware that he is only the visible face of formal power so that removing him 
would not improve much, as long as le pouvoir is known to be the obstacle to political 
change (Jabi 2012: 26).  
Legal mode 
In the legal mode, no changes in competences were noticeable in the relevant time span, 
as the presidential elections for Bouteflika’s fourth term were only held in 2014. No 
constitutional changes at all were engendered in the immediate management of the up-
risings. Even the much-discussed post of a vice presidency was not created, which can 
be interpreted as the elites’ wish to control a possible succession crisis through ad-hoc 
management rather than be stuck with a vice president.  
Symbolic mode  
In his speeches, Bouteflika focused on his achievement of having initiated the national 
reconciliation and restored peace. Other than that, he mainly refrained from personal 
references and instead put weight on his constitutional role (Bouteflika 2011). A pater-
nalistic style was nevertheless discernible, when he talked about “permitting the citizens 
to contribute to a greater extent to the decisions of which their and their children’s fu-
tures depend” (ibid., italics are mine).  
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Policy 
Elite management in Algeria is a tenuous affair, not least due to the diversity of the 
population and shifts in recruitment patterns over the past decades.266 Most important is 
the co-optation and promotion of members hailing from the same clan, as these form the 
real power base of individuals given the informal nature of politics. The government 
proper’s standing is not too decisive, as no minister reaches beyond the second circle of 
elites (Werenfels 2007: 63ff.). Nevertheless, reshuffles of ministers were rather frequent 
in Bouteflika’s first terms. This changed in 2011. While usually a new government was 
formed on a regular annual basis, the ninth government presided over by prime minister 
Ouyahia remained firmly in place from May 2010 until September 2012, being the 
longest serving Algerian government since 1988. This can be interpreted as a signal 
during the Arab uprisings that despite the fluid political situations in other countries, the 
Algerian elite displayed demonstrative stability, almost immovability.  
Instead of crisis management, a formal procedure of reshuffling personnel was used. 
The parliamentary elections with the weakening of the RND enabled Bouteflika to get 
rid of his prime minister Ouyahia, who was the general secretary of the second regime 
party and was said to have a tense relationship with the president. The new appointee 
Sellal was a close confidant of Bouteflika and had been involved in the presidential 
campaigns in the 2000s.  
Responses  
In fact, the president enjoyed some popularity for having ended the period of terrorism. 
This showed especially later in April 2013 when he fell seriously ill after a stroke, and it 
still took considerable time before opposition formed against his candidature for a 
fourth presidential term.267  
Most of my interview partners voiced the opinion that the political situation has arrived 
at a dead end and remains stuck as long as the question of succession is not resolved. 
From a different perspective, this argument might be just as well be used by regime 
elites to avoid any change. It seems as if elites not belonging to the core elite had to 
accept the immovability of the political institutions as well. They did not try to chal-
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lenge the ageing president, as the appearance of a more legalistic than a hands-on han-
dling of the situation did not leave them any choice but to wait. 
 
Table 5.5: Personal Legitimation Strategies in Algeria  
 
5.3.6. Preliminary Conclusion: Success or Failure of Legitimation Strategies? 
Assessing the Algerian approach towards the uprisings, Volpi briefly states that the rul-
ing elite “hardly deviated from its habitual methods of authoritarian governance” (2013: 
104). In this sense, the lack of a protracted challenge on the societal side mirrors the 
lack of a longer-term time frame on the side of political elites. Davis and Serres put it 
this way: “The temporality of contestation in Algeria, which is seen in riots, road block-
ages, protests and self-immolations, can also be seen as a way of challenging the tempo-
rality of survival and stability staged by the regime” (2013: 104). The wait-and-see ap-
proach the government took has its manifestations in different strategies that have been 
discussed. In domains other than the structural type of legitimation, the dominant pat-
tern of the legal mode was the non-enactment of laws or inaction when initiatives might 
have been expected.  
Regarding the structural type of legitimation strategies, despite a multitude of political 
reforms that display activism, a truly legitimating character is hardly discernible as most 
measures were rejected by protesters and at least part of the opposition. Besides, 
through built-in clauses all measures tended to open the door for justifying repression at 
a later point. The other remarkable package of strategies was material legitimation, the 
domain in which Algeria boasts considerable advantages for the time being. The mas-
sive injection of funds into a variety of fields seems to have calmed down things. The 
predominant message that was transmitted in the other domains focused on stability and 
almost amounted to immobility. This refers to the nationalist identity-related and per-
sonal strategies, which were employed to a lesser extent, while tradition was not used at 
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all. Moreover, in the nationalist subtype of identity-related legitimation, successful 
strategies were those that had negative connotations.  
Most strategies that the Algerian ruling elite employed in responding to the challenge of 
the Arab uprisings are characterized by the blatant attempt to reassert power and dis-
credit challengers. Those challengers who could not be bought faced repression.  
 
5.4. REPRESSION IN ALGERIA 
As described in the previous subchapters, the capacity and salaries of the security appa-
ratus were boosted before and during the uprisings. Both in numbers and in tactics was 
the effectiveness of the security forces in 2011 estimated as being “far superior to that 
of October 1988”, shifting from exerting lethal and indiscriminate violence against pro-
testers to containing and preventing mobilization in the first place (Volpi 2013: 111). 
Besides employing brute force, the “deployment of 30,000 police officers to quell the 
CNCD demonstration on February 12, 2011, was a very large show of force” (Zoubir & 
Aghrout 2012: 70; italics are mine). At the same time, this threat of force did not go 
unnoticed by the rest of citizens who learned what could happen if they were to chal-
lenge the regime.268 
 
5.4.1. Constraining Repression  
As the analysis of legal changes in section 5.3.1 above has already made clear, the gen-
eral level of constraining repression was raised in late 2011 in reversion of the more 
open space during the beginning of the protests.  
Despite the formal abolishment of the emergency law, one of the 2001 orders to counter 
the Black Spring of the Kabyle uprising which prohibits protests in Algiers remained in 
place and was used as the legal basis to deter and disperse demonstrations. Moreover, 
any street protest was regarded as an “attroupement non armé” which is prohibited ac-
cording to article 97 of the penal code if it “can disturb public tranquility”.269 Article 
100 even solicits a prison term for advertising such a demonstration. 
When trying to disperse the protests, the police used force, employing water cannons 
and batons. However, in the early phase they refrained from a disproportionate choice 
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of means that would lead to a public outcry, such as shooting into crowds. Their strate-
gy was on the one hand to intimidate potential protesters. On the other hand, it was to 
act in a preemptive rather than suppressive manner, precluding the mobilizing dynamics 
of mass protests: “Their tactic of dividing protesters into small groups also prevented 
any sense of power that would come from mass mobilization” (Achy 2013: 12).  
Confronted with more violent riots in March 2011, when illegal settlements were de-
stroyed by bulldozers and met the resistance of rock throwing inhabitants, riot police 
used also tear gas and fired rubber bullets to disperse the protesters (Wall Street Journal, 
24 March 2011).  
The security apparatus sought to be recognized as legitimately using force. From De-
cember 2010 on, police units consisting of female officers were deployed to prevent 
women from protesting, first of all the mothers of those who forcefully disappeared dur-
ing the civil war (Le Quotidien d’Oran, 24 February 2011). This feature tries to avoid 
delegitimation of repressive measures on the basis of cultural norms. In a different vein, 
anti-riot police staged a bizarre public relations event in which they opened their gates 
to journalists in February 2011 soon after the demonstrations, stressing their task of 
“protecting citizens” and trying to improve their image (Le Quotidien d’Oran, 24 Feb-
ruary 2011).  
Regarding the targets of repression, in a demonstration on 26 February, journalists were 
singled out as the target. They were beaten with batons by a disproportionally large po-
lice force (Le Quotidien d’Oran, 27 February 2011). Besides, thugs also attacked pro-
reform protesters.  
It was not solely at protests that journalists were targeted. After having unveiled the 
criminal network behind the flows of money from the ANSEJ program, unknown indi-
viduals wearing civilian clothes started to follow the El Watan journalist Zouheir Aït 
Mouhoub, later trying to assault him. When investigating another story, members of the 
security services tried to threaten and intimidate Aït Mouhoub. In a third event, four 
police officers in civilian clothes kicked him on the main street of Algiers and waited in 
front of his apartment in the night. When the journalist tried to have them identified at 
the local police station, it turned out they belonged to a parallel police of the Ministry of 
Interior outside the official structures (El Watan, 15 August 2012). 
More legalistic forms of preventing freedom of expression were employed in the con-
text of managing associational life, as described above. Refusal of authorization, travel 
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bans and denial of public locations for holding meetings and conferences, especially as 
regards political education, are common measures of impeding autonomous organiza-
tion.270 Furthermore, sanctions targeted professionals who were active in unions or took 
part in strikes. Some court clerks who had gone on strike in April 2012 were fired, oth-
ers were transferred to remote courts as a disciplinary measure, and one of the strike 
leaders was bullied (HRW 2013). Interestingly, while the court clerks on strike were not 
arrested, a CNDDC member who had filmed the strike was found guilty of inciting an 
“unarmed gathering” and “interfering with the work of an institution”, although his one 
year prison term was suspended (ibid.). Probably the authorities tried to suppress any 
form of cross-sector cooperation, in this case between the movement of the unemployed 
and a union. 
Another story that Aït Mouhoub had investigated was a highly sophisticated form of 
defaming political protest. A dubious anonymous call for an uprising on 17 September 
2011 was launched on Facebook which had the appearance of being instigated by a 
“foreign conspiracy” (El Watan, 23 September 2011). The Minister of Interior reacted 
by blaming the call on pied noir philosopher Bernard-Henri Lévy, who had supported 
the intervention in Libya, although he had never said a word about the situation in Alge-
ria.271 Internet activists were monitored and interrogated, which led the same minister to 
the statement in the newspaper Ennahar: “Were it people from the inside, we would 
have unmasked and arrested them, but the evidence directs us to foreign parties related 
to the zionist entity” (ibid.).272 Official news sources rejoiced at the inexistent turnout of 
the “revolt” and celebrated the would-be victory over alleged plotters from abroad who 
could not destroy Algeria through calling for a revolution (Algérie1.com, 17 September 
2011). 
The anonymous sources of the El Watan article claimed that the orders had come from 
circles close to the president and not even the DRS had knowledge of the plot (ibid.).273 
While the story cannot be verified independently, the fact that the journalist’s harassers 
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 Dernières Nouvelles d’Algérie, 15 September 2011, currently only accessible online at 
http://www.algerie360.com/algerie/ould-kablia-et-le-17-septembre-la-main-virtuelle-de-
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272
 The “zionist” involvement was deduced from the date which marks the anniversary of the signing of 
the Camp David peace accords and the massacres of Sabra and Shatila (ibid.).  
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 Ironically, a foreign consultant was instrumental in designing the scheme, if the source is to be trusted. 
The promotional link to this event appeared in such a pervasive manner that even the regional Facebook 
office could only account for it through programming by technical staff in the US headquarters (ibid.). 
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wanted to know about the sources instead of accusing him of spreading lies speaks for 
itself. Journalists were quite annoyed that the act of demonstrating was criminalized and 
tainted in such a perfidious way, while mass surveillance was described as normalized 
defense against phony conspiracy theories (Dernières Nouvelles d’Algérie, 15 Septem-
ber 2011).  
Finally, to impede the freedom of information, a permanent blocking of the internet as 
had taken place on 11 February 2011 was probably regarded as too harsh a measure to 
be used in a continuous way. Instead, steering political discussions online was attempt-
ed through assaults by hackers and fake internet accounts attacking al-Jazeera’s web-
sites and flooding them with abusive comments (El Watan, 23 September 2011).  
 
5.4.2. Incapacitating Repression 
An important element that prevented mass mobilization was the low number of casual-
ties, as five protesters were killed in the January riots and no casualties were reported 
from the February demonstrations. Obviously, the police was cautious not to create 
“martyrs” that would serve as symbols of oppression and trigger more protests, leading 
to a spiral of escalation.  
Rather than employing lethal force, temporary arrestment served to incapacitate protest-
ers, especially known activists. These short-time detainments are probably the most 
cost-effective way of incapacitation, as they tend to remain under the radar of interna-
tional attention, while ensuring the desired result.274 The targets were most often rank-
and-file activists, but partly even leaders, such as Ali Benhadj, who was partly 
instrumentalized for deterring other protesters and discrediting demonstrations and at 
other times himself intimidated through arrestment. An activist of the CNCD in 
Mostaganem was held in police custody for 24 hours and subsequently faced a trial for 
distributing leaflets in the streets after having tried to organize a meeting (El Watan, 23 
April 2011). In the run-up to the parliamentary elections, a blogger who had posted a 
video of himself burning his voter card and calling for a boycott was jailed and later 
sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment (Al-Akhbar English, 27 June 2012). Likewise, 
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a Salafi imam from Yemen who had issued a fatwa calling for boycotting the elections 
was imprisoned for six months and subsequently banned from Algeria (ibid.).  
However, in April 2011 Ahmed Kerroumi, an activist of the CNCD branch in Oran was 
reported missing shortly after having met with the UN Special Rapporteur on the Pro-
motion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression 
(L’Expression, 30 September 2013). Kerroumi’s body was found four days later, vio-
lently murdered in the local party headquarters of the Mouvement démocratique social. 
The mysterious way in which Kerroumi was killed was probably supposed to be 
smoothed over through the quick presentation of a suspect. A young man who asserted 
his innocence was detained and brutally tortured to induce a confession, which he did 
not make (Amnesty International 2013).  
The low number of deaths at organized protests stands in stark contrast to the high 
number of self-immolations by individuals which gives the overall situation a much 
more lethal appearance, although in an indirect way.275  
While for 2011 the Political Terror Scale gives a ranking of 3, in 2012 it eased to 2 
(Gibney et al. 2014). A closer look at the measures taken does not allow for discerning 
such a difference at all, let alone an improvement.276  
 
Table 5.6: Repression in Algeria 
 
Targeted persons/groups 
Opposition 
leaders 
Rank-and-file 
activists 
Politically 
inactive popula-
tion 
Form of 
repression 
Constraining Islamists, union leaders 
pro-reform pro-
testers, journalists, 
CSOs, autonomous 
unions 
 
Incapacitating 
Islamists, pro-
reform activists, 
Salafis 
pro-reform 
activists, rioters  
                                                 
275
 Other approaches would count this at least as structural violence, but the definition of repression 
adopted here focuses on the intentional decisions of elites.  
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 2 is the rating even France got in 2012, while e.g. the USA and Saudi Arabia stood at 3. This shows 
once again that the validity of such a rough index approximates zero and a disaggregated approach is 
much more informative.  
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5.5 CONCLUSION: SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF STRATEGIES OF POLITICAL RULE IN 
ALGERIA  
Dris-Aït Hamadouche and Dris hypothesize that the Arab uprisings gave Algeria the 
possibility to impose reforms from above that helped “reinforce the resilience of the 
Algerian regime” (2012). This assessment might seem daring to outsiders, but after re-
viewing the single strategies this is exactly in line with this analysis. One of the reasons 
why this was possible is the low threat that the actual demonstrations posed. This again 
was a result of the timely and swift repression that prevented potentially disturbing dy-
namics of mobilization. Moreover, the tightening grip on civil liberties with decreasing 
margins of action and the defamation of protesters led to many former activists’ resigna-
tion and temporary disengagement.  
In contrast, the beneficiaries of legitimation strategies were first and foremost the state 
apparatus itself, most prominently the security services. Besides, a more shadowy profi-
teer crystallized out of the non-enactment of laws and dubious credit schemes: the in-
formal “mafia”, which is hard to grasp as an addressee. Lastly, the broader population, 
which many described as “traumatized” from the civil war, cherished the stability that 
they partly ascribed to Bouteflika in comparison to historical and neighboring cases. 
Volpi insists that the leadership did not employ “the ‘correct’ combination of repression 
and cooptation to defuse a revolution, but merely that on this occasion what it did 
worked well enough” (2013: 108). If one was to employ counterfactual reasoning, how-
ever, it is possible to say that on the one hand potential mistakes were avoided, such as 
the escalation of violence on the side of security forces. On the other hand, the overall 
strategies seemingly attained their goal of maintaining stability. The lacking success of 
strategies that were directed to protesters was not consequential because the opposition 
never managed to build up a challenge that could be presented as a viable alternative to 
the regime in place. Seeing the Algerian street succumb to repression despite the favor-
able regional circumstances therefore indeed bore a strong signal for regime mainte-
nance.  
Nonetheless, the heart of Algeria’s stability mix is still material legitimation, which is 
dangerous in times of fading oil reserves. As the population and inflation rates adapt to 
the higher spending, problems will be reiterated on an even higher level. Therefore, al-
ready the medium-term outlook for stability is bleak. 
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Table 5.7: Summary of All Measures in Algeria       
 
 
Legal mode Symbolic mode Policy 
mode Success? 
All citizens 
Parliamentary  
elections 
Information law 
reform 
Associations law 
reform 
Reform discourse 
Nationalist  
campaign 
Stability discourse 
Depicting protesters as 
“Kabylians” and 
Christians 
Protests only  
socioeconomic  
Bouteflika as  
stabilizer 
Fighting  
corruption 
Pensions 
raises 
Subsidies on 
basic  
foodstuff 
Housing 
Avoidance of 
government 
changes 
Partly  
Pro-reform 
protesters 
Lifting the state of 
emergency  
Electoral reform 
Accusation of disloy-
alty  
Reference to regional 
instability (towards 
young protesters) 
Reference to civil war 
(towards older  
protesters) 
 
No / Yes (but 
negative) 
+ Repression 
Formal  
opposition 
Electoral reform   
Yes (FFS) /  
no (RCD) 
+ Repression 
Regime elites 
Bensalah  
commission 
Monitoring  
elections  
Political party law 
reform 
Bouteflika as stabilizer 
Avoidance of 
government 
changes   
Yes /  
No (MSP) 
Informal  
mafia 
No law on check 
payment  ANSEJ Yes 
Religious  
population 
 
Grand mosque of Al-
giers 
More state 
imams No? 
Salafis    
Closing 
churches 
No?  
+ Repression 
Public sector  
employees 
  Salary raises Yes 
Unemployed 
youth 
  ANSEJ Yes 
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6. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter compares the two case studies in detail, especially focusing on the working 
mechanisms of the strategies that were employed. This serves to depict the similarities 
and differences of strategies in both countries more explicitly. The aim is to trace possi-
ble causal mechanisms that help explain the common outcome of the Jordanian and Al-
gerian crises. First, the respective points of departure will be delineated, i.e. the crises of 
legitimacy that the Arab uprisings represented to both countries. Afterwards, the use of 
strategies is compared according to the various types of legitimation and repression. The 
presentation of similarities on the level of single measures is followed by a discussion 
of differences, including possible reasons for this divergence. This allows for testing the 
working hypotheses that were presented in the conceptual part, where possible. Fur-
thermore, from the inductive comparison new refined hypotheses are generated that can 
be tested in future research. The chapter concludes with a discussion of whether the 
crises of legitimacy could be solved. 
 
6.1. THE CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY POSED BY THE ARAB UPRISINGS 
As the case selection was based on different sources of legitimacy in a resource-rich 
republic and a resource-poor monarchy, it could be assumed that both the crises and the 
management strategies in Jordan and Algeria diverged to some extent. Furthermore, the 
success or failure of the same strategies is expected to be caused by different structural 
conditions. The crisis regarding the sources of legitimacy is only one part of the story. 
The other important question is why the challengers could not make use of this crisis to 
build such a threat to the regime as to permanently destabilize the existing power struc-
tures. 
The core of the legitimacy crises in both cases was a combination of structural and ma-
terial factors. In Jordan as well as Algeria, as in all countries in the Arab world, socio-
economic demands were the spark for unrest that spread throughout the region from 
January 2011. In late January 2011, both countries witnessed a politicization of de-
mands, which culminated in mid-February in the most important demonstration in Al-
giers and the largest demonstration in Amman. The dynamics within the oppositional 
movement were slower in Jordan than in Algeria, probably due to a less vibrant and 
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differentiated societal sphere. Notably, the regional momentum had already been lost 
when the protest movement became serious in Jordan in the end of March, which hap-
pened after the GCC intervention in Bahrain, the first status-quo preserving constitu-
tional referendum in Egypt and the beginning of the crackdown in Syria.277 More im-
portantly, the potentially influential cross-cutting opposition alliance in Jordan formed 
only in summer, while the Algerian CNCD had already split in February.  
However, political protests remained limited in terms of mobilization. Especially in 
Algeria, “political unrest in February was far less significant in scope than the social 
unrest in January” (Volpi 2013: 109). Moreover, the March demonstration by the auxil-
iary security forces, the communal guards, drastically outnumbered pro-reform protest-
ers.  
As regards the demands, the scope of the challenge was similar in both countries. The 
grievances were formulated in a more abstract way than in those countries in which pro-
tests led to the ousting of a ruler. In Jordan, the calls for a constitutional monarchy or 
reform under the king’s leadership did not touch upon his function as head of the state. 
Only very marginally did protesters call for changing kings or even for a republic, but 
the common denominator of oppositional activity was meaningful reform under monar-
chical leadership. The crisis of legitimacy did not pertain to overtly questioning the tra-
ditional or personal domains, as these remained largely taboo or else were repressed. 
Instead, the division of labor put the prime minister under public attack, while preserv-
ing the king’s role for holding together the nation. In the protests, more diffuse struc-
tures, intelligence services, corruption, economic injustice and the lack of representa-
tiveness of institutions were the targets of discontent. In Algeria, the latter demands also 
prevailed. Besides an anti-Bouteflika sentiment, many slogans revolved around le 
pouvoir. The opaqueness of the Algerian power structures made it virtually pointless to 
call for the president’s ouster (Davis & Serres 2013: 107). In this sense, for different 
reasons protesters in neither country had the possibility to project their grievances unto 
a single responsible person, which in other Arab countries had made it easier to mobi-
lize apolitical parts of the population. 
In both countries, street protests nevertheless became more common after the end of 
decidedly political demonstrations, however most often with a socioeconomic impetus. 
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Volpi states that even after February 2011, “‘normalcy’ in Algeria still included regular 
protests – clashes with police, road blockages, strikes, ransacking of buildings, and so 
on – but these were disparate episodes rather than part of a nationwide event” (Volpi 
2013: 108). The number of sit-ins in Jordan jumped as well, but these incidents also 
remained largely disconnected, except for the fuel riots, in which professional groups 
displayed solidarity through strikes. In general, pro-reform protesters remained peaceful 
despite attacks by thugs and security forces. The protests that turned most violent were 
anomic riots of marginalized groups, such as squatters, or tribal clashes.  
To conclude, while the crisis of legitimacy affected mainly structural and material as-
pects, the challengers largely stayed within the boundaries of the well-known red lines 
in Jordan and exerted some self-restraint as regards the means of contestation in Alge-
ria. Most importantly, they could not mobilize in a sufficient way to put the regimes on 
the brink of collapse. The reasons for this will be considered when reviewing the hy-
potheses.  
 
6.2. COMPARING THE USE OF STRATEGIES WITHIN THE SAME TYPES 
This subchapter compares the use of strategies of political rule that were devised to 
counter the legitimacy crisis following the framework of types of legitimation and re-
pression respectively. First, measures that were employed in both countries will be dis-
cussed and contrasted to find out about differences in the causal mechanisms that led to 
their success or failure. Second, the strategies that were unique to either of the cases are 
presented, along with hypotheses on why they were not employed in the other case. De-
pending on the multitude of measures, a further substructure in similarities vs. differ-
ences and conclusions, if necessary along the line of the modes, will be introduced. 
 
6.2.1. Structural Legitimation: Immediate Responses to Buy Time 
Similarities 
Legal mode 
The common strategies in the legal mode that were used in both Jordan and Algeria 
included reform commissions, the makeover of demonstration, electoral and political 
party legislation, the attempt to stylize legislative elections as turning points and en-
hancing their credibility through a higher level of monitoring than before. The purpose 
and result in both cases were newly elected parliaments that continued the old power 
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structures, policies and boosted patronage networks. Regarding the public sphere, in-
cumbents in both states tried to narrow the heightened freedom of expression through 
legal modifications concerning the press, in Algeria also pertaining to associational life. 
The lifting of the state of emergency in Algeria and the amendment of the public gath-
erings law in Jordan were the first measure to take steam out of the protests. But as the 
ban on demonstrations in Algiers remained in place and anti-terror legislation continued 
to serve as the legal basis for arrestments and prohibition of public protests, the effect 
on activists was zero. It was basically to the outside of the countries that the change 
seemed noteworthy. Similarly, in Jordan the duty to obtain permission from the authori-
ties for holding a protest was replaced by an obligation of notification only, something 
that Algerian NGOs also wished for.278 However, the stipulation in the Jordanian law 
that any kind of gathering that discusses a matter of politics falls under the law, theoret-
ically necessitating prior notification of the Ministry of Interior, rendered any event that 
fails to do so illegal. While these initial measures in both countries had in common that 
they represented a concession to protesters’ demands, the choice fell on a matter that did 
not really hurt incumbent elites and that could easily be compensated for through alter-
native control mechanisms, so that the bottom line of the initial responses is a lack of 
liberalization. 
The establishment of reform commissions: In Jordan, the creation of the National 
Dialogue Committee was initially greeted with more enthusiasm than the Bensalah 
commission in Algeria. This was the case despite the fact that Jordan has a history of 
committees that brought about few tangible results besides co-optation (Bank 2004) and 
that the NDC was convened by the government instead of the king. Both commissions 
were presided over by the respective Senate presidents, but invitations to participate 
were declined by the organized pro-reform opposition. While in Jordan at least the sub-
committees did some serious work, the procedure in Algeria involved more endless 
hearings of propositions by current and former elites. In consequence, the Bensalah 
commission did not produce any coherent results, while the NDC’s recommendations – 
which were cautious enough – were watered down by the Royal Constitutional Commit-
tee which took care of drafting the new legislation. In this sense, the NDC’s futility was 
engineered in a more subtle way than this was the case in Algeria. Nevertheless, the 
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limited mandates showed from the beginning that the purpose of both commissions was 
to buy time. This came at the cost of credibility, as at the latest after the work had been 
finished those who had boycotted found their decision to be justified. 
Reform of political parties laws: The legislative changes in both Jordan and Algeria 
were very hesitant. The legal texts failed to set lower thresholds for political party crea-
tion from which societal forces could have profited. The proliferation of new parties in 
Algeria was therefore not a result of the revised law, but of a different approval policy 
by the Ministry of Interior. Its effects showed in the legislative elections of May 2012. 
From the incumbents’ perspective, the new founding of political parties was highly suc-
cessful in scattering the opposition, as the FLN could win the parliamentary elections 
with a marginal 17% of the vote – a masterpiece of electoral engineering and manipula-
tion in Schedler’s sense (2002). The existence of more parties could lend a more demo-
cratic image to the political scenery, although most of them were one-man-shows of old 
guard politicians who willingly played into the hands of regime elites – and belonged to 
them anyway. This was a common trait of the party development in both countries. The 
roadmap for reform in Jordan as declared by the king theoretically foresaw a stronger 
role for political parties; nevertheless the fragmentation resulting from the elections was 
even more extreme, with eighteen one-man-shows not gaining more than one mandate 
out of a total of twenty-seven list-based mandates. Of course, these different nuances 
are a legacy of the polities until 1987, when Algeria was a single-party state, while no 
parties were allowed in Jordan.  
Electoral law reform: Although the electoral laws were changed in both Jordan and 
Algeria, there were few content-related similarities. What both cases had in common 
was an enlargement of parliament and a higher quota for women, allowing for about 
30% female deputies in Algeria and 10% in Jordan. The higher number of seats made it 
possible to co-opt more individuals and to maintain and even expand existing spoils. 
Differently from Jordan, Algeria also lowered the age of eligibility for candidates. What 
was presented as a milestone in Jordan and at least a formal shift from the previously 
practiced SNTV was the two-vote system. However, the reluctant introduction with 
only twenty-seven out of 150 mandates allocated according to party lists demonstrated 
the lack of inclination to give up on tried and tested practices. In all, the new elections 
laws can hardly count as innovations, as despite all novelties the detailed regulations set 
the basis for more of the same. In this sense, they did not serve to make the respective 
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national assembly more representative of the population, except probably for reducing 
the gender gap. The dissatisfaction of significant parts of both the population and the 
legal opposition manifest in high rates of abstention and boycotts shows that the reforms 
did not meet the demands of reform activists.  
Legislative elections: Parliamentary elections as such are nothing spectacular even un-
der conditions of authoritarianism. However, in a process of democratization, free and 
fair elections are a crucial and defining turning point that marks the end of previous 
practices and sets the path for further development (O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986: 
57ff.). This was also the case in Egypt and Tunisia in the early phase of the transitions. 
Because elections are attributed great importance especially by external actors, being 
able to demonstrate that this element exists is an important tool for autocrats. This could 
be witnessed in the two cases under study, although multi-party elections were not a 
new phenomenon there. Elites in both countries had tried to counter the calls for boycott 
by the Jordanian IAF and the Algerian RCD along with protest movements to enhance 
the credibility of the ballots. The decision of the Algerian FFS’s leadership to take part 
in the elections disgruntled many of its activists and adherents. The probably manipulat-
ed turnout numbers that included only the percentage of registered voters helped create 
the image of decently accepted elections that remained more or less in the scope of pre-
vious polls. In both cases, the extension of voting times was nothing new. Moreover, the 
institutions that were elected had very little influence on core decision-making.279 While 
the enlarged parliaments offered a chance for a wider range of representatives, they ba-
sically served to rejuvenate the entrenched elites.  
Electoral Monitoring: In both countries, efforts at monitoring the elections were 
stepped up to enhance their credibility. In Jordan, the respective commission had more 
far-reaching competences than its Algerian counterparts, and also the coverage by ex-
ternal observers varied accordingly. However, in neither case were irregularities pre-
vented. Most drastically, the candidates that had been accused of buying votes were 
elected while under arrestment, without losing their mandates or any other consequence. 
The international community was nevertheless happy to nod the results through.  
Parliaments: As a result of these measures, the parliaments that emerged out of the 
elections were largely what the leaderships had wished for. The Jordanian lower house, 
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which for the first time had the opportunity to participate in the designation of the prime 
minister, opted for the incumbent instead of presenting another candidate. Both parlia-
ments included factions of regime-friendly elitist Islamist parties. In Jordan, the Wasat 
party with its surprising weight probably benefited from the IAF’s boycott. In Algeria, 
the previously overrated MSP suffered the punishment for having withdrawn from the 
presidential alliance and was cut back to its actual size. In both cases, the overwhelming 
majority of deputies came from the regime strongholds and this to an unexpectedly high 
degree. So after a couple of legal twists, the pre-uprising elites were rearranged to assert 
the claim to rule in institutional terms. 
Press laws: Both states tried to limit the margins of free expression. The revised press 
laws introduced small improvements, but at the same time imposed vaguely defined off-
limits topics such as a nebulous “national interest” or “unity” that should not be harmed. 
Moreover, defamation as a punishable crime loomed large in the new laws. What was 
presented as enhancing “professionalism” in fact favors self-censoring professionals by 
introducing requirements for long lasting experience in the field of journalism, thereby 
restricting the possibility for a younger generation of amateurs who especially publish 
online, notably bloggers and local reporters. The news websites’ blunt coverage of in-
convenient stories without passing any seniors’ censorship obviously posed a danger to 
the control of information. This can be interpreted as fear of the youth’s potential for 
breaking with conventional red lines and forms of contestation.  
Symbolic mode 
In the symbolic mode, the emphasis on a gradual approach to political reform, which is 
led from above, was the common tenor. This accompanied a delegitimation of street 
protesters who refused to take part in national “dialogue”.  
In their rhetoric of controlled reform, the leaders of both countries stressed that they 
would initiate processes of political reform. This way, they tried to demonstrate the 
rightfulness of their positions as responsible and responsive rulers. At the same time, 
this was supposed to take steam out of the protest movements and even to delegitimize 
street protests as a means of politics. Both President Bouteflika and King Abdullah II 
warned against an escalation of protests that would lead to fitna, thus evoking a strong 
and even religiously connoted deterrent. They focused on the achieved stability which 
they tried to connote as positive and not to be taken for granted. As both the historical 
and regional experiences confirmed this argument, even protesters employed some self-
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restraint and echoed the calls for reform, although they actually meant meaningful re-
forms that would introduce different rules of the game. However, a blatant rift was no-
ticeable regarding the interaction of the legal and the symbolic mode, as the legal 
changes signaled a continuation of the status quo and overtly contradicted the rhetoric.  
Policy mode 
In the policy mode, the co-optation of Islamist parties failed, while the fight against cor-
ruption was stepped up on the surface, but followed the political logic of window dress-
ing and sacrificing dispensable elites.  
Failed co-optation of Islamists: To the rulers’ regret, the Islamist movements refused 
being (Jordan) or remaining (Algeria) co-opted. In Jordan, the IAF was offered partici-
pation in government, in the NDC and in the legislative elections. After the IAF had 
played the role of the loyal opposition for years, it established itself as the main chal-
lenger during the uprisings and did not want to give up its new credible role to reward 
reforms it regarded as insufficient. In a slightly different vein, also the MSP saw its 
chance in the wake of the regional uprisings to distance itself from the Algerian gov-
ernment. The remainder of the governing coalition was not amused, and in the aftermath 
of the elections the already diminished MSP was more or less crushed, with important 
cadres using their mandates to found new parties of their own. The resistance to co-
optation by established Islamic forces led to a flourishing of minor would-be religiously 
inspired political actors. 
Fighting corruption: Both Jordan and Algeria tried to react to a risen awareness and 
public complaints about rampant corruption through showing an intensified fight 
against corruption. In both cases, the exposure of important elites to accusations of cor-
ruption troubled the rulers. However, in Algeria the accusations were part of the DRS’ 
attacks on the president and the fight between different clans, while in Jordan the queen 
had become the target of the disgruntled former regime base. A more visible handling of 
corruption cases and show cases that mainly struck former elites were intended to prove 
the incumbents’ seriousness. However, even high-profile cases followed a political log-
ic, and no attempts at a thorough fight against a social practice that had gone out of con-
trol were visible. Notably independent news websites in Jordan and societal associations 
in Algeria trying to establish a popular backup for eradicating corruption were penal-
ized. The governments’ intention to pursue anti-corruption alone and failing to cooper-
ate with societal forces reveals that it is a purely instrumental use of this strategy rather 
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than profound willingness. This strategy is rather dangerous as it creates expectations 
that are not met, and it became ever more pervasive as one of the most used slogans 
during electoral campaigns. In the medium term, it can be expected to backfire.  
Differences 
Some differences were observed in the legal mode. Most importantly, the Jordanian 
elite made use of a wider range of measures than the Algerian leadership.  
Firing prime minister: Ironically enough, the first measure in Jordan, rotating the un-
popular head of government out of office, was cited in the Algerian independent press 
as a good example of taking protesters and the legitimacy of their demands seriously 
(Le Soir d’Algérie, 3 February 2011). Despite this enthusiasm, the rotation of elites and 
especially prime ministers is part and parcel of ordinary Jordanian crisis management, 
which is made possible through the division of labor with the prime minister acting as 
scapegoat. In Algeria, the still ruling party is more entrenched and formal offices are 
more institutionalized.  
Constitutional reform was also a measure that was unique to Jordan in the relevant 
time span, as it was deferred to a later point in Algeria. It included the establishment of 
the monitoring body for elections and a constitutional court without tangible benefits for 
citizens. From now on, relatively powerless political institutions can try to have the con-
stitutionality of laws reviewed by a constitutional court although the constitution that 
serves as the legal reference has long lost the more liberal contents it had once had.  
Associational law reform: While associational life in both Jordan and Algeria had at-
tained a high level in terms of the proliferation of organizations, its standing seemed to 
be more positively accepted in Jordan. This is probably due to the royal initiatives in the 
latter case, allowing for a higher degree of controlled activism, as it is also a welcome 
source of external rent-seeking. The ideologically more pluralistic landscape in Algeria 
with many autonomous syndicates and human rights organizations has obviously be-
come too unmanageable in size and scope. Granting approval only to few selected asso-
ciations, if any, leaves the door wide open for arbitrary closures and arrestments in case 
any of the still operating, but in the meantime illegal organizations should become too 
much of a nuisance. The way this law was enacted in Algeria was an extremely strong 
signal of deliberalization, which would be a less desirable strategy in Jordan, as the lat-
ter country depends more on its international image of being “the good guys” in the 
Middle East, therefore setting more subtle constraints to associational freedoms.  
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Conclusion  
Both Jordan and Algeria engaged in a multitude of strategies of structural legitimation, 
predominantly in the legal mode. The amount of similar strategies is striking, but many 
of those are part of the repertoire of engineering formal authoritarian institutions. Not-
withstanding their actual contents, legal amendments were presented as proving the 
elites’ commitment to reform, while at the same time gradualism and stability were 
stressed. In the policy mode, governments in both countries had to deal with the opposi-
tional stance of the largest Islamist movement. However, one problem that was tangible 
refers to the contradictions between words and actions as regards the interaction of the 
symbolic with the other two modes. As regards the differences, the slight edge Jordan 
has over Algeria in terms of the numbers of strategies mirrors both the different regime 
structures and the wish to be perceived as engaging in broad reform also to outside ac-
tors. 
 
6.2.2. Traditional Legitimation: The King’s Advantage  
Differences 
Effectively, strategies of traditional legitimation were only employed in Jordan. The 
Algerian leadership probably did not dare to openly prepare for a potential fraternal 
succession of the aging president in the context of region-wide discontent with dynasty-
building. Moreover, the contradiction to the revolutionary state-building narrative might 
have seemed to stark.  
While the crisis of legitimacy in Jordan did not touch upon monarchical rule, former 
allies were disappointed with the king’s priorities over the past years. In the wake of the 
uprisings, the king tried to reach out to his neglected base to restore support, especially 
as the Hirak became active. To stress the hereditary element, the crown prince who also 
turned 18 in 2012 was present in the public more often, while the queen tended to be 
visible in charity roles. Also elements of traditional rule such as renewing the wila’ and 
the makrama were used. Some of the tribally dominated areas profited financially from 
the rather technical municipality reform and the allocation of funds.  
The traditional legitimacy is also backed up through constitutional regulations limiting 
the freedom of expression when it comes to criticizing the institution of the monarchy 
and/or the person of the king. As protesters had grown accustomed to more drastic 
forms and means of contestation in attacking the king and the monarchy, they were 
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swiftly repressed, but partly pardoned by the king, who thereby had the chance to use 
another form of traditional legitimation.  
Conclusion 
To conclude, while the abundance of royal competences and power were criticized by 
the proponents of a constitutional monarchy, the existence of royal rule was not put into 
question by the oppositional alliance. Abdullah II somewhat recovered the advantages 
of being a traditional leader although he had done his best to appear as a modern king 
before – and partly also in parallel. He made use of all three modes, albeit targeting ra-
ther the tribal structures as such than the Hirak. While Algerian protesters widely called 
on their president to leave, the Jordanian king still enjoys the advantage of sitting on the 
Hashemite throne.  
 
6.2.3. Identity-related Legitimation: It’s the Nation, Traitor! 
Similarities (nationalist) 
In the symbolic mode of nationalism-related type of identity politics, in both countries 
the protest movements were villainized as being orchestrated by minorities, the Pales-
tinians and Kabylians respectively. In order to counter the regional wave or contagious 
character of protests, in both cases the question of loyalty was raised. Protesting was 
devalued as unpatriotic behavior and surrendering the nation to “foreign influences”. In 
Algeria more efforts were made to display the protest movement as orchestrated from 
abroad. This rhetoric was employed despite the fact that protesters in both Jordan and 
Algeria never attacked the state or the nation, but only the current form of rule.  
Differences 
As regards differences, in Jordan even the elite suffered from the new sense of national-
ism, as the possession of any other citizenship besides the Jordanian became illegal for 
high officials. Later, the rapprochement with Hamas could be read as a positive sign 
towards Palestinian Jordanians in the sense of considering the grievances of their com-
patriots in the occupied territories. The calculus might at the same time have been to set 
a trap for the IAF by encouraging transnational ties and then accusing the Islamists of 
unpatriotic behavior. At any rate, this attempt to appease or try the main domestic oppo-
sition did not work.  
Generally speaking, the Jordanian leadership was more flexible in employing diverse 
strategies in all modes. This is probably due to the fuzziness of national identity, differ-
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ent aspects of which are referred to upon necessity. Leaving this difficult matter in a 
heterogeneous society unresolved helped overcome the current crisis, albeit through 
creating insecurity. In contrast, as the Algerian national narrative is founded on events 
that happened 50 years ago, there is less leeway to adapt this story and its consequences 
to today’s situation. In the deterrent rhetoric, it was glued together with remembrance of 
the black decade of the 1990s, which was by far the stronger framing. Nevertheless, the 
constant reference to the past was lost on a young generation of protesters, which could 
only be pacified through reference to neighboring instability.  
Similarities (religious) 
In the religious domain, despite fundamental structural differences both states tried to 
reclaim control over the interpretation of Islam through raising the number of imams to 
staff state mosques. In Algiers, also the contract for the construction of the monumental 
mosque was signed when it was already expected to be nothing more than a project of 
prestige and control rather than an expression of the elites’ piety. Failed attempts to ap-
pease Salafis were also noticeable in both countries, with the closing of churches in Al-
geria and the cartoon crisis trial in Jordan, although both did not seem to be top-level 
politics. Again, the Jordanian government employed very ambiguous strategies towards 
the Salafi movement, instrumentalizing jihadists to taint the image of reform protesters 
and Islamists. After the Salafis had made use of their short time in the public, swift re-
pression soothed the scared population.  
Although religion was not a center of the legitimacy crisis during the uprisings, the dif-
ferent measures and their limited success show that it is a highly contested field.280  
Conclusion 
To summarize the results of both subtypes of identity-related legitimation, in Jordan as 
well as Algeria incumbents tried to reassert their definition of what it means to be a 
“good citizen” of the respective nation. They did this by emphasizing the dual identity-
relevant factors of a “national interest” and an accepted mainstream belief. While the 
legitimating aspect of these strategies is modest, it exposes minorities and dissenters to 
                                                 
280
 While judging from the success of Islamic movements some might argue that also a crisis of religious 
legitimacy was present, two counterarguments are to be considered. First, in no Arab country were Islam-
ists the initiators of the protesters. Rather, they jumped on the train after others had started and mobilized 
enough protesters so that the Islamists saw their own opportunity. Second, the demands that Islamic par-
ties and movements voiced were predominantly about political reform, not the leaderships’ perceived lack 
of religiosity or the like. Of course, this does not preclude that the Islamists were aware of the fact that 
they would benefit from any changes due to their social organizations.  
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criticism of being disloyal. After having experienced more liberal periods, citizens must 
have perceived of these developments as setbacks.  
 
6.2.4. Material Legitimation: Bread and Fuel 
Similarities 
In both Jordan and Algeria, material legitimation strategies in the years before the upris-
ings had been marked by fostering a growing business elite that profited from privatiza-
tion in the wake of structural reforms. After the uprisings, only some of the most corrupt 
of the nouveaux riches were ousted from the elite if deemed necessary, while the struc-
tures and possibilities for enrichment were left untouched. As the protesters’ socioeco-
nomic grievances were regarded as legitimate by the leaderships in both countries, they 
initiated a new wave of mass allocation to make up for the lost “social contract”. In con-
trast to political demands, which were only partially acknowledged on the levels of dis-
course, the material strategies were also realized in the policy mode, generating actual 
output rather than mere rhetoric. The political demands were easier to discard as they 
were voiced by only a comparatively small number of activists. By contrast, larger 
masses participated in the ubiquitous sit-ins and “micro-riots”, which were harder to 
control – and in some instances left to themselves by security forces. As political de-
mands had only followed socioeconomic ones in the emergence of protests, the ra-
tionale was to appease the most urgent needs and thus take the mass base and most per-
tinent reasons for discontent out of the potential collection of grievances. Moreover, 
giving in to demands through allocation is easier than tackling meaningful reforms, alt-
hough it is a short-term policy that generates new desires that will become all the harder 
to fulfill.  
Among the policies that were put in place in both cases were the reinstatement of subsi-
dies, salary raises in the public sector, especially benefits for army members including 
military veterans, but also for a variety of other professional groups. In Algeria, the sub-
sidies on sugar and cooking oil were the emergency response to the January 2011 riots. 
Salary raises: The salary raises for police and army forces which came into effect in 
2011 included even a sumptuous three-year back pay deal. Upon protests, also the 
communal guards were included to benefit. In Jordan, the pensions of military veterans 
were raised in part as a response to vocal criticism. Other professional groups protested 
for better working conditions. It was a common pattern that they staged sit-ins and after 
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some time got some of their demands fulfilled. Besides material gratification, some es-
tablished their own associations, such as the teachers in Jordan.  
Differences 
Symbolic mode  
In his speeches, Bouteflika presented a mixed bag of measures that did not testify to a 
coherent economic strategy, while Abdullah II put a markedly different focus in his 
post-uprising speeches, at least temporarily departing from his earlier neo-liberal mod-
ernization rhetoric.  
Policy mode 
Organization of labor: In Algeria, the pluralization of union life had already been a 
product of previous years. The difference is however that in Algeria, the state monopoly 
on labor organizations was abolished to give way to a fragmented landscape of more 
and less autonomous unions that hardly cooperate in their respective fields. In Jordan, 
only few groups of professionals had been allowed to unionize in the first place. When 
the teachers association formed as a strong and unified union, it quickly used its organi-
zational power to support the fuel riots.  
Scope: Other differences between the two countries affected mainly the scope of alloca-
tion. As Algeria disposes of large oil and gas reserves, it injected a greater amount of 
money into each single measure. Especially the heavy funding of unemployed youth 
through the ANSEJ and other credit schemes, on which over a billion USD was spent 
during the past years, is unique to Algeria. To put this number into perspective, in the 
admittedly tinier Jordan this sum amounts to one tenth of the whole state budget. The 
massive housing programs in Algeria were another attempt to appease the population. 
However, the state hopelessly stayed behind its five-year plans, the citizens that were 
finally allocated newly built apartments had been waiting for ten years at least, and of-
ten the eviction of squatters was an unavoidable side-effect.  
Tourism: In Jordan, as the economic situation without any hydrocarbon resources is 
much direr than in Algeria, revenues were sought from its unique historical resources, 
i.e. through rents and employment in the tourism sector. This fits well with the attempt 
to strengthen the tribal areas, as the most important sights are located in regions that 
used to be known for their loyalty to the monarchy. However, the regional instability 
turned holidays in the Middle East into a rather unlikely option for foreign tourists, and 
not even domestic tourism could be boosted. 
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Attempted transformation of subsidy system: The desperate situation in Jordan that 
had necessitated an IMF loan led the government to overturn the fuel and cooking gas 
subsidies and replace it with a cash transfer system in late 2012. This only attempt to 
introduce a potentially sustainable economic policy change was rewarded with the most 
violent riots since the beginning of the Arab uprisings. The subsequent management 
strategy of returning to a price committee that sets fixed prices for the current month 
squarely contradicts the logic of reducing state intervention and leaves responsibility 
with the government, maintaining potential for future outbursts of popular anger.  
Conclusion 
The main differences in material legitimation have their reason in the different resource 
endowment, making spending in Algeria massive and the search for income in Jordan 
more creative. In spite of the differences in structural conditions, the final conclusion 
reveals a similar pattern: both Jordan and Algeria resorted to emergency measures and 
failed to address the underlying economic challenges that had led to the massive discon-
tent. One central reason for this decision and a part of the problem was that the citizens 
had profited from the rentierist allocation before and neither side was willing or able 
negotiate over the conditions of achieving a transformation towards a more sustainable 
system. Especially the demographic challenge and youth unemployment are far from 
being tackled, as the elites prioritized the appeasement of their base instead of introduc-
ing a new social contract that could be a viable solution for the long term. It is remarka-
ble enough that the short-sighted ad-hoc allocation has worked so far, but a return to 
populist measures seems to be the order of the day in the whole Arab world (Matzke 
2012). A noteworthy result is that the previously dominant neoliberal policies were at 
least for some time superseded by the old spirit of collectivist material legitimation.   
 
6.2.5. Personal Legitimation: Rotation vs. Paralysis 
Similarities 
While protests in other Arab countries were among other things directed against 
personalist forms of rule and the individuals holding power, the rulers of Jordan and 
Algeria could not completely ignore this. As regards the legal basis for personalized 
rule, both rulers avoided introducing any changes that could be subject to criticism. Be-
sides, there was no necessity for legal modifications in the course of 2011-2012. Both 
rulers were careful not to cede any of their power to prevent a watershed.  
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The co-optation of reform-minded individual elites failed in both states, as the diver-
gence between rhetoric and actions grew stronger. 
Differences 
The consequences of protests on personal legitimation strategies differed strongly ac-
cording to the respective regimes and time horizons.  
Policy mode 
The reshuffling of elites is generally used to install loyal personnel. King Abdullah II 
used the tried and tested rotation of elites to alternate between rather security-oriented 
and reformist personalities. These quick reshuffles mirrored the balancing act of dis-
playing both firm leadership and willingness to pursue meaningful political changes. 
During the potentially more critical moments – shortly after the beginning of the upris-
ings and when pushing through the new electoral law – the prime ministers were known 
to be conservative “hard-liners”. As regards the mechanism of rotation, Bouteflika un-
typically refrained from reshuffling his cabinet during the high tide of protests. Instead, 
he relied on the electoral engineering of the parliamentary elections to bring a confidant 
into the office of prime minister. 
Symbolic mode 
In Jordan, the king tried to balance strategies that underline his personal credibility to-
wards various actors. He used different discourses and symbolic actions towards securi-
ty forces, the reformist opposition and external players. Bouteflika’s role was much less 
hands-on, probably due to his age and illness, but certainly also because of Algeria’s 
more complex institutional structure including a ruling party and the informal clan rival-
ry. The president was probably more concerned with securing his rule behind the scenes 
and setting the conditions for his reelection than with appealing to a reformist audience. 
This was a more important task for the Jordanian king who needs to keep his image as a 
progressive leader and reliable ally to attract Western funds, especially as the GCC ac-
cession came to stagnate. Therefore, he routinely throws his rhetorical weight into deci-
sions, at the risk of creating disappointment whenever some policy was stopped by “di-
nosaurs”. While the trust of pro-reform actors has been lost through this ambivalent 
approach, as long as the other addressees are content, it is of little consequence. 
Conclusion 
Ironically, one interview partner belonging to those Algerian activists who characterize 
themselves as “resistance, not opposition” praised one of the recent “reform” speeches 
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by the Jordanian king in November 2013. This paradoxical effect is telling of the differ-
ence between inside and outside perceptions of reform rhetoric. But it also says some-
thing about the dearth of political communication in Algeria and the fading personal 
legitimacy – which at the time was characterized by the president’s post-stroke speech-
lessness. 
 
6.2.6. Constraining Repression: The Autocrats’ Standard Repertoire 
Similarities 
As has been discussed in the conceptual part, constraining repression is at the core of 
authoritarian politics. During the Arab uprisings, protesters crossed many former red 
lines and broadened their room for maneuver. But especially after the uprising euphoria 
had ebbed away, all citizens were confronted with more constraining laws. 
Deliberalization: One of many striking similarities between the two cases, which is 
already a finding from the (pretended) structural legitimation strategies, is that after 
some time modified legislation set even harsher rules for restricting civil liberties. This 
happened notably through vague wording in the revised press and associations laws 
guising the potential for arbitrary repression under undefined terms such as “national 
interest” or “national unity”. The limited freedom that was allowed to the press seemed 
to follow the principle that barking dogs never bite, in the sense that written criticism 
offered a safety valve for discontent, while more effective forms of activism were dis-
couraged, not least through the use of force. In both cases, the close monitoring by secu-
rity forces was evident, even though it could be discussed more publicly than ever be-
fore. However, no tangible concessions regarding a limitation of their roles were made.  
Internet activism: Besides reform activists, Islamists and journalists, online activists 
suffered from the heaviest restrictions. At least in Algeria, the cyberspace was also used 
to strike back at possibly revolutionary elements and to disseminate rumors that were 
unfavorable to protesters. Draconian regulations in both cases and later even shutdowns 
impeded the work of both politicized bloggers and independent news websites. Most 
probably, this was an answer to some red lines that should not have been crossed, such 
as high-profile corruption charges in Jordan. Certainly, it is a decidedly anti-youth and 
counterrevolutionary development that seeks to reinforce the local bulwarks against the 
newly established regional dynamics of online activism.  
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Thugs: One feature of constraining repression used during demonstrations was that the 
“dirty work”, i.e. beating protesters etc. was partly outsourced to thugs. They also acted 
as agents-provocateurs in vain trying to incite the protesters’ anger to give the police a 
reason for forceful intervention. This does not mean that the security forces did not as-
sist them or act violently themselves. At the protest sites, tear-gassing and beating of 
protesters were frequent, affecting also known politicians and party leaders. The targets 
of intimidation were not confined to nameless low-profile activists in either case, as 
even the elderly and widely respected opposition leaders Hamza Mansour (IAF) and Ali 
Yahia Abdennour (LADDH/CNCD) were threatened by thugs and beaten by police, 
respectively. Apparently the level of violence rose over the months of 2011, although 
the protesters remained peaceful.  
Geographical constraints: While urban planning was not favorable to public protests 
in either state, the Jordanians later also adopted a spatial approach that had been em-
ployed in Algiers. The Algerian police forces had tried to prevent protests through their 
sheer size, but portable fences and road blocks for traffic control are part of the arsenal. 
In Amman, the fencing off and planting of protest-sensitive areas posed a more aesthet-
ic, but in effective similar obstacle to public gatherings.  
Identity: A common aspect of constraining repression was the (ab)use of the identity 
question. The term Palestinian/Kabylian was suddenly used as an insult, in Jordan refu-
gees were warned against political activity, and hysterical nationalist waves questioned 
the loyalty of the overwhelming majority of the respective populations. Sporadically, 
even derogatory statements about the protesters’ alleged religious affiliation were made 
to further discriminate against the mentioned groups. The effects in Jordan were that the 
Transjordanians were left suspicious and the Palestinian Jordanians insecure and disin-
clined to engage politically. In Algeria, the Kabylian part of the population was less 
impressed, as they were vocal in their protests, but the continuous crackdowns led to 
their periodical disengagement. 
Negative framing: The last similarity in constraining repression is also partly rooted in 
legitimation strategies towards nationalists and touches upon the legitimacy of repres-
sion itself. The combination of the elites’ rhetoric of stability versus fitna, the high secu-
rity presence and even more traffic jams than usual probably led ordinary citizens to 
think that the protesters were acting at their own risk. As regards the question whether 
repression was regarded as justified, the defamation of reform activists certainly worked 
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in the security service’s favor. Even the patterns of instrumentalizing Islamist forces 
were similar in some respects. The jihadi Salafis in Jordan and former FIS leader 
Benhadj in Algeria were allowed to enter the political stage to discredit popular protests 
and to deter potential reform activists, but at the same time they were also the target of 
repression, both constraining and incapacitating. 
Differences 
The main differences that can be discerned are that in Algeria, the grip on civil societal 
organizations was much tighter than in Jordan, as events could not be held and civic 
education was hardly possible for independent associations. Moreover, the general 
threshold for applying repression seemed somewhat lower than in Jordan. This especial-
ly affected the preventive use of security checks, amounting to closing off the capital 
when deemed necessary.  
Conclusion 
In both cases, constraining repression was employed broadly. The targeted groups go 
well beyond street protesters, including all sorts of citizens that do not acquiesce to an 
apolitical way of life, and sometimes even those who happen to belong to a particular 
minority or adhere to a non-mainstream belief.  
 
6.2.7. Incapacitating Repression: Low Death Toll, Full Prison Cells 
Similarities 
In both Algeria and Jordan, the preconditions for the employment of incapacitating re-
pression were given, i.e. the security apparatus possessed both the scope and cohesion 
for effective action. However, other factors influenced the actual use of repressive 
measures, most importantly regarding the characteristics of the challenges. The reform 
protests were not violent in either case, nor was the size of the threat in terms of the 
demands so dangerous as to trigger high-scale incapacitating repression. The same can-
not be said of the tactics employed: the open-ended sit-ins that were organized resulted 
from the demonstration effect of successful protests in other Arab countries. The an-
nouncement not to leave the streets until political demands were met was much harder 
to cope with than the more frequent cases of socioeconomic protests. Moreover, the 
street politics threatened to undermine the self-declared leading role of regime elites in 
pursuing reform.  
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Killings: The lethality of the protests in both countries was at the lower end of the Arab 
world. If the numbers are correct, less than ten citizens altogether lost their lives in di-
rect relation to demonstrations in the two countries. However, the fact that an activist in 
Algeria was brutally murdered under obscure circumstances leaves the door wide open 
for speculations. At any rate, the number of self-immolations by far surpasses those of 
victims of government violence in both cases. Notably the shockingly high number of 
80 suicides through fire in Algeria is a strong signal of desperation.   
Arrestment: The form of incapacitating repression that prevailed in both Jordan and 
Algeria on a much larger scale was arrestment. Opposition leaders were only very tem-
porarily targeted by these measures. Instead, mainly young rank-and-file activists ended 
up in jail or at a police station. The numbers of arrested activists were in the hundreds 
on various occasions in both countries, equaling a considerable share of protesters.  
Differences 
There are noticeable differences between the different approaches towards arresting 
protesters. In Algeria, the arrests were preemptive in nature, detaining activists shortly 
before protests and releasing them afterwards. In Jordan, the arrests had a much more 
punitive character, as protesters tended to be detained on the spot and in part also arrest-
ed for a longer time. The most bizarre case in point in Jordan was the release of jihadi 
Salafis and the subsequent crackdown on them after the street battle in Zarqa had been 
provoked in April 2011. The State Security Court largely kept its jurisdiction over pro-
testers, even though some of the convicted activists were later pardoned by the king.  
Conclusion 
In spite of the lack of news coverage in the Western media, many forms of repression 
are employed in Jordan and Algeria. One of the more disturbing aspects is how protest-
ers are treated as terrorists on the basis of laws governing the non-freedom of assembly 
and the judicial procedures upon arrestment. The use of this arsenal can be interpreted 
as a sign of incumbent elites’ firm control – or fear.  
 
6.3. SUCCESS, ADDRESSEES AND SEQUENCING OF STRATEGIES 
Having compared the strategies that were employed, the next step is to establish which 
of these strategies were successful and why this was the case or not. Insights that help 
answer these questions are related to the sequencing of strategies and the different ad-
6. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
212 
 
dressees. The different use of modes shows some first patterns that are directly related 
to the underlying regime types and contiguous sources of possible legitimacy. 
 
6.3.1. Modes of Legitimation Strategies 
Summing up some of the results of the comparison, table 6.1 gives a rough overview of 
which modes were employed, indicating the intensive use of modes with a double x, 
which is defined for the sake of simplicity as more than one observed measure – as one 
might have been rather randomly employed. Single measures are signaled by a single x, 
and no observed strategy by “-”.  
 
Table 6.1: Patterns of Modes of Legitimation Strategies in Jordan and Algeria  
  
Jordan Algeria 
 
Type 
            
Mode 
Subtype 
Legal 
mode 
Symbol-
ic mode 
Policy 
mode 
Legal 
mode  
Symbol-
ic mode 
Policy 
mode 
Structural  xx xx xx xx x x 
Traditional  xx xx xx - - - 
Identity-
related 
Nationalism x xx x - xx - 
Religion x xx x - x xx 
Material  Collectiv-
ism 
x x xx - xx xx 
Personal  x x x - x x 
 
The overview shows clearly how the Jordanian approach towards tackling the crisis of 
legitimacy was more broadly based than the Algerian one. Not only could the Jordanian 
king make use of traditional legitimation in all modes, which is little surprising, but 
probably his elevated position enabled him to fully engage in crisis management in oth-
er domains as well. By contrast, the strength on the Algerian side is certainly material 
legitimation, the amounts of which are far beyond anything that tiny and poor Jordan 
could ever dream of. This is a strong hint at the continuation of the “classical” sources 
of legitimacy that are still employed.  
Another observation regarding the modes is the tendency of more legal changes in Jor-
dan. This could again be explained by the greater flexibility in the loyal and royal insti-
tutions, whereas the Algerian regime structures with rumbling in the FLN, rivaling clans 
and the hidden power of the generals made the legislative process somewhat less 
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straightforward. However, this explanation is not convincing since the deliberalizing 
legislation package in Algeria was rushed through parliament on a single day. What 
happened in Jordan was that tackling one law after the other underlined the gradual ap-
proach to reform on the one hand and gave the appearance of a constant reform process 
on the other hand. This more continuous lawmaking, stretching over a longer period, 
was certainly also the attempt to play for time and wait for the opposition alliance to fall 
apart. The Algerian characteristic in the legal mode except for structural legitimation 
was a wait-and-see approach, refraining from lawmaking or quietly abandoning existing 
legislature.  
 
6.3.2. Success and Failure of Strategies towards Different Addressees 
The success or failure of legitimation strategies was defined in the conceptual part as 
acceptance or rejection, the success or failure of the more specific subtype co-optation is 
loyalty or opposition. Successful repression is deterrence, while failed repression can be 
measured as the continuation of protests. While it would be handy to boil the more de-
tailed results down to an unambiguous statement regarding the success or failure of all 
strategies in the respective types, after the empirical analysis this seems close to impos-
sible. Already the assessment of single strategies was oftentimes difficult, leading to 
ambiguous answers.  
As has become evident in the discussion of the strategies’ effects, a clear-cut categoriza-
tion proved to be hard in many cases ex post. This is because the effects of some strate-
gies turned out to completely contradict the way in which they were presented. This was 
the case e.g. in the deliberalizing political “reforms” that at the same time served as the 
legal basis for constraining repression. The second reason is that the strategies’ indirect 
effects, i.e. on groups other than the immediate target group, are problematic to come to 
terms with. Especially in the identity-related strategies, negative rhetoric that served to 
appease some addressees excluded other parts of the population. These factors led to the 
picture that strategies which were presented and are categorized under legitimation did 
not have the effect of creating legitimacy. Rather, they served to buy the time which 
was needed to paralyze challengers, make the population tired of futile discussions on 
“reform” activism and to accommodate the direst needs deemed legitimate – primarily 
economic ones.  
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As the aim of this study was to stress the addressees’ perspective and to differentiate 
between different target groups, an extreme yes/no simplification regarding the success 
or failure of single strategies would not do the chosen approach justice. Therefore, the 
following section briefly discusses the tendency of strategies towards relevant address-
ees in order to approximate a conclusion.  
The groups that profited most from the legitimation strategies in the wake of the upris-
ings in Jordan and Algeria were the regimes’ backbones, notably public sector employ-
ees, more specifically security personnel, veterans and in Jordan also the tribes. This 
option was preferred over the near impossibility of regaining legitimacy in the eyes of 
those challengers who in some cases had basically waited for the right moment to voice 
their long-standing protest. Instead, classical measures of co-optation towards current 
and former supporters were intensified and internal power relations clarified. To gener-
alize this finding, the prevalent pattern is that in times of crisis, rulers deem it most im-
portant to ascertain their (previous) supporters’ loyalty. 
As discussed before, the strategies targeted at Islamist and Salafi movements were a 
mixture of co-optation – which largely failed – and repression. Ruling elites acted high-
ly pragmatically, ignoring ideological differences for the sake of tactical maneuvers. In 
a slightly different vein, they considered the role of ideology in increasing the number 
of state imams, which aimed at reinforcing the state’s sovereignty over the interpreta-
tion of Islam and pushing aside alternatives. 
Journalists were deliberately targeted by especially constraining repression in both cas-
es, online bloggers in an intensified form, leading some of them to exert more self-
censorship than during the height of the uprisings. Where this did not work, technical 
measures were employed to counter the outspokenness. Regarding more elitist journal-
ists, co-optation attempts were directed towards opinion leaders, nevertheless generating 
mixed results.  
The youth as the group who had been most active in kicking off the protests in early 
2011 were largely neglected. As a target group of legitimation, they were considered to 
a somewhat larger degree in Algeria than in Jordan, as they were massively subsidized 
through the ANSEJ program and at least on paper attained the right to be voted into 
parliament with the lowering of the eligibility age to 23, which remained at 30 in Jor-
dan. Other than that, no measures were set in place that would enhance their prospects 
for the future, such as the creation of decent employment, better education or putting the 
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country’s economy generally on a more sustainable track. Instead, informal, irregular 
and even illegal structures were strengthened.  
Professional groups on strike were treated one by one and had parts of their demands 
satisfied in a piecemeal manner. This compartmentalized approach served to avoid the 
emergence of a larger labor protest. Therefore, professional associations held more fre-
quent work stoppages and sit-ins to attain further concessions. After initial courtesy and 
recognition of demands on behalf of state authorities, unwillingness to accept low-scale 
accommodation often led to more repressive behavior which negatively impacted on the 
strikers as regards freedoms, job security and reputation. Generally, trade unions and 
similarly organizations of unemployed are groups that will continue to protest after 
some time.  
The protest movements in general were confronted with more repression than legitima-
tion. The concessions that would have satisfied the protesters were too far-reaching for 
regime elites. As the analysis of the case studies showed, the potentially challenging 
cross-cutting oppositional alliances failed to gather momentum. They led the ruling 
elites only to superficial tactical concessions which basically served to take the dynamic 
out of the protest movements, introducing deliberalization instead of ceding power. The 
protests that are still frequently staged have come to be almost institutionalized, yet fail 
to trigger profound changes.  
Finally, some temporarily successful strategies of legitimation were employed towards 
the citizenry as a whole. Among the rhetorical arguments that were brought forward the 
strongest was probably the stability frame. This was backed up by massive material al-
location which overcharged the state budgets, even in oil-rich Algeria. However, high 
abstention rates in elections are indicative of a lack of support for existing institutions, 
and skepticism about the future is widespread. Moreover, the rising perception of and 
discontent with large-scale corruption has become an important societal feature which 
in the future is likely to remain one of the main triggers for protests. 
 
6.3.3. Sequencing Strategies of Political Rule 
Regarding the sequencing of different strategies of political rule, interesting dynamics 
could be observed. The sequencing of repression and legitimation shows that in the de-
cisive moments of possible mobilization dynamics, security forces acted with some re-
straint. This does not mean that they didn't employ violence, but an outrageously dis-
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proportionate use of force was avoided. Obviously, the intensity of repression was sup-
posed to be sufficient to actually constrain activists, but not to provoke the rage of pre-
viously unpoliticized citizens or even the international community. Moreover, it should 
serve as a deterrent to others. In contrast, in later phases of contestation “stubborn” pro-
testers were more likely to be subject to harassment than before.  
Another interesting aspect pertains to the geographic dimension of the different strate-
gies. In the Algerian capital, especially in the politically more sensitive areas, protests 
were far less tolerated than in more peripheral neighborhoods or cities. Almost the op-
posite was true in Jordan, where the crackdown on tribal areas was much harsher than in 
Amman, probably due to a higher institutionalization and “professionalism” of protests 
in the capital.   
The more radical and usually repressed groups in both countries willingly used the brief 
opportunity to appear in the public, as a feeling of broadened space and new liberties 
encouraged citizens. However, this short time of revealing the existing spectrum of so-
cietal forces did not mark the beginning of a new era of openness. The radical forces’ 
existence deterred the silent majority and showed them what would happen if freedom 
was actually unlimited. This was probably one crucial prerequisite for citizens to accept 
the subsequent deliberalization.  
The way in which incapacitating repression was employed was rather precisely targeted, 
while constraining repression turned against a wide variety of groups and in many cases 
simply all citizens. In general, the uneasy impression is that negative strategies, i.e. re-
pression and exclusionary strategies of legitimation, were temporarily more successful 
than positive strategies. This is because they worked as a deterrent for activists, whether 
because of reputational or physical factors. The lacking willingness to fundamentally 
change power structures sent the message that forcing change would not be possible 
without bloodshed. 
 
6.4. TESTING AND REVIEWING THE HYPOTHESES 
After the inductively guided discussion of the strategies of political rule, it is necessary 
to relate the empirical findings back to the conceptual chapter. This enables us to make 
more general statements in the sense of typological theorizing and will be done by tak-
ing a look at the hypotheses that were presented in the conceptual chapter to reconsider 
which have been strengthened or falsified or what new causal relationships can be sug-
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gested. The aim of this subchapter is to check which hypotheses elucidate outcomes at 
various points in the causal chain, reaching from the characteristics of a challenge to the 
choice of strategies, including their type, number, addressees, chance for success and 
interrelation to overcoming the crisis of legitimacy.  
The first hypothesis referred to the number and success of legitimation strategies, claim-
ing that the more strategies of legitimation are used, the higher the likeliness that some 
are successful and the crisis of legitimacy can be overcome (Hnumber). Turning to our 
cases, the number of measures put in place was higher in Jordan than in Algeria. How-
ever, this did not automatically translate in a higher likeliness for success, as many of 
these failed. In this perspective, the hypothesis is falsified – or it posits a too simple 
relation, as the number of strategies alone does not help explain much.  
A more precise hypothesis taking into account the target groups suggests that strategies 
of legitimation concentrated on few addressees have higher chances for success, but at 
the expense of others’ approval (Hfewaddressees). This relation mirrors how any ruler walks 
the tightrope of pondering which societal groups are so important for his survival that 
legitimacy in their eyes is actually required. Some strategies that incumbents in Jordan 
and Algeria used hint at their reluctance to be perceived as serving only particular inter-
ests. The material legitimation strategies, especially as regards subsidies and allocation, 
show the ambiguous but existing will to garner support on a broad basis. Groups which 
are more intensively pampered include state employees, especially the security appa-
ratus, the co-optation of which is vital for the rulers. While the success in these cases 
could be secured, others’ perception of this fact has not been investigated in the empiri-
cal analysis. It remains a task of further research to analyze the interrelations between 
different target groups.  
To make more specific statements about the regime base, the hypothesis has been put 
forward that co-optation that aims at strengthening the regime base is more likely to be 
successful than attempts at its widening (Hbase). This proposed relation can be corrobo-
rated with reference to various examples of failure from both cases. The rigged elections 
and futile reform commissions in Algeria and Jordan as well as the Jordanian govern-
ment reaching out to the IAF are cases in point that mark the continued disapproval of 
important political forces. Attempts aimed at widening the regime bases failed in most 
instances, whereas especially the traditional legitimation strategies in Jordan worked 
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better. The same holds true for the moment as regards the material benefits to public 
sector and security personnel, similarly to the hypothesis on few addressees.  
Another hypothesis relating to few addressees concerned repression, assuming that re-
pression is more successful if it is precisely targeted and not employed in an indiscrimi-
nate way (Htarget). There is hardly any variance in our case studies, therefore it is diffi-
cult to corroborate this hypothesis. What can be said is that in managing the reform pro-
tests, the strategies employed by riot police in both Jordan and Algeria also seemed to 
implicitly follow this assumption. While constraining repression did not deter all pro-
testers, it worked somewhat better towards the broader population. The low level of 
lethal incapacitating repression impeded solidarity with the protesters instead of mobi-
lizing apolitical citizens. 
Going further, a posited relation said that repression is more likely to be regarded as 
legitimate if it is directed at groups that are excluded anyway than if it targets the former 
regime base (Hlegrepression). The aspect of repressing excluded groups was the case in Jor-
dan where the crackdown against Salafis was probably seen with relief by many citi-
zens. Furthermore, the depiction of the March 24 Youth as a purely Palestinian move-
ment also helped defend the violent dispersal of the sit-in. The parts of the former re-
gime bases that protested in Jordan, i.a. military veterans, were met with legitimation 
strategies. Towards tribes, the picture is more complicated, as the Hirak suffered from 
repression, while tribal elders and tribal areas in general were considered through mate-
rial and traditional legitimation. The pattern that can be seen is that those who voice 
socioeconomic concerns are less likely to face repression than politicized protesters. 
However, in the more violent situations of fuel riots in Jordan and riots and forceful 
evictions in Algeria, the reverse was true. A refined hypothesis can be distilled from 
these considerations, saying that non-violent political protests are more likely to be re-
pressed than non-violent socioeconomic protests (H*peace).  
Based on a claim by Juan Linz, the competition of legitimizing formulae is expected to 
affect the success of otherwise working strategies (Hcontradictions). While this hypothesis 
sounds very appealing and intricate, it is hard to prove empirically. The inductive com-
parison has found an additional contradiction that poses a problem to the success of 
strategies of legitimation: contradictions between different modes. Regarding various 
issues in both analyzed cases, the rhetoric especially on reform was squarely contradict-
ed by either the legal or policy modes. However, the different addressees of the symbol-
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ic mode often accounted for this contradiction, especially as an external audience appre-
ciates reform rhetoric and cares less about what exactly becomes of it. The price elites 
have to pay is a loss of credibility on the domestic level in the eyes of those who are 
promised reform, but then the analysis has shown that protesters are not a top priority 
addressee of actual legitimation. However, such contradictions can lead to a loss of 
trust, a negative effect of learning that promises are usually not kept.281 A modified hy-
pothesis would claim that when different modes relating to one strategy of legitimation 
diverge, the strategy’s success is threatened (H*modescontradict). 
The cross-national advantage that was presumed to exist if war or insecurity were pre-
sent in a neighboring country (Hadvantage) turned out to be exploited on the discourse lev-
el not only cross-space, but also cross-time in the case of Algeria. This framing was also 
one of the more successful ones, actually resonating with people’s personal assess-
ments. Rhetorically, stability was presented as a reason for legitimacy. Conceptually, 
the cross-national and cross-time arguments do not neatly fit in any category of the ty-
pology that was used for analyzing the two case studies. The risk of civil war and pro-
tracted chaos has so far been considered in terms of alternatives that are at the heart of 
the contenders’ cost-benefit calculus as the reasons for mobilization or non-
mobilization. As this frame is especially pertinent once protests have already started, it 
is relevant at a dynamic moment when protesters decide on how to proceed further. The 
hypothesis can be specified to claim that if war or insecurity existed in a country or still 
exists in a neighboring country, protests are likely to remain limited in scope (H*stability). 
Going back to a hypothesis suggested by Przeworski, a lack of perceived alternatives as 
regards political personnel and the regime can legitimize the status quo (Halternatives). This 
proved to be one of the most pertinent arguments that explain the lack of meaningful 
changes in both cases. In Algeria, the reputation of most politicians is tainted through 
their closeness to the pouvoir (FLN and offshoots) or their role in the context of the mil-
itary coup (RCD). By the end of the 2000 years, Werenfels notes that “no strong and 
coherent preferable alternative in the sense of Przeworski was able to emerge” (2009: 
183). In Jordan, a republican system with strong political parties seems to be an un-
thinkable option. While a constitutional monarchy is desired by some, it is rather unlike-
ly to evolve anytime soon as long as the very gradual approach to reform is continued. 
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 It would be interesting to contrast this with a case in which actions and words concur, even if in a 
negatively framed way, to find out about the different psychological consequences for citizens. 
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As regards the more specific types of legitimation, it has been proposed that traditional 
legitimation is more likely to be successful in a monarchy (Htradition). As in Algeria ref-
erences to traditions are subsumed under the identity-related forms of legitimation, the 
literal understanding of traditional legitimacy is a prerogative of monarchical Jordan. In 
the context of this thesis, the hypothesis seems rather tautological and could at most be 
tested in a dynastic republic.282  
Another hypothesis stated that material legitimation is more successful in those cases 
where no immediate regional comparative disadvantage is present (Hmaterial). Algeria 
qualifies as a rather rich country that massively makes use of material allocation. How-
ever, because citizens are aware of the state’s wealth, they decry the ineffective and 
unjust distribution of resources, complaining about corruption rather than rejoicing over 
state spending. The regional environment hardly plays a role here. As regards Jordan, it 
is poor anyhow, but material allocation does not work worse because of the existence of 
neighboring Saudi Arabia, as the differences between those countries are too large. 
Therefore, the comparative research design did not allow for a fair test of this hypothe-
sis.  
Further hypotheses, based on Weyland’s considerations, focus on the protest move-
ments. The first hypothesis states that the more citizens regard their domestic structures 
as similar to those in a case of successful protests, the more likely they are to engage in 
contentious action (Hsimilar). The successful ouster of rulers in Tunisia (14 January) and 
Egypt (11 February) had preceded the important protests in Algeria (12 February) and 
Jordan (24 March). The demonstration effect of the Egyptian example was referenced 
more often in both cases due to the country’s central role in the region. Celebrations in 
both Jordan and Algeria took place in front of the Egyptian embassies and elsewhere 
and were treated almost as a domestic event.283 Despite the newly recovered pan-Arab 
solidarity, differences were pointed out more frequently than similarities by my inter-
view partners. The arguments they put forward in Jordan were that the domestic regime 
was “less evil” than the Egyptian one, while in Algeria the reason was given that civil 
society was not developed enough to allow for a similar degree of contentious action. 
The hypothesis that results from the empirical analysis is therefore the negative version 
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 Still it cannot be completely excluded that an attempt at establishing a familial succession might take 
place in Algeria. 
283
 Personal interview with political scientist, April 2011, Amman.  
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of Weyland’s statement and says that when the domestic structures are regarded as 
being dissimilar from those of countries with successful protests, engagement in conten-
tious politics is cautious (H*dissimilar).  
Following the hypothesis on the “king’s advantage” and the similarity hypothesis, re-
publics should generally be more prone to protests than monarchies during the Arab 
uprisings (Hrepublic). According to this hypothesis, Algerians should have been more 
prone to protest than Jordanians. Empirically, this is difficult to establish, as the level 
and course of protests were rather similar in both cases. What can be said at any rate is 
that the protests in Algeria more often included an anti-personal element than in Jordan. 
The hypothesis can thus be refined to claim that protesters in republics are more prone 
to directly attack the ruler than in monarchies (H*ruler). 
The final hypothesis asked whether better organized protest movements are less radical 
than spontaneous movements (Horganization). While this hypothesis is hard to test, both 
cases offer partial support. The oppositional alliances tried to be broad in scope, cover-
ing both formerly co-opted elites such as opposition parties, well-known opponents who 
had at times been repressed and at times tolerated, and finally new actors, most promi-
nently the youth. This combination explains that the demands remained within limits 
that were agreed upon and that did not scare off more established political actors. The 
more extreme sporadic outbursts of popular anger in Jordan were the result of individual 
or spontaneous, locally limited action, while the protest leaders backpedaled. The hy-
pothesis can therefore preliminarily be corroborated.  
To conclude, some hypotheses turned out to be too general to apply and others could 
not be tested, which is a consequence of the two cases studied that were selected inde-
pendently from the generation of the hypotheses. Nevertheless, several hypotheses 
could be strengthened and as many as five have been refined as a result of the empirical 
analysis.  
 
6.5. CONCLUSION: CRISES OVERCOME? 
To conclude the comparison, the analysis including the brief look at addressees and the 
sequencing of strategies leaves serious doubts whether the crisis of legitimacy in both 
cases could be solved. It would be rather surprising if an increased use of repression and 
deliberalization helped create new legitimacy, even in the eyes of the repressed groups’ 
enemies. The crises of legitimacy which many formal political institutions in both cases 
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suffer from continue to exist. No upgrading of credibility could be attained through the 
sloppy changes of the regulations concerning parties, elections and parliaments. Instead, 
these institutions again served to co-opt and strengthen regime-friendly parts of the 
population. As the oppositional movements correctly diagnosed these co-optation at-
tempts, the majority of them resisted.  
In order to establish whether the crises of legitimacy in general still exist it is helpful to 
briefly recall the definition: “a situation in which the basis on which authority has been 
claimed or acknowledged is under such severe stress that there is a strong possibility of 
its destruction and transformation” (Alagappa 1995b: 59). The empirical analyses of the 
Jordanian and Algerian cases showed that although legitimacy could hardly be reestab-
lished, the “severe stress” of protests and possible oppositional action has been reduced 
through a mix of different strategies, including repression. Rather than through legitima-
tion, the imminent crises that the political protests presented could be deferred through 
resorting to the more “negative” strategies of repression and divide-and-rule as well as 
the rhetoric of deterrence by reference to chaos and instability. Both the challengers and 
defenders of the systems exerted a degree of self-restraint in voicing their demands and 
in repressing them respectively. In the end, they seemed to be unwillingly united in their 
preference for stability over an uncertain, but certainly more violent, outcome, at the 
expense of truly legitimate rule.  
If we recall the proposed definition of stability as the low probability of an imminent 
regime breakdown, the prerequisites for inducing such a breakdown are not given at the 
present moment. This does not exclude that in the middle term they may emerge again, 
but for the time being a precarious equilibrium has been achieved. This becomes clearer 
considering a systems theoretical definition of stability as the ability to absorb pressures 
for change and maintain the system’s structure despite necessary adaptations: one can 
argue that incumbent elites stepped up their crisis management in a way as to arrive at 
exactly this kind of stability (Schmidt 2003: 35).  
The somewhat surprising result is that rulers in Algeria and Jordan have consolidated 
regime stability without achieving legitimacy in the eyes of most challengers, but 
through delegitimizing them and simultaneously attempting to renew legitimacy on the 
part of the long-standing, recently neglected base. While the crises of legitimacy could 
not be solved, the acute crises of stability were overcome as the protests faded and re-
pression rose. 
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7. CONCLUSION: A FUTURE FOR ARAB AUTOCRATS? 
 
This last chapter first summarizes the approach employed in this thesis before present-
ing the key findings of the empirical analysis. The final assessment of the strategies that 
were employed in 2011 looks into the question what is actually particular about the Ar-
ab uprisings as crises of legitimacy through a brief comparison to previous crises. This 
chapter then addresses the limits of the study and goes beyond the suggested analytical 
framework in suggesting avenues for further research, one important aspect of which is 
the regional embedment, asking whether authoritarian learning could be observed in the 
present case studies. The concluding parts of this chapter give a brief outlook on the 
future of Jordan and Algeria given more recent events before finally considering conse-
quences for Arab and other authoritarian rulers enduring crises in general. 
 
7.1. SUMMARY OF THESIS 
This thesis tackled the pertinent issue of legitimacy crises through an analysis of two 
cases of regime survival after the Arab uprisings. The point of departure was the debate 
on whether autocratic legitimacy can exist in the first place. While many normative un-
derstandings of legitimacy exist, empirical analytical approaches enable us to study dif-
ferent types of autocratic legitimation, as many classical works demonstrate. In order to 
approach relevant analytical categories, different aspects of legitimation and other strat-
egies of political rule were considered. First I discussed how likely crises of different 
sources of legitimacy are as a backdrop to the current crisis during the Arab uprisings. 
For building an analytical framework, an alternative typology of legitimation strategies 
situated on a medium level of abstraction was distilled from the literature. These types, 
namely structural, traditional, identity-related, material and personal legitimation were 
derived from a discussion of general political science approaches, most prominently 
Weber and Easton, and studies on the Arab world, enabling a further subcategorization 
of some types. Authoritarian regimes not only use legitimation, but also repression in 
order to reestablish stability. Therefore, a subtypology of repression was introduced that 
enables a holistic look at strategies of political rule especially in times of crisis. Regard-
ing both sets of strategies, one decisive dimension of analysis is the respective address-
ee. The addressee’s response to these strategies is central for empirically assessing the 
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latter’s success or failure. As a further dimension, this study took into account the dif-
ferent modes of the employed strategies, categorized into a legal, symbolic and policy 
mode, also studying their interaction. The conceptual chapter offered a multitude of 
working hypotheses, which were partly derived from the general discussions of strate-
gies of political rule. Some of them were borrowed from literature on authoritarian rule 
in the Arab world, including recent research on the 2011 uprisings in particular. Moreo-
ver, current debates on the continued value of authoritarianism research and the regime 
question of monarchies versus republics were considered.  
Along the principles of a most dissimilar systems design, two case studies of states in 
which regimes survived despite recurrent protests were chosen. The chapter on the 
methodology justified the qualitative approach and presented the used methods and 
sources. In the empirical chapters, first an overview over the different regime structures, 
sources of legitimacy and levels of repression was given. Subsequently, a thick descrip-
tion of the central demonstrations of the Jordanian and Algerian uprisings respectively 
served to shed light on the interaction between protesters and governments. A sketch of 
the development of the protest movements, their demands and tactics delineated the 
challenges the ruling elites faced. Using the qualitative method of process tracing, the 
bulk of the empirical analysis was devoted to presenting the strategies of political rule 
that were employed in Jordan and Algeria. The considered time span ranged from early 
2011 until the respective following legislative elections. After the analysis of legitima-
tion within the different modes along the typology presented above, the addressees’ 
responses were considered. Having tackled legitimation, strategies that fall within the 
two proposed subtypes of repression were analyzed, again taking into account the ad-
dressees.  
The comparative chapter first discussed the intensity of the crises of legitimacy in both 
cases before dealing with the various subtypes of strategies of political rule, elaborating 
on the respective mechanisms that guided the employment of similar measures. After-
wards, the differences within the types were highlighted and accounted for on the basis 
of structural, historical, regime- and actor-related factors. In a further step, the hypothe-
ses were tested and, if necessary, modified. For assessing the success and failure of the 
various strategies and thus the potential end of the crises of legitimacy, the target groups 
were considered. Moreover, some thoughts on the sequencing of legitimation and re-
pression shed light on the dynamics of protests and responses.  
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7.2. KEY FINDINGS 
The Arab uprisings have served as an excellent crisis of legitimacy to study different 
strategies of political rule. While for some researchers the uprisings since 2011 ushered 
in a new era of potential democratization and the scholarly return to the transitology 
paradigm, the analysis of Jordan’s and Algeria’s responses to the protests showed that 
the literature on authoritarianism is still well suited to explain what is going on in these 
countries. The analysis has produced mixed results as regards the uniqueness of this 
wave of protests, as its particularity is hard to feel in states that did not domestically 
experience world shaking changes. There are even remarkable similarities with previous 
patterns of crisis management, which a diachronic comparison to the regime strategies 
that followed the protests at the end of the 1980s would reveal, and some of which have 
been hinted at in the course of the empirical chapters. Therefore, some brief considera-
tions shall assess the significance of the uprisings for Jordan and Algeria. 
Basically all strategies that were part and parcel of the new literature on authoritarian-
ism dating from the 2000s have been employed also in and after 2011. The only strategy 
of upgrading authoritarianism as described by Heydemann that had a lower profile was 
what he had called “capturing the benefits of selective economic reforms” (2007: 13). 
While the current mass allocation tries to make up for some of the downside effects on 
the broader population, nevertheless the bulk of economic elites continue to profit from 
their cronyism. Relating this development of legitimation strategies to the terminology 
suggested by Albrecht and Schlumberger (2004: 383), the previous shift from allocative 
to inclusionary co-optation has been reversed again.  
So, one key finding of this study is how unspectacular the Arab uprisings turned out in 
Algeria and Jordan. In other Arab countries, the uprisings were an epoch-making phe-
nomenon that led to the most significant political changes in decades. To judge from the 
side of Jordanian and Algerian decision makers, the Arab uprisings “only” necessitated 
regular crisis management. Although no surprisingly new strategies were employed, 
their scope, intensity and comprehensiveness are a signal that there is an awareness of 
potentially threatening dynamics and consequences. At least, the rulers dealt with the 
protests as they did with previous crises of legitimacy, using the full repertoire of strate-
gies for upgrading authoritarianism with a twist towards more repression as time went 
by. The exceptional regional circumstances were mainly hinted at in discourse and 
through the breadth of employed strategies.  
7. CONCLUSION: A FUTURE FOR ARAB AUTOCRATS? 
 
226 
 
What is remarkable still is the pan-Arab character of the protests, including solidarity 
across the region. Furthermore and perhaps owing to new technologies, the quicker pace 
of the recent events is noteworthy. In Algeria, the previous period of liberalization 
stretched over a couple of years from 1989 until 1991, while in Jordan it even lasted 
until 1993 before deliberalization induced the containment of Islamic movements in 
both countries. But in the past wave, the scale of liberalization measures was more im-
pressive than the vague reform promises since 2011. The starting point was much lower 
back then, enabling more concessions. On the negative side, the initial repression of the 
uprisings in Algeria in 1988 was so violent that the subsequent opening of political life 
was a way out of an impasse. Of course, a detailed analysis of past events with the help 
of the framework set up in this study would merit a thesis of its own. The bottom line is 
that by and large, the current strategies do not represent anything new in the historical 
context. A lack of creativity in regime strategies becomes evident when compared to the 
crisis management following the 1987-1988 riots in both countries. As the level of lib-
eralization had been pushed before, it was impossible to cede more power and risk the 
implosion of the established power structures. Therefore, despite the raised expecta-
tions, the gains in freedom and responsiveness towards the citizens stayed way behind 
the liberalization of the late 1990s. To the contrary, the quick deliberalization shows 
that the elites try to proceed with their authoritarian business as usual.  
While some might argue that all government actions were only reactions to protests, 
through these strategies incumbents created facts to which the challengers had to adapt. 
And after the consolidation through legislative elections buried the last hopes for pro-
found change, many former activists have disengaged and wait in resignation for the 
next triggers that offer a new chance for protests, which are certain to come. 
Many citizens were little inclined to believe the discourse on political reform, as they 
perceived that the changes pursued during the uprisings fell far behind the liberalization 
that elites in both countries had kicked off at the end of the 1980s. For the matter of 
legitimation, it is important that the empty talk about political reform that is employed 
even in times of deliberalization diminishes the credibility of any current measures. To 
the contrary, the crises posed by the Arab uprisings offered the perfect occasion for re-
introducing deliberalization and harsher forms of repression. The reactive and delayed 
nature of concessions demonstrates that many strategies are much more part of power 
games than of responsiveness to the population’s demands. 
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In an earlier comparative analysis of Jordan and Algeria, Cavatorta and Elananza had 
concluded that “legitimacy is not necessary for authoritarian regimes to survive” (2008: 
577). They showed how the opposition movements in both countries could not unite 
across ideological cleavages during the 2000s and fell prey to divide-and-rule strategies, 
rather than being able to present a viable alternative to politics. In 2011, the situation 
looked similar. However, this was not due to an ideological impossibility of alliance-
building. Rather, the means of contestation were subject to dispute, and mistrust of the 
partners’ intentions, partly based on historical experience, made the opposition suscep-
tible to the seeds of division. Furthermore, regime discourse regarding the advantages of 
stability played a role. Paradoxically, on the one hand the lack of more intensive pro-
tests resulted from the protesters’ fear of history repeating itself, but on the other hand, 
the limited success of legitimation strategies was in part due to the effect of history re-
peating itself – this time in terms of a lack of tangible change. 
Turning to the results of the comparison, not only did history repeat itself, but the two 
cases located in different Arab subregions and displaying enormous structural differ-
ences revealed astounding similarities. This was apparent in the choice of strategies, 
sometimes down to the level of single measures and mechanisms, especially in the 
structural, identity-related and material subtypes of legitimation strategies as well as 
both subtypes of repression. As a tendency, the strategies geared towards the opposition 
were rejected, while the lost regime bases were partly recovered through successful 
strategies of legitimation.  
Due to the complexity of strategies employed in the two cases, the very general hypoth-
eses were not easy to test. Reasons were the contradictory effects of strategies of legiti-
mation and the differences regarding success or failure in relation to the respective ad-
dressees and indirect effects on other groups. E.g. the number of strategies has little 
explanatory power unless more details are considered. In some cases, especially refer-
ring to the content-wise types of legitimation, the comparative design did not allow for a 
coherent test of hypotheses. Still, some proposed causal relations presented in the con-
ceptual part could be corroborated. Most prominently, the “strengthening the regime 
base” subtype of co-optation is more likely to be successful than the “widening the re-
gime base” subtype (Hbase). Precisely targeted repression is still expected to be more 
successful than indiscriminate repression (Htarget). What is a definite result of the empir-
ical analysis is that a lack of perceived alternatives as regards political personnel and the 
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regime can legitimize the status quo (Halternatives). Finally, better organized protest 
movements in the analyzed cases were less radical than spontaneous movements 
(Horganization). Further hypotheses were modified as a result of the comparison, many of 
them referring to protesters’ interaction with incumbents:  
− When different modes relating to one strategy of legitimation diverge, the strategy’s 
success is threatened (H*modescontradict). 
− When the domestic structures are regarded as being dissimilar from those of coun-
tries with successful protests, engagement in contentious politics is cautious 
(H*dissimilar). 
− If war or insecurity existed in a country or still exists in a neighboring country, pro-
tests are likely to remain limited in scope (H*stability). 
− Protesters in republics are more prone to directly attack the ruler than in monarchies 
(H*ruler). 
− Non-violent political protests are more likely to be repressed than non-violent soci-
oeconomic protests (H*peace).  
From the outset, both Jordan and Algeria combined various factors that cause instability 
in such a balanced manner as to perpetuate this state and therefore retain a precarious 
sort of stability. However, the lack of a serious challenge despite the formation of 
broadly based oppositional alliances made it easy to resort to manifold strategies, not all 
of which served to regain legitimacy and not all of which were successful. 
The multitude of strategies employed in Jordan is partly a result of monarchical rule. 
The king has more leeway because of a lower degree of institutionalization, while in 
Algeria entrenched interests, both from the FLN and other political parties as well as the 
generals and spooks behind the scenes impede a similar degree of activities. The con-
centration of power brings about the capability to juggle with a multitude of measures 
and to quickly adapt to changing circumstances.  
The comparative advantage that was hypothesized in the conceptual chapter turned out 
to work both in a cross-national and cross-temporal dimension. Violent conflicts, i.e. the 
civil wars in Syria nowadays and in Algeria during the 1990s are a deterrent for social 
mobilization that would bring about uncertain results. The elites’ discourse on stability 
thus struck a chord with the population and led to diminishing the challenge. However, 
it is important to look at which of the individual strategies were successful in bringing 
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about the overall outcome of regime survival. One important result of this nuanced per-
spective on the crises of legitimacy is that the primary addressees of successful strate-
gies of legitimation were groups that were either long-time beneficiaries of the regime 
or elites themselves. In contrast, legitimation strategies towards oppositional move-
ments and protesters largely failed, while the latter were oftentimes deterred through 
defamation and other negative strategies, not least repression.  
 
7.3. ADDED VALUE AND LIMITS OF THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The added value of the analytical framework chosen for this thesis is the disaggregated 
look at grand issues of political science. Through a focus on the addressees of single 
measures and a preliminary assessment of their acceptance or rejection of these strate-
gies, this study showed that Jordan and Algeria survived the Arab uprisings without 
solving their crises of legitimacy in a sustainable way as to allow for long-term stability.  
In various parts of this study, the limits of what can reliably be stated regarding such 
complex phenomena have become apparent. Methodologically, it began with the opaci-
ty of authoritarian regime structures and the question how to find out what citizens ac-
tually believe. Conceptually, the pivotal question revolves around the definition – or 
lack thereof – of central phenomena, the elephant in the room being stability. This prob-
lem could be tackled through keeping it largely out of the empirical analysis itself and 
only reintroducing it in the summaries and the comparative chapter. As is the case so 
often, this thesis shows that regime stability is overdetermined. Due to the similarity of 
more strategies than could be expected, it was not possible to single out a specific factor 
that accounts for the longevity of the two cases, and even the most dissimilar cases re-
search design did not allow for an unambiguous result. However, this had been some-
what expected, as equifinality is assumed to be at work to generate such a complex out-
come. The interaction of various factors and actors worked together to secure the re-
gimes’ preliminary survival despite a protracted crisis of legitimacy in both cases.  
The framework requires some in-depth knowledge about regime structures to locate the 
addressees of different strategies. This is a contrast to e.g. Gerschewski’s (2013) model 
of stabilizing pillars of authoritarian regimes, which can be more easily applied to a 
large range of cases, but uses indicators that are too crude to explain actual dynamics. 
As regards the location of measures in the suggested typology, it was not always 
straightforward to trace and assess the strategies that were not openly “sold” as reform, 
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crisis management or the like. Omissions can therefore not be excluded. Only studying 
two cases, it was hard to keep track of all addressees and especially to find reliable data 
on their responses; sometimes it was simply not possible. This would necessitate more 
extensive qualitative field work, investigating e.g. either specific groups or single strat-
egies.   
The analytical distinction between different modes in the typology of legitimation was 
important in order to detect the contradictions, even if it was not always elegant when 
different elements of one strategy popped up in various parts of a chapter, especially the 
discourse on a specific topic and its actual implementation.  
The dynamics of the relationship between ruling elites and challengers could only be 
acknowledged to a limited degree. An element of interaction was considered in analyz-
ing the addressees’ responses to different strategies and in the description of the protests 
at the beginning of the uprisings. Nevertheless, the analysis of the strategies proceeded 
in a rather static way, which oftentimes resulted in short passages reporting various ac-
tions and reactions even before presenting the responses. For gaining more profound 
insights into the formation of decisions on both sides, a method that can better account 
for the cyclical nature of protests and responses with actors adapting to each other’s 
behavior would be desirable. Although cycles of contention feature prominently in So-
cial Movement Theory (see Tarrow 1993), this strand of literature offers few instru-
ments for explaining causal mechanisms. In the comparative chapter, a look at the se-
quencing of the strategies was a first step in this direction, but a coherent analytical tool 
would still be desirable.  
One shortcoming of the approach of studying the elites’ strategies towards and respons-
es by societal groups one by one is that it only marginally considers the relation between 
different societal actors. Apart from the benefit of shedding light on the incumbents’ 
decisions to respond to the demands of some groups and reject others, it might also be 
interesting to study how the different groups perceive of each other and how they reflect 
on regime strategies in a contextualized manner. This would allow for more substantial 
statements about the prospects for societal structures and actions.   
By and large, the suggested framework allowed for nuanced findings as regards the im-
pact of the analyzed strategies. However, it neglected other factors that have an influ-
ence on the outcome of regime survival. Most prominently, the role of the military and 
the security services in general, which are the decisive actors in actually employing re-
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pression, would need to be taken into account if one was to study diverging paths of 
crises of legitimacy, including both regime survival and breakdown. So while a more 
differentiated perspective on the addressees solved one shortcoming of previous re-
search, further studies could put a focus on the diversity of decision-making elites and 
their interaction with societal addressees. 
 
7.4. AVENUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
As the study of two precariously stable cases that have survived the Arab uprisings 
showed, a shift from the authoritarianism to the transitology paradigm in studying the 
Arab world would be premature and only appropriate for studying a narrow set of cases. 
It makes sense to depart from given regime characteristics, which are authoritarian in 
the majority of cases, and then choose appropriate approaches. Nevertheless, this analy-
sis has produced findings that partly tie in with existing literature and partly hint at ne-
glected factors, opening up various avenues for further research.  
The central conceptual desiderate is still to come to terms with a definition of regime 
stability. Although the empirical analysis was rather disillusioning as regards the suc-
cess of legitimation, it is worthwhile to consider the temporarily successful attempts at 
attaining legitimacy. This relates only to a narrowly defined part of the population, but 
obviously to a vital one. Mechanisms of co-optation are widely used, but their sustaina-
bility is subject to question and deserves closer attention. This might again bear im-
portant consequences for stability.  
Conceptually, a bias towards legitimation in the literature also exists in the approach of 
this thesis. More “negative” strategies such as repression only now find their way back 
into qualitative scholarly debates. But beyond repression, more subtle mechanisms of 
deterrence through framing are understudied in the literature on authoritarian rule. This 
includes framing that uses the stability and comparative arguments and to a lesser de-
gree divide-and-rule strategies. Moreover, the legitimacy of repression or the attempt by 
security forces to appear as highly professional and legitimately applying force is a re-
current topic that has not been specified conceptually. Empirically, such attempts were 
observed in both case studies.  
The analytical framework presented is general enough to be applied to cases from other 
world regions in order to study strategies of political rule in different authoritarian set-
tings. A cross-regional comparative analysis could highlight whether other regimes are 
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more successful in overcoming crises of legitimacy. It would be especially interesting to 
find out whether the trend of employing more “negative” strategies is a common feature 
of current autocracies. This could offer clues to answer the question whether after a 
decade of liberalized autocracy a new decade of more intolerant and uncompromising 
forms of authoritarian rule is looming.  
Owing to the breadth of the framework, some of the strategies were treated rather short-
ly. Regarding legitimation, it is possible to focus on single types and to study the inter-
action or contradictions between the different modes in more detail. Extending the 
timeframe to a longer period could enable us to observe shifting patterns of both strate-
gies and responses. From a methodological point of view, such an approach makes 
sense to study the addressees’ responses more closely, as it is difficult to even identify 
and map all relevant actors for each strategy. Concerning repression, one could go be-
yond the differentiation between the two subtypes according to their effect. One earlier 
finding was that constraining repression is a constantly used characteristic of authoritar-
ian rule (Josua & Edel 2014: 16f.), but also regarding incapacitating repression, the in-
ductively found strategies lend themselves to a further differentiation. Routine measures 
are permanent and prevent challenges emanating from the population as a whole, while 
“emergency” measures are more acutely set in place to counter urgent threats. But ideal-
ly, refined frameworks should integrate the whole repertoire of strategies, specifying the 
different effects on different addressees.  
Another aspect that turned out as relevant is the return of regionalism in many different 
aspects. First, societal forces hoped for leeway emanating from the successful counter-
parts in other countries. The choices that different actors on the national level make are 
regionally embedded. The bold moves of the Islamic movements resisting co-optation 
was not to be understood solely domestically, but also followed such a regional logic. 
Besides, the repercussions of protesters’ or the opposition’s ties to transnational actors 
remained out of the scope of this study. The same is true for an analysis of the windows 
of opportunity that opened for shifting regional alliances, which had their effects on the 
scope of action on the domestic level.  
In a similar vein, a further desiderate for future research is the interaction between elites 
on the regional level. The study of authoritarian learning is still in its infancy, and not 
least the interplay of regional factors and elites’ decision-making is crucial for under-
standing why certain strategies were employed. Regional dynamics were decisive for 
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the momentum of protests, which in turn also influenced the sequencing of government 
responses. The height of regional mobilization and euphoria were decisively influenced 
by events in Egypt. The feeling of people’s empowerment was probably strongest be-
tween the end of January and mid-February 2011. This was also the time when political 
mobilization in Algeria reached its peak and the highest turnout in Jordanian protests 
was witnessed. Reacting to these developments, incumbent elites could or should have 
engaged in authoritarian learning in the sense of Heydemann and Leenders (2011). 
Masses of Egyptian citizens overwhelming the police forces in the end of January 2011 
must have sent chills to security forces in the whole region. Following Mubarak’s de-
mise, rulers in other Arab countries in which protests took place certainly felt the need 
to avoid similar developments and therefore to disrupt mobilization. However, as au-
thoritarian decision-making takes place in a very black box, it is difficult to empirically 
prove that the Egyptian negative example served as the backdrop that e.g. accounted for 
the massive display of police in the Algiers demonstrations. Analysts of Algerian poli-
tics mentioned previous domestic experiences with riot control which were also defi-
nitely important in containing the protests. Looking at one specific strategy of structural 
legitimation, Bank (2012) has similarly argued that the constitutional reform process in 
Jordan seemed to emulate the Moroccan model. King Muhammad VI let citizens vote in 
a referendum on a revised constitution that outside observers prematurely and falsely 
hailed as a great step towards the downsizing of the king’s role to a simply representa-
tive one, even though it served to prevent such a development. Nevertheless, Jordanians 
were not allowed to vote on their amended constitution and its contents lagged behind 
the Moroccan example. 
There is one element in which no authoritarian learning took place. The southern Jorda-
nian discontent with rumbling tribes and the emergence of the Hirak showed at least 
geographic and socioeconomic similarities with the starting point of protests in Syria, 
the southern town of Dar’a. Both peripheral rural regions that were losers of recent cen-
tralization had been considered “an unlikely candidate for the start of an uprising” 
(Leenders & Heydemann 2012: 142). Paradoxically, this miscalculation in both cases 
enabled covert organization in the cities where it was least expected. In Jordan, the ur-
ban areas with large Palestinian populations were much easier to regain control of. 
While Schwedler’s study of the geography of protests (2012) helps to understand the 
mapping of protests in Amman, the periphery and spatial aspects of protest and repres-
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sive policies in general are still understudied. As the dynamics of demonstrations have 
been surprising in many instances, groups that maintain a high level of contention even 
if they do not always voice political demands deserve further study. This applies to 
movements by day laborers and the unemployed, but also labor organizations and the 
tribes in Jordan.  
As the results regarding successful legitimation were so disillusioning, the question re-
mains what the long-term consequences of constantly simmering and frequently erupt-
ing discontent are not only for political rule, but also for a society. The lingering percep-
tion of illegitimacy must have devastating psychological effects. This was mirrored in 
the recent statement of an enraged Algerian editor who bitterly complained about a new 
book law that obliges citizens to obtain an authorization from the Ministry of Culture 
for keeping even private libraries, comparing it to colonial law which treated Algerians 
as second class subjects.284 In a nation that still tries to derive legitimacy from anti-
colonial struggle, such a judgment is disastrous. Studies on political socialization might 
shed light on the cognitive dissonance in the relation between official discourse and 
experiences. To come full circle, socialization research would also be desirable to look 
into the “acting ‘as if’” mechanism following up on Lisa Wedeen’s analysis of Syria 
(1999). The broad definition of legitimacy as mere acceptance includes such behavior, 
and it certainly plays a role in all authoritarian countries. As the Syrian example by now 
shows, acting “as if” does not continue forever. A more nuanced look at this mechanism 
also in other states is vital for locating the fine line between acceptance and revolt in 
temporarily surviving regimes. 
 
7.5. OUTLOOK ON JORDAN’S AND ALGERIA’S FUTURE  
Before concluding, a very brief sketch of events since the legislative elections in Jordan 
and Algeria shall elucidate the sustainability of strategies beyond the short term of Jan-
uary 2011 until May 2012 and January 2013 respectively. At the time of writing in 
summer 2014, the regimes in both states appear well consolidated, which is remarkable 
given the regional situation with Egypt, Libya and Syria as hotbeds of violence. Moreo-
                                                 
284
 Comments at a press conference presenting the petition against the associations law, 1 November 
2013, Algiers. More information on the draft book law can be found online at 
http://www.socialgerie.net/spip.php?article1286#1 rev. 15.06.14. 
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ver, as has been established, recurrent protests have become a topical feature of post-
Arab uprising politics.  
Despite all this, the Algerian president had himself reelected for a fourth term in April 
2014, casting his vote in a business-style wheelchair. In fall 2013, Bouteflika had even 
wrested enormous competences from the DRS and reshuffled government as to install 
even more close confidants in important positions. In defiance of his post-stroke ail-
ment, the president has concentrated power internally and clamped down harshly on the 
protest movement that had formed against his fourth mandate, led by the CNCD-
Barakat which is well-known for having disengaged from the weekly street protests in 
early 2011. Still, their renewed protests, which turned decidedly anti-personal, different-
ly from three years before, failed to attract enough sympathizers as to defeat the security 
forces’ superiority. In a different vein, Algerian-Moroccan tensions have been stirred 
over the past months, among other things on the issue of the Western Sahara. Seemingly 
irrational mutual provocations and discussions on the possibility of war prevail on both 
sides, in line with an age-old unconcealed attempt at diverting from internal problems 
through foreign policy. This neatly fits with the nationalist rhetoric and paranoia regard-
ing foreign influences. Real foreign influence as regards the war against terror is wel-
come nevertheless. On the southern front, the Mali intervention necessitates security 
cooperation with Western powers, e.g. arms exports from Germany to Algeria have sky-
rocketed since 2011. The attack on the gas field in In Aménas in January 2013 during 
which AQIM fighters executed foreign workers underlined the need for strong Algerian 
security forces. In all, support is secured from the outside; rights are curtailed on the 
inside, but glossed over through populist war rhetoric. 
In Jordan, the refugee problem is growing to dimensions that shape the population 
structure in a way similar to previous influxes of Palestinians and Iraqis, after about 
600,000 Syrians have registered with the local UNHCR. The refugees’ inflow is inces-
sant and the largest camp in Za’tari has already come to be Jordan’s fourth largest city, 
with intermittent riots underpinning the dire conditions of living there. Tensions be-
tween local citizens and refugees have also become manifest in the northern parts of the 
country, as many Jordanians feel threatened due to rising costs for housing and masses 
of Syrians who are ready to work for lower wages in the informal sector. On the politi-
cal level, this does not materialize as of yet, and if any country is used to hosting im-
mense numbers of refugees, it is Jordan. Paradoxically, the refugee problem helps rein-
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force the Jordanian self-image of being an island of stability in the Middle East – or, 
more accurately these days: “the eye of the tornado” (The Jordan Times, 8 June 2014). 
Divisions have further weakened the IAF, as leading Transjordanian Islamists have 
launched the so-called Zamzam initiative which seeks to represent a more moderate 
Islamic movement cooperating with the government and standing in elections. The IAF 
expelled all Zamzam activists from its ranks, but fears a crackdown as the regional tide 
turns against Islamists. Ryan’s conclusion is that “[i]f the Jordanian regime felt insecure 
during the early months of the Arab uprisings in 2011 – and perhaps especially so dur-
ing the November 2012 riots triggered by economic austerity measures – it was noticea-
bly more confident in 2013 and 2014” (Ryan 2014: 151). 
To put it shortly, while Algeria suffers from post-traumatic stress and is at an impasse, 
Jordan is a survivor, “forever on the brink” (Lynch 2012a). For the time being, things 
could go on for quite a while as they used to. However, heavy dependency on external 
factors in both cases (high oil prices, external aid) turns the achieved stability into a 
short-term matter. Depending on what definition of stability one adheres to, there are 
different perspectives on the future. If stability is to be understood as the ability to deal 
with demands while preserving the nature of the system, then both Jordan and Algeria 
have been very stable. However, adding the prospective aspect which requires the struc-
tures in place to be able to absorb unforeseen future demands, the picture looks much 
bleaker. The uprisings in other Arab countries have taught us that change may come 
from where it is expected the least. As long as the leaderships of Jordan and Algeria 
refuse to be the initiators of tangible change, they might at some point lose control. In 
the long run, change will come all the more abruptly and then developments might be-
come more disturbing. 
 
7.6. A FUTURE FOR ARAB AUTOCRATS? 
Going beyond the cases analyzed in this study, there are general implications for author-
itarian rule during times of crisis. First, the way in which the strategies were employed 
show that there was no master plan for managing the challenge. Instead, it resembles an 
ad hoc muddling through with cash injections as emergency measures, superficial 
piecemeal concessions and massive deployment of security forces. Although the crisis 
management has worked for the moment, this does not mean that it should not be in the 
rulers’ interest to strive for legitimation that goes beyond allocation and the stability 
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argument. As far as the Arab world is concerned, the two role models of Egypt and Tu-
nisia loom large. Egypt embodies the risk of losing all achieved liberalization measures, 
even if they served as window dressing in a liberalized autocracy. For other Arab citi-
zens, the risk of losing all of the few liberties and facing harsh and relentless repression 
under a new authoritarian regime might be just one of those “worse” alternatives that 
lead them to tacitly accept their current ruler. At the other side of the spectrum, Tunisia 
as the only candidate for a potential democratic transition might threaten the no-
alternative discourse as soon as a new regime consolidates. The presence of a function-
ing Arab democracy as a regional model for participatory politics would be a source of 
dissatisfaction with domestic authoritarian rule.  
However, even in the case of a regime breakdown, the establishment of a democracy is 
a rare outcome. As the empirical cases showed, structures in society and economy con-
tradict principles that would facilitate democratization. Through decades of authoritari-
an politics, elites have destroyed societal cohesion, but more importantly, the pervasive 
power of the security apparatus, notably the strong role of the militaries in both coun-
tries is a force to be reckoned with. 
The absence of participatory structures might prove fatal as soon as the mix of populist 
allocation, reform talk and deterrence ceases to function. The temporarily most success-
ful strategies of legitimation were the most expensive ones, meaning a procrastination 
of solving the crises until they become even larger. The authoritarian retrenchment is a 
dangerous strategy, given that only strategies of the past were used and there has been 
no evident attempt at renewing the social contract. This would be necessary to include 
more citizens than the long-standing regime bases, which due to demographic factors 
are already losing in importance.  
In pushing for necessary changes, pro-reform protesters in the Arab world cannot expect 
any help from Western powers. During the optimistic early phase of the uprisings, ex-
ternal support was rather targeted towards incumbents. As the regional tide turns more 
violent, the interests of state leaders as regards stability converge even more, with little 
reason to expect a change. When the next crisis comes, it will emanate from the inside, 
and both again will be caught on the wrong foot.  
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NEWSPAPERS, NEWS WEBSITES AND AGENCIES  
Al Akhbar 
Al-Akhbar English 
Algérie1.com 
Algerie-Focus.com 
Al Arabiya 
Al-Ghad 
Al-Jazeera 
Al-Masri al-Youm 
Ammannet 
Ammonnews 
Associated Press 
La Dépêche de Kabylie 
Der Spiegel 
Dernières Nouvelles d’Algérie 
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Echorouk 
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Ennahar 
Euronews 
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La Nouvelle République 
La Tribune  
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Le Quotidien d’Algérie 
Le Quotidien d’Oran 
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Liberté 
Petra 
Reuters 
The Atlantic 
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Tout sur l’Algérie 
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List of Interview Questions in Jordan (March – April 2011) 
Why are the protests not such a widespread phenomenon as in other countries of the 
region?  
What strategies are used to keep the population content? 
What has changed in Jordan since the protests in Tunisia and Egypt began? 
Are the local protests a regional phenomenon? Are there domestic grievances? 
What do the protests signify? Is there a crisis? 
What are the causes of the protests/crisis? 
Whom – do you think – does the population blame for their situation? 
What changes do you expect? 
How far will political reform go? In which areas do you see changes? 
What do you expect from the government? What do you expect from parliament? 
Will parliament assume a more important role? 
Do you expect a shift of power within institutions of the state? 
Is this crisis different from other crises? 
In what way is the crisis management different? 
What do you expect from the new political parties? 
Have you observed shifts in economic policy? 
To what extent does the king/government rely on tradition, nationalism, religion, alloca-
tion, his own personal credibility, political reform as a source of legitimacy? Either by 
relying on the respective societal forces or talking of justifying his actions? 
What are the most important sources of legitimacy in your opinion?  
What are the reasons for stability? 
Do you think the population regards as legitimate the king, state, government, parlia-
ment, political system? 
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List of Interview questions in Algeria (October – November 2013) 
 
En général : 
Quels sont les changements les plus importants dès le printemps arabe? 
Quelles sont les stratégies les plus importantes? Et sont-elles nouvelles ?  
Qu’est-ce qu’étaient les stratégies et les narratives les plus importants pour éviter plus 
de manifestations?  
Y-a-t-il plus de répression maintenant? Envers quels groupes? 
Où y-a-t-il plus de libertés ? Pour qui ? 
Quel était le rôle des élections législatives de 2012 ? 
Y-a-t-il des différences entre les régions et la capitale ? Est-ce important ? 
Stratégies :  
Y avait-il des développements importants sur le plan religieux? Développements éco-
nomiques? sociaux? identitaires? relatifs à la légitimation par le nationalisme? 
Quel est le rôle des forces de sécurité? L’emploi ou la sécurité? 
Comment essaie-t-on de combattre la corruption ? 
La création et dissolution de la CNCD – comment cela s’est-il passé? 
Le discours du régime concernant les années noires fonctionne-t-il? 
Le discours concernant les autres pays du printemps arabe est-il plus important que le 
discours historique algérien? 
Manifestations :  
Vous étiez présent à la manifestation du douze ou dix-neuvième février 2011? Qu’est-
ce qui c’est passé là ? 
Y avait-il des tournants pour les mouvements contestaires? Y avait-il des tournants 
regardant leurs stratégies et exigences? 
Comment est le support populaire pour les grèves et les manifestations ? 
